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Abstract 
This research has first reviewed the current status of offshore and marine safety, and 
security assessment. The major problems identified in the research are associated with 
risk modelling under circumstances where the lack of data or a high level of uncertainty 
exists. Following the identification of the research needs, this PhD thesis has developed 
several analytical models for maritime risk assessment based on the safety principles 
identified from safety regulations. Such frameworks are subsequently demonstrated by 
their corresponding test cases with regard to safety and security of port operations. 
First, in this PhD study, a risk assessment framework is Proposed to evaluate port security 
using fuzzy set theory and the rule base technique due to the lack of data resulting from 
the confidentiality of the intelligence with regard to terrorism and the difficulty of the 
information accession. Secondly, a shortcoming occurs when the fuzzy rule base 
technique is applied to circumstances where there are multiple parameters to be evaluated 
which are described by multiple linguistic terms. Such a problem can be overcome by a 
proposed risk prediction model incorporating fuzzy set theory with an Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN). The framework is demonstrated by a test case focusing on port safety. 
Thirdly, human error accounts for a significant contribution in marine accidents. In this 
study, a new method of human error assessment using fuzzy set theory and Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) is proposed. It is demonstrated using a test case of a port oil 
cargo handling process and is capable of avoiding the criticism raised when using 
traditional Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) techniques. Fourthly, many real world 
decision analysis problems involve multiple attributes with both a quantitative and 
qualitative nature. A decision making model using the evidential reasoning algorithm is 
proposed to demonstrate the selection of the best security, safety and human error 
reduction measures under such circumstances. Finally, more safety regulations and 
security measures may often imply an increased probability of inefficiency influencing 
port operations. Thus, the quality of the port processes regulated by such measures is 
essential. A quality control model is proposed based on the Six Sigma technique and is 
demonstrated by a test case of a port security process. The five models are original in 
nature being developed from existing theoretical techniques and applied to realistic port 
scenarios. The development of the frameworks and the test case applications are major 
contributions to knowledge in this thesis. 
It is concluded that the frameworks proposed possess significant potential for use in 
improving safety and security of port operations based on the verifications of their 
corresponding test cases. Accordingly, the developed models can be integrated to 
formulate a platform to facilitate risk assessment and safety management of port 
operations without jeopardising the efficiency of port operations in various situations 
where traditional techniques cannot be applied with confidence. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This chapter first presents the background of this PhD study. The 
research problem and research questions are then given. This is 
followed by a brief discussion of the research methodology and the 
scope of this study. Finally, the structurefor this thesis is given. 
1.1 Background 
Historically, maritime safety regulations were introduced following an accident or a 
series of major accidents, intending to address the most obvious causes. Over years, 
after a number of defining accidents and incidents including the capsize of the semi- 
submersible rig 'Alexander Keilland' in 1980, the explosion aboard the 'Piper Alpha' 
platform in 1988 and the capsize of the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' in 1987, the way 
in which safety is reviewed has been altered. The characteristic of maritime safety 
has evolved from a reactive manner towards a proactive attitude where a goal-setting 
and risk-based regime is required since the introduction of the safety regulations 
including Safety Case Regulations (SCR) and Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) in the 
1990s. The main objective of these safety regulations is to ensure that risk has been 
reduced to the level of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and Risk Control 
Options (RCOs) proposed are cost effective. 
In general, the tendency of the maritime risk assessment is that it is not only used for 
verification purposes in design and operational process of marine and offshore 
systems, but also for making decisions from the early stages [Wang, 2006]. 
Accordingly, interest in the improvement of the safety of large engineering systems 
based on safety management from the initial stages has been growing considerably 
within both the regulatory bodies and industry. However, since such a safety analysis 
is conducted at the initial stages, circumstances of the lack or incompleteness of data, 
or the low or none relevance of generic data to specific areas in question are 
inevitably encountered. This would cause a high level of uncertainty that may 
undermine significantly the conclusion acquired based on the traditional quantitative 
risk assessment and safety management techniques. Consideration of these 
uncertainties may drive estimated risk levels appreciably upwards or downwards from 
the initial calculated results. Regardless of whether these estimated results are 
initially assessed as optimistic or pessimistic estimates, for instance, an upward 
revision could result from the consideration of the effect of a limited incident 
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reporting in relation to its failure mode definition. Thus, the risk results evaluated 
under such circumstances may not be acquired with confidence. 
Seaports are important for the economy of every country. Given the position in 
coastal areas and the great variety of substances handled there, a port can be regarded 
as a complex system from the environmental point of view. Due to the fact that 
detailed and historical safety and security related data within port areas is scarce, the 
issue as to the lack or incompleteness of data is also imposed on port security and 
safety studies. This inevitably increases the difficulty of risk assessment and safety 
management in ports. 
1.2 Research problem and research questions 
1.2.1 Research problem 
As aforementioned due to the lack or incompleteness of data, the uncertainty incurred 
may undermine significantly the conclusion acquired based on the traditional 
quantitative risk assessment and safety management techniques. Accordingly, the 
research problem for this PhD study is shown as follows: 
How risk assessment and safety management are conducted with 
confidence under circumstances where the lack or incompleteness of data 
or a high level of uncertainty exists? 
A number of risk and security assessment techniques need to be developed and 
applied to port operations under such circumstances where there is a high level of 
uncertainty due to the fact that the detailed safety related data is scarce. Thus, the 
first objective of this PhD study is to propose the frameworks capable of performing 
risk assessment and safety management in circumstances where the lack or the 
incompleteness of data exists. Secondly, the models to be developed can be 
integrated on which to formulate a platform to facilitate risk assessment and safety 
management of port operations without jeopardising the efficiency of port operations 
in a variety of situations where traditional techniques cannot be applied with 
confidence. Accordingly, the research questions raised in this study as to the 
objectives of this PhD project are discussed as follows. 
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1.2.2 Research Question 1 
Due to the confidentiality of the intelligence with regard to terrorism and the difficulty 
of accessing information, the data available for conducting security risk assessment is 
scarce for most researchers. Thus, the issue as to the lack or incompleteness of data is 
imposed on port security risk assessment as aforementioned. Therefore, the first 
research question for this study is: 
How port security is modelled in circumstances of the lack of data 
resulting from the confidentiality of the intelligence with regard to 
terrorism and the difficulty of information accession. 
1.2.3 Research Question 2 
In risk assessment under circurnstances where a high level of uncertainty exists, 
approximate reasoning methods using the fuzzy rule base technique have proven to be 
useful. However, such applications may become impractical as there are multiple 
parameters to be evaluated which are described by multiple linguistic terms. If there 
were five parameters described by five different linguistic variables, for example, the 
number of fuzzy rules needed to be developed would be 3,125. Thus, the research 
question with regard to this is shown below. 
How the risks are modelled using the fuzzy rule base technique in 
circumstances where there are multiple parameters to be evaluated, 
which are described by multiple linguistic terms. 
1.2.4 Research Question 3 
Human error, according to literature, accounts for a significant contribution to marine 
and port accidents. Human Error Assessment (HEA) has been conducted in a variety 
of industries. However, the nature of the sources from which the data is collected 
may be different from the context under consideration. Thus, the reliability of such 
data and quality of the HRA conducted may be questioned. A detailed review with 
regard to traditional HRA approaches is discussed in section 2.6.4. In addition, HRA 
is often absent from maritime risk assessment. This may be due to the fact that there 
is little or no human error related data collected by the industry [Wang et al., 2004]. 
Accordingly, the research question with respect to human effor analysis is raised as 
follows: 
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How human error assessment is conducted without the difficulty imposed 
on traditional human error methods. 
1.2.5 Research Question 4 
When evaluating RCOs for enhancing security and safety for a port, there are many 
parameters that need to be considered other than risk reduction and the ratio of costs 
and benefits such as time of deployment, current resources available, etc.. Thus, 
difficulties may be encountered due to the nature of the attribute of the defined 
criteria. The research question for this multi-attribute decision-making issue is shown 
as follows: 
How the selection of the best RCOs by multi-experts is achieved in 
circumstances where the defined criteria are of a multi-attribute nature. 
1.2.6 Research Question 5 
More and more security and safety regulations and policies have been adopted and 
implemented in both the port and shipping industry. The objective of this is certainly 
to ensure that the international trade could be safely expedited without undue safety 
pý%ctices//orýhreat from intentional crime activities. However, it may undermine the 
effi iency of port and shipping operations. Thus, the quality assurance of the 
efficiency with regard to safety and security measures should be a main concern. 
Accordingly, the research question for such an issue is raised as follows: 
How the quality assurance concept is introduced to the port industry. 
1.3 Research methodology 
According to the safety regulations including SCR 1992, FSA, Port Marine Safety 
(PMS) Code and the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code as discussed in 
sections 2.2-2.5, the establishment of an effective port safety analysis should consist 
of the steps of hazard identification, risk estimation, preparation of RCOs, cost- 
benefit assessment and decision making without which the benefits discussed in 
section 2.3.7 cannot be foreseen [MSA, 1993] [Wang, 2002]. Therefore, the research 
methodology of this PhD study starts with the hazard identification of port operations, 
followed by risk assessment and safety management in order to meet the objective of 
establishing an effective safety analysis. 
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Hazard identification of port operations 
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The hazard identification of port operations is concerned with the critical review of 
port accidents and the current safety analysis practices. The risk assessment 
component includes risk analysis of port security and safety as well as human error 
assessment in port operations whereas the safety management component consists of 
a multi-attribute decision-making framework and a quality assurance model. Figure 
1.1 illustrates the research methodology of this study. The techniques to be applied in 
the risk assessment and safety management components will be justified in section 
2.7 allowing for the circumstance of the lack of safety and security related data 
encountered by ports. The framework consisting of five different methods will be 
verified by five corresponding test cases in order to answer the research problems and 
questions stated in section 1.2. The limitations of the framework will also be 
identified by investigating the results acquired from the test cases. Such discussions 
will be conducted in a separate chapter following the development of the methods. In 
addition, it is noted that since the difficulty of acquiring real industrial data, the expert 
judgement in the test cases will be hypothetically prepared by the author based on the 
experience from the supervisors and expert specialising in the port industry. 
1.3.1 Hazard identification of port operations 
The first step of the methodology in this research is the hazard identification of port 
operations. The purpose of this stage is to identify the areas with high risks that have 
the potential to cause harm and damage to human being and the environment in port 
operations. The mission of this step is accomplished by conducting a critical review 
of port accidents as well as the current risk assessment and safety management 
practices in the maritime industry. 
1.3.2 Risk assessment using approximate reasoning approach 
After the critical review conducted, the higher risk areas identified in port operations 
include port security, port marine safety and oil cargo handling, respectively. In this 
stage, the objective is to conduct risk analysis to evaluate these higher risk areas. 
Allowing for the lack of data, it is necessary to incorporate subjective judgement from 
experts into the risk assessment component. Accordingly, the approximate reasoning 
approach using ftizzy set theory is applied. Three different methods based on fuzzy 
set theory are proposed, depending upon the number of the parameters and linguistic 
terms considered as well as the level of the information obtained. 
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1.3.2.1 Risk assessment of port security using fuzzy modelling 
In circumstances where the lack or incompleteness of data exists, there is a need to 
incorporate expert judgement into the risk study. A framework is established based 
on fuzzy set theory alone with the fuzzy rule base method since it is capable of 
quantifying the judgement from experts who express opinions qualitatively. Four 
parameters are considered to evaluate the overall risk associated with each asset, 
namely, the criticality of each asset (C), the likelihood or probability of occurrence of 
each threat against a specific asset or target (P), the severity of each adverse attack 
against that specific asset (S), and the vulnerability of each asset or facility (V). 
According to literature security risk could be regarded as a function of the threat of an 
attack associated with the vulnerability of the object under consideration and the 
consequences caused by such an attack [Bum-Howell et aL, 2003]. However, such a 
combination may not genuinely reflect the risk results because of the absence of the 
consideration as to the relative importance of each asset. Therefore, in this study the 
criticality element has been incorporated into the security risk model. Criticality is 
defined as the relative importance of each facility, taking into account its function, 
location, costs and allowable time for returning operational. Five linguistic priority 
terms describing these four elements are employed, namely, Remote, Low, Moderate, 
High and Very High. A scenario associated with these four elements will then be 
established, representing the primary risk characteristics. Each scenario cannot be 
compared until the following steps have been taken. The first step is to establish the 
membership functions for the linguistic priority terms using a triangular distribution 
based on expert judgement. The values of the membership function associated with 
the linguistic priority terms of each of these four elements involved in a specific 
scenario will then be determined. This is followed by the development of a rule base 
which is also based on expert judgements. An element called Priority Level 
comprising the value of the weight associated with a defined linguistic priority term 
will be introduced with respect to the combinations of C, P, S and V. The first three 
steps are regarded as a fiizzification process expressing how well the input belongs to 
the linguistic priority terms used in the rules. A defuzzification process will then be 
adopted by employing appropriate algorithms. A value of the overall risk to a 
scenario will be obtained and therefore, a risk ranking of all scenarios can 
consequently be produced. 
1.3.2.2 Risk prediction of port marine safety using fuzzy set theory and Artificial 
Neural Network (ANN) 
In risk assessment under circumstances of the lack or incompleteness of data, the 
application of ftizzy set theory and the rule base technique has proven to be useful. 
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However, such an application may become impractical as there are multiple 
parameters to be evaluated which are described by multiple linguistic terms. In this 
study, a risk prediction model incorporating fuzzy set theory and an ANN is 
developed. This is due to the fact that fuzzy set theory enables safety analysts to 
incorporate expert judgement in a safety study and ANNs have the strength of pattern 
recognition. The model proposed will be demonstrated by a test case of port marine 
safety due to the fact that the data available for such an area is scarce. Five 
parameters are considered, namely, vessel traffic control (VTC) performance, 
navigational aids and facilities, pliotage performance, sealane maintenance and the 
weather conditions. These factors are regarded as the specific port marine safety 
functions determined based on the experience from the experts specialising in ports 
[Sydney Ports, 2005]. The methodology of this framework commences with the 
establishment of the membership functions for the linguistic terms describing the five 
parameters to be taken into consideration. A fuzzy combination algorithm will 
subsequently be developed and applied to obtain an overall risk with the crisp-value 
property. This is due to the fact that the data fed into neural networks must have 
numerical characteristics. A batch of training and testing data will then be prepared, 
followed by the construction of a feedforward ANN model and a training process by 
introducing the training data into the network. The trained network will be verified as 
to whether it is capable of predicting reliable results using the testing data prepared. 
Once the trained ANN has satisfied the acceptable accuracy established based on 
expert judgement, the ANN will be capable of predicting risk with high reliability. 
Such a framework will be able to establish a risk ranking based on the results 
predicted if applied. 
1.3.2.3 Human error assessment in port operations using fuzzy Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
In general, fuzzy set manipulation rules are applied to process the information at the 
same level and to conduct synthesis. However, when the information available is 
sufficient to a certain level and can be presented in a hierarchical structure, such an 
application cannot avoid the loss of useful information in the hierarchical synthesis 
process. A human error assessment model is developed based on fuzzy set theory and 
the AHP technique since it is capable of avoiding the difficulty encountered when the 
fuzzy rule base technique is applied. The parameters considered are the likelihood of 
human error, failure consequence probability and severity caused. Failure 
consequence probability is defined as the probability that effects will emerge 
provided that the failure has occurred. Traditionally, a risk study is the evaluation of 
the combination of likelihood and severity. However, the events with high likelihood 
may not always cause severe consequences. Accordingly, the parameter of failure 
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consequence probability is considered. The test case used to demonstrate the model 
proposed is an oil cargo handling process in port. The framework of human error 
assessment in this study starts with the operational description and mission 
identification, so enabling a full understanding of the test case in question. Therefore, 
an AHP structure can be established. In this structure, there will be four hierarchies 
required, namely, the operation hierarchy, risk factor (criteria), mission and step 
hierarchies. Since the study incorporates the fiizzy set theory into the AHP method to 
evaluate human error related risks, a set of linguistic priority terms along with the 
membership functions describing the relationship between the elements in each 
hierarchy of the AHP structure will be adopted. Therefore, the pairwise comparisons 
between the elements in each hierarchy using fuzzy set theory will be able to be 
established. The fuzzy expressions are subsequently converted to the single crisp 
values using the appropriate defuzzification method. This is followed by the 
weighting vector calculation so as to obtain the relative importance of the elements. 
By repeating the steps aforementioned, the risk of the elements in the step hierarchy 
in terms of each criteria defined will be acquired based on the normalised weighting 
vectors calculated. The results obtained from these three criteria will then be 
synthesised and an overall risk priority will finally be established based on the 
combined risks. 
1.3.3 Safety management 
In the safety management component, a decision-making method is proposed that 
considers the factors of effectiveness, cost, time of deployment, resource availability 
and co-operation level. This is consistent with the other two elements essential for the 
establishment of an effective safety analysis, namely, cost-benefit assessment and 
decision making. After acquiring the RCO priority and the implementation of the best 
RCOs, next step is to ensure that the quality of the safety and security measures will 
not be jeopardised. A quality assurance model is accordingly proposed to enhance and 
maintain the quality of safety and security RCOs in port. Therefore, the purpose of 
this stage is to develop a decision-making model capable of considering multi- 
attribute factors to demonstrate the selection of best measures and to introduce the 
quality concept to the port industry. 
1.3.3.1 Multi-attribute decision-making using Evidential Reasoning (ER) 
Many real world decision analysis problems involve multiple attributes in both a 
qualitative and quantitative nature. A multi-attribute decision-making model is 
proposed to select the appropriate RCOs provided that all the RCOs have been 
identified. The decision-making method is developed based on the ER approach due 
-9- 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
to the fact that such an approach is capable of solving the Multiple Attribute Decision 
Analysis (MADA) problems characterised by both qualitative and quantitative 
attributes with various types of uncertainties. The parameters considered are 
effectiveness, cost, time of deployment, resource availability and co-operation level, 
respectively. This is because such factors are commonly regarded as crucial elements 
in risk-based decision-making projects. The framework for this topic commences 
with the identification of the criteria that will be used to assess the RCOs. The AHP 
technique is subsequently employed to determine the relative weight of the criteria 
identified. The effects of each RCO in terms of the criteria identified will then be 
evaluated by each expert. This result is then synthesised using the ER approach to 
acquire the overall aggregating result. This, in turn, is followed by the development 
of a utility category-evaluation grade matrix for each expert to estimate the utility 
level of each evaluation grade using the belief degree method. The utility preference 
of each evaluation grade estimated by each expert is then combined using the ER 
algorithm which will subsequently be normalised. The synthesised utility level of 
each evaluation grade based on all experts is subsequently applied to the aggregating 
result of the effects of each RCO. An RCO priority will then be acquired based on 
the results calculated. Finally, a sensitivity analysis will be conducted to identify the 
best measures and so provide another way of considering the importance of the 
various risk and cost aspects. 
1.3.3.2 Quality assurance of the efficiency of port security and safety measures 
The introduction of more and more safety and security measures may imply an 
increase probability of inefficiency influencing port operations. A quality assurance 
framework based on the Six Sigma technique is developed since such a technique is 
proven to be useful in quality control and improvement particularly in the 
manufacturing industry. When implementing a Six Sigma project to improve the 
quality of a process, there are five steps which should be taken, namely, Define, 
Measure, Analyse, Improve and Control (DMAIC). In the definition step, the unit of 
the measurement that will be used to judge the performance of the quality of a process 
should first be decided. Secondly, the goal of the quality and the value of the Critical 
to Quality (CTQ) must be identified. Thirdly, the term "defect" will be defined. The 
mission of the measurement step is to evaluate the current performance of the 
efficiency of a port process. At the analysis stage, the root causes of poor quality that 
may occur due to excessive variations contributing to the defects are identified and 
analysed. A sensitivity analysis will also be conducted to identify appropriate 
solutions. In the improvement step, the solutions aimed at reducing the root causes 
identified in the analysis step can be generated. Accordingly, the quality of port 
security and safety measures can be improved. After the implementation of the 
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solutions, the actual improvement of the quality of the process will be realised in the 
final step. 
1.4 Delimitations of the scope 
Since the objective of this PhD research is to provide a platform for risk assessment 
and safety management addressing port safety and security with confidence in 
circumstances of the lack or incompleteness of data, the data for the test cases 
demonstrated in this study will be hypothetically prepared by the author based on the 
experience from the supervisors and expert specialising in the port industry. This is 
because of the difficulty of acquiring real industrial data. Furthermore, the subject 
matter of this study is the port industry. 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
A diagrammatic guide to this thesis is shown in Figure 1.2. There are 8 chapters in 
this study, which are outlined as follows. 
Chapter I- Introduction 
This chapter first presents the background of this PhD study. The research problem 
and research questions are then given, followed by a discussion of the research 
methodology and scope of this study. Finally, the structure of this thesis is given. 
Chapter 2- Literature review 
In this chapter, the current status of offshore safety, marine safety, maritime security 
and port safety is reviewed. The frameworks of the safety regulations including SCR 
1992, Formal Safety Assessment, the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code (ISPS) and the Port Marine Safety (PMS) Code are also discussed. The 
strengths and shortcomings of maritime risk assessment techniques currently and 
commonly applied are examined, providing a critical review for current practices. 
The current status of the quality assurance in port operations is also presented. Finally, 
this PhD research is justified based on the problems and difficulties encountered. 
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Chapter 3- Risk assessment of port security using fuzzy modelling 
In this chapter, a security risk assessment framework using fuzzy set theory is 
proposed. The security risk can be modelled and a risk ranking can be obtained based 
on the concept of "Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis" (FMECA) using 
fuzzy set theory and the fuzzy rule base technique. . The outcome of the study will 
be a security risk ranking based on the risk level of each scenario obtained. 
Chapter 4- Risk prediction of port marine safety using fuzzy set theory and ANN 
In the risk assessment research, a drawback occurs when the fuzzy rule base 
technique is applied in circumstances where there are multiple parameters to be 
evaluated which are described by multiple linguistic terms. In this chapter, a risk 
prediction model incorporating ftizzy set theory and ANN capable of resolving the 
problem encountered is proposed. Its application is demonstrated by a test case 
evaluating the navigational safety within port areas. 
Chapter 5- Human error assessment in port operations using fuzzy AHP 
In this chapter, following a review of Human Reliability Assessment (HRA), a new 
method of human error assessment using fuzzy set theory and the AHP method is 
proposed. In assessing the human error risk using the proposed method, the steps in 
each mission of port operations are compared to each other in terms of the likelihood, 
failure consequence probability and severity criteria to acquire the relative importance 
and overall risk priority. The method is demonstrated using a test case of an oil cargo 
handling process when in port, and is capable of avoiding the criticism raised when 
using traditional HRA techniques. 
Chapter 6- Multi-attribute decision-making using ER 
When evaluating RCOs, difficulties may be encountered due to the attribute nature of 
the defined criteria. In this chapter a decision-making model using the ER approach is 
proposed provided that RCOs have been identified. The framework is demonstrated 
by a test case which considers the effects of the security, safety and human error 
reduction measures in ports. 
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Chapter 7- Quality assurance of the efficiency of port safety and security 
measures 
More and more security and safety regulations and policies have been adopted and 
implemented in the port industry. However, this could sometimes imply an increased 
probability of inefficiency influencing port operations. In this chapter, following the 
introduction of the Six Sigma method, a methodology for improving the quality of 
port security and safety measures is proposed. A test case is then used to demonstrate 
the proposed methodology. 
Chapter 8- Discussion 
In this chapter, the integration of the research is discussed based on the safety 
principles arising from safety regulations, addressing how the findings of the previous 
chapters can be linked each other. This is followed by the validation of the research, 
explaining the degree to which the framework proposed can be tested and verified. 
Finally, the limitations of the research are addressed due to the nature of the design or 
the assumption made in the reasoning process. 
Chapter 9- Conclusion and implications 
Following the introduction, the conclusions of the research questions and research 
problem are drawn. The conclusions and recommendations for the port industry as 
well as the implications for further research are also given. 
References - References related to the research are presented in this section 
Appendices - This section provides relevant information and data of the research. 
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Figure 1.2. Structure of the PhD thesis 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
In this chapter, the current status of offshore safety, marine safety, 
maritime security and port safety is reviewed The ftameworks of the 
safety regulations including Safety Case Regulations (SCR) 199Z Formal 
Safety Assessment (FSA), the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
(ISPS) Code and the Port Marine Safety (PMS) Code are also discussed 
The strengths and shortcomings of maritime risk assessment techniques 
currently and commonly applied are examined, providing a critical review 
for current practice. The current status of the quality assurance in port 
operations is also presented Finally, this PhD research is justified and 
discussed based on the problems and difficulties encountered 
2.1 Introduction 
Maritime safety has evolved from a reactive manner towards a risk-based and goal- 
setting regime since the 1990s. It has become an important issue in the maritime 
industry due to public concern following several catastrophic accidents and the 
introduction of safety regulations. The main objective of these safety regulations is to 
ensure that risks have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practical (ALARP) and 
Risk Control Options (RCOs) to be implemented are cost effective. In addition, due 
to the competitive nature, there is a need for the maritime industry to constantly 
conduct risk assessment and safety management with regard to assets from the initial 
stage, develop new approaches, propose new operational procedures and invent 
innovative technology. This inevitably brings about new hazards and uncertainties in 
one form or another. 'Mus, risk assessment and safety management should cover all 
possible areas including those where traditional techniques are difficult to be applied. 
Accordingly, the development of a variety of novel risk modelling and decision- 
making techniques capable of resolving such difficulties encountered is required. In 
this chapter, following the discussion of the current status of maritime safety and 
security, the frameworks of the safety regulations including SCR 1992, FSA, the ISPS 
Code and the PMS Code are presented. The current status of the quality of port 
operations is also reviewed. The strengths and difficulties of current maritime risk 
assessment practices encountered are subsequently discussed. Finally, the PhD 
research is justified based on the research questions established. 
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2.2 Offshore safety and SCR 1992 
The public attention to offshore safety was triggered by a series of major disasters 
such as the capsize of the semi-submersible rig 'Alexander Keilland' in 1980 and the 
explosion of the 'Piper Alpha' platform in 1988. The public inquiry into the 'Piper 
Alpha' accident published in 1990 covered the complete range of safety and reliability 
issues. The inquiry formed a cornerstone of the safety regime change in the U. K. 
offshore industry [Department of Energy, 1990]. The responsibilities for offshore 
safety regulations were transferred from the Department of Energy to the Health and 
Safety Commission (HSQ through the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as the 
single regulatory body for offshore safety. Subsequently, the HSE Offshore Safety 
Division launched a review of all offshore safety legislations and implemented 
changes. The objective of this was to seek a more 'goal setting' regime to replace 
legislation which was regarded as prescriptive [Wang, 2002]. The mainstay of the 
regulations is the Health and Safety at Work Act, under which a draft of the offshore 
installation (safety case) regulations was produced [Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE), 19921. It was then modified to incorporate the comments arising from public 
consultation. The regulations came into force at the end of May 1993 for new 
installations and in November 1993 for existing installations. The regulations require 
operational safety cases to be prepared for all offshore installations, including both 
mobile and fixed ones. In addition, all new fixed installations are required to have a 
design safety case in place. For mobiles, this duty holder is the owner. The SCR 
establishes a clear guidance as to what a safety case should include with respect to the 
design and operations of a particular type of offshore installations. Particular 
requirements to be included in a safety case for the design, operation, abandonment 
and well operations of different installations are also given. 
Risk criteria are standards that represent a view of a regulator of how much risk is 
acceptable or tolerable [HSE, 1995a]. A framework for decisions on the tolerability 
of risk proposed by HSE is shown in Figure 2.1, where there are three regions, namely, 
intolerable, ALARP and broadly acceptable [HSE, 1995a]. The risks in the 
intolerable region cannot be justified on any grounds. In the region of ALARP, the 
risks must be reduced by introducing control measures towards the broadly acceptable 
region. The residual risks remaining in this region will be tolerable only if further risk 
reduction is impracticable or its cost required is grossly disproportionate to the 
improvement gained. There is no need to demonstrate ALARP in the broadly 
acceptable region. However, it is necessary to take any measure to assure that the 
risks remain at this level. 
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Goals have to be established when preparing a safety case. Subsequent demonstration 
has to prove that the goals so proposed have been achieved. Therefore. an installation 
cannot legally operate without such a safety case demonstration that has been 
approved by HSF Offshore Safety Division. An accepted operational safety case 
must be capable of demonstrating that hazards with the potential to cause m4jor 
accidents have been identified. associated risks have been evaluated and reduced to 
ALARP using appropriate measures. For example, the occurrence likelihood of 
events causing a loss of integrity of the safety refuge should be less than 10 ' per 
platform year [Spouse. 19971. and associated risks should be reduced to ALARP. It is 
noted that since uncertainties in inputs may be high the application ot'numerical risk 
criteria may not always be appropriate [Wang, 20021. Thereflore, the acceptance of a 
safety case is unlikely to rely solely on a numerical risk assessment. 
Intolerable 
Region 
Tolerable 
(ALARP) 
Region 
Broad1% Acceptable 
Region 
Negligible Risk 
Figure 2.1. The HSE framework for decisions on the tolerability of risk IHSE, 
1995a I 
2.2.1 The safetv case approach 
The concept of the safety case came from the principles of safety assessment of 
system engineering or installations for which little or no previous operational 
experience exists [Kuo. 1998]. There are five key elements in the safety case 
approach, namely, hazard identification, risk assessment, risk reduction, emergency 
preparedness and a Safety Management System (SMS) [Wang, 2002a]. The 
relationships between these elements are illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
Hazard identification. The mission of this step is to identify all hazards that 
have the potential to cause a major accident. 
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2. Risk assessment. Once the hazards have been identified, the associated risks 
will be evaluated using risk assessment techniques. The techniques 
employed may include either qualitative, quantitative, combined qualitative 
and quantitative or some other risk assessment techniques such as 
approximate reasoning methods. It depends upon circumstances encountered. 
3. Risk reduction. The risk reduction measures will be identified based on the 
results of the risk assessment obtained from step 2. 
4. Emergency preparedness. The objective of this step is to ensure that the 
appropriate actions have been taken in the event that a hazard has become a 
reality so as to minimise the negative consequences caused. 
5. Safety management system. The aim of a safety management system is to 
demonstrate that the organisation is achieving the goals safely and efficiently 
without jeopardising the environment. This is regarded as one of the most 
important factors of the safety case approach. 
SMS 
Hazard 
Measure identification 
Implement 
Risk 
assessment 
Orgarfise 
Risk 
Policy 
reduction 
Review EE 
e ency 
p pri 
m rg 
reparedness 
Figure 2.2. The key elements of the safety case approach [Wang, 2002a] 
A safety case is a written submission prepared by the operator of an offshore 
installation. In general, the information contained in a safety case includes: 
1. A comprehensive description of the installation. 
2. Details of hazards identified. 
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3. Demonstrations that associated risks have been appropriately evaluated and 
reduced to ALARP. 
4. Details of the SMS, including plans and procedures in place for both normal 
and emergency operations. 
Appropriate supporting references. 
It can be seen that risk assessment and safety management play crucial roles in a 
safety case. Accordingly, the following missions should be accomplished: 
Establishment of acceptance criteria for safety related decision making, 
including environment and asset, if possible. These could be both risk-based 
and deterministic. 
2. Consideration of both internal and external hazards using formal and rigorous 
hazard-identification techniques. 
3. Estimation of the probability of occurrence of each hazard and its associated 
consequences caused if occurred. 
4. Analysis of associated risks and comparison with criteria established. 
5. Demonstration of ALARP. 
6. Identification of remedial measures to avoid the hazard in question or 
mitigate its associated risks. 
7. Preparation of the detailed description of the installation and the information 
with regard to protective systems and measures in place to manage the risk. 
8. Description of the SMS, including the information demonstrating that 
hazards are identified and that the associated risks have been properly 
evaluated and managed. 
Conventional risk assessment methods and Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) approaches 
can be employed to prepare a safety case. The objective of incorporating CBA into a 
safety case is to ensure that the measures or RCOs proposed are cost-effective. This 
is achieved by comparing the cost of the proposed measure in question with its 
potential benefit resulting from the reduced risk. An RCO can be regarded as cost- 
effective only if its benefit incurred is larger than the cost. It should be noted that 
significant uncertainties in the data, information and factors may be encountered in 
the decision-making process. These may include the estimates of costs, benefits, risks, 
the assessment of stakeholder views and perceptions etc [Wang, 2006). Therefore, 
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there is a need to apply common sense and to ensure that any uncertainties are 
identified and addressed [U. K. Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA, 1999)]. 
2.2.2 Other U. K. offshore safety regulations 
Fires and explosions may be regarded as the most significant hazards with potential to 
cause catastrophic consequences in offshore installations. Prevention of Fire and 
Explosion and Emergency Response Regulations 1995 (PFEER 1995) were 
introduced to tackle these types of hazards [HSE, 1995a]. A risk-based approach is 
recommended to deal with problems involving fire and explosion and emergency 
responses. The regulations specify goals for preventive and protective measures to 
manage fire and explosive hazards, to secure effective emergency response and to 
ensure compliance with regulations by the duty holder. 
Management and Administration Regulations 1995 (MAR 1995) were developed to 
deal with areas such as notification to the HSE of owner or operator changes or 
functions and powers of offshore installation managers etc [HSE, 1995b]. The 
regulations are applied to fixed and mobile offshore installations, excluding subsea 
offshore installations. The importance of offshore pipeline safety has also been 
recognised. Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 (PSR 1996) were introduced to embody 
a single integrated, goal setting and risk-based approach to regulations prescribing the 
safety issues to both onshore and offshore pipelines [HSE, 1996a]. 
The SCR was amended in 1996 to incorporate verification of safety-critical elements 
[HSE, 1996b]. Safety-critical elements are the components of an installation or its 
plants, including computer programmes. The failure of these components may cause 
or contribute substantially to a major accident. Thus, the objective of the amendment 
is to prevent or mitigate the consequences. Offshore Installations and Wells (Design 
and Construction, etc. ) regulations 1996 (DCR 1996) were launched to deal with 
various stages of the life cycle of the installation [HSE, 1996c]. The DCR 1996 
allows offshore operators to have more flexibility to deal with their own safety 
problems. This encourages safety analysts to develop and employ novel safety 
assessment and decision-making approaches to tackle offshore safety problems. 
These offshore safety regulations, including SCR, in the U. K. are aimed at 
establishing a more goal-setting regime. This is accomplished by defining specific 
duties of the operator and setting forth high-level safety objectives while leaving the 
selection of particular hazard arrangements in the hands of the operator. This is 
because hazards encountered by each installation may be specific subject to its 
function and operating condition. In addition, the demonstration of design for safety 
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using state-of-the-art risk assessment methods based on the principles of hazard 
identification, risk estimation, preparation of RCOs, cost-benefit assessment and 
decision making is the main concern arising from these regulations. Therefore, in 
order to comply with these offshore safety regulations, an integrated risk-based 
approach, starting from feasibility analysis and extending through the life cycle of the 
installation, should be applied. 
2.3 Marine safety and FSA 
Similar to the offshore safety regulations, the international marine safety regulations 
are driven by serious marine accidents. The capsize of the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' 
in 1987, for example, attracted the public attention on operational requirements and 
the role of management. It resulted in the implementation of the International Safety 
Management (ISM) Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention. 
The 'Exxon Valdez' accident in 1989 jeopardised the environment with a relatively 
large oil spill (37,000 tons), facilitating the adoption of the international convention 
on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation (OPRC) in 1990. This is 
followed by the requirement of double hull or mid-deck structure for existing and new 
oil takers. The 'Scandinavian Star' disaster with the loss of 157 lives in 1990, and the 
catastrophic sinking of the 'Estonia' in 1994 highlighted the role of human error in 
marine casualties. Consequently, the new Standards for Training, Certificates and 
Watchkeeping 95 (STCW 95) for seafarers were introduced [Wang, 2006]. 
Subsequent to a report by the House of Lords on the investigation into the capsize of 
the 'Herald of Free Enterprise' in 1992, the U. K. Maritime and Coastguard Agency 
(MCA, previously named Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) ) in 1993 introduced 
'Formal Ship Safety Assessment' as a proposal to the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO). The agency recommended that the FSA framework so proposed 
should be applied to ship design and operations, of which the objective was to provide 
a strategic oversight of safety and pollution prevention for the shipping industry. The 
FSA framework proposed by U. K. MCA consists of five steps [MSA, 1993] and the 
relationship between each step is illustrated in Figure 2.3: 
1. The identification of hazards. 
2. The assessment of risks associated with those hazards. 
3. The identification of RCOs. 
4. Cost-benefit assessment of RCOs. 
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5. Decision-making process. 
FSA was initially studied by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) FSA at its 
62nd meeting. MSC 65 in 1995 agreed that the framework should be a high priority on 
its agenda. In 1997, MSC 68 and the 4V' meeting of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC) 40, the interim guidelines for the application of FSA 
was approved [IMO, 1997a]. The interim guidelines were superseded by the 
Guidelines [IMO, 2002a] that were finalised based on the experience gained from the 
trial applications to the safety of high-speed catamaran ferries and bulk carriers [IMO, 
1997b, 1998]. The objective and techniques commonly applied in each step of FSA 
are discussed in the following subsections. 
Decision Makers 
FSA Methodology 
Step 1: Step 2: Step 5: 
Hazard 
1 
Risk 
1 
Decision 
Identification Assessment Making 
Step 3: 
Risk Control Options 
Step 4: 
Cost-Benefit Assessment 
Figure 2.3. FSA Framework [MSA, 19931 
2.3.1 Hazard identification CHLAZID) 
The objective of this step is to identify all hazards which could potentially lead to 
significant consequences and also provide a rank for the hazards in terms of their risk 
levels. In formal ship safety assessment, hazard is defined as a physical situation with 
the potential to cause human injury and/or death, and/or damage to property and/or 
environment [MSA, 1993]. In addition, accident is defined as a status of the vessel, at 
the stage where it becomes a reportable incident that has the potential to progress to 
loss of life, major environmental damage, and/or loss of vessel [MSA, 1993]. The 
accident can be divided into several categories such as contact or collision, explosion, 
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fire, flooding, grounding or stranding etc. It is noted that human error issues should 
also be systemically analysed in the FSA framework. 
HAZID is the process of systematically identifying hazards and associated events that 
could have the potential to result in considerable negative consequences. The process 
is concerned with the application of brain-storming techniques conducted by trained 
and experienced personnel to determine the hazards. Therefore, it is often a 
qualitative exercise strongly based on expert judgement. The techniques which could 
be employed in this step include Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), Failure Mode, Effects and Critical Analysis 
(FMECA), What-If Analysis, Checklist Analysis, Structured What-If Checklist 
Technique (SWIFT), Cause-Consequence Analysis, Boolean Representation Method, 
Simulation Analysis etc. [Henley and Kumamoto, 1992] [Villemeur, 1992] [Smith, 
1993] [Wang et al., 1995]. Tbe-use of the database can facilitate the HAZID process. 
The databases available for FSA may include Lloyd's Maritime Information Services 
(LMIS) Database, IM0 Marine Accident Reporting Scheme (MARS) Database, U. K. 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) database, Australia Marine Incident 
Investigation Unit (MIIU), and Scandinavia Data Management Association (DAMA). 
The risk matrix technique is often applied to prioritise the hazards identified [Wang 
and Foinikis, 2001] [Loughran et al., 20021 [Lois et al., 2004]. This is because it is 
capable of providing a traceable framework for explicit consideration of the frequency 
or probability of occurrence and consequences of hazards. In this preliminary risk 
assessment process, each haza d is evaluated in terms of its frequency/probability of 
occurrence and potential consequence. Thus, the combined result, i. e. the risk of each 
hazard can be obtained and a risk priority of each hazard can be determined. The 
hazards associated with higher risks need to be focused and evaluated in detail in the 
next step. It is noted that the experience and knowledge of the personnel involved 
play a crucial role in this step. 
2.3.2 Risk assessment 
The objective of this step is to evaluate risks and factors influencing the level of safety. 
The mission of this step is to study how hazardous events can progress and interact to 
cause an accident [Wang, 2006]. Shipping consists of a sequence of distinct phases 
starting from design, construction and commissioning, through operation, to 
decommissioning and disposal. The status of ship functions varies in each phase. A 
ship is made of several systems such as machinery, control system, electrical system, 
navigation system etc. A serious failure may cause a catastrophic accident. Risk 
assessment can be applied with respect to each phase of shipping and each system. 
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The probability of occurrence of each failure event and its estimated consequences 
can be assessed using appropriate techniques. Generic data or expert judgement may 
be used in this step. The construction of an Influence Diagram (ID) combining fault 
trees and event trees may be applied in this step. This is because it is capable of 
studying how the regulatory, commercial technical and political/social environments 
influence each accident category and of quantifying these influences with regard to 
human and hardware failures as well as external events [Wang et al., 1999]. In other 
words, the ID model allows a holistic understanding of the problem area to be 
displayed in a hierarchical way by identifying the potential influencing factors that 
could contribute to a major marine accident. In addition, this approach can be applied 
strongly based on expert judgement. Accordingly, it is particularly useful in 
situations where little or no empirical data is available. The techniques which can be 
employed in this step include IDs, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis 
(ETA), the Frequency and Severity Index technique, the Potential Loss of Life (PLL) 
technique etc.. 
233 Risk control options (RCOs) 
The purpose of this step is to deliver effective and practical risk control options to 
manage the risks analysed in Step 2. Accordingly, a list of countermeasures aimed at 
preventing or mitigating the risks in question will be identified. The hazards that have 
a high probability of occurrence and catastrophic consequences will be the first 
priorities to be dealt with. Ile 'Casual Chain' approach can be employed to meet the 
mission in this step [Passenger Vessel Association, 1997]. Figure 2.4 illustrates the 
basic idea of the 'Casual Chain' approach and the function of each step is discussed as 
follows. 
Cause 0, Incident 1, Accident 0 Consequence 
tttt 
Intervention Intervention Intervention Intervention 
to remove the before the before the before the 
cause incident accident consequence 
Figure 2.4. Casual chain [Passenger Vessel Association, 19971 
Intervention to remove cause. The measures to be proposed are capable of 
preventing the conditions that can lead to lapses. 
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2. Intervention before the incident. The RCOs to be identified can prevent or 
avoid the lapses that can lead to an incident. 
3. Intervention before the accident. The measures to be proposed are capable of 
preventing or avoiding the incidents that can lead to a major accident. 
4. Intervention before the consequence. The RCOs to be identified can reduce 
or mitigate the harm caused by the accident. 
In general, RCOs have the attributes surnmarised below [Wang and Foinikis, 2001]: 
Those relating to the fundamental type of risk reduction (i. e. preventative or 
mitigating). 
2. Those relating to the type of action required (i. e. engineering or procedural). 
3. Those relating to the confidence that can be placed in the measure (i. e. active, 
passive, redundant, auditable). 
Three types of solutions are used for risk reductions, namely, the managerial, 
engineering and operational solutions [Loughran et al., 2002]. Managerial solutions 
involve the activities with regard to the management of an organisation. The purpose 
of this is to develop a safety culture. Effective communications between each 
department within the organisation are the key factors to their success. A new design 
and/or construction of a ship can be regarded as an engineering solution. One of the 
features of this type of resolution is that they can clearly be identifiable. A good 
example for this is the introduction of double hulled oil carriers. Addressing hazards 
in the early stages of a vessel's life is the main strength of the engineering solutions. 
Operational solutions involve the development and introduction of appropriate 
procedures for carrying out safety-critical tasks and improving the effectiveness of 
personnel in these tasks. Such procedures involve safety working practices, 
contingency plans and safety exercises. These procedures are capable of addressing 
human error factors and ensuring the existence of uniformity of the adopted safety 
standards. 
RCOs that will be analysed in the next step are those that will either reduce the risk to 
the acceptable level or provide a high reduction rate. The acquirement of risk 
reductions will be strongly based on expert judgement due to the lack of the 
operational data. FTA and ETA may be employed to predict the risk reductions in 
circumstances where the historical data with regard to the RCOs that are similar to the 
ones under consideration is available. 
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2.3.4 Cost-benefit assessment (CBA) 
A distinctive feature of FSA-based RCOs is that the measures so proposed are cost- 
effective. The objective of this step is therefore to estimate the benefits resulting from 
the reduced risks and the associated costs for each RCO. The CBA conducted should 
take into account the overall situation (the costs and bencfits of a specific RCO during 
its life cycle) and the various parties concerned and influenced by the problem under 
consideration. Such parties are referred to as stakeholders [IMO, 1997a]. 
A 'base case' is established as a reference for the subsequent comparisons. Such a 
'base case' presents the existing situation, covering all levels of associated risks 
arising from a particular activity prior to the implementation of any RCO. The costs, 
benefits and Cost of Unit Risk Reduction (CURR value) of each RCO can be 
estimated by comparing the base case with the one since the implementation of the 
RCO under consideration. The CURR value is determined by dividing the 'Net 
Present Value' (NPV) of the costs and benefits of an RCO by the combined reduction 
in mortality and injury risks [Wang et al., 1999]. Alternatively, a cost-benefit index 
technique [Lois et al., 2004], the one similar to the Frequency and Severity Index 
approach, as well as the Cost of Averting a Fatality (CAF) method [Kontovas, 2005], 
can be employed. The cost effectiveness of each measure is then compared with each 
other. Subsequently, a rank of RCOs will be established based on the values of 
CURR, cost-benefit ratio or CAF. However, there are limitations in conducting a 
CBA. These limitations mainly come from imperfect data and uncertainties in 
estimating costs and benefits [Wang and Foinikis, 2001]. Therefore, it should be 
noted that CBA, as suggested for the use in FSA, is not a precise method. Thus, it can 
only be used as a consulting instrument in decision making. 
23.5 Decision making 
The purpose of the final step is to make decisions with regard to the selection of the 
appropriate RCOs and present recommendations with respect to safety improvement. 
The information obtained from the steps of HAZID, risk assessment, RCOs and CBA 
is used in this step. In the decision-making process, the decision maker should ensure 
that the RCOs selected are fair to all stakeholders [Spouse, 1997]. 
In the decision-making process, risk criteria may be used to judge whether risks are 
tolerable, intolerable or need to be mitigated to an ALARP level. When Quantitative 
Risk Assessment (QRA) is performed, numerical risk criteria are required. However, 
the application of absolute numerical risk criteria may not always be appropriate 
because of the uncertainties involved in the risk assessment and safety management 
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process. The establishment of such criteria may cause inflexibility for the decision- 
making process [Wang et al., 1999]. In addition, risk criteria may vary between 
classification societies and alter with time, accident experience and various 
expectations of life. Accordingly, there are no quantitative criteria in formal safety 
assessment for a particular type of ship, although the MCA trial applications have 
applied QRA to a certain context [Wang, 2002]. Thus, risk criteria can only be used 
as guidelines to assist judgement in the decision-making process. 
It is noted that risk criteria are different in the differing industries. In the aviation 
industry, for example, failure with catastrophic effects must have a frequency less 
than 10-9 per aircraft year flying hour [Wang, 2006]. In the nuclear industry, the 
basic principle of the safety policy is that all exposures shall be kept As Low As 
Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), taking into account the economic and social 
factors [International Commission on Radiological Protection, 1977]. In the shipping 
industry, the general risk criteria may include [Spouse, 1997]: 
1. The activity should not impose any risks that can reasonably be avoided. 
2. The risks should not be disproportionate to the benefits. 
3. The risks should not be unduly concentrated on particular individuals. 
4. The risks of catastrophic accidents should be a small proportion of the total. 
More specifically, individual risk criteria and social riský criteria need to be defined 
[Wang, 2001]. Maximum tolerable risk for workers, for instance, may be 10-' per 
year according to the HSE industrial risk criteria. It is noted that the IMO has adopted 
HSE individual risk criteria that follow the modem risk assessment practice to define 
the intolerable and negligible risk. Table 2.1 shows HSE individual risk criteria 
adopted by the IMO [Kontovas, 2005]. In the regions between the maximum 
tolerable and negligible levels, risks should be reduced to an ALARP level, taking 
into account the economic and social factors. Again, it should be noted that these 
criteria should only be used as guidelines since they may vary between countries. 
Table 2.1. HSE & IMO individual risk criteria 
Maximum tolerable risk criteria 
(per year) 
Negligible risk criteria 
(per year) 
Crew members 10-1 10-6 
Passengers 10-4 10-6 
Public ashore 10-4 10-6 
Source: [Kontovas, 2005] 
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The RCOs to be adopted in the decision-making process would be the measures that 
are based on the balance of risk reductions, cost-effectiveness and the impact on the 
particular stakeholders. 
2.3.6 Human elements 
Human element is one of the most significant factors contributing to maritime 
accidents. It is realised that such an element is a crucial component in most marine 
and offshore safety practices and engineering products and it is also, historically, 
regarded as the most unreliable factor [Wang, 1995]. It is estimated that up to 50% of 
tanker accidents and 80% of all shipping accidents are caused by human errors in all 
phases of the process [IMO, 2000]. This has motivated risk analysts to develop 
methodologies capable of capturing the nature of human errors in marine accidents 
and storing such information in databases for fin-ther statistical study [Kristiansen et 
al., 1999]. Accordingly, the issue of human element has been systematically 
addressed within the FSA framework, associating it directly with the occurrence and 
causes of the accidents. This may also encourage the Flag States to collect the 
operational data with regard to human element. The most appropriate technique for 
incorporating the human factor as recommended in FSA Guidelines is human 
reliability analysis [IMO, 2002a], consisting of the following steps: 
1. Identification of key tasks. 
2. Analysis of key tasks. 
3. Identification of human errors. 
4. Analysis of human errors. 
Quantification of human reliability. 
Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) was originally developed and implemented for 
the nuclear industry. It can be conducted on either a qualitative or quantitative basis. 
If a quantitative analysis is in order, Human Error Probability (HEP) can be derived to 
fit into HRA models. 
2.3.7 Research activities with regard to FSA 
FSA represents a fundamental change from reactive regulatory approach to one that is 
regarded as a proactive and integrated framework based on risk assessment and safety 
management in a transparent and justifiable manner. Its philosophy has been 
approved by the IMO for reviewing current safety and environmental protection 
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regulations. In recent years, many research activities in maritime risk modelling and 
decision making have been taking place to improve both design and operations. The 
research findings based on the FSA framework include: 
1. Trial study on high-speed craft [IMO, 1997b]. 
2. Trial study on bulk carriers [IMO, 1998a] [IMO, 2002b] [IMO, 2002c]. 
3. Trial study on passenger ro-ro vessels with dangerous goods [IMO, 1998b]. 
4. The FSA application to fishing vessels [Loughran et al., 2002] [Pillay, 2001]. 
S. Application to offshore support vessels [Sii, 2001]. 
6. Application to containerships [Wang and Foinikis, 2001]. 
7. Trial application to the hatchway watertight integrity of bulk carriers [Leea et 
al., 2001]. 
8. Application to ports [Trbojevic, 2002]. 
9. Introduction of the concept of FSA qualification to support the consolidation 
of confidence in FSA results [Rosqvist and Tuorninen, 20041 
10. Application to cruising ships [Lois, 2004] [Lois et al., 2004]. 
11. Application to liner shipping [Yang, 2005]. 
FSA involves many more scientific aspects than previous conventions. The 
availability of suitable data necessary for each step of the FSA process is very 
important. When such data are not available, expert judgement, physical models, 
simulations and analytical models may be applied to achieve valuable results. The 
benefits of adopting FSA as a regulator tool include [MSA, 1993]: 
A consistent regulator regime that addresses all aspects of safety in an 
integrated way. 
2. Its cost-effective characteristic enabling safety investment to be targeted to 
areas where it will achieve the greatest benefit. 
3. A proactive approach enabling hazards that have not contributed to accidents 
to be properly identified and considered, thus, ensuring that new ships are of 
good design. 
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4. Confidence that regulator requirements are in proportion to the severity of the 
risks. 
5. A rational basis capable of addressing new risks posed by ever-changing 
marine technology. 
Although FSA has been applied by many research activities, it is noted that there are 
areas that still need to be improved. The areas for improvement include risk criteria 
acceptance, cost-benefit estimates, uncertainty and expert judgement, human 
reliability and information availability etc. [Wang, 2006]. 
2.3.8 The difference between SCR and FSA 
FSA is an approach to marine safety using risk assessment and CBA to assist the 
decision-making process. There is a significant difference between these two 
approaches. A safety case approach is applied to a specific ship (specific application) 
whereas the FSA approach is employed to address safety issues common to a ship 
type such as bulk carriers, or to a particular hazard such as fire or grounding (generic 
application) [Wang, 2002]. However, the philosophy of these two approaches is 
identical. The feature of the FSA approach is that it is capable of identifying 
commonalities and common factors that influence risk and its reduction. Such 
information can subsequently be reflected in the regulator's approach for all ships of a 
particular type. The safety case approach, on the other hand, is able to identify the 
features specific to a particular ship, depending upon its operating environment. 
Accordingly, many shipowners have begun to develop their own ship safety cases. 
2.4 Maritime security and the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) 
Maritime security is not a new concern within the shipping industry. For many years 
the industry has recognised numerous threats, including terrorism, piracy, stowaways, 
the smuggling of people and drugs, cargo theft and pilferage, fraud, bribery and 
extortion. Piracy, for example, is a threat which has never disappeared, but which has 
become an ever increasing problem. Both the IMO and the International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) have been active with investigations into piracy since the early 1980s. 
On another, but related, issue the U. S. Department of Transportation published "Port 
Security: A National Planning Guide" [U. S. Department of Transportation, 1997]. 
That article overviewed the essential aspects of port security and it identified many 
challenges faced by ports. Its aim was to provide government authorities and the 
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commercial maritime industry with a common basis upon which port security 
standards could be established. Subsequent to the terrorist attack in the U. S. on I Pt 
September, 2001, even greater heed has been paid to matters relating to maritime 
security. In December 2002, the IMO adopted the ISPS Code, which came into force 
on I't July, 2004 [IMO, 2003a]. The Code is based on the concept of risk analysis, 
with the prime purpose of ensuring that the international trade, as conducted by the 
shipping industry, could be safely expedited without undue threat or fear from 
terrorist or any other intentional criminal activity. 
2.4.1 Piracy 
Data based on annual reports of the IMO and IMB, and from books, journals and 
newspaper articles from 1981 to 2002, clearly demonstrate that the number of piracy 
incidents has been generally increasing since 1995. Table 2.2, which is based upon 
annual reports from 1998 to 2002 published by the IMO and IMB, indicates, 
notwithstanding some slight difference between the reports resulting from various 
sources, that the problem of piracy has been deteriorating [Bruyneel, 2003]. The 
worst year was 2000, when 471 and 469 actual and attempted incidents were reported 
by the IMO and IMB respectively. Furthermore, it is relevant to note that during 
2003,445 incidents were recorded by the IMB and the attacks have become more 
violent with 71 crew and passengers reported missing and 21 confirmed killed 
[international Maritime Bureau (IMB), 20041. This figure is in excess of that reported 
in 2002. According to various sources [Abhyankar, 2001] [International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), 2002] [Gunawan, 2003], the most dangerous waters with regard to 
incidents of piracy are the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Malacca Straits. 
Table 2.2. The nomber of actual and attempted piracy incidents from 1998 to 
2002 renorted hv the IM0,9nd IMiR 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Imo 210 309 471 370 383 
IMB 192 285 469 335 370 
Source: [13ruyneel, 2UUjj 
Through its "Awareness Policy" the IMB aims to help reduce the number of incidents 
of piracy. To this end, by the establishment in 1992 of the Piracy Reporting Centre 
(PRC), the IMB collects and disseminates information on piracy in a systematic and 
beneficial manner. The IMO, too, has been implementing anti-piracy measures. 
These include a project commenced in 1998, which in Phase I involves regional 
seminars and workshops attended by governmental representatives of countries in 
whose waters piracy is prevalent. In Phase 2, a number of evaluations and assessments 
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are assigned to various locations of particular concern [IMO, 2003b]. Furthermore, 
the IMO now promulgates an annual summary of incidents and attempted incidents of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea (international and territorial waters) as well as in port 
areas. In addition, it is worthwhile noting that the figure for piracy incidents has 
reduced slightly since 2004 based on the IMB Annual Report in which there are 329 
actual and attempted incidents reported in 2004,276 in 2005 and 61 in the first 
quarter of 2006 [ICC IMB, 2006]. 
2.4.2 Terrorism 
The terrorist act on I I't September, 2001 in New York resulted in the estimated death 
of 3,029 people, injuries to some 8,700 persons, and a certain level of damage to the 
world economy. Until that tragedy, not much attention had been paid over years to 
such activities occurring within the shipping industry, in spite of notable maritime 
attacks such as the hijacking aboard the passenger ships 'Santa Maria' in 1961 [Miller, 
1997], and 'Achille Lauro' in 1985 and the terrorist attack of the Greek cruise ship, 
'City of Poros' in 1989 [Williamson, 2001]. In addition, a recent maritime terrorist 
act was committed in October 2002 where a French tanker, the 'Limburg', was ripped 
apart by an explosive device [ICC, 2002]. Table 2.3 shows the number of significant 
terrorist attacks from 1993 to 2002 based on the statistics collated by Dudley Knox 
Library [Ung et al., 2004]. The increasing number of incidents implies that the world 
is continuously under the shadow of terrorist attacks. Thus, there is an urgent need for 
appropriate solutions capable of preventing human beings from such attacks. 
Table 2.3. The number of siLynificant terrorist attacks from 199-'; to 2(102 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1 1997 1 1998 1999 1 2000 1 2001 1 2002 
62 57 81 84 
_ 
I 94 1 119-1 167 1 149 123 1 
Source: LUng et al., MU41 
At the 2002 Conference on Maritime Security, the IMO adopted comprehensive 
measures designed to strengthen Maritime security and to constrain and prevent the 
acts of terrorism. To this end, the core document was the ISPS Code incorporating a 
review of issues relating to the long range identification and tracking of ships at sea. 
A Maritime Security Trust Fund was also established. The purpose of this Trust Fund 
is to provide financial support to developing countries in order that they can 
strengthen their maritime security infrastructure. To further enhance security there is 
a requirement for co-operation between the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
and the World Customs Organisation (WCO). 
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2.4.3 The principles of maritime security 
The fundamental goal of maritime security is the establishment of an environment 
wherein trade can be conducted with high probability that it will neither be hampered 
by criminal activity, nor will it be a conduit for such an activity. Therefore, when 
developing a proactive security programme, the emphasis must be directed at 
determining, preventing, detecting and reducing the losses which could be attributed 
to intentional and criminal activities. Such a programme requires both intelligence 
input and the co-ordinated co-operation of the national and international security 
authorities as well as that from the law enforcement agencies connected with the 
shipping industry and port facilities. When dealing with port security, an effective 
port security related programme must be consistent with port policies, and it must be 
integrated into the port planning and operational functions. In summary, the 
principles of a maritime security programme should be [Ung et al., 2004]: 
Proactive and capable of preventing physical access and of protecting 
infrastructure from attacks. 
2. Nationally and internationally co-ordinated. 
3. Capable of identifying threats, vulnerabilities and consequences. 
4. Consistent with port policies and compatible with port planning and 
operations. 
5. Cost-effective. 
A continuing process. 
7. A dynamic and cybernetic process subject to refinement and adjustment as 
changing circumstances necessitate. 
It should be apparent that the successful implementation of a maritime security 
programme is dependent upon the commitment of all personnel and the full support of 
senior management. It follows that there must be induction and training courses for 
all those involved in the various aspects of the programme. All must affirm to the 
programme and the standards established. 
2.4.4 The ISPS Code 
In 2002 the IMO addressed security threats to maritime transportation systems 
essentially by first, the partition of the 1974 SOLAS Chapter XI into two parts, 
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namely, Chapter XI-1 for Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Safety and a new 
Chapter XI-2 for Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security; and secondly, the 
establishment of the ISPS Code to support the security regulations incorporated in the 
SOLAS XI-2 regulations. In addition, SOLAS XI-1 introduces the new regulation 
XI-1/5 requiring ships to be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) and 
modifies regulation XI-1/3 for ships identification numbers to be permanently visibly 
marked. There has also been a further modification to SOLAS chapter V/19 with a 
new timetable for the fitting of Automated Identification Systems (AIS). 
The ISPS Code adopted by the IMO contains detailed security requirements for 
governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), 
together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a non- 
mandatory section (Part B). The Code raises the issue that ensuring the security of 
ships and port facilities is basically a risk analysis activity and that to determine what 
security measures are appropriate, a risk assessment must be conducted in each 
particular case [IMO, 2002d]. 
According to the Code, each government has to conduct a Port Facility Security 
Assessment consisting of the following three important components: 
The identification and evaluation of important assets, infrastructures, areas 
and structures that may cause significant loss of life or damage to the 
economy of a port facility or environment if damaged. 
2. The identification of the actual threats to those critical assets and 
infrastructure in order to prioritise security measures. 
3. A statement of vulnerability of the port facility by the assessment of its 
weaknesses in physical security, structural integrity, protection systems, 
procedural policies, communication systems, transportation infrastructure, 
utilities and other areas within a port facility that may be a likely target. 
In addition, there are Minimum functional security requirements for ships and port 
facilities. For ships, the requirements include: 
1. Ship security plans. 
Ship security officers. 
3. Company security officers. 
4. A system of survey, verification, certification and control. 
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5. Certain onboard equipment and specific documents (e. g. International Ship 
Security Certificate). 
For port facilities, the requirements are: 
1. Port facility security plans. 
2. Port facility security officers. 
3. Certain security equipment. 
4. Report of certain security-related information to the Government. 
Apart from that, the requirements for both ships and port facilities include: 
1. Monitoring and controlling access. 
2. Monitoring the activities of people and cargo. 
3. Ensuring that security communications are readily available. 
The matter of security levels is also dealt with in the Code. The setting of the security 
level applying at any particular time is the responsibility of each contracting 
government and such a setting will apply to its ships and port facilities. Security 
levels 1,2, and 3 correspond to "Normal", "Heightened risk7, and "Exceptional risk" 
situations. The definition of the security levels is presented in Table 2.4. The security 
level is determined from ashore and is imposed on vessels in waters and ports relevant 
to that nation. Consequently, the common link of an identical security level is legally 
applicable to both ship and port facilities. This of necessity triggers the 
implementation of appropriate identical security measures both for the ship and for 
the port facility. 
Table 2.4. The definition of securitv levels in the ISPIS Cade 
Security level Definition 
I (Normal) 
Minimum protective security measures to be maintained at all 
times. 
2 (Heightened risk) 
Additional protective security measures shall be maintained for a 
period of time as a result of medium risk of security incidents. 
3 (Exceptional risk) Further specific protective security measures need to be 
maintained for a limited period of time when a security-related 
incident is probable or imminent although it may not be possible 
to identify the specific target. 
Source: [IMO, 2002d] 
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2.5 Port safety and Port Marine Safety Code (PMSC) 
Seaports are important for the economy of each country. Given the position in coastal 
areas and the great variety of substances handled there, ports can be regarded as 
complex systems from the environmental point of view. They tend to be associated 
with water and air pollution; soil contamination; dust and noise problems; the 
generation of waste; dredging operations; movements of ships, lorries and trains; 
warehouse storage of hazardous substances; etc. According to a study carried out to 
investigate accidents in seaports from the beginning of the twentieth century to 
October 2002 collected by Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDS), 43.6 % of a 
total of 471 accidents occurring in 95 countries are caused by an impact or collision 
between ships or between a ship and dry land, vehicle collisions etc. [Darbra and 
Casal, 2004]. Therefore, navigational safety is an important factor to be considered as 
far as port safety is concerned. In the U. K., the guidelines indicating a general 
framework on port safety were originated form 'Safety in Docks-Docks Regulations 
1988 and Guidance' [HSC, 1988]. The current status of port safety reveals that there 
is a close relation between the MCA and the port authorities in order to ensure 
adequate levels of safety and pollution prevention in U. K. ports [Wang, 2006]. 
Furthermore, following the 'Sea Empress' disaster in 1996, a review of the Pilotage 
Act 1987 was published in 1998. The outcome of the review was the 
recommendation of a development of a 'Marine Operations Code for Ports'. The 
Code to be developed shall cover all port safety functions including pilotage. 
Consequently, the process of enhancing management control systems for the safety of 
navigation in ports was initiated. The PMS Code (previously called 'Marine 
operation Code for Ports' was finalised and came out in March 2000). The Code 
requires all ports in the U. K. to demonstrate that a SMS for marine operations is 
established and that it is underpinned by a formal safety assessment process [DETR, 
20001. The important issues addressed in the Code are as follows [Wang, 2006]. 
It established the term 'duty holder' i. e. harbour authority. 'Board members' 
are collectively and individually responsible for the proper exercise of their 
legally authorised duties. It is clear that 'it' and 'they' are severally and 
collectively the 'duty holder'. 
2. Harbour authorities have powers to appoint harbour masters and authorise 
pilots, and properly entrust the operation of the harbour to such professional 
personnel. However, the authority cannot assign its accountability. 
3. Harbour authorities should publish policies, plans and periodic reports setting 
out how they comply with the standards regulated by the Code. 
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4. Powers, policies, plans and periodic reports should be introduced based on a 
formal assessment of hazards and risks. In addition, harbour authorities shall 
have formal safety management systems. 
5. The objective of a SMS is to ensure that all risks are tolerable and ALARP. 
Risk assessment methods shall be applied and control measures shall be 
proposed and implemented to minimise risks. Although each port will 
implement a SMS differently depending upon its size and functions, each 
SMS will have the same basic format. 
The demonstration of ALARP principle, which is already applied to the offshore 
safety and all other hazardous activities in the U. K., is also required. The extent of 
the ALARP demonstration is illustrated by the quotation shown below from the Guide 
to the Health and Safety at Work Act [HSE, 1991]. 
'If someone is prosecuted for failing to comply with a duty so far as is 
reasonably practicable, they have to prove that it was not reasonably 
practicable to meet the requirement or that there was no better practicable 
means ofmeeting the requirement '. 
A SMS has to be structured, cohesive, transparent and auditable. It should be based 
on the following five functions [DETR, 2000]: 
1. Definition of the safety policy. 
2. Definition of the organisation and personnel roles. 
Establishment of standards. 
4. Development of performance-measuring methods. 
5. Development of an audit and review system. 
The Code will also attempt to establish the best practice in marine operations which 
will positively influence other ports in the EU and worldwide. The most influential 
outcome may be the reduction in insurance for the ports equipped with risk-based 
SMS and ALARP demonstration [Wang, 2006]. 
2.6 Critical review of maritime risk assessment 
The attitude of safety in the maritime industry has evolved from a reactive manner 
towards a risk-based and goal-setting regime since the 1990s. In the past, safety 
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regulations were introduced as a result of an accident or a series of accidents and 
intended to address the most obvious causes. Over years, however, a number of 
defining incidents and accidents as discussed in the previous sections of this chapter 
have altered the way in which safety is reviewed. Risk assessment researchers and 
safety engineers are motivated to develop and apply a variety of risk modelling and 
decision-making techniques. In general, the tendency of risk assessment is that it is 
not only used for verification purposes in design and operational process of marine 
offshore systems, but also for making decisions from the early stages [Wang, 2006]. 
Accordingly, interest in the improvement of the safety of large engineering systems 
based on safety analysis from the initial stages has been growing considerably within 
both the regulatory bodies and industries. Some large companies and organisations 
have applied quantitative safety management techniques to a considerable extent 
while others have merely used qualitative methods mainly due to the lack of data. In 
addition, over the last two decades, the increasing public concerns with regard to 
safety together with the growing technical complexity of large engineering systems 
have contributed great interest to the development and application of safety 
assessment procedures. In this section, in order to have a holistic view of maritime 
risk assessment, a critical review of its current practice is conducted and the problems 
encountered are also addressed. 
2.6.1 Traditional risk assessment 
Traditional risk assessment involves the processes of probability of occurrence or 
frequency estimates, consequence predictions and the combination of such elements 
to obtain the degree of risk. Historical casualty data and information play important 
roles in risk studies. If historical data are available, risk profiles can be established 
without the need to model scenarios. This is particularly true for the FSA studies 
relevant to bulk carriers. However, this usage may not be proactive for new designs 
and systems and cannot even measure the potential effect of proposed RCOs since 
sufficient data is unavailable. Thus, in some cases, especially for the conduction of 
simple FSA work, historical data can be directly used while in general, analytical 
modelling incorporating expert judgement is strongly recommended. 
The risk matrix technique is often applied to prioritise hazards based on the risk index 
method [Wang and Foinikis, 2001] [Loughran et al., 2002] [Lois et al., 2004]. Such a 
technique is also employed by security analysts. The technique, as shown in Tables 
2.5 and 2.6, uses the index method to represent the frequency and consequence of 
hazards. It is capable of providing a traceable framework for explicit consideration of 
the frequency or probability of occurrence and consequences of hazards. A7x4 risk 
matrix introduced by the IMO is shown in Table 2.7 based on the frequency and 
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severity indices in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 respectively [IMO, 2002a]. The risk index of a 
specific hazard is obtained based on the summation of the frequency and severity 
indices. 
Table2.5. Freauencv index (FI) 
F1 
I 
Frequency Definition 
F (per ship 
year) 
7 Frequent Likely to occur once per month on one ship 10 
5 
Reasonably Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 10 ships, 10-1 
probable i. e. likely to occur a few times during the ship life 
3 Remote 
Likely to occur once per year in a fleet of 1,000 ships, 10-1 i. e. likely to occur in the total life of similar ships 
I 
Extremely 
Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20 years) 10-1 remote I I 
Source: [IMO, 2002a] 
Table 2.6. Severitv index (1,91) 
S1 Severity 
Effects on human Effects on ship 
S (Equivalent 
safety fatalities) 
I Minor Single or minor injuries 
Local equipment 10-2 
damage 
2 Significant 
Multiple or severe non-severe ship 10-1 injuries damage 
Single fatality or 3 Severe 
multiple severe injuries 
Severe damage 
I 
I 
I 
4 Catastrophic Multiple fatalities I Total loss 1 10 
Source: [IMO, 2002a] 
Table 2.7. Risk indey (RII 
II Severity (SI) 
F1 Frequency 1 2 3 4 
Minor Significant Severe Catastrophic 
7 Frequent 8 9 10 11 
6 7 8 9 10 
5 Reasonably probable 6 7 8 9 
4 5 6 7 8 
3 Remote 4 5 6 7 
2 3 4 5 6 
[-I I Extremely remote 2 3 4 5 
Source: LIMU, muzaj 
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However, there are weaknesses when applying such an approach: 
It can be seen from Table 2.7 that since the risk of a specific hazard is 
obtained based on the summation of the frequency and severity indices, the 
risk implications of the hazards with identical risk indices may be different. 
A risk index of 8, for example, is the combination of either frequent 
frequency and minor severity, frequent frequency and significant severity, 
reasonably probable frequency and severe severity, or reasonably probable 
frequency and catastrophic severity. This may result in the underestimation 
or misunderstanding of the hazards in question. 
2. In circumstances where multiple outcomes are possible, e. g. the consequence 
of a fall on a slippery deck could range from nothing of consequence to a 
broken neck, it may be difficult to select the appropriate frequency or 
severity for the risk categorisation. It is noted that many practitioners suggest 
the use of the more pessimistic outcome [Kontovas, 2005]. 
3. The risk matrix approach evaluates hazards one at a time rather than in 
accumulation. However, risk decisions should be made based on the total 
risk of an activity. Potentially many smaller risks can accumulate into an 
undesirably high risk whereas each of these smaller risks on its own may not 
warrant risk reduction [Kontovas, 20051. Accordingly, the approach may 
underestimate the total risk if such an accumulation is ignored. 
4. According to experiences from conducted FSAs, experts prefer to provide 
percentile values rather than point estimates [Rosqvist and Tuominen, 2004]. 
Thus, experts may have the difficulties of estimating the frequency and 
severity of hazards. 
Other commonly used techniques include IDs, FTA, ETA and the PLL method. An 
ID model allows for a holistic understanding of the problem area to be displayed in a 
hierarchical way by identifying the potential influencing factors that could contribute 
to a major marine accident and as discussed in section 2.3.2. A fault tree is a logic 
diagram presenting the causal relationship between events which individually or 
collectively contribute to the occurrence of a higher level event. Thus, the probability 
of occurrence of a specific hazard can be determined. In addition, FTA is capable of 
considering common cause failures in systems with redundant or standby elements. It 
also has the capability of contemplating failure events or causes related to human 
errors. FTA is a top-down approach, systematically considering the causes or events 
at levels below the top level. Prior to the use of the quantitative FTA, the probability 
of occurrence of each basic event has to be obtained. If two or more lower events 
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need to occur to cause the next higher event simultaneously, a logic gate, AND gate, 
is employed to express the operation. If any one of two or more lower events can 
cause the next higher event directly, an OR gate is applied to show such an operation. 
The logic gates determine the addition or multiplication of probabilities to obtain the 
values for the top event. 
An event tree is a logic diagram applied to analyse the effects of unintended events. 
Such a technique first expresses the probability or frequency of the accident linked to 
the safeguard measures required to be implemented to mitigate or prevent escalation 
after the occurrence of the event. The probabilities of success or failure of these 
actions are subsequently evaluated. Success and failure paths lead to various 
consequences with differing magnitude. The likelihood of each consequence is 
finally obtained by multiplying the probability of occurrence of the accident by the 
likelihood of failure or success in each path. Another technique of estimating 
consequences is the use of PLL. Equation 2.1 shows its formula. 
PLL = 
Nf 
s 
(Equation 2.1) 
where Nf represents the number of fatalities of a specific type of vessel, and 
S denotes the shipyears of that type of vessel. 
As aforementioned historical data is crucial for risk assessment. In theory, the 
reliability of the results obtained depends upon the data collected. Therefore, it is 
highly likely that the risk analysis techniques previously discussed will produce a 
reliable outcome if the data in hand is complete. 
However, such techniques may not be practicable in circumstances where the lack of 
data exists or the level of uncertainty associated with failure data may be 
unreasonably high [Wang et al., 2004]. This is particularly true for large maritime 
systems at the initial design stages or newly adopted processes and regulations for 
ports or vessels. Only nonnumerical data, which could be subjective, may be 
available at such a stage. To sum up, the problems encountered by risk assessment 
researchers due to the nature of maritime operations include [Sii et al., 2001a][Sii et 
al., 2001b] [Wang et al., 2004]: 
Nonexistence or inadequacy of historical data for many newly adopted 
processes and regulations for ports and vessels and for many novel designs. 
In many cases the statistical accuracy of these inadequate and the limited data 
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available for safety analysts may be poor. It may also be difficult to acquire 
failure information considering the effects of human factors with confidence. 
2. Since safety is a multiple level and multiple variable optimisation subject, it 
is difficult to establish a mathematical model to represent and describe the 
safety with regard to a specific port system or a newly designed maritime 
product. There are many instance§ where causes of an accident involved 
operational procedures, human errors and decisions determined by designers 
and management. Accordingly, the safety of a system is influenced by a 
variety of factors including manufacturing, installation, commissioning, 
operations, maintenance etc. 
3. A number of effective techniques capable of dealing with human factors are 
mostly absent in risk assessment conducted within the safety case regime. 
This may be due to the fact that there is little or no human error related data 
with regard to maritime safety. 
4. It may be difficult to quantify the probability of occurrence and consequences 
of hazards. This is because hazards are associated with the operational 
processes in a very changeable environment and therefore it may involve a 
high level of uncertainty. 
5. A large number of assumptions, judgements and opinions are involved 
subjectively in a risk quantification process. As such, considerable skills are 
required for safety analysts to interpret the results produced. 
6. It may be impracticable for a full scale experimentation to be conducted due 
to a high level of cost. The use of computer simulation may be potentially 
possible. 
7. Since safety is only one of the important factors involved in the appraisal of 
the acceptability of an activity, it is difficult to establish an absolute safety 
criterion for acceptance standard. 
2.6.2 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is defined as a situation in which a person does not have appropriate 
quantitative and qualitative information to describe, prescribe or predict 
deterministically and numerically a system, its behaviour or other characteristics 
[Zimmermann, 2000]. Some of the problems encountered by risk assessment 
researchers discussed in section 2.6.1 present a high level of uncertainty which may 
bias the results acquired. Uncertainty in principle is originated from the areas 
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including, at least but not last, failure and accident data, assumptions, consequence 
methodologies, the lack or incompleteness of data and non-specificity with regard to 
RCOs. 
2.6.2.1 Failure and accident data 
The uncertainties affecting the use of failure and accident data can be considered with 
respect to the statistical significance of such data. Uncertainties mainly come from 
the following sources [Schofield, 1998]: 
1. The effect of a small sample size. 
2. The relevance of generic data to specific facilities or operating conditions in 
question. 
3. The effect of a limited reporting in relation to failure mode definition. 
The effect of a small sample size may bias the results acquired since such a sample 
may not fully reflect the characteristic of the population. If a small sample size were 
merely the only source of uncertainty, sample theory could provide confidence 
intervals relating to failure rates. Accordingly, such uncertainty could be addressed in 
the risk assessment process. 
The relevance of generic data to specific items of equipment or specific scenarios of 
operating conditions is a factor that is more difficult to address. This is because the 
facilities and operating conditions under consideration may not be as relevant as first 
thought to those for which data have been collected. Under such circumstances, none 
of the methods is capable of addressing what data should be appropriate [Schofield, 
1998]. 
The effect of a limited reporting in relation to failure mode definition is also a 
potentially insuperable problem from the quantification point of view. It may result in 
the underestimation of the potential significance of some failure modes which were 
not included within the domain of definition. The existence of such lesser failure 
modes is due to the fact that these failure modes have random possibility to escalate to 
the failure modes within the domain of definition [Schofield, 1998]. Inclusion or 
otherwise of these lesser failure modes depends upon the factors that may not be 
significant statistically. An example of this is the possible absence of near-misses in 
incident reporting. 
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The overall effects of these three factors may be the data that do not adequately 
represent a realistic potential rate of occurrence of defined failure modes. 
2.6.2.2 Assumptions 
Various types of assumptions have been used in risk analysis. Some relate to the use 
of data sub . ect to the discussion of the data uncertainty as addressed in section 2.6.2.1. 
Some relate to the use of consequence methodologies which will be discussed in 
section 2.6.2.3. Another category of assumptions is concerned with the definition of 
the system under consideration. This includes the identification of hazards and 
associated accident scenarios as well as the physical conditions which exist within 
these scenarios. Assumptions within this category are often stated explicitly and 
openly based on practical knowledge about the subject matter under consideration. 
As such, they can be scrutinised and varied using the techniques such as sensitivity 
analysis to assess their effect on risk results. 
2.6.2.3 Consequence methodologies 
Consequence methodologies are concerned with the predictions of risks arising from 
accident escalation. Such modelling may at one extreme comprise very simple 
assumptions. At another extreme it may consist of a very complex mathematical 
model implemented by sophisticated computer software. Alternatively, it is the 
modelling which may be somewhere between these extremes. A problem with 
attempting to model maritime accident scenarios is the often complex nature of 
escalating events leading to a major accident [Schofield, 1998]. This complexity is 
associated with the intrinsic nature of many of the consequence phenomena under 
consideration. This may make the consequence become unpredictable. Some 
phenomena may be characterised by chaotic behaviour associated with inherent non- 
linearities, for which model predictions may be very sensitive to small changes in 
factors such as initial conditions or assumptions about parameter values. Examples of 
these include smoke migration, explosion overpressure, fire development and 
personnel movement during escape and evacuation. 
2.6.2.4 Lack or incompleteness of data 
The lack of incompleteness of data can lead to uncertainty, in particular for novel 
maritime products or safety processes at the initial stage. The gaps in such data are 
usually bridged based on a combination of scientific data or analysis if applicable, 
expert judgement and through the use of some analogous data that may be the only 
option available. The information obtained sometimes tends to be non-numerical and 
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subjective as previously addressed. Very often such information gathered is vague. 
This would cause the inconsistency of information interpretation between safety 
analysts. Thus, this lack of consensus can increase uncertainty. 
2.6.2.5 Non-specificity with regard to RCOs and others 
Non-specificity with regard to RCOs is a lack of information resulting from not 
explicitly stating or distinguishing alternatives. It is characterised by sizes of relevant 
sets of alternatives. The more possible alternatives a situation has, the less specific 
the situation is. In addition, other sources leading to uncertainties may include the 
estimates of the costs, time-scales, risks, safety benefits, the assessment of stakeholder 
views and perceptions etc. 
2.6.2.6 Overall effect and uncertainty treatment 
When the uncertainties originating from these sources are combined, the overall effect 
caused may undermine significantly the conclusion arising from a quantitative risk 
analysis. Consideration of these uncertainties may drive estimated risk levels 
appreciably upwards or downwards from the initially calculated results. Regardless 
of whether 'these estimated results are initially assessed as best or pessimistic 
estimates, an upward revision could result from the consideration of, for example, the 
effect of a limited incident reporting in relation to its failure mode definition. 
Methods for analysing and describing uncertainty can range from simple to complex 
depending upon circumstances encountered. Common approaches applied to handle 
uncertainty can be divided into two different categories: those developed based on 
probabilistic analysis, including classical set theory, probability theory and Bayes 
theory; and those modelled based on possibilistic analysis, including possibility 
theory and fuzzy set theory [Eleye-Datubo, 2006]. Each approach has various 
strengths and characteristics regarding its representational and propagation 
capabilities. The uncertainty modelled by the methods under the first category is 
represented by a collection of estimates of the quantity and the degree of certainty or 
uncertainty measured by means of the distribution of values in the collection of such 
estimates. The methods falling into the second category are reasoned with regard to 
an epistemic state using max/min or max/product calculus that is not found in 
probability theory. Among the approaches under the category of possibilistic analysis, 
the significance of fuzzy set theory is the use of linguistic variables capable of 
providing a flexible modelling of imprecise data and information. 
-45- 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
It should be noted that in risk analysis if uncertainties could be expressed 
quantitatively, the conduction of sensitivity analysis would be recommended so that 
such negative effects might be reduced to a certain level. 
2.6.3 CBA and decision making 
The objective of CBA is to estimate cost and benefit and so compute their ratios for 
all ROCs, followed by the identification of the RCOs with lower and minimum costs 
related to a unit of risk reduction. Evaluation of the cost component is usually not the 
problem in CBA. In general, the cost component consists of one-time (initial) and 
running costs cumulating over the predicted lifetime of the system. The benefit 
component, however, is much more intricate as it may not only be valued in terms of 
risk reduction but also in terms of safety margin or robustness to risk [Rosqvist and 
Tuominen, 2004]. Thus, it may be difficult to compare cost and benefit on a common 
basis. Furthermore, when more parameters such as reliability are contemplated, 
simple comparison of cost and benefit cannot reasonably be conducted. 
In addition, the CAF method is the technique that is often applied in CBA due to its 
characteristic of simple calculations. However, it is often corrupted by the 
manipulation of cost and benefit in order to satisfy or unsatisfy the given criteria. 
This would bias the results obtained in CBA. 
A cost-benefit index technique applied by a company providing ferry services, the 
North Ferry Company, offers another way of analysing costs and benefits of each 
alternative [PVA, 1997] [Lois et al., 2004]. It consists of three stages: 
1. Estimate of benefit using the references shown in Table 2.8. 
2. Cost estimate based on the scale developed in Table 2.9. 
3. Combination of the estimated cost and benefit by dividing the estimated 
benefit by the predicted cost as shown in Table 2.10. 
Table 2.8. Estimate of benerit 
Level of 
linguistic terms 
Description Estimated 
index 
Very low No benefit from reduced risks I 
Low Small benefit from reduced risks 2 
Medium Medium benefit from reduced risks 3 
High High benefit from reduced risks 4 
Very high Very high benefit from reduced risks 5 
Source: JPVA, 19911 [Lois et al., 2UU4] 
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Table 2.9. Estimate of cost 
Level of Description 
Estimated 
linguistic terms 
II 
index 
I 
No cost for the implementation of the I Very low 
countermeasure 
Small cost for the implementation of the Low 2 
countermeasure 
Medium cost for the implementation of the 
Medium 3 
countermeasure 
High cost for the implementation of the High 4 
countermeasure 
Very high cost for the implementation of the 
Very high 5 
countermeasure 
Source: [PVA, 199-/] LLois et at., LUU41 
Table 2.10. Cost-benerit assessment 
Cost-benerit assessment 
Countermeasures Estimate of benefit - Cost estimate = Overall score 
Source: [PVA, 19911 ILois et at., 2. UU41 
Tables 2.8 and 2.9 provide another way of modelling benefit and cost based on the 
index method. This technique can be particularly useful in circumstances where 
safety analysts have the difficulty of explicitly expressing cost and benefit on a 
common basis. The overall score obtained from Table 2.10 is capable of assisting 
decision makers to select the best option. However, such a technique, in some 
circumstances where the values of the overall score of some RCOs are equal, may not 
be applicable. This is because the cost-effective implications of these RCOs may be 
different. An RCO with the estimated benefit score of 4 and cost score of 2, for 
example, would have an overall score identical to the one with the score of 2 for its 
estimated benefit and score of I for the estimated cost. The implications of these 
RCOs are different and may not be discriminated if decision makers fully rely on the 
values of their overall scores. 
When considering the cost-effectiveness of RCOs, the decision should ensure that 
such effects are impartial to all stakeholders. The Stakeholder Analysis technique is 
capable of providing information about the distribution of benefit and cost of RCOs. 
Such information is useftil for refining the options. In particular, RCOs may be 
augmented with monetary compensation for the unfairness that may be perceived by 
some stakeholders. A spreadsheet model describing the cost-benefit distribution 
among stakeholders has been developed [Gilfillan, 2002]. However, models 
addressing such compensation between stakeholders have not been proposed. 
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It is noted that in the decision-making process risk criteria are also important. They 
are used to judge whether risks are tolerable, intolerable or need to be mitigated to an 
ALARP level. ALARP may be demonstrated by historical data of low or acceptable 
levels of risk and by the adoption of the best practice. When QRA is performed, 
numerical risk criteria are required. However, the application of absolute numerical 
risk criteria may not always be appropriate because of the uncertainties involved in 
the risk assessment and safety management process as aforementioned. The 
establishment of such criteria may therefore cause inflexibility for the decision- 
making process [Wang et al., 1999]. As such, in the offshore safety case regime, the 
ALARP demonstration seems to be lost in numerical estimates of risk and is 
considered as an add-on to the risk assessment process [Trbojevic, 2001]. Such a 
demonstration may also become complicated with new technologies or procedures for 
which there is no historical data and the good practice has not yet been established. 
Furthermore, decision making would become more complex if there were many 
parameters to be considered apart from the factors of risk criteria and cost 
effectiveness with regard to each RCO. 
2.6.4 Human error assessment 
Human error assessment deals with the risk contributed by human error. Most HRA 
material is concerned with the quantification of the potential of human error. In 
general, HRA has three fundamental functions, namely, the identification of human 
errors, the prediction of their likelihood and reduction of the likelihood if required 
[Kirwan, 1992a]. The HRA approaches can be divided into two categories, those 
using a database, and those using expert judgement [Kirwan, 1996]. The approaches 
falling into the first category apply a database containing generic HEP to the specific 
circumstance being assessed. The manipulation is often based on the assessment of 
circumstance related Performance Shaping Factors (PSF) that modify the probabilities 
based on environmental and contextual circumstances. The HEI's obtained based on 
the approaches in the second category are acquired by asking experts directly with 
regard to the scenario under consideration. Alternatively, some approaches in this 
category generate HEI's by manipulating and interrogating a quasi database which has 
some basis in real data from industrial incidents and which is incorporated with expert 
judgement. Some most widely used HRA techniques in the UK include Technique 
for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [Swain and Guttmann, 1983], Human 
Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) [Kirwan, 1994], Justification 
of Human Error Data Information (JHEDI) [Kirwan, 1992b], Success Likelihood 
Index Method using Multi-Attribute Utility Decomposition (SLIM-MAUD) [Gertman 
and Blackman, 1993], Paired Comparisons [Hunns, 1982], and Absolute Probability 
Judgement [Seaver and Stillwell, 1983]. 
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Although HRA has been adopted in various industries, it is not without some 
problems. The issues addressed below are the drawbacks criticised when applying the 
HRA approaches [Hollnagel, 1993] [Fields, 2001] [Kirwan, 1994]. 
For the methods such as THERP, the information contained in the database is 
from a variety of sources. The reliability of such data has always been 
questioned. 
2. The approaches often involve steps of breaking the task into small 
components, assigning probabilistic estimates to the components and 
producing the results to provide an overall risk index. The validity of these 
steps is often criticised. 
3. The nature of the sources from which the data is collected may be different 
from the context to be assigned to the HEPs. This may influence the quality 
of the HRA. 
4. The precision of the opinions with regard to the relative importance of the 
PSFs or the HEP predictions is often questioned. 
5. Interdependencies existing between the factors under consideration are rarely 
addressed. The Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) in the HEART method, 
for instance, interact with each other in complex ways and such 
interdependencies are usually ignored. 
2.6.5 Quality assurance in the port industry 
High performance quality of safety and security measures can ensure the effectiveness 
and efficiency of port operations so as to achieve safety and security objectives 
without jeopardising customer satisfactions simultaneously. However, according to 
literature, very few port authorities employ a quality assurance system to maintain and 
improve the quality with regard to the services provided. Associated British Ports 
PLC (ABP) formed in 1983, for instance, is the single largest U. K. operator 
controlling 22 of the privatised ports. Neither ABP itself nor its individual ports have 
a system-wide quality control mechanism. Nevertheless, there are some ports 
incorporating quality assurance system into some of the operations provided. Port of 
Singapore, for instance, requesting bunker tankers to carry onboard a Certificate of 
Quality (coQ) showing that the quality of bunker fuels carried are in compliance with 
the ISO 8217 Standard [Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, 2003]. 
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2.7 Justification of research 
In the risk assessment and safety management research, management of the effects 
caused by uncertainty is an important issue. However, causes of uncertainty as 
discussed in section 2.6.2, are diverse. Thus, regardless of what approach is to be 
applied, it is always dependent upon human judgement to manage such negative 
effects. In other words, the deficiencies of risk modelling resulting from the lack of 
information or a high level of uncertainty must be made up by means of the general 
evaluation capacity of humans who are able to grasp the essence of an object, even if 
it is vague and unclear. One feasible way to model such a situation under a high level 
of uncertainty is the use of approximate reasoning approaches using a fuzzy inference 
system where the conditional part and/or the conclusions contain linguistic variables 
[Wang et al., 1995] [Wang, 1997]. It is capable of handling imprecise, ambiguous 
and qualitative information and quantitative data in a consistent manner. This greatly 
reduces the need for safety analysts to know the precise point at which a risk factor 
exists. It also permits experts to evaluate the risk associated with failure modes 
directly using linguistic terms that are commonly employed in carrying out risk 
assessment. In this context, a safety model using the approximate reasoning approach 
may be more appropriate to model the risks of the systems associated with incomplete 
safety information. 
Fuzzy set theory, formalised in 1965, has been widely applied in different fields. Its 
use in system safety and reliability analysis could prove to be useful since such 
analysis often requires the use of subjective judgement and uncertain data. The use of 
linguistic variables provides flexible modelling of imprecise data and information. A 
linguistic variable differs from a numerical variable in that its values are not numerals 
but words or sentences in a natural or artificial language. The significance of fuzzy 
variables is that they facilitate gradual transition between states and therefore are able 
to deal with the observation and measurement of uncertainties. On the other hand, 
traditional variables, which may be referred to as crisp variables, do not have such a 
capability. Although the definition of states by crisp sets is mathematically correct, in 
many cases it may be regarded as unrealistic in the face of unavoidable measurement 
errors. When dealing with the safety of a system using fuzzy set theory, the 
parameters including occurrence likelihood, consequence and probability of failure 
consequence can be judged and described using linguistic terms and the membership 
values associated. These ftizzy variables can then be synthesised with confidence 
using a fuzzy rule base or some other techniques such as Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN) or Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). 
-50- 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
Traditionally, risk assessment is usually carried out using either a top-down approach 
or a bottom-up approach, depending upon the availability of failure data, the level of 
the analysis required, the degree of complexity of the interrelationships between the 
components in a design and the level of innovation in the design [Wang et al., 1995]. 
The success of a top-down safety assessment is highly dependent upon the reliability 
of failure data in previous incident and accident reports where proper investigations 
and appropriate data collections of incidents and accidents are crucial. In the bottom- 
up safety assessment process, a system can be divided into subsystems that can be 
further broken down to the component level in order to identify all possible hazards. 
Possible failure events at both the component and the subsystem levels can then be 
combined. Consequently, possible serious failure events can be identified. Compared 
to the top-down safety assessment, the bottom-up analysis provides safety analysts 
with a higher level of confidence that possible failure events are identified with less or 
no omissions. Therefore, the risk assessments of port security, marine safety and 
human error to be conducted in this PhD study are based on the bottom up approach, 
breaking down port operating systems into subsystems and even system components. 
Such an analysis in this research can be regarded as a hierarchical process where risks 
associated with the elements at higher levels are determined by the risks of the 
parameters at lower levels. 
2.7.1 Risk assessment of port security using fuzzy modelling 
As aforementioned in section 2.4.4, under the ISPS Code each government has to 
perform a Port Facility Security Assessment for each port facility within its territory 
which serves ships engaged on international voyages. Such an assessment is basically 
a risk analysis of all operational aspects of a port system in order to determine which 
parts of it are more susceptible and more likely to be the target of an attack. Hence, it 
could be reasonable to deduce that the purpose of security is to protect all assets 
including people, information and the physical assets. 
According to literature, security risk could be regarded as a function of the threat of 
an attack associated with the vulnerability of the object under consideration and the 
consequences caused by such attack [Bums-Howell et al., 2003]. 11ireat could be 
defined as an action or potential action likely to cause damage, harm or loss [Bums- 
Howell et al., 2003]. If explained quantitatively, it would be a measure of the 
likelihood that a specific type of attack will be initiated against a specific target (i. e. a 
scenario). The threats related to the shipping industry may include terrorism, robbery, 
cargo theft, stowaways and the smuggling of people, and drug and currency 
laundering. Vulnerability is a weakness in any system or equipment, or in procedures 
designed to protect assets [Bums-Howell et al., 2003]. Its quantitative description 
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could be the likelihood that various types of safeguard measures against a scenario 
would fail. Consequence (impact) is either the amount of expected loss or damage, or 
it is the negative effects in the shipping industry should the attack be successful. 
However, the risk results obtained from such a combination may not genuinely reflect 
the risk levels with the absence of the consideration as to the relative importance of 
each asset. Thus, in this PhD study, another parameter has been incorporated into this 
security risk function, namely, criticality. Thus, criticality is defined as the relative 
importance of each facility, taking into account its function, location, costs and 
allowable time for returning operational. 
However, due to the confidentiality of the intelligence with regard to terrorism and 
difficulty of the information accession, the data available for conducting security risk 
assessment is rare for most researchers. Accordingly, fuzzy set theory is employed in 
this study. Under the concept of FMECA, the parameters of criticality, likelihood, 
vulnerability, and consequence of each scenario are modelled using linguistic terms 
and the membership values associated. Such elements are then synthesised to obtain 
the fuzzy conclusions based on a fuzzy rule base developed. A defuzzification 
process is subsequently employed to acquire the numerical values. Consequently, a 
security rank of the scenarios under consideration can be established. 
2.7.2 Risk prediction of port safety using fuzzy Artificial Neural Network (ANN) 
As aforementioned that 43.6 % of a total of 471 accidents occurring in 95 countries 
are caused by an impact of heavy objects or collision between ships or between a ship 
and dry land, and vehicles [Darbra and Casal, 2004]. Table 2.11 summarises the 
specific causes of the accidents in seaports. It can be seen from the impact category, 
the causes of 71 % of the accidents are related to a ship/land, or ship/ship collision. 
In addition, using the same statistics, 56.5 % of accidents took place during the 
transport process [Darbra and Casal, 2004] as shown in Table 2.12. The transport 
category includes, all accidents that occurred in moving ships (entering or leaving the 
port), and in lorries or trains entering or leaving port facilities. Therefore, as far as 
port safety is concerned, navigational safety is an important factor to be considered. 
The salient parameters playing important roles in navigational safety in this research 
include the Vessel Traffic Control (VTC) performance, navigation aids and facilities, 
pilotage performance, sealane maintenance and the weather condition. The first four 
elements mentioned above are regarded as the specific port safety functions relating to 
navigation by the experts specialising in ports [Sydney Ports, 2005] whereas the 
weather condition is the parameter that cannot be managed or controlled by a port. In 
addition, due to the scarcity of navigational safety data, fuzzy set theory is employed. 
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From the risk assessment point of view, the applications of fuzzy set theory with the 
adoption of a fuzzy rule base become impractical as there are multiple parameters to 
be evaluated which are described by multiple linguistic terms. If there were five 
parameters described by five different linguistic variables, for example, the number of 
fuzzy rules needed to be developed would be 3,125. In this study, a risk prediction 
model incorporating fuzzy set theory and ANN capable of resolving the problem 
encountered is proposed. An algorithm capable of converting the risk-related 
parameters and the overall risk level from the fuzzy property to the crisp-valued 
attribute is also developed. 
Table 2.11. SDeciric causes of accidents in sennorts 
Specific cause Number of accidents T-Percentage of category 
Impact 
Ship/land impact 79 45 
Ship/ship impact 45 26 
General operation 8 5 
Heavy object 8 5 
Rail accident 7 4 
High winds 7 4 
Others 20 11 
Subtotal 193 100 
Human 
General operation 21 23 
Overfilling 10 11 
Maintenance 9 10 
Procedures 7 8 
Ship/land impact 6 6 
Others 39 42 
Subtotal 92 100 
Mechanical 
Valve 13 14 
Flange coupling failure 8 9 
Metallurgy failure 7 8 
Hose 6 7 
High winds 6 7 
Over pressure 5 5 
Others 45 50 
subtotal 90 100 
External 
High winds 21 25 
Sabotage 10 14 
External fire 9 13 
Ship/land impact 7 7 
Ship/ship impact 6 6 
others 30 35 
Subtotal 83 100 
Unknown 13 100 
Source: [Varbra anci Uasal, ZUU4] 
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Table 2.12. Snecific orioinq af nerith-nf. . 
Specific origin Number of accidents Percentage of category 
Transport 
Ocean going vessel 173 65 
Pipeline 31 12 
Portable transport container 26 10 
Barge 14 6 
Road tanker 12 4 
Rail tanker 7 3 
Tank container 3 1 
Subtotal 266 100 
Load ing/unloading 
Ocean going vessel 24 34 
Pipework 10 14 
Hose 10 14 
Not defined 6 8 
Barge 5 7 
Portable transport container 4 6 
Road tanker 4 6 
Solid conveyance 2 3 
Pipeline 2 3 
Tank container 2 3 
Pumps/compressor I I 
Rail tanker I I 
Subtotal 71 100 
Storage 
Atmospheric pressure storage 
vessel 
31 56 
Portable container 9 16 
Solid storage 5 9 
Not defined 5 9 
Small commercial tank 1 2 
Pipework 1 2 
Pressurised storage vessel 1 2 
Solid conveyance 1 2 
Barge 1 2 
Subtotal 55 100 
Process 
Not defined 19 37 
Pipework 7 13 
Process vessel 6 12 
Reactor 5 10 
Pump/compressor 6 12 
Fired process equipment 4 8 
Heat exchangers 3 6 
Process machinery drives 1 2 
Subtotal 51 100 
Unknown 28 100 
Source: [Darbra and Casal, 20041 
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2.7.3 Human error assessment in port operations using fuzzy Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
The human element is one of the most important factors contributing to maritime 
accidents. This can be verified by the statistics shown in Table 2.11 where human 
errors make a significant contribution in port operations, consisting of 19.5 %. In 
addition, it can be seen from Table 2.12 that 15.1 % of seaport accidents are caused by 
cargo loading and unloading. With the available information from MHIDS, the 
accidents have been divided into the categories of oils, chemicals, acids, natural gas 
and others. The greatest proportion of the accidents, 59 % occurred with oils [Darbra 
and Casal, 2004]. Therefore, the test case selected for illustrating the proposed 
framework of human error assessment is an oil cargo handling process. 
The human error assessment in this PhD research is conducted based on the bottom- 
up safety approach since such an approach provides safety analysts with a higher level 
of confidence that possible failure events are identified with less or no omissions. 
This is achieved by combining the fuzzy set theory and the AHP technique, allowing 
for the difficulties aforementioned in section 2.6.4 when using traditional HRA 
techniques as well as the lack of human error related data. The human error 
assessment framework is demonstrated by a test case with regard to an oil cargo 
handling operation as aforementioned. Cargo handling operations involve several 
missions in different phases and each mission is accomplished by a number of steps in 
order. By virtue of breaking down the oil cargo handling operation to the missions 
(subsystem) and the steps (component) levels, the probability of occurrence, the 
failure consequence probability and the severity of the hazards associated in each step 
can be determined based on pairwise comparisons. Consequently, the step with the 
highest risk can be identified. Likewise the mission that has the highest risk can then 
be obtained by combining the risks of each associated step. 
2.7.4 Multi-attribute decision making using ER 
In the decision making process of this PhD study, the factors considered when 
evaluating each RCO include, effectiveness, cost, time of deployment, resource 
availability and co-operation level. Effectiveness is defined as the effectiveness of the 
RCOs on risk reductions in terms of the security, safety and human error aspects. 
Cost is the capital that will be consumed once the RCOs are implemented, including 
initial costs, operational costs, maintaining costs and decommissioning costs. Time of 
deployment is the time spent in deploying the measures, including the time taken for 
personnel training and for facility or equipment installations. Resource availability is, 
regardless of monetary capitals, defined as the existing resource available for the 
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measures such as existing facilities, equipment or skilled personnel capable of 
accomplishing the missions established. Co-operation level is the level of the 
diversity that different departments both within and outside the port need to 
participate in the activities proposed by the measures, depending upon the functions 
and complexity of the RCOs. In other words, a specific measure would be preferred if 
the number of different departments participating in the proposed activity was low 
(e. g. one or two) in terms of the co-operation level criterion. Thus, the decision 
making in this study is the analysis with multiple objectives that both have a 
quantitative and qualitative nature. The research method employed is the ER 
approach. It is one of the techniques that were developed to solve multi-attribute 
decision-making problems. By using this technique, subjective judgement with 
uncertainty and precise data can be consistently modelled under the unified 
framework based on an evaluation analysis model and the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) 
theory of evidence [Lopez de Mantaras, 1990]. A sensitivity analysis considering the 
aspects of effectiveness and cost will be conducted to obtain the best and preferred 
RCOs. 
When applying such a technique, a drawback occurs in circumstances where a 
decision-making project is evaluated by multiple experts due to the fact that the utility 
appreciation'of each evaluation grade by the experts may be different. This could 
result in a general attribute or RCO ranking order conflict between the experts. The 
phenomenon would become obvious if the evaluation grades and belief degrees 
evaluated for each alternative or general attribute were close. The framework 
proposed in this study is capable of solving such a difficulty. 
2.7.5 Quality assurance of efficiency of port security and safety measure using 
Six Sigma 
Nowadays, more and more security and safety regulations and policies have been 
adopted and implemented in both the port and shipping industries. The objective of 
this is certainly to ensure that the international trade could be safely expedited without 
undue safety practices or threat from intentional crime activities. However, it may 
undermine the efficiency of port and shipping operations. In the port context, it is 
therefore necessary to incorporate the opinions with regard to the quality of the 
implementation of safety and security measures from port customers such as vessels 
and traders having businesses within port areas. The purpose of this is to achieve 
customer satisfaction based on the opinions gathered to improve the quality of 
security and safety measures adopted so as to ensure that the efficiency of port 
operations is improved and maintained. 
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Many quality assurance approaches are capable of achieving the aforementioned 
objective. However, the method chosen for this study is Six Sigma. This is because 
many well-known quality assurance methods such as Total Quality Management 
(TQM) or International Organization for Standardization (ISO) do not emphasise data 
collection and analysis. Six Sigma, on the other hand, is a data-driven method that 
focuses on customer satisfaction and scientifically leads a company to attain the best 
quality level. From the statistical point of view, the term Six Sigma is defined as 
having less than 3.4 defects per million opportunities or a success rate of 99.9997% 
where sigma is a unit used to represent the variation about the process average 
[Antony and Coronado, 2002]. From the business point of view, however, it is 
defined as a business strategy used to improve business profitability, the effectiveness 
and efficiency of all operations to meet or exceed customer needs and expectations 
[Antony and Banuelas, 20011. Motorola was the first organisation to adopt Six Sigma 
in the 1980s as part of its quality performance measurement and improvement 
programme. Such a method has since been successfully applied in other 
manufacturing organisations such as General Electric, Boeing, DuPont, Toshiba, 
Seagate, Allied Signal, Kodak, Honeywell, Texas Instrument, Sony etc.. The benefits 
and savings reported are composed and presented in Table 2.13 from investigating 
various literatures in Six Sigma [Kwak and Anbari, 2006]. On the other hand, 
however, there are some criticisms with regard to this quality assurance tool. One of 
the criticisms is that Six Sigma is a high investment and resource-intensive 
programmes that only big companies can afford [Caulcutt, 2001]. Therefore, it may 
be argued that Six Sigma seems to be an expensive tool for small enterprises. It is 
worthwhile noting that a number of modifications [Wessel and Burcher, 2004] have 
been proposed to adjust the approach in this context. In addition, a research carried 
out using multilevel case analysis identify that a certain degree of the Six Sigma 
problems is attributed to the lack of empowerment. It suggests that organisations, 
need to evaluate their existing culture, empowering employees where appropriate, 
before the adoption of Six Sigma [McAdam and Lafferty, 2004]. The factors that 
play important roles in quality assurance using the Six Sigma programme have also 
been identified. These include, namely, upper management commitment, training, 
linking Six Sigma to business strategy and customers, culture change and 
organisational structure [Henderson and Evans, 2000] [Antony and Coronodo, 2002] 
[Dale, 2000] [Harry and Schroeder, 2000]. Such elements are crucial for the 
establishment of an effective Six Sigma system without which any organisation will 
not be able to acquire the benefits listed in Table 2.13. 
As aforementioned that Six Sigma has been widely and successfully applied in the 
manufacturing industry to improve the performance quality. However, it has not 
been employed in the port industry as far as quality issues are concerned. The 
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research framework proposed will be demonstrated using a test case of a transport 
process of ship stores. This will provide a positive starting point by introducing 
quality assurance approaches on a scientific and quantitative basis to the port industry. 
Table 2.13. Benefits and savings from Six Sigma in the manufacturing sector 
Company/Project Metric[Measures Benefits/Savings 
Motorola In-process defect levels 150 times reduction 
Raytheon/Aircraft Depot Maintenance Reduced 88% as measured 
integration systems inspection time in days 
GE/Railcar leasing Turnaround time at repair 
business shops 
62% reduction 
Allied Signal. /Bendix IQ Concept-to-shipment cycle Reduced from 18 months 
brake pads time to 8 months 
Hughes aircraft missiles Improved 1,000% in 
systems group/Wave Quality/productivity quality and 500% in 
soldering operations productivity 
General Electric Financial $2 billion 
Motorola (1999) Financial $15 billion over II years 
Dow Chemical/Rail Savings of $2.45 million in 
delivery project 
Financial 
capital expenditures 
DuPont/Yerkes plant in Savings of more than $25 
New York 
Financial 
million 
Increases in revenue 30 
Telefonica de Espana Financial million euro, in the first 10 
months 
Texas Instruments Financial $600 million 
Johnson and Johnson Financial $500 million 
Honeywell Financial $1.2 billion 
Source: [Kwak and Anbari, 2UU6] 
In summary, this PhD research attempts to establish a platform of risk assessment and 
safety management consisting of various frameworks addressing port safety and 
security without jeopardising the efficiency of port operations under circumstances 
where the lack or incompleteness of data exists or a high level of uncertainty is 
presented. 
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2.8 Discussion 
Maritime safety has been moving towards a risk-based and goal-setting regime since 
the 1990s. Traditional risk assessment techniques such as FTA and ETA are capable 
of providing results with confidence if historical data are available. However, they 
may not be applicable in circumstances where the lack of data exists or the 
information available consists of a high level of uncertainty. As such, it is very often 
that risk analysis under such circumstances strongly relies on human judgement. 
Approximate reasoning approaches may be more appropriate due to the capabilities of 
modelling vague, fuzzy, imprecise and qualitative information as well as quantitative 
data in a consistent manner. The information and data available for port security and 
navigational safety in ports are scarce. Human error assessment in port operations 
would encounter some difficulties aforementioned if traditional HRA methods were 
applied due to the lack of such data in ports. Accordingly, the risk assessment of port 
security and safety together with human factors in this PhD study is based on the 
approximate reasoning approach. Different techniques including ANN and AHP can 
also be incorporated respectively into the risk assessment framework alone with fuzzy 
set theory to facilitate the analysis performance and provide results with confidence. 
In the decision-making process, many factors need to be considered when evaluating 
the RCOs proposed for port security, safety and human error assessment. Under such 
circumstances where the factors considered have different attributes, the best RCOs 
will be identified using the ER approach together with the conduct of a sensitivity 
analysis. For the purpose of maintaining and improving the quality of the RCOs once 
implemented, the Six Sigma technique is employed. This provides a positive starting 
point for the port industry to consider the quality of its measures and policies resulting 
from safety regulations based on the scientific and quantitative methods. Finally, 
there are five technical chapters presented in this PhD study, namely, risk assessment 
of port security using fuzzy modelling, risk prediction of port marine safety using 
fuzzy ANN, human error assessment using fuzzy AHP, multi-attribute decision 
making using ER and quality assurance in ports using Six Sigma. Each chapter 
provides its research methodology, which is subsequently demonstrated by its 
corresponding test case. The objective of this PhD research is to establish a platform 
of risk assessment and safety management consisting of various frameworks 
addressing port safety and security without jeopardising the efficiency of port 
operations under circumstances where the lack or incompleteness of data exists or a 
high level of uncertainty is presented. 
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Chapter 3. Risk Assessment of Port Security 
using Fuzzy Modelling 
A security assessment is considered as a difficult mission because of the 
characteristically unpredictable outcomes associated with high 
consequences. However, due to the confidentiality of the intelligence with 
regard to terrorism and the difficulty of the information accession, the data 
available for conducting security risk assessment is scarce for most 
researchers. In this chapter, a security risk assessment framework using 
fuzzy set theory is proposed, The security risk can be modelled and a risk 
ranking can be obtained based on the concept of Failure Mode, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) using a fuzzy rule base method The model 
presented in this study is based on the assumption that the elements of 
criticality at each port facility, and of the vulnerability of the security 
measures associated, are more important than the elements ofprobability of 
occurrence of the threat associated and its severity. This is because the 
criticality determines the relative importance of each asset and vulnerability 
is the only factor that can be fully under control of the port authority. The 
outcome of the study will be a security risk ranking based on the risk level of 
each scenario obtained 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the terrorist attack in the U. S. on I I't September 200 1, even greater heed has 
been paid to matters relating to maritime security. In December 2002, the 
international Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which came into force on I July 2004. The Code is 
based on the concept of risk assessment, with the prime purpose of ensuring that the 
international trade, as conducted by the shipping industry, could be safely expedited 
without undue threat or fear from terrorists or any other intentional criminal activity. 
Such an assessment is basically a risk analysis of all operational aspects of a port in 
order to determine which facilities in the port area are more susceptible and more 
likely to be the target of attack. It treats the security risk as identical to others caused 
by either natural hazards or human errors. When developing a port security 
assessment model, four elements are introduced, namely; the criticality of each asset 
(C), the probability of occurrence of each threat against a specific asset or target (P), 
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the severity of each adverse attack against that specific asset (S) and the vulnerability 
of each asset or facility (V). C is defined as the relative importance of each facility, 
taking into account its function, location, costs and allowable time for returning 
operational. P would be a measure of the likelihood that a specific type of attack will 
be initiated against a specific target. S is either the amount of expected loss or 
damage, or it is the negative effects in the shipping industry should the attack be 
successful. V would be the likelihood that various types of safeguard measures 
against a scenario would fail [Ung et al., 2004]. According to literature security risk 
could be regarded as a function of the threat of an attack associated with the 
vulnerability of the object under consideration and the consequences caused by such 
an attack [Bum-Howell et al., 2003]. However, such a combination may not 
genuinely reflect the risk results because of the absence of the consideration as to the 
relative importance of each asset. Therefore, in this study the criticality element has 
been incorporated into the security risk model. In the model, a scenario is defined as 
a specific type of attack that would be initiated against a specific target. Therefore, 
when assessing a scenario the four elements aforementioned will be taken into 
account. However, due to the confidentiality of the intelligence with regard to 
terrorism and difficulty of the information accession, the data available for conducting 
a security risk assessment is scarce for most researchers as aforementioned. Thus, the 
security risk in this study is evaluated using FMECA based on fuzzy theory. The 
outcome for this study is a risk ranking for all scenarios based on the results obtained. 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 Fuzzy set theory 
Fuzzy set theory, formalised in 1965, has been widely applied in different fields. Its 
use in system safety and reliability analysis could prove to be useful since such an 
analysis often requires the use of subjective judgement and uncertain data. The use of 
linguistic variables provides flexible modelling of imprecise data and information. A 
linguistic variable differs from a numerical variable in that its values are not numerals 
but words or sentences in a natural or artificial language. The significance of fuzzy 
variables is that they facilitate gradual transition between states and therefore are able 
to deal with the observation and measurement of uncertainties. On the other hand, 
traditional variables, which may be referred to as crisp variables, do not have such a 
capability. Although the definition of states by crisp sets is mathematically correct, in 
many cases it may be regarded as unrealistic in the face of unavoidable measurement 
errors. When dealing with the safety of a system using fuzzy set theory, the 
parameters including occurrence likelihood, consequence and probability of failure 
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consequence can be judged and described using linguistic terms and the membership 
degrees (values) associated. These fuzzy variables can then be synthesised using a 
fuzzy rule base or some other techniques. 
Consider a fuzzy set, A, with points or objects in some relevant universe, X, is defined 
as the elements of x that satisfy the membership property defined for A. In traditional 
4crisp' sets theory, each element of x either is or is not an element of A. Elements in a 
fuzzy set can have a continuum of degrees of membership ranging from complete 
membership to complete non-membership [Zadeh, 1987]. 
Suppose, u(x) expresses the degree of the membership for each element where x r= X 
and p(x) is defined on [0, I]. A membership of zero means that the value does not 
belong to the set under consideration. A membership of I would mean full 
representation of the set under consideration. A membership somewhere between 
these two limits indicates the degree of membership. The manner in which values are 
assigned to a membership is not fixed and may be established according to the 
preference of the person conducting the investigation. 
Formally a fuzzy set A is represented as the ordered pair [x, p(x)]: 
A= {(x, p(x)) Ix cX and 0:: 9 pft):! ý 1) (Equation 3.1) 
The use of a numerical scale for the degree of a membership provides a convenient 
way to represent gradation in the degree of the membership. Fuzzy sets can be 
represented by various shapes. They are commonly represented by S-curves, n-curves, 
triangular curves and linear curves. The shape of a specific fuzzy set depends on the 
best way to represent the data. In general the membership (often indicated on the 
vertical axis) starts at 0 (no membership) and continues to I (full membership). The 
domain of a set is indicated along the horizontal axis. The fuzzy set shape defines the 
relationship between the domain and the membership values of a set. 
3.2.2 Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) was first adopted as a formal design 
methodology in the 1960s by the aerospace industry seeking to enhance the safety and 
reliability level [Sankar and Prabju, 2000]. Since then, it has been applied to assure 
the safety and reliability of products in many industries, mainly including aerospace, 
automotive, nuclear and medical technologies. In the automotive industry for 
example, most companies divide FMEA into two processes, design FMEA and 
process FMEA [Aldridge et al., 1991] [Ford Motor Company, 1988]. Design FMEA 
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is a procedure to ascertain that the right materials are being used to confirm customer 
specifications, and to ensure that government regulations are being met before 
finalising the product design. Process FMEA deals with the manufacturing and 
assembly processes. Several variations of FMEAs have been developed. These 
include the use of a knowledge based system for the automation of the FMEA process 
[Price et al., 19921 [Price et al., 19951 [Russomano et al., 1992], and the introduction 
of a causal reasoning model for FMEA [Bell et al., 1992]. An improved FMEA has 
also been proposed using a single matrix to model the entire system and a set of 
indices derived from a probabilistic combination reflecting the importance of an event 
relating to the indenture under consideration and to the entire system [Kara-Zaitri et 
al., 1992] [Kara-Zaitri et al., 19911. Usually, FMEA is applied to evaluate the system 
behaviour in tenns of identifying potential failure modes and their impact on every 
system component. 
FMECA is an extension of FMEA capable of ranking each potential failure mode 
according to the combined impacts from the parameters such as severity, probability 
of occurrence and detectability. The criticality assessment of each failure mode is 
traditionally performed by either calculating its Criticality Number (CN) or 
developing a Risk Priority Number (RPN). The first method was proposed in U. S. 
MIL-STD-1629A Proceduresfor Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) presenting a well-known criticality assessment methodology based 
on the calculation of a CN for each system failure mode i. That is, CN, = aAApt, 
where fl, is the failure effect probability, a, the failure mode ratio, AP the failure 
rate and t the operating time. The procedure includes the determination ofA, a,, 
AP, and t and the calculation of the values determined to obtain a CN for each failure 
mode. However, there are some shortcomings raised when applying the CN 
calculation method [Bowles and Pelaez, 1995]: 
The CN may be underestimated in that a failure mode has multiple effects in 
different severity categories since only the severest effect is considered in the 
calculation. 
9 The determination of'A, aj, Ap and t is based on qualitative assessment 
using expert predictions or generic apportionments, making the calculation 
less precise. 
An alternative approach for criticality assessment capable of prioritising failures for 
corrective actions is based on an RPN [Pillay and Wang, 2003]. When assessing a 
risk level of a specific failure mode, the RPN method uses linguistic priority terms to 
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rank the elements of probability of occurrence (Sf ), severity (S ) and detectability 
(Sd) on a numeric scale from I to 10. These rankings are subsequently multiplied to 
give the RPN, that is, RPN = Sf xSx Sd . 
Failure modes with higher RPN are 
deemed to be more risky and give a higher priority than those having a lower RPN. 
Tables 3.1,3.2 and 3.3 show how traditional FMEA employs linguistic priority terms 
to rank (Sf ), (S ) and (Sd). 
Table 3.1. Traditional FMECA scale for probability of occurrence (Sf ) 
Criteria Score 
Possible failure occurrence 
rate (operating days) 
Remote I < 1/20000 
Low 2 1/20000 
3 1/10000 
Moderate 4 1/2000 
5 1/1000 
6 1/200 
High 7 1/100 
8 1/20 
Very High 9 1/10 
_ 10 1/2 
Source: [Pillay and Wang, 2OU3] 
Table 3.2. Traditional FMECA scale for severitv (S) 
Criteria Score 
Remote I 
Low 2,3 
Moderate 4,5,6 
High 7,8 
Very High 9,10 
Source: [Pillay and Wang, 2003] 
Table 3.3. Traditional FMECA scale for detectability (Sd) 
Criteria Score Possible detection rate 
Remote 1 86-100 
Low 2 76-85 
3 66-75 
Moderate 4 56-65 
5 46-55 
6 3645 
High 7 26-35 
8 16-25 
Very High 9 6-15 
10 0-5 
Source: [Pillay and Wang, 2003] 
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However, some criticisms have been raised with regard to the application of the RPN 
method [Gilchrist, 19931 [Ben- Daya and Raouf, 1996] [Deng, 1989]: 
There is no precise algebraic rule to assign a score to the possible failure 
occurrence rate and detection rate. Although the application of the traditional 
FMECA scales for probability of occurrence, severity and detectiability as 
shown in Tables 3.1,3.2 and 3.3 simplify the calculation, there can 
nevertheless be problems. The reason for that is because the relationship 
between detection rate and its corresponding score is linear, whereas the 
failure rate and its score do not follow the linear law. 
Although the risk ranking based on the RPN values enables management to 
allocate the limited resources to the most risky events, there is no rationale in 
obtaining it as a product of the elements of (Sf ), (S ) and (Sd) . 
In situations where various sets of (Sf ), (S ) and (Sd) produce an identical 
value of RPN, however, the risk implication may be totally different. For 
example, if considering two different sets of (Sf ), (S ) and (Sd) with values 
of 1,4,6 and 2,3,4, respectively, the RPN value of these two sets is identical 
(24). However, the risk implication is different. When such a circumstance 
occurs, a misjudgement could take place, consequently, the more risky event 
would become unnoticed. 
I 
The RPN value does not consider the relative importance between (Sf ), (S 
and (Sd) , that 
is, these three elements are assumed to have the same 
importance. However, this may not always be the case and sometimes it is 
regarded as impractical. 
3.2.3 Fuzzy Logic FMECA 
In a ftizzy logic based FMECA, linguistic variables such as the probability of 
occurrence and severity can be'represented as members of a fuzzy set, described using 
linguistic priority 'terms associated with corresponding membership values (fuzzy 
inputs) and combine, d'by matching them against rules in a rule base. The input and 
output membership functions as well as the rules are developed based on expert 
judgement. The outcome of such a combination is referred -to as a set of fuzzy 
conclusions. By introducing the deftizzification method taking into account the 
consequentmembership functions, the Ask level of an event based on the defuzzified 
value acquired can be realised. If there are many 
I 
events in question, a list of risk 
priority of these events will then be developed on the basis of their defuzzified values. 
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Bowles and Pelaez evaluated a stopper valve on the water tank levelling system 
illustrates the idea well [Bowles and Pelaez, 1995]. The method has also been 
employed to perform reliability assessment of electronic devices [Zafiropoulos and 
Dialynas, 2004]. A modified method proposed by Braglia and Bevilacqua outlines 
how the AHP method may assist the practitioners in establishing the numerousness 
fuzzy rules [Braglia and Bevilacqua, 2000]. This is because it has several advantages: 
It provides a tool for directly working with the linguistic priority terms used in 
assessing risks. Thus, fuzzy theory enables analysts to evaluate risks in a natural 
way. 
Ambiguous, qualitative or imprecise information as well as quantitative data can 
be used in the assessment and can be handled in a consistent manner. 
It is capable of providing a flexible structure for combining the elements of 
criticality, probability of occurrence, severity and vulnerability. In other words, 
these elements can be evaluated taking into account their individual importance. 
In addition, the traditional method only allows for three elements in the fuzzy logic 
FMECA model whereas this study evaluates four. Furthermore, the work presented 
here demonstrates how a fuzzy rule base can be established as each element has its 
own degree of importance. Figure 3.1 clearly illustrates the idea of risk assessment 
using the ftizzy modelling proposed in this research [Ung et al., 2005]. 
Input membership ftinctions Rules 
supplied by experts 
II 
Fuzzy input Consequent 
P 10. Fuzzy PF membership 
C0v Fuzzy C 
rul bas functions 
S 
01 
Fuzzification 
Fuzzy S Fuzzy 
co nc 
Fuzzy V 
Ic 
L 
lusion 
Defuzzi- 
fication 
Risk Iý 
Ranking 
Figure 3.1. The proposed idea of risk assessment using fuzzy modeling [Ung et 
al., 20051 
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3.3 Research methodology 
In circumstances where the lack or incompleteness of data exists, there is a need to 
incorporate expert judgement into the risk study. A framework is established based 
on fuzzy set theory alone with the ftizzy rule base-method since it is capable of 
quantifying the judgement from experts who express opinions qualitatively. The 
parameters considered include the elements of C, P, S and V. Five linguistic priority. 
terms describing these four elements are, employed, namely, 'Remote', 'Low', 
'Moderate', 'Iligh' and 'Very High'. A scenario associated with these four elements 
will then be established, representing the primary risk characteristics. Each scenario 
cannot be compared until the following steps are taken. The first step 4s to establish 
the membership function for the linguistic priority tekms using a triangular 
distribution based on expert judgements. The values of the membership function 
associated with the linguistic priority terms of 9ach of these four elements involved in 
a specific scenario will then be determined. This is followed by the development of a 
rule base which is also based on expert judgements. - An element, namely, Priority 
Level, comprising an arbitrary value associated with a defined linguistic priority term, 
will be introduced with respect to the combinations of C, P, S and V. The first three 
steps are regarded as a fuzzification process expressing how well the input belongs to 
the linguistic priority terms used in the rules. A defuzzification process will then be 
adopted by employing appropriate algorithms. A value of the overall risk to a 
scenario will be obtained. A risk ranking of all scenarios can consequently be 
produced. Figure 3.2 shows the research methodology [Ung et al., 20051. 
1. Establishment of membership 
function for the linguistic prioriýv terms 
of each element based on expert 
I 
judgement 
I 
Criticality II Probability II Severity II Vulnerability 
2. Development of fuzzy rule base 
3. Acquirement of the set of Rizzy 
conclusions of each scenario 
I 
Fuzzification 
4. Deftizzification process 
5. Establishment of a security risk 
ranking of all scenarios 
Figure 3.2. The flowchart of the research methodology 
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3.3.1 Establishment of membership function for linguistic priority terms of 
each element 
The membership function is established for the linguistic priority terms describing the 
linguistic variables C, P, S and V using multiple experts. The experts involved in a 
port security project should be appropriately selected in order that an unrealistic and 
biased membership function will be avoided [Kuusela et al., 19981. Each expert is 
asked to evaluate a proposition 'x belongs to A T. Suppose A is a fuzzy set on X 
that represents a linguistic priority term associated with a given linguistic variable and 
a, (x) is a value of scores within a certain range. in X i. e. a, (x) r: X (in this study, X 
follows the sarne pattern the traditional FMEA adopts, 1-10 categories). In the 
situation where there are n experts and each of them has equal competence, the 
following formula is applied [Klir and Yuan, 1995]: 
A(x) = 
1, 
=, 
a, (x) 
(Equation 3.2) 
where A(x) is the final answer (value) after the judgements made by these n experts 
are synthesised, and 
a, (x) is the answer (value) given by the ih expert, ien. 
In the case where the experts have different degrees of competencies, Equation 3.2 is 
modified as: 
n 
A(x) Comnai (X) (Equation 3.3) 
where Comp, is the degree of competency of the i' expert, and 
n 
ECOM 
(Equation 3.4) 
It is important to note that the degree of competency for each of the experts should be 
determined based on his knowledge and experience in risk assessment as well as the 
port security field. 
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The triangular membership function is adopted since it has a smooth transition from 
one linguistic priority term to the other. In addition, it facilitates easy defuzzification 
of each linguistic priority term. The membership function for each linguistic priority 
term is evaluated within its limits on an arbitrary scale from 0 to 1. 
Prior to the determination of the membership function for C, it is important to conduct 
a criticality assessment since it is capable of identifying and evaluating significant 
assets and infrastructure in terms of various factors. The following factors should be 
taken into account when evaluating the criticality of facilities within port areas: 
The importance of the function of each facility in terms of overall port 
operations. 
* The location of each facility. 
The allowable time for returning the facility to operational capability if 
attacked [U. S. Department of Veteran Affairs, 20021. 
The costs of permanent replacement and temporary substitute as well as the 
loss of income in the downtime period [ASIS International Guidelines 
Commission, 2003]. 
Traditional risk assessment techniques evaluating the element of likelihood of 
occurrence is often based on failure rates obtained from daily operations. When 
assessing the likelihood of occurrence of potential threats in port security, however, 
there is usually no such data available. It may only be possible to rely on complicated 
factors such as politics, intelligence, the capability, intention and past activities of 
potential criminal organisations etc. to determine the likelihood of occurrence level 
using linguistic priority terms. Additionally, the level of severity would depend upon 
the extent to which the negative effects impose on the port operations once an attack 
or intentional crime was initiated. The criteria of evaluating such effects may include 
the number of injuries and fatalities as well as the damage to the facility. 
A vulnerability assessment is a process that obtains the probability of the weaknesses 
identified in physical structures, personnel protection systems, the security processes 
aimed at the surveillance of the passage of cargoes and personnel and some other 
measures designed to prevent attacks ihdt may be exploited by terrorists or criminals. 
By conducting drills periodically, the data available for the vulnerability assessment 
can be collected and analysed. In general such an assessment is performed by teams 
of experts specialising in engineering, intelligence, security, etc.. 
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Thus, the first step of the methodology is strongly concerned with the application of 
braining-storming techniques conducted by trained and experienced personnel to 
determine the hazards. Therefore, it is often a qualitative exercise strongly based on 
expert judgement. The techniques which could be employed in this step include 
Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), 
FMECA, What-If Analysis, Checklist Analysis, Structured What-If Checklist 
Technique (SWIFT), Cause-Consequence Analysis, Boolean Representation Method, 
Simulation Analysis etc. [Henley and Kumamoto, 1992] [Villemeur, 1992] [Smith, 
1993] [Wang et al., 1995]. 
In addition, as stated earlier, five linguistic priority terms are employed to describe the 
linguistic variables of each scenario, whose interpretations are given in Tables 3.4, 
3.5,3.6 and 3.7. 
It is worthwhile noting that the more quantified the data supporting the criteria 
adopted in each of these four elements is, the more precise the acquired outcome will 
be. The output of this step is that each element of a scenario has at least one 
membership degree associated with one linguistic priority term. 
Table 3.4. The interpretation of the linauistic Prioritv terms for criticalitv 
Linguistic Interpretation 
priority term 
The importance of the facility is near none. Its location is much 
further away from the centre where . 
important personnel are 
Remote located and/or confidential information is stored. Its costs and 
time for returning to operational capability would be extremely 
low if attacked. 
The importance of the Lfacility is low. Its location is far away from 
Low the centre. Its costs and time for returning to operational 
capability would be low if attacked. 
The importance of the facility is moderate. Its location is not far 
Moderate away from the centre. Its costs and time for returning to 
operational capability would be moderate if attacked. 
The importance of the facility is high. The location is near the 
High centre. The costs and time for returning to operational capability 
would be high if attacked. 
The importance of the facility is very high. The location is very 
Very High near or in the centre. The costs and time for returning to 
operational capability would be extremely high if attacked. 
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Table 3.5. The interpretation of the linguistic priority terms for probability of 
occurrdnce 
Linguistic Interpretation 
priority term 
it would be very unlikely for the scenario in question to occur Remote 
even once in the facility's lifetime. 
it would be unlikely for the scenario in question to occur once in Low 
the facility's lifetime. 
It would be likely for the scenario in question to occur more than Moderate 
once in the facility's lifetime. 
It would be very likely for the scenario in question to occur at High 
least once in the facility's lifetime. 
It would be almost certain for the scenario in question to occur Very High 
several times in the facility's lifetime. 
Table 3.6. The interpretation of the linguistic priority terms for severity 
Linguistic Interpretation 
priority term 
The scenario in question would have almost no effect on port Remote 
operations. 
The scenario in question would have low effect on port 
Low operations, e. g. a few people slightly injured and / or little damage 
to the facility. 
The scenario in question would cause moderate effect on port 
Moderate operations, e. g. a limited amount of injuries and a limited amount 
of damage to the facility. 
The scenario in question would have high effect on port 
High operations, e. g. a certain amount of injuries and fatalities and 
serious damage to the facility. 
The scenario in question would have extremely high effect on port 
Very High operations, e. g. serious injuries and fatalities and complete 
damage of the facility. 
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Tnhlp-'I-7- The internretation of the linizuistic nrioritv terms for vulncrabilitv 
Linguistic Interpretation 
priority term 
it is extremely unlikely that the security measures designed to Remote 
prevent the intentional crimes would fail once attacked. 
It is unlikely that the safety and security measures designed to Low 
prevent the intentional crimes would fail once attacked. 
It is likely that the safety and security measures designed to 
Moderate 
prevent the intentional crimes would fail once attacked. 
It is very likely that the safety and security measures designed to High 
prevent the intentional crimes would fail once attacked. 
The safety and security measures designed to prevent the Very High 
intentional crimes would definitely fail once attacked. 
3.3.2 Development of a fuzzy rule base 
Fuzzy rule base systems are constructed from human knowledge in the form of fuzzy 
IF / THEN rules [Wang, 1997]. A fuzzy IF / THEN rule is an IF / THEN statement in 
which some words are characterised by continuous membership functions [Pillay and 
Wang, 2002]. It provides a systematic procedure capable of transforming a 
knowledge base into non-linear mapping. The first part of an IF / THEN rule is the 
input variables, including the elements of C, P, S and V. The second part is the 
consequent describing the risk level based on a value of weight established by experts 
and a linguistic priority term attached. In this study, the consequence i. s. referred-to-as- 
Priority Level and five. linguistic priority terms are introduced to interpret it, namely, . ýo_ Minor, w, Mi6dýerate, Signi-ficant and., Very Significant. 
A ftizzy rule base is developed in the fashion where the selected experts are asked to 
group the various combinations of linguistic priority terms describing C, P, S and V of 
each scenario into a consequent described by one of the five linguistic priority terms 
reflecting the Priority Level. Since there are four elements associated with five 
linguistic priority terms, the total number of the rules is 625. When developing the 
rule base in this study, it is decided to put more weight onto the elements of criticality 
and vulnerability i. e. 0.3 each for C and V and 0.2 each for P and S. This is due to the 
fact that the criticality determines the relative importance of each asset whereas the 
vulnerability is the only element that the administration can fully control when 
encounfering intentional crimes. It is noted that the purpose for assigning the weights 
to each parameter in this test case is to demonstrate that the rufe base established is 
capable of taking into account different importance of parameters and the values of 
the weight for each parameter may vary depending upon the assumption made. The 
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consequent (the column of Priority Level) is determined by the five linguistic priority 
terms (Minor, Low, Moderate, Significant and Very Significant) and an arbitrary 
value based on the combination of the weights assigned and the level of each 
linguistic priority term describing the four parameters. 'Me membership function for 
the linguistic terms depicting the Priority Level of each rule developed can be 
determined by applying Equations 3.3 and 3.4. The procedure to determine a Priority 
Level is indicated below: 
If Criticality is Remote, Probability of Occurrence is Remote, Severity is Remote and 
Vulnerability is Remote, then the Priority Level is Minor (1). The value of I is 
determined by the summation of the product of the individual weight assigneý (that is, 
Criticality 0.3, Probability of Occurrence = 0.2, Severity 0.2 and Vulnerability 
0.3) and the level of each linguistic priority term describing these four elements 
(Remote = Level 1, Low = Level 2, Moderate = Level 3, High = Level 4 and Very 
High = Level 5). The value of threshold of dach linguistic priority term describing 
Priority Levels is set up to be 1 (that is, Minor = 1, Low = 2, Moderate = 3, 
Significant =4 and Very Significant = 5). If Criticality is Remote, Probability of 
Occurrence is Remote, Severity is Low and Vulnerability is Remote, for instance, the 
summation of the product based on the individual weight assigned and the level of the 
linguistic terms describing the security parameters is 1.2 
( 0.3 xI+0.2 x1+0.2 x2+0.3 xI). Therefore, the linguistic priority term and its 
associated value adopted to describe the Priority Level is Low (0.2). 
Thus, the fuzzy rule base to be developed in this study takes the relative importance of 
each linguistic variable into consideration and this is a distinguishing feature from 
traditional rule base methods. 
3.3.3 Acquirement of the set of fuzzy conclusions of each scenario 
The Priority Level of a specific scenario will be decided on the basis of the fuzzy rule 
base developed. Using the 'min-max' approach, a set of fuzzy conclusions for each 
scenario will be obtained. When applying the 'min-max' approach, the following 
steps are taken: 
i. Identify the poS'Sible combinations of C, P, S and V in which the 
membership values associated with the corresponding linguistic priority 
terms are not zero. The outputs of such combinations can be obtained 
from the fuzzy rule base developed. 
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Determine the minimum value of each combination (rule) by comparing 
the values obtained from each element and the value of summation of the 
product based on the individual weights assigned and the level of the 
linguistic terms describing the security parameters established in the 
Priority Level. 
Determine the highest minimum values obtained from the last step with 
respect to each linguistic priority term. 
If there is only one rule that can be applied to the scenario in question, then the 
minimum value of the combination and the linguistic priority term associated 
describing the Priority Level will be the set of fuzzy conclusions. In the above, each 
maximum value and its associated linguistic priority term is a fuzzy conclusion, each 
set of fuzzy conclusions of each scenario will be defuzzified using the method 
proposed in the next section. 
In general fazzy set manipulation rules are applied to process the fuzzy information at 
the same level and to conduct synthesis between different levels. However, the use of 
fuzzy set manipulation rules cannot avoid the loss of useful information in a 
hierarchical synthesis process. It is noted that in this study, the number of the 
hierarchy is only two. That is, the bottom level containing the parameters of C, P, S 
and V and the top level consisting of the overall security risk. Thus, the loss of useful 
information can be restricted to a certain level. Accordingly, the overall results to be 
obtained can still express the risk levels with confidence. 
3.3.4 Defuzzification process 
The defuzzification process is capable of createing a single crisp value based on the 
fuzzy conclusion set describing the Priority Level of scenarios to express the inherent 
security risk. Several deftizzification algorithms have been developed [Runkler and 
Glesner, 19931. The one selected for use in this study is the Weighted Mean of 
Maximums (WMoM). The algorithm averages the points of maximum possibility of 
each Priority Level of scenarios, weighted by the degree of truth at which the 
membership functions reach their maximum values [Pillay and Wang, 2002] [Andrew 
and Moss, 2002]. The formula of WMoM is as follows: 
WMOM = lwi 
(Equation 3.5) 
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where w, is the degree of truth of the membership function of the i" linguistic priority 
tenn, and 
x, is the risk rank at maximum value of the membership function of the 
i' lingui§tic priority term. 
3.3.5 Establishment of a security risk ranking for all scenarios 
It is in this step that the security risk ranking of all scenarios will be presented. Based 
on the results obtained from the defuzzification process, the scenarios with relatively 
higher risks will be identified. The higher the defuzzified values the scenarios have, 
the more the attention that should be paid. 
3.4 Test case 
The aim of this study is to demonstrate how the methodology can be applied to port 
security. A difficulty exists however in that data is difficult to acquire and thus, the 
data in this research is obtained based on expert judgement. In real world case 
studies, however, such data should be evaluated by the experts specialising in risk 
assessment and port security operations. 
3.4.1 Establishment of the membership functions for linguistic priority terms of 
C, P, S and V 
As described in Section 3.3, five linguistic priority terms are introduced for modelling 
C, P, S and V, namely, Remote, Low, Moderate, High and Very High. Using 
Equations 3.3 and 3.4 provided that the weight of each expert is given, the values 
capable of fully representing each linguistic priority term (that is, the limits where the 
membership function reaches I or becomes 0) can be determined. The value (A(x)) 
that fully represents the linguistic priority term when the membership function reaches 
1, e. g. Remote, can be obtained as follows (provided that there are five experts with 
the weights of 0.3,0.3,0.2,0.1 and 0.1, associated with their individual answers as to 
the value that can fully describe the linguistic term, Remote, when the membership 
function reaches 1, which are 1.5,1.5,1,2, and 2, respectively): 
A(x) =1 Ca, (x) = 0.3 -1.5 + 0.3.1.5 + 0.2.1 + 0.1.2 + 0.1.2 = 1.5 
i=I 
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The values of two limits of the linguistic priority term, "Rcmote", as the membership 
function reaches 0, can also be calculated using the pattern illustrated above. Figure 
3.3 illustrates the membership functions established in this test case for the five 
linguistic priority terms depicting the parameters of C, P, S and V based on expert 
judgements. In the real world, the establishment of membership functions and 
determination of the linguistic priority terms and its associated membership depend 
upon the data collected if possible and the factors already stated in the section 3.3.1. 
3.4.2 Development of a fuzzy rule base 
As stated in the previous subsection, since there are four linguistic variables and each 
has been assigned five linguistic priority terms, the number of fuzzy rules developed 
is 625 (5 x5x5x 5). As already described in the research methodology section, due 
to the fact that the criticality and vulnerability assessments are the internal factors that 
can be fully controlled by the adniinistration, the weight assigned to each is 0.3, which 
is higher than the other two, 0.2. The consequent (the column of Priority Level) is 
determined by five linguistic priority terms (Minor, Low, Moderate, Significant and 
Very Significant) and an arbitrary value based on the combination of the weights 
assigned and the level of each linguistic'priority term describing the four elements. 
By applying Equations 3.3 and 3.4, the membership functions of the linguistic terms 
depicting the Priority Level of each rule developed can be obtained as shown in 
Figure 3.4. Also by applying the procedure described in section 3.3.2, a fuzzy rule 
base is developed. Appendix I shows the fuzzy rule base developed for this test case 
that is capable of taking the relative importance of each parameter into consideration, 
possessing such a distinguishing feature from traditional rule base methods. 
Membership 
I 
Categories 
Figure 3.3. Membership function for linguistic priority terms reflecting C, P, S 
and V 
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Membership 
I 
3.4.3 Determination of risk levels for C, P, S and V of each scenario and the 
acquirement of its fuzzy conclusion 
In order to obtain a security risk ranking, two steps are required. First, the linguistic 
priority terms and the membership values associated reflecting the risk levels for C, P, 
S and V of each scenario should be carefully. decided. Secondly, the fuzzy set 
conclusion of each scenario will be obtained based on the fuzzy rule base using the 
6min-max' approach. Since the purpose of this research is to demonstrate how the 
security risk can be modelled, in the first step a test case containing 10 scenarios is 
established. Suppose the risk catego of the criticality of scenario I falls within c 
categories 7 and 8,7.3, for exampl 
7, 
the level for C from a specific scenario is 
described as Moderate 0.3 8 and Higý(O. 18 as shown in Figure 3.5. 
Membership 
Figure 3.5. The Determination of Membership Function for the Criticality 
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In a similar way, the descriptions of C, P, S and V for all scenarios can be produced as 
described in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8. The levels of C. P. S and V of each Scenario 
Probability of Scenario No. Criticality Severity Vulnerability Occurrence 
Moderate 0.38, Low 0.42, Very High 0.8, High 0.41, 
I 
High 0.18 Moderate 0.14 High 0.1 Moderate 0.17 
High 0.6, Very High 0.55, 
2 Remote 0.5 
High 0.1 
Moderate 0.7 
Moderate 0.09 
Very High 0.4, High 0.4, 
Very High 
3 
High 0.4 Moderate 0.18 
Moderate 0.5 0.52, High 
1 0.29 
4 Moderate I 
Low 0.28, 
High 0.65 
Very High 0.9, 
Moderate 0.28 High 0.05 
Very High 0.9, Low 0.39, Moderate 0.39, 
Very High 
5 
High 0.05 Moderate 0.19 Low 0.12 
0.81, High 
0.12 
Low 0.39, 
Very High 
Very High 0.9, Moderate 0.39, 
6 
Moderate 0.19 
0.805, High 
High 0.05 Low 0.12 
0.12 
Low 0.5, Low 0.3 1, Moderate 0.44, 
7 
Remote 0.17 Remote 0.31 Low 0.08 
Remote I 
8 
Moderate 0.38, 
High 0.65 
Low 0.39, 
Moderate 0.7 High 0.18 Moderate 0.19 
Low 0.42, High 0.6, Very High 0.4, Low 0.28, 
9 
Moderate 0.14 High 0.1 Moderate 0.18 Moderate 0.28 
Very High 0.9, Very High 
10 
High 0.05 
Remote 0.5 Remote 0.5 0.81, High 
1 0.12 
By applying the 'min-max' approach, the set of fuzzy conclusions of Scenario I is 
obtained as follows: 
i. List the membership function values according to the rules developed. 
(1) If C= Moderate 0.38, P= Low 0.42, S= Very High 0.8 and V High 
0.41, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.5. 
(2) If C= High 0.18, P= Low 0.42, S= Very High 0.8 and V High 
0.41, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.8. 
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(3) If C= Moderate 0.38, P= Moderate 0.14, S= Very High 0.8 and V 
High 0.41, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.7. 
(4) If C= High 0.18, P= Moderate 0.14, S= Very High 0.8 and V= High 
0.41, then the Priority Level is Significant 1. 
(5) If C= Moderate 0.38, P= Low 0.42, S= Moderate 0.1 and V= High 
0.4 1, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.1. 
(6) If C= High 0.18, P= Low 0.42, S= Moderate 0.1 and V= High 0.4 1, 
then the Priority Level is Significant 0.4. 
(7) If C= Moderate 0.38, P= Moderate 0.14, S= Moderate 0.1 and V 
High 0.41, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.3. 
(8) If C= High 0.18, P= Moderate 0.14, S= Moderate 0.1 and V= High 
0.41, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.6. 
(9) If C= Moderate 0.38, P= Low 0.42, S= Very High 0.8 and V 
Moderate 0.17, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.2. 
(10) If C= High 0.181, P= Low 0.42, S= Very High 0.8 and V= Moderate 
0.17, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.5. 
(11) If C= Moderate 0.3 8, P= Moderate 0.14, S= Very High 0.8 and V= 
Moderate 0.17, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.4. 
(12) If C= High 0.18, P= Moderate 0.14, S= Very High 0.8 and V= 
Moderate 0.17, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.7. 
(13) If C= Moderate 0.38, P= Low 0.42, S= Moderate 0.1 and V= 
Moderate 0.17, then the Priority Level is Moderate 0.8. 
(14) If C= High 0.18, P= Low 0.42, S= Moderate 0.1 and V= Moderate 
0.17, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.1. 
(15) If C= Moderate 0.38, P= Moderate 0.14, S= Moderate 0.1 and V 
Moderate 0.17, then the Priority Level is Moderate 1. 
(16) If C= High 0.18, P= Moderate 0.14, S= Moderate 0.1 and V 
Moderate 0.17, then the Priority Level is Significant 0.3. 
I Determine the minimum value of each combination in terms of comparing 
the values obtained from each element and the value of the product based 
on the individual weight assigned and the level of the linguistic terms 
describing the security parameters established in the Priority Level. 
In the first combination, C= Moderate 0.38, P= Low 0.42, S= Very High 0.8 
and V= High 0.41 and the Priority Level is Significant 0.5. Therefore, the 
minimum value of C, P, S and V is 0.38, which is associated with the 
linguistic priority term Significant according to the fuzzy rule developed. The 
minimum values of the other 15 combinations can be determined in a similar 
way as shown in Table 3.9. 
-79- 
Chapter 3. Risk Assessment ofPort Security using Fuzzy Modelling 
Tnhle 3.9. The minimum value of each conthination 
Significant Significant Significant Significant 
I 2 3 4 
0.38 0.18 0.14 0.14 
Significant Significant Significant Significant 
5 
0.1 
6 
0.1 
7 
0.1 
8 
0.1 
Significant Significant Significant Significant 
9 10 11 12 
0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 
Moderate Significant Moderate Significant 
13 14 15 16 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
iii. Determine the maximum value of the minimum values obtained from the 
last step that has the same category of linguistic priority term. 
In the first scenario, there are 16 combinations and two different categories 6f 
linguistic priority terms, Moderate and Significant. The membership values in 
the Significant category are 0.38,0.18,0.14,0.1 and 0.17, respectively. 
Therefore, the maximum membership value is 0.38 as shown in Table 3.10. 
Likewise, the values in the Moderate group are 0.1 in the 13 th combination and 
the 15'h combination. Thus, the maximum membership value in the Moderate 
category is 0.1. The sets of ftizzy conclusions of the other 9 scenarios can be 
obtained in a similar way, which will be defuzzified in the next section. Table 
3.11 shows the set of fuzzy conclusions of the 10 scenarios. 
Table 3.10. The maximum value associated with the same category of 
linizuiStiC Drioritv terms 
Category of linguistic priority terms Maximum values 
Moderate 0.1 
Significant 0.38 
Table 3.11. The sets of fuzzv conclusions of the 10 scenarios 
Scenario No. The set of fuzzy conclusions 
1 Moderate 0.1, Significant 0.38 
2 Moderate 0.5, Significant 0.1 
3 Significant 0.29, High 0.4 
4 Significant 0.28 
5 Significant 0.39, High 0.19 
6 Moderate 0.12, Significant 0.39 
7 Fairly Low 0.31 
8 Moderate 0.38, Significant 0.19 
9 Moderate 0.28, Significant 0.14 
10 Moderate 0.05, Significant 0.4 
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3.4.4 Defuzzification process 
By applying Equation 3.5 in the defuzzification process, taking into account the risk 
ranks at the maximum value of the membership function as shown in Figure 3.4, the 
defuzzified value of scenario I can be detailed as follows: 
wmom = 
lwi 
= 
0.1 -2+0.38-4.5 
0.1+0.38 
In a similar way, the defuzzified values of all scenarios are obtained as shown in 
Table 3.12. The scenarios with higher defuzzified values are considered to be more 
risky. 
Table 3.12. The defuzziried values of the 10 scenarios 
Scenario No. Deftizzified Values 
1 3.98 
2 2.42 
3 6.53 
4 4.5 
5 5.65 
6 3.91 
7 1.0 
8 2.83 
9 2.83 
10 4.22 
3.4.5 Establishment of a security risk ranking for all scenarios 
The security risk ranking of all scenarios can be determined based on the defuzzified 
values calculated. Table 3.13 shows the ranking based on the risk results acquired. 
Table 3.13. The securitv risk rankine of the 10 scenarins 
Scenario No. Security risk ranking (associated with defuzzified vales) 
1 5(3.98) 
2 8(2.42) 
3 1(6.53) 
4 3(4.5) 
5 2(5.65) 
6 6(3.91) 
7 9(1.0) 
8 7(2.83) 
9 7(2.83) 
10 4(4.22) 
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It can be seen from Tables 3.8 and 3.13 that the scenarios in which the parameters 
described by more negative linguistic terms have higher risks than those depicted by 
more positive terms. This is consistent with the human-being common sense. 
Furthermore, the difference of the risk level between these scenarios can be 
appreciated. It can also be seen from Table 3.13 that the first five scenarios with 
higher security risks are Scenarios 3,5,4,10 and 1, respectively. This is because 
their corresponding defuzzified values are higher than the rest, which are 6.53,5.65, 
4.5,4.22 and 3.98, respectively. These scenarios arc the ones that need to deserve 
more attention and appropriate RCOs should be devised and employed to reduce the 
risks. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The security assessment is usually difficult to model since its characteristic has been 
regarded as an unpredictable likelihood but with a high consequence. In this chapter, 
port security is evaluated based on the concept of risk assessment using fuzzy 
modelling, illustrating a different thinking of assessing security. Within the FMECA 
framework, the risk level of each scenario can be appreciated. Based on the results 
obtained from the defuzzification process, the scenarios with relatively higher risks 
can be identified. The higher defuzzified values the scenarios have, the more the 
attention that should be paid. Thus, security measures aimed at reducing security 
risks will be able to be identified based on the ranking acquired. In addition, although 
the model proposed in this study is capable of dealing with the security risk in ports 
when there is not much precise information in hand based on the partial validation 
conducted in section 3.4.5, the quantification of the data compiled and collected from 
daily operations associated with security by port authority is still recommended. It is 
noted that although the fuzzy rule base technique applied in this study is capable of 
modelling and synthesising the fuzzy parameters under consideration in a consistent 
manner, it has drawbacks. A shortcoming occurs as the technique is applied to 
circumstances where there are multiple parameters to be evaluated which are 
described by multiple linguistic terms. If there were five parameters described by five 
different linguistic variables, for instance, the number of fuzzy rules needed to be 
developed would be 3,125. Accordingly, the applications of fuzzy set theory with the 
adoption of a Rizzy rule base would become impractical. Such a drawback can be 
overcome by incorporating the ftizzy set theory with an Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN). The framework so proposed is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. Risk Prediction of Port Marine 
Safety using Fuzzy Set Theory and Artificial 
Neural Network 
The traditional fuzzy-rule-based risk assessment technique has been 
applied in many industries due to the capability of combining different 
parameters to obtain an overall risk However, a drawback occurs as the 
technique is applied in circumstances where there are multiple parameters 
to be evaluated which are described by multiple linguistic terms. In this 
chapter, a risk prediction model incorporating fuzzy set theory and 
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) capable of resolving the problem 
encountered is proposed An algorithm capable of converting the risk- 
relatedparameters and the overall risk levelfrom the fuzzy property to the 
crisp-valued attribute is also developed Its application is demonstrated 
by a test case evaluating the navigational safety within port areas. It is 
concluded that a risk predicting ANN model is capable of generating 
reliable results as long as the training data takes into account any 
potential circumstance that may be met. 
4.1 Introduction 
Fuzzy set theory has been applied in many fields including that of the maritime 
industry for decades. One of its great advantages is that it has the ability of 
representing mathematically a class of decision problems with the involvement of 
many vague goals and constraints. It is common for risk practitioners to apply the 
theory in association with the development of a fuzzy rule base. Successful 
applications of fuzzy set theory in the maritime industry include the combinations of 
fuzzy set modelling and evidential reasoning assessing the safety associated with and 
the cost incurred in each option of safety requirements specifications [Wang and 
Yang, 20011; the risk assessment of fishing vessels using fuzzy set theory [Pillay and 
Wang, 2002]; a decision making model using fuzzy set theory and a Dempster-Shafer 
algorithm based approach dealing with multiple-attribute decision making problems 
[Sii et al., 2002]; a risk assessment approach based on modified failure mode and 
effects analysis using a fuzzy rule base [Pillay and Wang, 2003], etc. 
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However, the applications of fuzzy set theory with the adoption of a fuzzy rule base 
become impractical as there are multiple parameters to be evaluated which are 
described by multiple linguistic terms. If there were five parameters described by five 
different linguistic variables, for example, the number of fuzzy rules needing to be 
developed would be 3,125. In this study, a risk prediction model incorporating fuzzy 
set theory and ANN aimed at resolving the problem encountered is proposed due to 
the strength of such a network in data recognition. 
The framework proposed is demonstrated by modelling the navigational safety within 
a port area by taking into account the crucial factors affecting it. According to a study 
carried out to investigate the accidents in seaports from the beginning of the twentieth 
century to October 2002 collected by Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDS) 
as discussed in Chapter 2,43.6 % of a total of 471 accidents are caused by an impact 
of heavy objects or collision between ships or between a ship and dry land, and 
vehicles [Darbra and Casal, 2004]. Table 2.11 in Chapter 2 sunimarises the specific 
causes of accidents in seaports. It can be seen that within the impact category, the 
causes of 71 % of the accidents are related to a ship and land, or ship and ship 
collision. In addition, using the same statistics, 56.5% of accidents took place during 
the transport process [Darbra and Casal, 2004] as shown in Table 2.12. The transport 
category includes, all accidents that occurred in moving ships (entering or leaving the 
port), and in lorries or trains entering or leaving port facilities. Therefore, as far as 
port safety is concerned, navigational safety is an important factor to be considered. 
The salient parameters playing important roles in navigational safety in the study 
include the Vessel Traffic Control (VTC) performance, navigation aids and facilities, 
pilotage performance, sealane maintenance and the weather condition. The first four 
elements aforementioned are regarded as the specific port safety functions relating to 
navigation by the experts specialising in ports [Sydney Ports, 2005] whereas the 
weather condition is the parameter that cannot be managed or controlled by a port. 
Fuzzy set theory enables safety analysts to evaluate risks under circumstances where 
the lack of data exists whereas-an ANN has the strength of predicting reliable results 
based on the quantitative training data prepared. Therefore, for the purpose of 
incorporating the advantages of these two techniques and allowing for the fact that the 
data entered into an ANN must be quantitative, an interface between the fuzzy set 
theory and ANN must be provided. Accordingly, an algorithm capable of converting 
the risk-related parameters and the overall risk level from the fuzzy property to the 
crisp-valued attribute is developed. The model will be tested and modified by 
inputting the testing data until it meets the accuracy criteria established appropriately. 
Consequently, the model can be utilised as a risk prediction tool facilitating the 
process of decision making. 
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4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Fuzzy set theory 
One of the objectives of fuzzy set theory is to help in making decisions characterised 
by imprecise information [Zadeh, 1965] [Klir and Folger, 1988] [Predrycz and 
Gomide, 1998]. The strengths and background of fuzzy set theory is available and 
can be found in section 3.2.1 of this PhD study. 
Frequently fuzzy set theory is applied along with the development of a fuzzy rule 
base, followed by a defuzzification process to yield an overall risk index. However, 
as the number of the parameters or objects to be evaluated and the linguistic terms 
associated increases, such an application becomes, as aforementioned, impractical. 
4.2.2 Artiricial Neural Network 
ANNs can be defined as an interconnected assembly of simple processing elements, 
neurons or nodes, of which the functionality is based on the human brain neurons 
[Gurney, 1997]. The processing ability of the network is stored in the interunit 
connection strengths, or weights that are obtained and adjusted by a learning process 
from a set of training patterns. A trained ANN is capable of recognising, recalling 
and comparing non-linear and multidimensional input-output patterns. 
Figure 4.1 is a simple neuron illustrating the signal processing ability. It receives the 
signals from n inputs( X1 11 X2, *, *'Xn), each of which has its own connection strength 
(W19W2 .... wj. 
The neuron subsequently evaluates the signals by adding the product 
of each input and the connection strength associated and comparing the summation to 
its threshold value, 0. The vector calculated is then converted using the transfer 
function, F. Consequently, the converted value is the output of the neuron. Figure 
4.2 shows two examples of transfer functions and each of them determines the value 
of outputs in different ways. 
W, 
X2 
W2 
F] 
W. 
n 
,. I- y=F ýx, *w, - X. i=l 
0) 
0 
Figure 4.1. The signal processing procedure of a neuron [Gurney, 19971 
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Figure 4.2. The linear and tansigmoid transfer functions [Gurney, 19971 
Figure 4.3 is a two-layer neural network containing two inputs in the input layer, ten 
neurons in the hidden layer and one output in the output layer. In a supervised 
training process in which the actual response from output layers is compared with a 
priori desired output known as the target output [Kartalopoulos, 1996], the goal i. e. 
the criterion of the error signal, is achieved by adjusting weight vectors. The speed of 
the training process depends upon an important element, the learning rate. This is 
because it governs the quantity of the changes to the connection strengths of each 
neuron. Learning rates between 0.05 to 0.25 are often preferred. The larger the 
learning rate, the faster the training process. It is noted that a too large learning rate 
would lead the learning process to become unstable and that it would vary whenever 
the number of the neurons and layers changes. Therefore, the optimum learning rate 
should be selected based on experiments. In addition, there are several algorithms 
capable of assisting' ANNs to achieve the goal. The one adopted is the 
backpropagation algorithm based on the delta rule using the gradient descent 
technique. The steps of applying such an algorithm associated with the use of the 
ftizzy set theory are discussed in the next section. 
Inputlayer Hidden layer Output layer 
1,2 i=L. 10 k=1 
Figure 4.3. A two-layer neural network 
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In addition, ANN has been employed in many spheres because of its strength in data 
pattern recognition. These include signal processing [Cichocki and Unbehauen, 
19931; visual image data recognition [Miller, 1994]; communication systems 
[Kartalopoulos, 1994]; onboard satellite navigation systems, classification of aircraft 
radar signals; automatic target recognition [Kartalopoulos, 1996]; traffic safety 
analysis [Abdelwahab and Abdel-Aty, 2002]; the fire safety assessment [Lee et al., 
2004], etc. The application of ANNs in the maritime industry is rare in comparison 
with other industries. Nevertheless, this includes an ANN application to marine 
systems modelling complex non-linear functions [Roskilly and Mesbahi, 19961; the 
prediction as to the likelihood of the type of vessel accidents [Hashemi et al., 1995]; 
the employment of the statistics of bulk carrier loss predicting the overall risk [Buxton 
et al., 1997]; the application of a neural network for ship domain assessment 
[Lisowski, 2000]; the use of an ANN with regard to vessel accidents for pattern 
recognition [Blanc et al., 2001] and the incorporation of an ANN into a risk 
estimation model [Wang et al., 2004]. 
4.3 Research methodology 
The research methodology of this study starts with the establishment of the 
membership functions for the linguistic terms describing the five parameters to be 
taken into consideration. A ftizzy combination algorithm will subsequently be 
developed and applied to obtain an overall risk with the crisp-vale property. This is 
due to the fact that the data fed into neural networks must have numerical 
characteristics. A batch of training and testing data will then be prepared, followed by 
the construction of a feedforward ANN model and a training process by introducing 
the training data into the network. The trained network will be verified as to whether 
it is capable of predicting reliable results using the testing data prepared. The steps 
from 3 to 6 (sections 4.3.3-4.3.6) will be repeated until the trained ANN has satisfied 
the acceptable accuracy established based on expert judgement. Consequently, the 
ANN so trained will be capable of predicting risk with high reliability. Figure 4.4 
shows the flowchart of the research methodology in this study [Ung et al., 2006a]. 
4.3.1 Establishment of membership function for linguistic terms of each 
parameter 
The membership function is established for the linguistic terms describing the 
linguistic variables including VTC performance, navigation aids & facilities, pilotage 
performance, sealane maintenance and weather conditions based on the opinions from 
multiple experts. The experts involved in a port safety project should be appropriately 
-87- 
Chapter 4. Risk Prediction ofPort Marine Safeiy using Fuzzy Set Theory and ANN 
1. Establishment of membership function for the 
linguistic terms of each parameter based on expert 
judgement 
VTC 
- ce 
TI 
Navigation aids Pilotage 
I 
Seal ane Weather 
performa n & facilities performance maintenance conditions 
2. Development of a fuzzy combination algorithm 
capable of obtaining the overall risk of any 
specific circumstance in terms of crisp values 
3. Training and testing data i 
preparation 
I 
4. The construction of a 
feedforward multi-layer ANN 
I 
model 
I 
1 5. ANN training I 
1 6. ANN testing and evaluation I 
Unacceptable accuracy 
accuracy 
7. Risk predictions 
Figure 4.4. The flowchart of the research methodology 
selected so that an unrealistic and biased membership function will be avoided 
[Kuusela et al., 1998]. Each expert is asked to evaluate a proposition 'x belongs to 
AT. it is assumed that A is a fuzzy set on X that represents a linguistic term 
associated with a given linguistic variable and a, (x)is a value of scores within a 
certain range in X i. e. a, 
(X) EX (in this study, X is defined as 1-10 categories). In 
situations where there are n experts and each of them has equal competence, the 
following formula is applied [Klir and Yuan, 1995]: 
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n J, 
_, 
a, (x) 
A(x) =. 
n 
(Equation 4.1) 
where A(x) is the final answer (value) after the judgements made by n experts arc 
synthesised, and 
a, (x) is the answer (value) given by the ih expert, icn. 
In the case where the experts have different degrees of competencies, Equation 4.1 is 
modified as: 
A(x) = 1] Compa, (x) (Equation 4.2) 
where Compi is the degree of competency of the ih expert, 
n 
COMPI (Equation 4.3) 
It is important to note that the degree of competency for each expert should be 
determined based on their knowledge and experience in risk assessment as well as in 
the field of port marine safety. 
The triangular membership function is adopted since it has a smooth transition from 
one linguistic term to the other. On the other hand, it facilitates easy defuzzification 
of each linguistic term. The membership function for each linguistic term is evaluated 
within its limits on an arbitrary scale from 0 to 1. Five linguistic terms are employed 
to describe the parameters in this study, which are 'Excellent', 'Good', 'Moderate', 
'Poor' and 'Very Poor" - 
4.3.2 Development of a fuzzy combination algorithm capable of obtaining the 
overall risk of any specific circumstance in terms of crisp values 
The linguistic terms adopted in this study are 'Excellent', 'Good', 'Moderate', 'Poor' 
and 'Very Poor', respectively. Traditionally, the overall risk of a specific event is 
evaluated by combining the rules developed. However, this study intends to introduce 
a risk prediction method using a neural network, where the antecedent and consequent 
of a ftizzy rule must be crisp values. Instead of developing a fuzzy rule base, the 
antecedent and consequent of each combination of these five parameters are converted 
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from fuzzy expressions to crisp values. It is assumed that the relationship between 
these linguistic terms is linear. Thus, the numerals of these five linguistic terms 
assigned arbitrarily for the following input crisp value calculation arc I for Excellent, 
2 for Good, 3 for Moderate, 4 for Poor and 5 for Very Poor. Therefore, the antecedent 
crisp value of specific linguistic terms and their membership values associated is 
defined as the product of the membership value (, u, ) and the numeral assigned 
arbitrarily for that linguistic term as shown in Equation 4.4. 
E 
'4parameter Z-, A 
(Equation 4.4) 
where Aparameter is the antecedent crisp value of the parameter in question, 
A is the membership value obtained from a fuzzy set i and 
N, is the i' linguistic-term assigned numeral, i=1,2,3,4,5. 
Allowing for the relevance that each parameter differs from port to port, an element 
representing the importance degree of each parameter, W, is introduced. Thus, the 
numeric value of consequent associated with the combination described above can be 
defined as the sum of the product of the linguistic-term assigned numeral and the 
weight of each parameter in question, multiplied by the minimum membership value 
of the- parameters as indicated in Equation 4.5. 
5 
Comsequent 
-'": 9mill * 2: N,, j - Wi (Equation 4.5) 
j=l 
whereCwnsequent is the crisp value of the consequent of the combination, 
p. j. is the minimum membership value of the parameters, 
N,, j is the i' linguistic-term assigned numeral describing the j' parameter 
and 
W is the weight of the j' parameter assigned based on expert judgement. i 
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In this study, an event may have many combinations, depending upon the pattern of 
the membership functions. The overall risk will be obtained by choosing the 
maximum membership value attached to each sum of the product of the linguistic- 
term assigned numeral together with the weight of the parameter belonging to the 
same category in these combinations as shown in Equation 4.6. 
K 
ZJ"k'Ck(N-W) 
R,, 
verall -= 
k=l 
K 
EA 
k=l 
(Equation 4.6) 
where 
Roverall is the value of the overall risk obtained from K categories, 
pk is the maximum membership value of the minimum membership values of 
the parameters 
inCk(N-W) 
9 
Ck(N-W) is the Ph category of the sum of the Product of the linguistic-term 
assigned numeral describing the jh parameter and the weight of the parameter 
and 
5 
Ik w4 Ck(N-W) = 
LNt 
j-1 
4.3.3 Preparation of training data and testing data 
Both training and testing data consist of two elements, namely, inputs and target 
outputs. The function of training data is that it can be adopted to train the neural 
network whereas testing data is used to verify the network. Once a neural work has 
been trained and tested appropriately, it can generate the desired outputs. In general, 
the training and testing data are chosen from the historical data collection. However, 
in situations where there are difficulties with regard to obtaining data as the study 
encounters, the preparation of these two types of data is generated using expert 
judgement hypothetically made by the author. By virtue of adopting the methods 
introduced in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, the training and testing data are converted from 
fuzzy properties to numeric values. Since the neural network can only recognise the 
inputs and generate the outputs that are similar to the ones it has met during the 
training process, the training data should be comprehensive, covering all possible and 
potential situations the port may confront. The size of the testing data should be 
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smaller than the training data and be chosen evenly throughout the whole range of the 
training data. 
The commonly used non-linear transfer functions are the sigmoidal and tanh functions 
that have saturation values of 0 to I and -1 to I respectively. If the values of the 
inputs and outputs in a training data set are not bounded by the saturation range, the 
neurons will be forced to their saturation points and are unable to respond to the 
changes in input. Therefore, prior to applying the training data, the data must be 
normalised between two threshold values [Ebelhart and Dobbins, 1990]. Therefore, 
in this study the formula in Equation 4.7 is introduced to obtain the normalised values. 
Normalised value = 
realvalue - min value (Equation 4.7) 
max value - min value 
where realvalue is the crisp value of a specific set of data in a specific parmneter to 
be normalised, 
max value is the maximum value the specific parameter has and 
min value is the minimum value the specific parameter has. 
4.3.4 Construction of a feedforward multi-layer ANN model 
After obtaining the training and testing data a feedforward multi-layer ANN model 
capable of predicting risk levels is constructed. Since the use of a single hidden layer 
is sufficient to approximate any continuous function as closely as requested 
[Funahashi, 19891 [Homik et al., 1989], a two-layer feedforward ANN model 
consisting of one hidden layer and one output layer will be adopted. There is no rule 
prescribing how the optimum number of neurons in the hidden layer can be decided. 
Therefore, according to the experience gained by the network practitioners, the 
appropriate number of neurons in the hidden layer will be selected based on numbers 
of experiments. Feedforward networks often have hidden layers with sigmoid 
neurons followed by linear neurons in the output layer. Therefore, the transfer 
functions adopted for the ANN model in this study will be tanh sigmoid for the 
hidden layer neurons and pure linear for the output neuron. 
4.3.5 ANN training 
The training data prepared based on expert judgement will be introduced to the neural 
network developed. The type of training applied in the network is supervised learning 
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where the actual response from output layers is compared with a priori desired output 
known as target outputs [Kartalopoulos, 1996]. The training data with regard to the 
parameters deemed to have great influence to the sealane navigation safety within port 
areas are the inputs for the model, whereas the overall risk levels are treated as the 
target outputs. If the actual response differs from the target output, the neural network 
generates an error signal. The error signal is subsequently used to calculate the 
adjustment that will be made to the connection weights between the neurons in the 
output, hidden and input layers. By repeating this process, the error signal between 
the actual response and the target outputs will be gradually minimised to become an 
acceptable criterion judged by the practitioner, or even possibly zero. It is noted that 
each criterion requested in each application is different and it is subject to the 
practitioners. There are several algorithms that can be applied to minimise the error 
signal, and the one selected for the network in this study is the backpropagation 
method. The procedure of calculating the error signal using this method is described 
in the following subsections. 
4.3.5.1 The backpropagation algorithm 
The first step of the loop structure of the algorithm is to initialise the weights to small 
random values which are between 0 to 1. Secondly, each pattern containing inputs 
and outputs in the training set will be trained. By repeating the process described 
above, the error will eventually reach the criterion required. The loop structure of the 
backpropagation algorithm is indicated below: 
initialise weights 
repeat 
for each training pattern 
train on that pattern 
end for loop 
until the error is acceptably low 
One iteration of the 'for' loop is referred to as an epoch resulting in a single 
presentation of each pattern in the training set. The main step in this structure is "train 
on that pattern". The training procedure of evaluating the outputs from each layer and 
adjusting the connection weights associated in order to achieve the goal of the error 
signal is expanded into the following steps. 
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4.3.5.1.1 Presentation of the pattern in the input layer 
The first step is to present the pattern consisting of inputs and target output in the 
input layer. The values contained in the inputs and target output are the normalised 
numerals obtained using Equation 4.7. 
4.3.5.1.2 Evaluation of the output from each hidden neuron 
In this step, by calculating the difference between the summation of the weighted 
inputs and the bias value in the hidden neuron and subsequently applying the tanh 
sigmoid transfer function to the value of the difference, the output value of each 
hidden neuron will be obtained. Since the type of transfer function introduced is tanh 
sigmoid, the value is confined from I to -1. It is assumed that there are i inputs in 
the input layer, j hidden nodes in the hidden layer and k outputs in the output layer. 
The mathematical expression is shown in Equation 4.8. 
Yj" = F(E x, x w, L-HL- b, 
) 
= F(s. p,,, 
) (Equation 4.8) 
where F =tan sig(sinput 
)= 219 
I+e 
x, is the signal of the ih input neuron, wjL-HL is the connection weight from 
the ih input neuron in the input layer to the j' hidden neuron in the hidden 
layer and bj is the bias (sometime referred to as threshold) value of the jh 
hidden neuron, 
YHL is the output value of the j' hidden neuron in the hidden layer and i 
SmPut is the difference between the summation value of the weighted inputs 
and the bias value in the jth hidden neuron. 
4.3.5.1.3 Evaluation of the Output from each output neuron 
After calculating the difference between the summation value of the weighted signals 
from the hidden layer and the bias value in the output neuron, the pure linear transfer 
function is then adopted to obtain the output value of each output neuron. As a result 
of the transfer function introduced, the output can take on any value. Equation 4.9 is 
the mathematical expression of this subsection. 
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Y OL 
HL-OL 
'= F(E ji -bk)=F(Shidden k. YHL X Wkj (Equation 4.9) 
where F= purelin(Shidden 
)= 
Shidden ý 
Y' is the output value of the j' hidden neuron in the hidden layer, wIIL-OL is i i, j 
the connection weight from the j' hidden neuron to the 0 output neuron 
and bk is the bias or threshold value of the k" output neuron, 
'Y is the output value of the k' output neuron in the output layer and I k, 
Shidd,,, is, the difference between the summation value of the weighted signals 
from the hidden layer and the bias value in the Ph output neuron. 
4.3.5.1.4 Introduction of the target value to the output layer and calculation of 
the contribution that each output neuron makes towards the error 
The target value of the pattern is applied to the output layer and subsequently 
compared with the actual output. The error signals on the output neurons are obtained 
using Equation 4.10. 
It-OL OL I sk F'(Shidden 
Xt 
- 
Yk (Equation 4.10) 
where 5k-' is the contribution that the output neuron k in the output layer makes 
towards to the error, 
F'(Shidden )is the derivative of the activation function in the output layer and 
Y OL) is the difference between the target output and the actual output of I k 
the kh output neuron. 
4.3.5.1.5 Training of each output neuron using the gradient descent method 
As mentioned previously the minimum error established by the practitioner can be 
achieved by updating the connection weights. Therefore, the variation of the weight 
from each hidden neuron to the output neuron in question is the core issue. By 
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applying the learning rate established, the variation value can be obtained using 
Equation 4.11. 
, -OLyHL Aw, "' = a, 5k' j 
(Equation 4.11) 
where Aw" is the variation of the weight from the hidden neuron j to the output k, j 
neuron 
a is the leaming rate, 
t-OL 
'5k P(s OL 
) 
and hidden 
Xt 
- 
Yk 
YHL is the output value of the j' hidden neuron in the hidden layer. i 
4.3.5.1.6 Calculation of the contribution that each hidden neuron makes towards 
the error 
The main mission of this step is to evaluate the effect that the hidden neuron can 
influence the output neuron and via this, the effect that the output neuron affects the 
error. Therefore, when calculating the effects, the contribution that the output neurons 
make towards the error and the influence of the hidden neuron on the output neuron, 
that is, the connection weight, are taken into consideration. The mathematical 
expression of this step is given in Equation 4.12. 
t-HL gt-OL HL-OL 91 
k wi, j 
kr=li 
(Equation 4.12) 
where 5ý-HL is the contribution that each hidden neuron makes towards to the error, i 
I, is the set of neurons that take an input from the hidden neuron 
8 t-OL is the contribution that the output neuron k makes towards to the error, k 
and 
wk"" is the connection weight from the j" hidden neuron to the k" output 
neuron. 
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4.3.5.1.7 Training of each hidden neuron according to the gradient descent 
method 
Applying a similar method to that described in Step 5 (section 4.3.5.1.5), the variation 
of the weight from each input neuron to the hidden neuron in question can be 
acquired, and its mathematical term is expressed in Equation 4.13. 
A IL; HL 
ýt-HLXi 
wj = aF'(s. p,,, , 
(Equation 4.13) 
where is the variation of the weight from the input neuron 1 in the input layer AW;, 
to the hidden neuron j in the hidden layer, 
a is the leaming rate, 
P(Sinput )is the derivative of the activation function in the hidden layer, 
t-HL yt-OL HL-OL 
, yj k wij 5and kelj 
x, is the signal of the ih input neuron. 
It is often the case that the slope of the transfer function, 
F(Sinput )I is absorbed into 
the corresponding term. Thus, Equation 4.13 is rewritten to: 
IL HL t-HL X. Awj',, - = ai5, ' ,, (Equation 4.14) 
HL F t-OL H. -OL 
where 5j ý Wi'LJ t- 
F(Sipul t3k 
kr=Ij 
The steps from Steps I to 3 (sections 4.3.5.1.1 - 4.3.5.1.3) are regarded as the 
"Forward Pass" since the signal is flowing forward throughout the network. On the 
other hand, the procedures from Steps 4 to 7 (sections 4.3.5.1.4 - 4.3.5.1.7) are known 
as the "Backward Pass". 
4.3.5.2 Introduction of the momentum term 
The gradient descent method applied to the term requires that the calculating steps 
taken be infinitesimal. Thus, when establishing the learning rate the stability of the 
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training procedure must be taken into account. A large learning rate may facilitate the 
training performance to reach the convergence in a stable situation. However, if it is 
set too high, the training will become unstable, causing oscillation and divergence. 
Learning rates between 0.05 to 0.25 are often preferred to ensure network 
convergence [Roskilly and Mesbahi, 1996]. Although a small learning rate 
guarantees training stability, the time spent on convergence may be long. Therefore, 
in order to overcome this and facilitate the training, a momentum term is introduced. 
The modified learning rules for each output and hidden neurons are expressed in 
Equation 4.15. 
Aw(n) = m5(n)I(n) + AAw(n - 1) (Equation 4.15) 
where Aw(n) is the Wh change in weight w, 
a is the leaming rate, 
S(n) is the n" contribution that the neuron in question makes towards the 
error, 
I(n) is the n" input signal from the adjacent neuron and 
A is the momentum constant usually set up between 0 and 1. 
It can be seen from the learning rule that the weight change depends on the previous 
weight change. In other words, if the weight changes are consistently of the same 
sign over a certain run of updates, the weight change will grow larger when the 
previous weight change contributes cumulatively and consistently towards the current 
update. The ANN training will be performed using Matlab Neural Network Toolbox 
since such software enables safety analysts to establish ANNs simply using the codes 
and functions provided. 
4.3.6 ANN testing and evaluation 
The ANN trained model will be tested using the testing data prepared to evaluate its 
performance. Subsequently, the actual output will be compared with the target output. 
if the risk prediction generated reaches the acceptable accuracy, the model is ready for 
the mission in the next step. If not the model should be reviewed and modified by 
repeating Step 3 to Step 6 (sections 4.3.3-4.3.6) until it fulfils the expected criterion. 
In this study the accuracy criterion of 90% was arbitrarily established. 
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4.3.7 Risk predictions 
The ANN model trained can be utilised to predict the risk level of sealane navigation 
within port areas. New data will then be able to be fed into the model. The model 
will then generate the results. A risk ranking can consequently be established which 
can be used as a reference for the risk assessment practitioners. 
4.4 Test Case 
4.4.1 Establishment of membership function for linguistic terms of each 
parameter 
The linguistic terms applied to describe the characteristic of each parameter are, 
namely, 'Excellent', 'Good', 'Moderate', 'Poor' and 'Very Poor', respectively. The 
values of each linguistic term are obtained using Equation 4.1 based on the 
assumption that the competence of each expert is equal. The acquirement of the value 
that fully represents a linguistic term, Moderate, e. g., is achieved by requesting the 
individual opinion of each expert with regard to which category value can precisely 
describe the linguistic term. A compromising opinion is obtained using Equation 4.1 
as follows (provided that there are four experts and their individual opinions i. e. 
ai (x), are 5,6,4,5, respectively): 
1, 
=, a, 
(x) (5 +6+4+ 5) A(x) =. =5.0 
n4 
Two boundary values as the membership value reaches 0 can also be obtained using 
Equation 4.1. Figure 4.5 shows the membership functions for the linguistic terms of 
the parameters of VTC performance, Excellent, Good, Moderate, Poor and Very Poor 
based on expert judgement hypothetically made by the author. It is noted that in real 
world case studies, the membership functions of the linguistic terms for each 
parameter may be different. Since the purpose of this test case is to demonstrate the 
framework proposed, the membership functions of the linguistic terms in question 
describing the parameters of the VTC performance, navigation aids and facilities, 
pilotage performance, sealane maintenance and weather condition are set to identical. 
4.4.2 Preparation of the training data using the fuzzy combination algorithm 
This step is needed to prepare the training data and testing data. Such data, which is 
obtained based on the expert judgement hypothetically made by the author, should 
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take into account all possible situations the port may encounter. Thus, this mission 
could be accomplished by collecting the opinions from the port authority with regard 
to the historical and potential operations and circumstances of the five parameters in 
question to ensure that the data gathered is representative. However, since the 
objective of this study is to demonstrate how the risk predictions can be acquired 
using fuzzy set theory and a neural network, the data prepared is based on the expert 
judgements generated by the author. In addition, as neural networks need training and 
testing data with numerical property, the fuzzy combination algorithm developed in 
the methodology is subsequently applied to convert the property of these data. The 
process of obtaining an overall risk with crisp value from a specific set of the training 
data using the fuzzy combination algorithm is illustrated as follows. 
Membership 
I. OtEmplignt i 
r. nnrl Mnflýýfp V- If- D- 
It 
23456789 10 
Categories 
Figure 4.5. Membership function for the linguistic terms describing the VTC 
performance parameter of sealane navigation safety in port 
4.4.2.1 Process of converting the fuzzy training data to crisp-value risk indices 
A set of the fuzzy training data listed in Table 4.1 is used to demonstrate the 
conversion process. 
Table 4.1. The fuzzv trainina data 
NI avigation 
VTC 
aids & 
Pilotage Sealane Weather 
Performance Facilities 
Performance Maintenance Condition 
Very Foor ery Poor Very Poor ery Poor Very Poor 
0775, Poor ( or 0 
E 
Po 
- 
. 25 0.75, 
Poor 0.25 0.75, Poor 0.25 0.75, Poor 0.25 0.75, Poor 0.25 
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First, in the VTC performance parameter, since it has two linguistic terms, Very Poor 
and Poor, describing its characteristics associated with membership values of 0.75 and 
0.25 respectively, Equation 4.4 consisting of the elements of the membcrship values 
and linguistic-term assigned numeral is applied to obtain its antecedent crisp value: 
j]A-Nj 0.75x5+0.25x4 
rrc =, -=4.75 EA0.75+0.25 
The other four parameters follow the same pattern illustrated above and the 
antecedent crisp values for the training data in question are shown in Table 4.2. 
TAM 4.2. The antecedent crisD values of the traininiz Data 
Navigation 
VTC Pilotage Sealane Weather 
aids & 
Performance Performance Maintenance Condition Facilities 
4.75 4.75 4.75 1 4.75 4.75 
Secondly, the minimum membership value among the parameters and the linguistic- 
term assigned numeral corresponding to each parameter are adopted to acquire the 
consequent value for each combination. Since there are five parameters, each of 
which is described by two linguistic terms, the number of consequent combinations is 
32. In addition, the importance degree of each parameter, W, is assumed to be equal 
i. e. 0.2. The calculation below shows the first combination for the training data in 
question using Equation 4.5. All 32 combinations are listed in Table 4.3. 
5 
C,.,. 
sequent 
= lini. - 
JNIj 
- Wj = 0.75 - 
(5 
x 0.2 +5x0.2 +5x0.2 +5x0.2 +5x0.2) = 0.75 -5 
j=l 
i me 4. j. i ne COMDinations oi tne traini g ciata 
No. of 
Combinations 
VTC 
Performance 
Navigation 
aids & 
Facilities 
Pilotage 
Performance 
Sealane 
Maintenance 
Weather 
Condition Consequent 
----2- 
A 
0.75 
Nj, j 
5 
5 
A 
0.75 
0.75 
Ni, j 
5 
5 
A 
0.75 
0.75 
Nj, j 
5 
5 
A 
0.75 
0.75 
Nj, j 
5 
5 
A 
0.75 
0.25 
Njj 
5 
4 
0.75 
0.25 
Nij Wi 
5 
4.8 
0.75 5 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 5 1 0.25 4.8 
0.7 5 5 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.25 4.6 
------- 5 0. 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4.8 
0n 11; . 75 
5 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 
15 0.25 4 0.25 4. 
F7 
ý-. 7 -5 5 0.75 15 1 0.25 4 0.25 14 1 0.75 15 1 0.25 4.6 
1 
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8 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.25 4' 0.25 4.4 
9 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4.8 
10 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4.6 
11 0.75 51 0.25 41 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 1 5 0.25 4.6 
12 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 1 4 0.25 4.4 
13 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4.6 
14 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4.4 
15 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4.4 
16 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.25 1 4 0.25 1 4 0.25 4.2 
17 0.25 4 0.75 1 5 0.75 1 5 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4.8 
0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4.6 
0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4.6 
20 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 14 0.25 1 4 0.25 4.4 
n 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4.6 
22 ""5-. 25 -4 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4.4 
23 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4.4 
24 0.25 4 0.75 15 
0.25 
14 
0.25 4 0.25 4 
1 
0.25 4.2 
25 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4.6 
26 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 4.4 
27 0.25 4 
- 
0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 4.4 
28 -T2-5 4 0.25 4 1 0.75 5 0.25 4 0.25 14 0.25 4.2 
29 
30 
0.25 
0.25 
4 
4 
0.25 
0.25 
4 
4 
0.25 
0.25 
4 
4 
0.75 
0.75 
5 
5 
0.75 
0.25 
5 
4 
0.25 
0.25 
4.4 
4.2 
31 0.25 14 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.25 4 0.75 5 0.25 1 4.2 
32 7-25 4 1 0.25 4 1 0.25 4 0.25 
:4d 0.25 i4 ---- 1-0-. 25 14 
Finally, the overall risk can be obtained by selecting the maximum membership value 
attached to each sum of the product of the linguistic-term assigned numeral and the 
weight of the parameter belonging to the same category in the 32 combinations using 
Equation 4.6. Table 4.4 shows the consequents that fulfil the condition described 
above. 
Table 4.4. The consequent values needed for the acquirement of the overall risk 
0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Ck(N, 
W) 5 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.2 4 
Thus the value of the overall risk of the training data is: 
k 
p '*c k(N*w) 0.75x5+0.25x4.8+0.25x4.6+0.25x4.4+0.25x4.2+0.25x4 
R,,, 
erall 
k--l 
k'0.75+0.25+0.25+0.25+0.25+0.25 4.625 
l, "k 
k--l 
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Therefore, the fuzzy training data associated with its overall risk is indicated in Table 
4.5. 
Table 4.5. The fuzzv training data and the overall risk associated 
Navigation 
VTC Pilotage Sealane Weather Overall 
aids & Performance Performance Maintenance Condition Risk 
Facilities 
Very Poor Very Poor Very Poor Very Poor Very Poor 
0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 4.625 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Since only the numerical training data is applicable to neural networks, the training 
data to be adopted to the network in question is converted to crisp values, which are 
shown in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6. The crisiD-value traininiz data 
Navigation 
VTC Pilotage Sealane Weather Overall 
aids & 
Performance Performance Maintenance Condition Risk Facilities 
4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4 
There are 857 sets of training data that are applied to the neural network. The first 20 
sets of such data are shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 with fuzzy and numerical properties 
respectively. The complete data sets with both properties used to train the neural 
network are listed in Appendices 2 and 3, presenting the characteristic of the network 
to be trained. It can be seen from Table 4.7 that the scenarios in which the parameters 
described by more negative linguistic terms have higher risks than those depicted by 
more positive terms. This is consistent with the human-being common sense. 
Furthermore, the difference of the risk level between these scenarios can be 
appreciated. In addition, it is important to note that when preparing the training data, 
the difference between the levels of the linguistic terms used describing the 
parameters of VTC performance, navigation aids and facilities, piltoage performance 
and sealane maintenance is limited to a certain range. This is based on the assumption 
that the circumstances of these four parameters are dependent upon the equal resource 
allocation of a port whereas the weather changes continuously. In other words, it may 
be unlikely that an efficient port would have Very Poor VTC performance and Good 
pilotage performance, or Very Poor navigation aids and facilities and Excellent 
sealane maintenance. 
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Table 4.7. The first 20 sets of the fuzzv tainine data 
Navigation 
Data VTC Pilotage Sealane Weather Overall 
aids & No. Performance Performance Maintenance Condition Risk Facilities 
V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, I Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 4.625 
V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 2 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Moderate 0.25 
4.425 
V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 3 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Good 0.25 4.225 
V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 4 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Excellent 0.25 4.025 
Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, 5 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Poor 0.25 3.825 
Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 6 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.625 
Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 7 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.425 
Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 8 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.225 
Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, 9 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Poor 0.25 3.025 
Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 10 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.825 E 
Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
ll Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.625 Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 12 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.425 
Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, 13 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Poor 0.25 2.225 
Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Poor 0.75, 14 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.025 
Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 15 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 1.825 
Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75 16 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 , Excellent 0.25 1.625 
Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V-Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V-Poor 0.75, 17 Moderate 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 4.425 
Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 18 Moderate 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.225 
Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75 19 Moderate 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 , Good 0.25 4.025 
Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, V-Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Good 0.75 20] 
-- 
Moderate 0.25 Poor 0.25 Poor 0.25 
1 
Poor 
ýO. 
25: , 
TExcellent 
0.25 
3.825 
11 
Note: V. Poor means Very Poor 
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Tnhlp d-R- The fired 26 vet-. nf the cri. qn-vnhie. trninincr dato 
Data No. 
VTC 
Performance 
Navigation 
aids & 
Facilities 
Pilotage 
Performance 
Sealane 
Maintenance 
Weather 
Condition 
Overall 
Risk 
1 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.625 
2 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.425 
3 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 2.75 4.225 
4 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 1.75 4.025 
51 5 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.825 
6 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.625 
7 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.425 
P 
88 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 1.75 3.225 
9 9 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 4.75 3.025 
10 I 10 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.825 
11 I1 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.625 
12 12 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 1-. 75 2.425 
13 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 4.75 2.225 
14 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 3.75 2.025 
15 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 1.825 
16 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.625 
17 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.425 
18 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.225 
19 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 '2.75 4.025 
20 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 1.75 3.825 
4.4.3 Preparation of training data 
For the purpose of ensuring that the neural network reaches the goal, the training data 
in each parameter and the overall risk index are normalised using Equation 4.7. The 
data range associated with the VTC performance parameter, for example, is between 5 
and 1; its normalised value in the first data set is calculated as follows: 
Normalised Value = 
realvalue - min value = 
4.75-1 
= 0.9375 max value - min value 5-1 
The rest of the training data follows the same method mentioned above, and Table 4.9 
shows the normalised data of the first 20 sets. Appendix 4 contains the complete 
normalised training data. It can be seen from Appendix 4 that the values have been 
converted to a range between zero and one for the purpose of ensuring that the 
network reaches the goal. In addition, it is worthwhile noting that this computing- 
intensive data preparation process can be accomplished using computer software such 
as Excel. 
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Tahip. d-()- The first 20 sets of the normalised training data 
Data No. 
VTC 
Performance 
Navigation 
aids & 
Facilities 
Pilotage 
Performance 
Sealane 
Maintenance 
Weather 
Condition 
Overall 
Risk 
1 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.90625 
2 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.85625 
3 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.4375 0.80625 
4 Oe9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.1875 0.75625 
5 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.70625 
6 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.65625 
7 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.60625 
8 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.1875 0.55625 
9 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.9375 0.50625 
10 0.4375 0.4375 0.4373 0.4375 0.6875 0.45625 
11 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.40625 
12 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.35625 
13 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.9375 0.30625 
14 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.6875 0.25625 
15 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.20625 
16 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.15625 
17 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.85625 
18 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.80625 
19 8 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.4375 0.75625 
20 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.1875 0.70625 
4.4.4 Construction of a feed forward multi-layer ANN model 
It is in this step that 857 sets of normalised training data are fed into a two-layer 
neural network. The columns of these five parameters are treated as the inputs, and 
the overall risk index is used as the target output for the network. After a series of 
experiments conducted using the Matlab software, the optimum number of the hidden 
neurons for this test case is chosen at 25 and is associated with a leaming rate of 
0.0008 and the goal is set to 0.35 SSE (sum square error). The initial connection 
weight of each neuron in the neural network is selected randomly by the software. In 
general, learning rates between 0.05 to 0.25 are preferred. However, since there are 
857 sets of training data in this study, the neural network does not remain stable until 
the learning rate is adjusted to 0.0008. The meaning of 0.35 SSE is that the 
aggregated square errors of 857 training data sets are 0.35. Therefore, the average 
square error for each set is 4.084 x 10-4 and the average error for the actual output and 
target output is 0.02. Thus, in theory, the goal established is capable of predicting the 
risk with high accuracy. It is noted that there are no clear or straightforward solutions 
to determine the number of hidden layers and neurons [Roskilly and Mesbahi, 1996]. 
it should also be noted that as the number of the hidden neurons increases, the training 
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time decreases to achieve the same model accuracy and that too many hidden nodes 
may make the network unable to reach the goal. During the experiments in this study, 
when the network is trained with 10 hidden neurons, it reaches the goal after 160,201 
epochs. Thus the training time is much longer than that with 25 nodes. However, if it 
is equipped with 30 hidden neurons, the training performance becomes unstable and 
unable to reach the goal. Figure 4.6 shows the neural network constructed for this 
study. 
4.4.5 ANN Training 
The previous section mentioned that after a number of experiments using different 
combinations of the hidden neurons and the learning rates, the neural network is 
trained with 25 hidden nodes associated with the learning rate of O. Ooo8 and is 
required to reach the goal of 0.35 SSE. Figure 4.7 shows the training performance of 
the ANN. The dashed line in the Figure is the goal established and the gradient- 
descent curve indicates the training performance during the process. The neural 
network reaches the goal requested after 98,103 epochs. Therefore, the network has 
been trained and will be verified as to whether it is capable of predicting risks by 
introducing the testing data in the next section. 
all 
k 
inputlayer 
i=1,.. 5 
Hiddenlayer 
j=l 
.... 
25 
Output layer 
k=1 
Figure 4.6. The neural network constructed for the study 
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Performance is 0.35, Goal is 0.355 
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Figure 4.7. The ANN training performance 
4.4.6 ANN testing and evaluation 
In this step, the trained ANN is verified by introducing 40 sets of testing data. The 
data is also generated based on the same assumption used to prepare the training data. 
However, the membership values produced in the testing data are random from 1.0 to 
0 whereas the values in the training data are 1.0,0.75,0.25 and 0, respectively. Table 
4.10 shows the detail of the testing data as well as the results predicted by the network 
in comparison to the target values conducted using the fuzzy combination algorithm 
developed. It can be seen that the lowest prediction rate is 92.88% in the set of data 
numbered 29, which is the only data below 95%. Inspiringly, the average prediction 
rate of the neural network is over 98% despite the difference between the membership 
values adopted in the training and testing data. As a result of the average prediction 
rate generated being greater than the acceptable criterion (90%), there is no need to 
repeat the steps from 3 to 6 (sections 4.3.3-4.3.6) of the methodology. It can then be 
concluded that the neural network has been trained appropriately and is capable of 
predicting risks as long as the training data takes into account any potential 
circumstance that may be met by the port. 
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Table 4.10. The detail of the testing data, the ANN prediction value and 
prediction rate 
Data VTC NAV PIL SEA WEA T 
ANN Prediction 
No. Value Rate (%) 
V. Poor 0.9, V. Poor 0.6, V. Poor 0.8, V. Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.75, I 
Poor 0.1 Poor 0.4 Poor 0.2 Poor 0.5 Poor 0.25 4.66 4.69 99.33 
Poor 0.9, V. Poor 0.8, V. Poor 0.8, V. Poor 0.7, V. Poor 0.75, 2 Moderate 0.1 Poor 0.2 Poor 0.2 Poor 0.3 Poor 0.25 4.49 4.53 99.08 
Poor 0.9, Poor 0.8, Poor, 0.8, V. Poor 0.7, V. Poor 0.2, 3 Moderate 0.1 Moderate 0.2 Moderate 0.2 Poor 03 Poor 0.8 4.02 4.10 98.04 
Moderate 0.7, Poor 0.8, Poor 0.8, Moderate 0.7, Moderate 0.7, 4 Good 0.3 Moderate 0.2 Moderate 0.2 Good 0.3 Good 0.3 3.04 3.16 96.21 
V. Poor 0.3, Poor 0.4, V. Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.2, Good 0.3, 5J Poor 0.7 Moderate 0.6 Poor 0.5 Poor 0.8 Excellent 0.7 3.60 3.55 98.72 
Moderate 0.3, Moderate 0.4, Good 0.5, Moderate 0.2, V. Poor 0.3, 6I Good 0.7 Good 0.6 Excellent 0.5 Good 0.8 Poor 0.7 2.60 2.53 97.18 
V. Poor 0.1, V. Poor 0.4, Poor 0.4, Poor 0.1, Poor 0.3, 7 Poor 0.9 Poor 0.6 Moderate 0.6 Moderate 0.9 Moderate 0.7 3.72 3.66 98.56 
Poor 0.5, Poor 0.4, Poor 0.3, Poor 0.2, Poor 0.3, 8 Moderate 0.5 Moderate 0.6 Moderate 0.7 Moderate 0.8 Moderate 0.7 3.40 3.33 98.08 
Poor 0.7, Poor 0.8, Moderate 0.7, Moderate 0.6, V. Poor 0.8, 9 I Moderate 0.3 Moderate 0.2 Good 0.3 Good 0.4 Poor 0.2 3.43 352 97.52 
Good 0.7, Good 0.8, Moderate 0.7, Moderate 0.6, Poor 0.8, 10 
l 
Exccllent 0.3 Excellent 0.2 Good 0.3 Good 0.4 Moderate 0.2 2.43 2.50 96.95 
Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.9, Moderate 0.7, Poor 0.6, V. Poor 0.5, 11 
I 
Moderate 0.5 Good 0.1 Good 0.3 Moderate 0.4 Poor 0.5 3.42 3.44 99.32 
Poor 0.5, Poor 0.9, Moderate 0.7, Poor 0.6, Good 0.5, 12 Moderate 0.5 Moderate 0.1 Good 0.3 Moderate 0.4 Excellent 0.5 3.02 3.06 98.44 
V. Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.7, Poor 0.2, Poor 0.2, Poor 0.5, 13 Poor 0.5 Poor 0.3 Moderate 0.8 Moderate 0.8 Moderate 0.5 3.84 3.80 99.16 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.4, Poor 0.7, Poor 0.1, Poor 0.9 14 
IPoor 0.5 Moderate 0.6 Moderate 0.3 Moderate 0.9 
, 
Moderate 0.1 3.72 3.71 99.76 
Moderate 0.5, Good 0.4, Good 0.5, Good 0.7, Good 0.6, 15 
I 
Good 0.5 Excellent 0.6 Excellent 0.5 Excellent 0.3 Excellent 0.4 1.73 1.77 97.57 
Moderate 0.4, Moderate 0.4, Good 0.9, Good 0.6, Good 0.6 16 
I 
Good 0.6 Good 0.6 Excellent 0.1 Excellent 0.4 , Excellent 0.4 1.97 1.98 99.83 
Poor 0.6, Poor 0.8, Poor 0.7, Moderate 0.6, V. Poor 0.7 17 
j 
Moderate 0.4 Moderate 0.2 Moderate 0.3 Good 0.4 , Poor 0.3 3.61 3.67 98.40 
V. Poor 0.1, V. Poor 0.8, Poor 0.7, Poor 0.6, Moderate 0.8 18 Poor 0.9 Poor 0.2 Moderate 0.3 Moderate 0.4 , Good 0.2 3.74 3.79 98.76 
Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.8, Poor 0.9, Poor 0.6, Good 0.8 19 Moderate 0.5 Poor 0.2 Moderate 0.1 Moderate 0.4 , Excellent 0.2 3.66 3.71 98.73 
Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.6, Poor 0.5, Poor 0.9, Moderate 0.7 20 lGood 0.5 Good 0.4 Moderate 0.5 Moderate 0.1 , Good 0.3 3.02 3.02 99.87 
Moderate 0.2, Moderate 0.5, Good 0.3, Good 0.2, V. Poor 0.7 21 Good 0.8 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.7 Excellent 0.8 , Poor 0.3 2.42 2.36 97.57 
Good 0.2, Good 0.5, Good 0.3, Gooý0.2, V, Poor 0.9 22 Excellent 0.8 Excellent 0.5 Excellent 0.7 Excellent 0.8 , Poor 0.1 2.07 2.03 98.13 
Poor 0.8, Poor 0.7, Poor 0.6, Poor 0.5. V-. Poor 6.9 23 Moderate 0.2 Moderate 0.3 Moderate 0.4 Moderate 0.5 , Poor 0.1 3.85 3.92 98.30 
Moderatc 0.8, Moderate 0.7, Moderate 0.6, Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.9 24 
I 
Good 0.2 o 0.3 I IGood 0.4 Good 0.5 j 
, 
Poor 0.1 3.05 3.07 99.23 
25 lGood 0.9, Moderate 0.7. IModcratc 0.5, Good 0.9,1 Poor 0.0, - 2.51 2.58 -97719 
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Excellent 0.1 Good 03 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.1 Moderate 0.1 
V. Poor 0.9, V. Poor 0.9, V. Poor 0.8, V. Poor 0.9, Good 0.9, 
26 4.17 4.25 98.21 
Poor 0.1 Poor 0.1 Poor 0.2 Poor 0.1 Excellent 0.1 
Poor 0.2, Poor 03, V. Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.1, Poor 0.4, 
27 3.75 3.68 98.25 
1 Moderate 0.8 Moderate 0.7 Poor 0.5 Poor 0.9 Moderate 0.6 
Moderate 0.6, Moderate 0.6, Moderate 0.6, Good 0.6, Poor 0.6, 
28 
I 
2.54 2.60 97.75 
Good 0.4 Good 0.4 Good 0.4 Excellent 0.4 Moderate 0.4 
Good 0.9, Good 0.9, Good 0.9, Good 0.9, Good 0.9, 
29 
I 
1.79 1.91 92.88 
Excellent 0.1 Excellent 0.1 Excellent 0.1 Excellent 0.1 Excellent 0.1 1 
Good 0.9. Good 0.9, Good 0.6, Moderate 0.2, V. Poor 0.3, 
30 
l 
2.38 2.36 99.29 
Excellent 0.1 Excellent 0.1 Excellent 0.4 Good 0.8 Poor 0.7 
Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good 0.6, Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.7, 
31 
I 
Good 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.4 Good 0.5 Poor 0.3 
2.75 2.74 99.59 
Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.2, Moderate 0.5, Po7r 0.2, 
32 
I 
2.80 2.75 98.31 
Good 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.8 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.8 
V. Poor 0.6, Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.2, Poor 0.3, Poor 0.2, 
33 3.80 3.75 98.80 
Poor 0.4 Moderate 0.5 Poor 0.8 Moderate 0.7 Moderate 0.8 
V. Poor 0.6, V. Poor 0.8, V. Poor 0.2, Poor 0.3, Good 0.2, 
34 
Poor 0.4 Poor 0.2 Poor 0.8 Moderate 0.7 Excellent 0.8 
3.65 3.60 98.65 
Moderate 0.6, Moderate 0.8, Moderate 0.2, Moderate 0.5, Good 0.2, 
35 2.27 2.27 99.91 
lGood 0.4 Good 0.2 Good 0.8 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.8 
Good 0.6, Good 0.8, Good 0.2, Good 0.5, V. Poor 0.2, 
36 
I 
2.07 2.07 99.79 
Excellent 0.4 Excellent 0.2 Excellent 0.8 Excellent 0.5 Poor 0.8 
37 JV. Poor I 
_V. 
Poor I V. Poor I V. Poor I V. Poor 1 5.00 4.93 98.64 
38 1 Poor I IPoor I IPoor I IPoor I jPoor 1 4.00 4.01 99.81 
39 IModcrate I IModeratc I IModerate I IModerate I Moderate 1 3.00 2.99 99.51 
40 IGood I IGood I I Good I IGood I IGood 1 2.00 2.01 99.46 
Note: T means the target values of the overall risk indices, ANN Values are the values predicted by the 
neural network after the de-normalising process. 
4.4.7 Risk predictions 
The neural network trained will be capable of predicting risks with a high degree of 
reliability if applied. 'Me prediction process can be conducted as follows: 
1. The acquirement of the membership values and the linguistic terms associated 
which describe the circumstance of each parameter. 
2. The conversion of the characteristic of each parameter from fuzzy to crisp-value 
properties using Equations 4.4,4.5 and 4.6. 
3. The adoption of the normalisation process using Equation 4.7. 
4. 'Me introduction of the normalised numerical data into the trained neural network. 
5. The acquirement of the overall risk predicted by the ANN. 
6. The implementation of the de-normalising process transferring the normalised 
result generated into the crisp-value expression. 
Consequently, a risk ranking can be established based on the predicted results 
generated. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
The traditional fuzzy-rule-base risk assessment technique has been employed in 
various fields due to the capability of combining different parameters to obtain an 
overall risk. However, a drawback occurs when the technique is applied in 
circumstances where there are multiple parameters to be evaluated which are 
described by multiple linguistic terms. The risk prediction method incorporating 
ftizzy set theory and neural networks presented in this chapter is capable of avoiding 
such awkward situations encountered when employing the fuzzy-rule-base technique. 
However, there is an issue as to whether successful application of this method 
depends upon the accuracy of the prediction rate, implying the importance of the 
training data preparation. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the parameters to 
be evaluated which play important roles in risk analysis is crucial, since neural 
networks only recognise the patterns similar to the ones they met in the training 
process. Thus, if a neural network is trained using data which covers more potential 
circumstances that the port may confront, the result of the prediction generated is 
more reliable. In addition, the fuzzy combination algorithm developed in this study 
could also be applied even without the use of neural networks. It would be more 
computing-intensive if the algorithm were employed independently. Nevertheless, 
whether the application combining the fuzzy combination algorithm with neural 
networks or the practice employing the algorithm alone is utilised, the process is 
computing-intensive. Therefore, the adoption of calculating computer software is 
highly recommended. 
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Chapter 5. Human Error Assessment in Port 
Operations using Fuzzy Analytical Hierarchy 
Process 
Human error accounts for a significant contribution to maritime 
accidents. There has been growing commitment attempting to tackle such 
a problem. In this chapter, following a review discussion of traditional 
HRA methods, a new method of human error assessment usingfuzzy set 
theory andAnalytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is proposed Inassessing 
the human error risk using the proposed method, the steps in each mission 
ofport operations are compared to each other in terms of the likelihood, 
failure consequence probability and severity criteria to acquire the 
relative importance and overall riskpriority. The method is demonstrated 
using a test case of an oil cargo handling process in port, and is capable 
ofavoiding the criticism raised when using traditional HRA techniques. 
5.1 Introduction 
Human effor plays a crucial role in the causes of many major marine accidents. It 
costs the maritime industry approximately $541m per year according to the UK P&I 
Club [UK P&I Club, 2003]. Some 62% of the 6,091 major claims spanning a period 
of 15 years based on the analysis conducted by the Club are attributable to human 
effor. There has been an increasing commitment to explicitly identify and address the 
impact of such an element upon marine safety in the maritime community since the 
accidents of Piper Alpha, Braer, Estonia and Herald of Free Enterprise. The examples 
for such commitments include the evaluations of the role of Human and Organisation 
Effors (HOEs) in the life cycle of vessels [Moore and Bea, 1995] and in offshore 
structures [Bea, 1998], the application of the knowledge addressing the HOE in 
marine operations to tanker loading and discharging operations [Bea et al., 1996], the 
collection of offshore human error probability data [Basra and Kirwan, 1998], human 
effor assessment and decision making using AHP [Pillay and Wang, 2003], etc. A 
new method of human effor assessment using fuzzy set theory along with AHP is 
proposed in this study. The method is demonstrated by a test case of an oil cargo 
handling process in port, and is capable of avoiding the awkward situation met as 
addressed in section 5.2.3 when applying traditional HRA techniques. 
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5.2 Background 
5.2.1 Human error related accidents in ports 
Human error is one of the most important factors contributing to port accidents. This 
can be verified by the statistics shown in Table 2.11 of this PhD study where human 
errors make a significant contribution in port operations, consisting of 19.5%. In 
addition, it can be seen from Table 2.12 that cargo loading and unloading is also an 
important factor in seaport accidents, comprising 15.1%. With the available 
information from Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDS), the accidents have 
been divided into the categories of oils, chemicals, acids, natural gas and others. The 
greatest proportion of the accidents occurred with oils, of which the percentage is 
59% [Darbra and Casal, 2004]. Therefore, because of the quality and quantity of the 
data available, the test case selected for illustrating the proposed framework of human 
error assessment is an oil cargo handling process. 
5.2.2 Human reliability assessment (HRA) 
HRA deals with the risk contributed by human error. Most HRA material is 
concerned with the quantification of the potential for human error. In general, HRA 
has three fundamental functions, namely, the identification of human effors, the 
prediction of their likelihood and reduction of the likelihood if required [Kirwan, 
1992a]. The HRA approaches can be divided into two categories, those using a 
database, and those using expert judgement [Kirwan, 1996]. The approaches falling 
into the first ýategory apply a database containing generic Human Error Probability 
(HEP) to the specific circumstance being assessed. The manipulation is often based 
on the assessment of circumstance related Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs) that 
modify the probabilities based on environmental and contextual circumstances. The 
HEPs obtained based on the approaches in the second category are acquired by asking 
experts directly with regard to the scenario under consideration. Alternatively, some 
approaches in this category generate HEPs by manipulating and interrogating a quasi 
database which has some basis in real data from industrial incidents and which is 
incorporated with expert judgement. Some most widely used HRA techniques in the 
UK include Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [Swain and 
Guttmann, 1983], Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) 
[Kirwan, 1994], Justification of Human Error Data Information QHEDI) [Kirwan, 
1992b], Success Likelihood Index Method using Multi-Attribute Utility 
Decomposition (SLIM-MAUD) [Gertman and Blackman, 1993], Paired Comparisons 
[Hunns, 1982], and Absolute Probability Judgement [Seaver and Stillwell, 1983]. 
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5.2.3 The criticisms of HRA 
Although HRA has been adopted in various industries, it is not without some 
problems. The issues addressed below are the drawbacks criticised when applying the 
HRA approaches [Hollnagel, 1993] [Fields, 2001] [Kirwan, 1994]. 
1. For the methods such as THERP, the information contained in the database is 
from a variety of sources. The reliability of such data has always been questioned. 
2. The approaches often involve steps of breaking the task into small components, 
assigning probabilistic estimates to the components and producing the results to 
provide an overall risk index. The validity of these steps is often criticised. 
3. The nature of the sources from which the data is collected may be different from 
the context to be assigned the HEPs. This may influence the quality of the HRA. 
4. The precision of the opinions with regard to relative importance of the PSFs or the 
HEP predictions is often questioned. 
5. Interdependencies existing between the factors under consideration are rarely 
addressed. 'Me Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) in the HEART method, e. g. 
interact with each other in complex ways, of which the interdependencies are 
usually ignored. 
5.2.4 Fuzzy sct thcory 
As aforementioned in section 3.2.1 the objective of fuzzy set theory is to help in 
making decisions characterised by imprecise information [Zadeh, 1965] [Klir and 
Folger, 1988] [Predrycz and Gomide, 1998]. Again, the strengths and background of 
fuzzy set theory are available and can be found in section 3.2.1 of this PhD study. 
5.2.5 Analytical hierarchy process (AHP) 
The AHP proposed by Satty is a multi-criteria decision making approach which can 
be used to solve complex decision problems [Satty, 1980]. It uses a multi-level 
hierarchical structure of objectives, criteria and alternatives. The weights and relative 
importance of the element in each hierarchy can be acquired using the pairwise 
comparison technique. An overall preference of the alternatives is obtained based on 
the weights and relative importance calculated. If the comparisons are not perfectly 
consistent, a mechanism for improving consistency is provided [Anderson et al., 
2003]. In general, the AHP consists of the following four steps [Drake, 1998]: 
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1. The selection of criteria. 
2. Evaluation of the relative importance of these criteria using pairwise 
comparisons. 
3. Evaluation of each alternative relative to each other on the basis of each selection 
criteria using the pairwise comparison technique. 
4. Combination of the ratings acquired in steps 2 and 3 to obtain an overall relative 
rating for each alternative. 
5.2.6 The problem with AHP 
In the AHP, the pairwise comparison technique is crucial since it is concerned with 
the quantification of the expert opinions using a scale. The scale is a one-to-one 
mapping between a set of linguistic expressions and a discrete set of numerals 
representing the importance of the linguistic expressions. The main problem with it is 
how to quantify the linguistic expressions selected precisely [Triantaphyllou et al., 
1994]. Although there have been two major approaches in developing such scales, a 
linear scale defined on the interval [9,1/9] [Satty, 1980], and an exponential scale 
[Lootsma, 1988,1990,1991], the mapping between linguistic terms and discrete 
numerals is sometimes regarded as too straightforward and its preciseness is 
questioned. 
5.2.7 Fuzzy AHP 
The fuzzy AHP method uses the estimation of an underlying rational scale described 
by membership functions to express fuzzy information. It allows a more accurate 
description of the decision making process. There have been many fuzzy AHP 
methods proposed. The earliest fuzzy AHP compared Rizzy ratios using triangular 
membership functions [Van Laarhoven and Pedrycz, 1983]. Another fuzzy AHP was 
developed to determine fuzzy priorities of comparison using trapezoidal membership 
functions [Buckley, 1985]. A more robust approach was applied to normalise the 
local priorities by modifying the Van Laarhoven-Predrycz approach [Boender et al, 
1989]. Another approach for handling ftizzy AHP was also introducted, which 
utilises triangular fuzzy numbers for pairwise comprison scale of ftizzy AHP and 
applies the extent analysis method for the synthetic extent values of the pairwise 
comparison [Chang, 1996]. The fuzzy AHP approach has been applied to various 
fields, including the assessment of alternative production cycles [Weck et al., 1997], 
the evaluation of weapon systems [Ching-Hsue, 1997] [Cheng et al, 1999], the 
assessment of modular product design [Lee et al., 2001], the determination of the 
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I 
importance of customer requirements in quality function deployment [Kwong and Bai, 
2003], the analysis of the financial and non-economic aspect of technology selection 
[Tola et al., 2005], the reduction of a set of conceptual design alternatives [Ayag, 
2005], etc.. 
5.2.8 The fuzzy AHP proposed 
A fuzzy AHP is proposed for resolving the difficulties encountered when conducting 
HRA as well as the application of the traditional AHP described in sections 5.2.3 and 
5.2.6. The method proposed utilises the fuzzy set theory to express the opinions from 
experts in the pairwise comparison stage rather than using the linear or exponential 
scales [Ung et al., 2006b]. This provides another concern as to the preciseness with 
regard to the expert judgement in pairwise comparisons. On the other hand, since the 
proposed fuzzy AHP does not consider the HEP database as evaluating HRA, it 
avoids the difficulties encountered when applying traditional HRA approaches. The 
research methodology of the framework proposed and a test case illustrating its 
application are presented in the following sections. 
5.3 Research methodology 
The framework of human error assessment in this study starts with the operational 
description and mission identification, so enabling a full understanding of the test case 
in question. Therefore, an AHP structure can be established. In this structure, there 
will be four hierarchies required, namely, the operation hierarchy, risk factor 
(criteria), mission and step hierarchies. Since the study incorporates the fuzzy set 
theory into the AHP method to evaluate human error related risks, a set of linguistic 
priority terms along with the membership functions describing the relationship 
between the elements in each hierarchy of the AHP structure will be adopted. 
Therefore, the pairwise comparisons between the elements in each hierarchy using 
fuzzy set theory will be able to be established. The fuzzy expressions are 
subsequently converted to the single crisp values using the appropriate defuzzification 
method. This is followed by the weighting vector calculation so as to obtain the 
relative importance of the elements. By repeating the steps aforementioned, the risk 
of the elements in the step hierarchy in terms of each criteria defined will be acquired 
based on the normalised weighting vectors calculated. The results obtained from 
these three criteria will then be synthesised and an overall risk priority will finally be 
established based on the combined risks. Figure 5.1 shows the research methodology 
of this study and each step of the framework is discussed in the following subsections. 
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1 1. Operation description I 
1 2. Mission identification I 
1 3. Establishment of a hierarchical structure I 
AHP Modellin 
4. Establishment of membership functions for the 
linguistic terms proposed to describe the relationship 
I 
between the elements in each hierarchy 
I 
5. Pairwise comparison of relationship between human error likelihood, 
failure consequence probability and severity using fuzzy set theory 
I 
1 6. Deft=ification I 
1 7. Weighting vector calculation I 
8. Evaluation of the 8. Evaluation of the 8. Evaluation of the 
likelihood in failure consequence severity in elements 
elements identified probability in elements identified in the 
in the mission identified in the mission mission hierarchy 
hierarchy hierarchy 
9. Evaluation of the 9. Evaluation of the failure 9. Evaluation of the 
likelihood in consequence probability in severity in elements 
elements identified elements identified in the identified in the step 
in the step hierarchy step hierarchy hierarchy 
10. Synthesis of the risk of each step and acquirement of an 
overall risk priority of each step in terms of the likelihood, failure 
consequence probability and severity criteria 
Figure 5.1. The research methodology of human error assessment in port 
operations 
5.3.1 Operation description 
The first step in this study is to describe the Port operation under consideration in 
detail. It is noted that the more detailed the procedures of the operation are narrated, 
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the more useful the information about human-related performance that will be 
obtained. 
5.3.2 Mission identification 
In this step the missions to be performed will be identified and presented in their 
appropriate order. The processes contained in each mission are also described. This 
forms a hierarchical structure enabling an effective application of the AHP method in 
the subsequent steps. 
5.3.3 Establishment of an AHP structure 
The AHP structure starts with Hierarchy 1, the port operation statement describing all 
activities required to take place. The information from sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 will be 
useful references for this step. The elements contained in Hierarchy 2 arc the criteria 
to be used to perform pairwise comparisons in the next levels. These criteria are often 
identified by brainstorming or experience based on expert judgement. In this study, 
the criteria are set to be the probability of occurrence, the failure consequence 
probability and the severity of human errors that might possibly influence port 
operations. Hierarchy 3 shows the procedure in order whereas Hierarchy 4 contains 
the steps taking place in each mission. Figure 5.2 shows an example of a hierarchical 
structure similar to the one to be adopted in this study. 
Hierarchy I 
Hierarchy 2 
Probability of human 
error occurrence 
Mission I 
Port operation 
statement 
Human error failure 
consequence probability 
Mission 2 Hierarchy 3 
Hierarchy 4 
B4 
Mission 4 
D4 
Figure 5.2. An example of an AHP hierarchy structure 
Human error I 
severity 
I 
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5.3.4 Establishment of membership functions for the linguistic priority terms 
describing the relationship between the elements in each hierarchy 
Membership functions are established for linguistic priority terms describing human 
error probability, failure consequence probability, severity and missions using 
multiple experts. The experts involved in human error assessment in a port operation 
project should be appropriately selected so that an unrealistic and biased membership 
function will be avoided [Kuusela et al., 1998]. Each expert is asked to evaluate a 
proposition, 'x belongs to AT. Suppose A is a fuzzy set on X that represents a 
linguistic priority term associated with a given linguistic variable and a, (x) is a value 
of scores within a certain range in X i. e. a, 
(x) E: - X (in this study, X is defined to be 10 
categories i. e. 0-10 categories). In situations where there are n experts and each of 
them has equal competence, the following formula is applied [Klir and Yuan, 1995]: 
7n 
A(x) 
a, (x) (Equation S. 1) 
n 
where A(x) is the final answer (value) after the judgements made by n experts are 
synthesised, and 
a, (x) is the answer (value) given by the ih expert, i En . 
In the case where the experts have different degrees of competencies, Equation S. I is 
modified as: 
A(x) =Z Comp, a, ( 
'x) (Equation 5.2) 
where Comp, is the degree of competency of the i" expert, and 
n 
compi (Equation 5.3) 
It is important to note that the degree of competency for each of the experts should be 
determined based on his/her knowledge and experience in human error assessment as 
well as that in the port operation field. 
The triangular membership function is adopted since it has a smooth transition from 
one linguistic priority term to the other. On the other hand, it facilitates easy 
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defuzzification of each linguistic priority term. The membership function for each 
linguistic priority term is evaluated within its limits on an arbitrary scale from 0 to 1. 
5.3.5 Pairwise comparison of human error probability of occurrence, failure 
consequence probability and severity 
Since the elements of human error probability of occurrence, failure consequence 
probability and severity are identified as crucial criteria in risk assessment, the 
relationship between these three factors will be evaluated using the membership 
functions established in section 5.3.4. This means that the relative importance 
identified will be described by a membership degree associated with one or more 
linguistic terms. A pairwise comparison matrix will also be developed. When 
evaluating the relationship between the elements the membership functions can be 
determined by either a crisp numerical value (for a single deterministic value), a range 
(for a closed interval), a most likely value (for a triangular distribution), or a most 
likely range (for a trapezoidal distribution) limited to the universe of discourse in 
question [Sii, et. al., 2005]. This depends on the knowledge experience of the experts 
specialising in port operations. 
5.3.6 Defuzzification process 
The deftizzification process obtains a single crisp value converted from the fuzzy 
output describing the relationship between the probability of human error occurrence, 
failure consequence probability and severity. Several defuzzification algorithms have 
been developed. The method selected for use in this study is the Weighted Mean of 
Maximums (WMoM) since it is computationally lighter. The algorithm averages the 
points of maximum possibility of each ftizzy expression, weighted by their degree of 
truth at which the membership functions reach their maximum values [Pillay, et. al., 
2003]. The formula of W"MoM is given as follows: 
WMOM = 
Ewix, 
ZT, (Equation 5.4) 
where wl is the degree of truth of the membership ftmction of the Phlinguistic priority 
term, and 
x, is the risk rank at maximum value of the membership function of the 
i'hlinguistic priority term. 
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5.3.7 Weighting vector calculation 
After the defuzzification process, the fuzzy pairwise comparison matrices have been 
converted into a single-value comparison matrix. Suppose the quantified judgement 
on pairs of criteria C, and C, are represented by an nxn single-value comparison 
matrix A. 
a, 2 ... a,, 
A= (a, )= a2, ... 
a2, 
(Equation 5.5) 
a. 2 ... 
where each a. is the relative importance of criteria C, and Cj - 
The weighting vector indicating the priority of each element in the pairwise 
comparison matrix in terms of its contribution to the overall risk can be obtained by a 
synthesisation procedure [Anderson, et. al., 2003], which consists of the following 
three steps: 
Calculating the summation of the values in each column of the pairwise 
comparison matrix. 
2 Dividing each element in the pairwise comparison matrix by its column 
summation. The resulting matrix is referred to as the normalised pairwise 
comparison matrix. 
3 Computing the average value of the elements in each row of the normalised 
pairwise comparison matrix. In this section the average values of each element 
indicate the priority for the criteria under consideration. 
The mathematical expression of the synthesisation is shown in Equation 5.6. 
In aki 
Wk I 
ya 
11 
n j=l Ea, 
i=l 
(Equation 5.6) 
where Wk is the weighting vector of a specific element k in the pairwise comparison 
matrix, and k=1,2 n. 
- 121 - 
Chapter 5. Human Error Assessment in Port Operations using Fuzzy A IIP 
The aspect of the consistency of pairwise judgements provided by decision makers is 
important. When numerous pairwise comparisons are evaluated, perfect consistency 
may be difficult to achieve, and some degree of inconsistency could be expected to 
exist in almost any set of pairwise comparisons. The AHP method provides a 
measure of the consistency for pairwise comparisons by introducing a consistency 
ratio. The ratio is designed in such a way that a value greater than 0.1 indicates an 
inconsistency in the pairwise judgements in question, meaning that the comparisons 
will have to be revaluated. The comparisons will be considered reasonable only if the 
consistency ratio is equal to or less than 0.1 [Yang, el. al. -, 2001]. The exact 
mathematical computation of the ratio is beyond this study, however, an 
approximation of the ratio can be obtained using the algorithm described in Equation 
5.7 below. 
CR = 
ci (Equation 5.7) 
RI 
where CR is the consistency ratio, RI is e random index for the matrix size, n. 
The value of RI depends on the number of items being compared and is given in 
Table 5.1 [Satty, 1980], and CI is the consistency index that can be obtained from 
Equation 5.8. 
A. 
ax - 
n-I 
(Equation 5.8) 
where A,,. is the maximum eigenvalue of an nxn comparison matrix A that is 
calculated using Equation 5.9. 
n 
n 
1: Wkakj 
F, k=lj=l 
ll, ax 
=. 
k=l Wk 
n 
Table 5.1. Averas! e random index value. q 
(Equation 5.9) 
n 1 21 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 01 0.58 0.90 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
Note: n is the size ofthe pairwise comparison matrix. 
source: Patty, 1980] 
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5.3.8 Evaluation of human error likelihood, failure consequence probability 
and severity in the elements identified in the mission hierarchy 
In this step, the probability of occurrence, failure consequence probability and 
severity of human errors that might potentially occur in the missions identified in 
section 5.3.2 will be evaluated separately. This is achieved by repeating Steps 4-7 
(sections 5.3.4-5.3.7) of the research methodology. In other words, the pairwise 
comparisons in this section will be performed by evaluating the relationship between 
the elements in the mission hierarchy. 
In order to realise the contribution of each element in terms of its probability of 
occurrence, the failure consequence probability and severity to the overall risk, the 
weighting vector of each element in the hierarchy is multiplied by the weighting 
vector obtained in its upper level to acquire the normalised vector. 
5.3.9 Evaluation of human error likelihood, failure consequence probability 
and severity in the elements identified in the step hierarchy 
Using the method of pairwise comparison matrices aforementioned, the risk 
(normalised weighting vector) of each step in the missions evaluated in terms of the 
criteria of probability of occurrence, failure consequence probability and severity will 
be obtained. 
5.3.10 Synthesis of the risk of each step in terms of the three criteria and 
establishment of an overall risk priority for all oil cargo handling steps 
The results of the normalised vector of each step required to complete the missions in 
terms of the aforementioned criteria can then be synthesised to obtain the overall risk 
for each step. Accordingly, the overall risk priority of these steps in port operations 
will finally be established. After acquiring the result of the overall risk priority of the 
steps in port operations, the steps with potentially higher human error related risks 
will be identified and deserve more attention than the others. 
5.4 Test case 
The test case used to illustrate the idea of assessing human error related risks in port 
operations is an oil cargo handling process at a terminal. The following sections 
demonstrate the method using the steps addressed in the research methodology. 
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5.4.1 Operation description 
The oil cargo loading operations of tankers using loading arms include the steps of 
approach and berthing, connection, start up, steady rate, finishing, disconnection and 
departure [Bea et al., 1996]. Approach is the movement of vessels from the pilot area 
to a pier. Berthing is the securing of vessels alongside the pier. The connection 
process is the attachment operation of manifolds between ships and shore. Start up is 
the gradual increase in flow rate. The steady rate agreed will be reached when the 
cargo handling process is examined to be in a perfectly safe circumstance. As the 
ship tanks are nearly full, the finishing process will commence. Subsequently, the 
flow rate decreases gradually and will be stopped when the oil loading is successfully 
completed. The manifolds will then be disconnected, and finally the vessel departs. 
5.4.2 Mission identification 
As stated in the previous section that the oil cargo loading and discharging operations 
of tankers consist of approach and berthing, connection, start up, steady rate, 
finishing, disconnection and departure. The steps needed to achieve each mission are 
subsequently identified and described in the following sections. 
5.4.2.1 Approach and berthing 
In general, there are six steps associated with approach and berthing, which are berth 
selection, the assistance of tugs when approaching, ship positioning with tugs, 
approaching speed to berth, line handling and final berthing. 
5.4.2.2 Connection 
Connection is a task that attaches the shore piping system to the tanker piping system. 
The connection process consists of the missions of pre-transfer conference, flange 
preparation, loading arm connection and alignment check. The details of the oil 
transfer are discussed by the personnel that will be involved in the oil cargo handling 
during the pre-transfer conference. The actions of flange preparation and connection 
are committed after the pre-transfer conference. Loading arms are moved to the 
vessel and drains are opened so that any oil product remaining in the arms will be 
emptied. Face plates are then removed and o-rings are examined before attaching to 
the ship flanges and will be replaced if worn or damaged. This is followed by 
securing the arms to the ship flanges. The mission of alignment check will be 
initiated if necessary so as to ensure that all connections are tight. 
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5.4.2.3 Start up 
In this process the personnel in charge of the vessel, the berth operator and the pump 
operator play crucial roles. The procedure starts with the open and verification of 
valves by the receiving party. The initiating party then opens its valves. After the 
path of the oil product is verified the initiating party requests permission to commence 
pumping. The oil flow is started at a slow rate and all connections are checked for 
leaks. Loading arms are observed to ensure the absence of excessive cyclic loading 
due to fluctuating rates or line hammer due to sudden valve closure. After both the 
initiating and receiving parties are certain that either side is operating appropriately, 
the flow rate will be increased. 
5.4.2.4 Steady rate 
The first step of this process is the increase of the flow to steady rate. The step will be 
monitored by the personnel involved in the oil cargo handling. When the flow is set 
in the steady rate condition, the volume of transfer is calculated continuously and 
verified periodically to ensure that all oil is accounted for. Tiny deviation is to be 
expected. However, if the deviation is unusually high it is likely that the missing oil 
is spilling somewhere. 
5.4.2.5 Finishing 
As the tanks become nearly full, the finishing process takes place. Finishing is the 
most complex and difficult process in the cargo handling operation. The process 
begins with the prior warning, which requires timed communication and appropriate 
control of the critical equipment. The timing of the notification of the finishing is 
important. The recommended time of the notification is 30 minutes before the 
transfer is to be completed. In the prior warning step, the receiving party will alert the 
initiating party to stand by the valves for further notification. Some 15 minutes before 
the end of the cargo handling, the valves are closed incrementally by the initiating 
party. Careful and slow manipulations of these valves should be made so that no 
hydraulic shock will result in line rupturing. The pumps are slowed and then stopped 
in response to the back pressure on the line as the valve is closed. As receiving the 
notification to stop the flow, valves are closed completely by the initiating party and 
the valves under control of the receiving party remain open so that the lines can be 
drained in preparation for the disconnection process. 
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5.4.2.6 Disconnection 
The process starts with the drain of the lines using drain taps in both headers and 
arms. Flanges are then disconnected from the bottom around to the top connectors to 
allow I any remaining oil to drain into the containment tray. After the loading arms arc 
disconnected from the vessel, the o-ring is examined and replaced if damaged. The 
face plates are then secured. Finally, the loading arms are protected with plastic 
covers to catch any possible drips and then returned to rest position at the berth. 
5.4.2.7 Departure 
The lines on the vessel are let go and it is pulled away from the terminal by the 
assisting tugs. Finally, the tanker departs for its next port of call. Table 5.2 shows the 
detail of the oil cargo handling procedure consisting of the steps of each mission. 
Table 5.2. The detail of the oil cargo handling nrocedure 
Processes or missions Steps needed to achieve the mission 
I. Berth selection 
2. Approach with tugs 
1. Approach and 3. Ship positioning 
berthing 4. Approaching speed to berth 
5. Line handling 
6. Final positioning 
I- Pre-transfer briefing 
2. Removal of face plates 
2. Connection 3. Examination of o-rings 
4. Loading arms connection 
5. Alignment check 
I. Valves opened and verified by the receiving party 
2. Valves opened and verified by the initiating party 
3. Request of permission to commence pumping by the 
initiating party 3. Start up 4. All connections checked for leaks 
5. Observation of loading arms 
6. Gradual increase of flow after both parties ensure that either 
side of the system is functioning properly 
--- - --- I. Gradual increase of flow to steady rate 
4. Steady rate 2. Continuous calculation and periodical verification of the 
volume of transfer 
I. Prior warning 
5. Finishing 
2. Closing valves slowly by the initiating party 
I Shutting down pump 
4. Closing valves completely by the initiating party 
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1. Drain of lines using drain taps in both headers and anns 
2. Disconnection of flanges 
6. Disconnection 3. Disconnection of loading arms from the ship 
4. Examination of o-rings and securing of face plates 
5. Use of plastic covers protecting loading arms 
1. Ship lines let go 
7. Departure 2. Vessel pulled away from the wharf by assisting tugs 
Source: [Bea et al., 1996] 
5.4.3 Establishment of an AHP structure 
Figure 5.3 is the AHP structure established for the cargo handling in an oil terminal. 
Hierarchy I in the AHP structure contains the oil cargo handling operation. The 
information in section 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 is a useful reference for this. Since the 
objective of this study is to evaluate human error related risks, the elements adopted in 
hierarchy 2 are human error probability of occurrence, failure consequence probability 
and severity, respectively. The processes and steps needed for the oil product transfer 
procedure have been described in section 5.4.2 and can be presented in a hierarchical 
structure shown in hierarchies 3 and 4. 
Hierarchy I 
Hierarchy 21 
[ -ý, 
an error probability U-M 
of occurrence 
ý Hierarchy 31 
Approach Connection 
and 
berthing -Step I 
I Oil cargo handling operation I 
Human error failure 
consequence probability 
Start Steady Finishing 
rate 
Step I 
Step I 
I Human error severity I 
--F I -I 
Disconnection parture 
ýSep 
I 
! Step t-ELJ 
*ý ýL 
CEE 
Step 
+EED +EED +Ejj] +Ejý] Hierarchy 4 Step 
+EEE +EE-*aE: ] 
LStep I 
Step 6 
Figure 5.3. The AHP structure of the oil cargo handling operation 
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5.4.4 Establishment of membership functions for the linguistic priority terms 
describing the relationship between the elements in each hierarchy 
Six linguistic terms are adopted to describe the relative importance of the elements in 
each hierarchy, namely, 'Equally', 'Slightly', 'Moderately', 'Fairly', 'Strongly' and 
'Absolutely' more important. Table 5.3 interprets the definition of the linguistic 
terms when applied in a pairwise comparison matrix. 
Table 5.3. The interpretation of linguistic terms describing the relative 
importance of human error probability of occurrence, failure consequence 
iDrobabilitv and severity in pairwise comt)arison matrices 
Linguistic terms Interpretation 
Equally Both equally important 
Slightly Left slightly more important than top 
Moderately Left moderately more important than top 
Fairly Left fairly more important than top 
Strongly Left strongly more important than top 
Ab olutely Left absolutely more important than top 
The next step is to establish the membership functions for the linguistic terms. Using 
Equations 5.2 and 5.3 provided that the weight of each expert is given, the value of 
A(x) capable of fully representing each linguistic term can be detennined. It can be 
obtained as follows (provided that there are four experts with the weights of 0.2,0.3, 
0.2 and 0.3, associated with their individual answer as to the value that can fully 
describe the linguistic term, Fairly, e. g. when the membership function reaches 6,6,8, 
and 8, respectively): 
Ca, (x) = 0.2.6 + 0.3.6 + 0.2.8 + 0.3.8 = 7.0 A(X)Fahrly 
i=I 
The values of two limits of the linguistic term, Fairly, as the membership function 
reaches 0, can also be obtained using the same pattern described above. Figure 5.4 
shows the membership functions established for the six linguistic terms depicting the 
relative importance between the criteria of likelihood, failure consequence probability 
and severity based on expert judgement. 
The membership functions for the linguistic terms describing the relationship between 
the elements in the mission and step hierarchies in terms of probability of occurrence, 
failure consequence probability and severity criteria can be established using the 
pattern illustrated above. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the interpretation of the linguistic 
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terms describing the relationship between the elements in the mission and step 
hierarchies in terms of the likelihood, failure consequence probability and severity 
criteria when applied in the pairwise comparison matrices. Likewise, Figures 5.5 and 
5.6 show the membership functions established for the linguistic terms employed in 
terms of the human error likelihood and failure consequence probability as well as 
severity criteria. 
Membership 
1.0 
Categories 
Figure 5.4. Membership function for the linguistic terms describing the relative 
importance of human error probability of occurrence, failure consequence 
probability and severity 
Table 5.4. The interpretation of the linguistic terms describing the relationship 
between the elements in the mission and step hierarchies in terms of the human 
error Probabilitv of occurrence and failure conseauence nrohahilitv criteria 
Linguistic terms Interpretation 
Equally Both magnitudes equal 
Slightly Left slightly higher than top 
Moderately Left moderately higher than top 
Fairly Left fairly higher than top 
trongly 
- - 
Left strongly higher than top 
Absolutely Left absolutely higher than top 
Table 5.5. The interpretation of the linguistic terms describing the relationship 
between the elements in the mission and step hierarchies in terms of the human 
error severitv criteria 
Linguistic terms Interpretation 
_ Equally Both magnitudes equal 
Slightly Left slightly more serious top 
Moderately Left moderately more serious than tqR 
Fairly _ Left fairly more serious than top 
Strongly Left strongly more serious than top 
Absolutely Left absolutely more serious than top 
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Membership 
1.0 
Figure 5.5. Membership function for the linguistic terms describing the 
relationship between the elements in the mission and step hierarchies in terms of 
the human error probability of occurrence and failure consequence probability 
criteria 
Membership 
1.0 
Figure 5.6. Membership function for the linguistic terms describing the 
relationship between the elements in the mission and step hierarchies in terms of 
the human error severity criteria 
5.4.5 Pairwise comparison of human error probability of occurrence, failure 
consequence probability and severity in hierarchy 2 
The relative importance of the human error likelihood, failure consequence 
probability and severity is obtained using the membership functions developed. 
Figure 5.7 shows the relationship with regard to the comparison between the elements 
of the human error likelihood and failure consequence probability where the single- 
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deterministic-value method is adopted. Thus, the relationship can be described as 
"the criterion of human error failure consequence probability is 0.5 Moderately and 
0.5 Fairly more important than the criterion of likelihood". Tables 5.6 and 5.7 
indicate the pairwise relationships between these three criteria using fuzzy set theory. 
Membership 
1.0 
Categories 
Figure 5.7. The determination of the fuzzy relationship between human error 
likelihood, failure consequence probability and severity 
Table 5.6. The pairwise comparisons of human error likelihood, failure 
conseauence Drobabilitv and severitv inina fijz7v QPt thearv 
Probability of 
Failure 
occurrence 
consequence Severity 
probability 
Failure 
0.5 Moderately, 1.0 Equally 0.42 Equally, 0.18 
consequence 
probability 
0.5 Fairly important Slightly 
Table 5.7. The pairwise comparisons of human error severity and probability of 
occurrence using fu7.7. v v,,,. t th,, nr, 
Probability of Severity 
occurrence 
Severity 
0.5 Slightly, 0.5 
1.0 Equally important 
Moderately 
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5.4.6 Defuzzirication process 
The ftizzy expression in the pairwise comparison shown in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 can be 
converted to a single crisp value using the WMoM algorithm in Equation 5.4. The 
fuzzy output, 0.5 Moderately and 0.5 Fairly, is defuzzified as follows: 
WMOM = 
lowixi 
ET 
0.5.5 + 0.5.7 
0.5+0.5 
Likewise, the defuzzified values of the other pairwise comparisons with regard to 
these three criteria can be obtained and shown in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. 
Table 5.8. The defuzzified values of the pairwise comparisons of human error 
likelihood. failure conseauenceDrohabilitv and severitv 
Failure 
Probability of 
consequence Severity 
occurrence 
probability 
Failure 
consequence 6.0 1.0 1.6 
probability I 
Table 5.9. The defuzzified values of the pairwise comparisons of human error 
severitv and Drobabilitv of occurrence 
Probability of Severity 
occurrence 
Severity 4.0 1.0 
5.4.7 Weighting vector calculation 
Since there are three elements that are evaluated in this hierarchy, a3 by 3 pairwise 
comparison matrix is developed. ApFs is the pairwise comparison matrix expressing i 
the quantified judgement with regard to the relative importance of human error 
probability of occurrence, failure consequence probability and severity after the 
deftizzification process. 
-132- 
Chapter 5. Human Error Assessment in Port Operations using Fuzzy A HP 
1.0000 0.1667 0.2500 
Apj,, s = 6.0000 1.0000 1.6000 
_4.0000 
0.6250 1.0000_ 
The weighting vector indicating the priority of each element in the pairwise 
comparison matrix in terms of its contribution to the overall risk is obtained using 
Equation 5.6. 
Wl=l 
3 aj I10.1667 0.25 
-1 =. -+0.0906 .., 33 3 j=l Ea, 
[T+6+4] 
_0.1667+1+0.625' 
0.25+1.6+1.0 
ij a2,6 
+ 
1.6 
W2 -T -0.5550 3 j=l 2]a 31'([T+6+4]+ 0.1667+1+0.625 0.25+1.6+1.0000] 
13 a3j 140.625 
W3 3 j=l ,33. 
[F+6+4] 
+ 0.1667+1+0.625 + 0.25+1.6+1.000 =0.3545 Ea. 
61 
M 
Tberefore, the weighting vector matrix of the hierarchy in level 2, WpFs , is shown 
below: 
0.0906 
WpFs 0.5550 
0.3545 
In order to examine whether the pairwise comparison of the three risk elements 
achieves the consistency, CR,,, s is obtained using Equations 5.7,5.8,5.9 and Table 
5.1 shown as follows: 
n 
nZ 
wkakj 
E 
3.0012-3 A. 
= =. 
k=l Wk 3.0012, CI -=6.0 x 10-' n n-I 3-1 
CRmp = 
CI 6.0 x 10-4 1.0345 x 10-' RI --7.5 8 
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Since the value of CR,,, < 0.1 , the pairwise comparisons have achieved the 
consistency. 
5.4.8 Evaluation of human error probability of occurrence, failure consequence 
probability and severity in the elements identified in the mission 
hierarchy 
There are two hierarchies. Each hierarchy will be evaluated in terms of the criteria of 
human error likelihood, failure consequence probability and severity, respectively by 
repeating steps 5-7 (sections 5.3.5-5.3.7) of the research methodology. 
5.4.8.1 Evaluation of the elements in the mission hierarchy in terms of the human 
error likelihood criterion 
Tables 5.10-5.15 indicate the fuzzy expressions with regard to the pairwise 
comparisons between the missions using the membership function developed in 
Figure 5.5 based on expert judgement. When performing such comparisons, the 
factors of the number of personnel involved, the workload of each mission and the 
circumstance surrounding the personnel should be considered in terms of their 
contributions to human error. 
Table 5.10. The pairwise comparisons between the approach & berthing mission 
and the connection, start-up, steady-rate, finishing, disconnection and departure 
missions 
Approach 
& Connection Start up 
Steady 
Finishing Disconnection Departure 
berthing rate 
Approach 0.8 
0.3 0.6 0.5 
0.7 Slightly, 0.9 
& 
1.0 
Moderately, 
Equally, Fairly, Slightly, 
0.3 Strongly, 
berthing 
Equally 
0.2 Fairly 
0.3 0.4 0.5 
Moderately 0.1 Fairly 
I I I 
Slightly 
I 
Strongly 
I 
Moderately 
I 
Table 5.11. The pairwise comparisons between the start-up mission and the 
connection. steadv-rate. finishini!. disconnection and denarture missions 
Connection r r Start up Steady rate Finishing Disconnection Departure F F 
0.5 
0.3 
0.6 
St art f 1.0 Slightly 1*0 Moderately, Equally, 0.7 Equally, Moderately, UP Equally 0.5 Slightly 0.3 0.2 Slightly 0.4 Slightly 
I I I 
Slightly 
I II 
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Table 5.12. The pairwise comparisons between the disconnection mission and the 
connection, steadv-rate. finishina and departure missions 
Connection Steady rate Finishing Disconnection Departure 
0.7 
0.9 
Disconnection Equally, 0.7 Slightly 
Equally, 
1.0 Equally 0.8 Slightly 
0.2 Slightly 
0.1 
I I I I 
Slightly 
Table 5.13. The pairwise comparisons between the finishing mission and the 
connection. steadv-rate and denarture missions 
Connection Steady rate Finishing Departure 
Finishing 
0.8 Equally, 
0.1 Slightly 
0.6 Slightly 1.0 Equally 0.75 Slightly 
Table 5.14. The pairwise comparisons between the connection mission and the 
steadv-rate and denarture miqrzinne 
Connection Steady rate Departure 
Connection 1.0 Equally 
0.7 Equally, 0.2 
0.55 Slightly 
Slightly 
Table 5.15. The pairwise comparisons between the steady-rate mission and the 
departure mission 
Steady rate Departure 
Steady rate 1.0 Equally 0.9 Equally, 0.1 Slightly 
Subsequently, the ftizzy pairwise comparisons shown in Tables 5.10-5.15 Will be 
defuzzified using Equation 5.4. Tables 5.16-5.21 contain the results after the 
deftizzification process. 
Table 5.16. The single crisp values of the pairwise comparisons between the 
approach & berthing mission and the connection, start-up, steady-rate, finishing, 
disconnection and deDarture miWom 
Approach 
Start Steady 
& Connection Finishing Disconnection Departure 
berthing up rate 
Approach & 1 5.4 2 7.8 4 3.6 8.8 
berthing 
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Table 5.17. The single crisp values of the pairwise comparisons between the 
start-up mission and the connection, steady-rate, finishing, disconnection and 
denarture missions 
Connection Start up Steady rate Finishing Disconnection Departure 
Start 3.0 1.0 4.0 2.0 1.4444 4.2 
UP 
Table 5.18. The single crisp values of the pairwise comparisons between the 
disconnection mission and the connection, steady-rate, finishing and departure 
missions 
Connection Steady rate Finishing Disconnection Departure 
Disconnection 1.4444 2.10 1.20 1.0 2.4 
Table 5.19. The single crisp values of the pairwise comparisons between the 
finishiniz mission and the connection. steadv-rate and denarture missions 
Connection Steady rate Finishing 1 Departure EFinishing 
1.2222 1.80 1.0 2.25 
Table 5.20. The single crisp values of the pairwise comparisons between the 
connection mission and the steadv-rate and deDarture missions 
Connection Steady rate Departure 
Connection 1.0 1.4444 1.65 
1 
Table 5.21. The single crisp values of the pairwise comparisons between the 
steady-rate mission and the departure mission 
Steady rate Departure 
Steady rate 1.0 1.2 
Therefore, the pairwise Comparison matrix can be constructed as shown in Amp. 
1.0 5.4 2.0 7.8 4.0 3.6 8.8- 
0.19 1.0 0.37 1.4444 0.74 0.67 1.65 
0.5 3.0 1.0 4.0 2.0 1.4444 4.2 
Amp = 0.13 0.69 0.26 1.0 0.51 0.46 1.2 
0.25 1.2222 0.5 1.8 1.0 0.9 2.25 
0.28 1.4444 0.56 2.1 1.2 1.0 2.4 
0.11 0.61 0.23 0.89 0.45 0.41 1.0 
The weighting vector Wp and normalised weighting vector WNMp matrices can be 
obtained as follows: 
-136- 
Chapter 5. Human Error Assessment in Port Operations using Fuzzy AIIP 
0.4094 0.0371 
0.0760 0.0069 
0.2013 0.0182 
WUP = 0.0530 WNmp = Wmp - 0.0906 = 0.0048 
0.1002 0.0091 
0.1136 0.0103 
_0.0465_ _0.0042 
It can be seen from Tables 5.6-5.21 and WNmP that the more important parameters 
described by the linguistic terms have higher normalised weighting vectors. This is 
consistent with the human-being common sense. Furthermore, the difference of the 
risk level between these parameters can be appreciated. In addition, in order to 
examine whether the priority in missions achieves the consistency, CR,,, is obtained 
using Equations 5.7,5.8,5.9 and Table 5.1 and evaluated as follows: 
n 
n 
Zwkakj 
E k=lj=l 
A. =. 
k=l Wk 6.973 6, CI ' Max 
n n-I 
CI -4.4xlO-' __ X 10-03 CRmp = Ri = 1.32 = 
3.3333 
6.9736-7 
2- -4.4 x 
10-3 
7-1 
Since the value of CRmp < 0.1, the priority of the missions achieves the consistency. 
5.4.8.2 Evaluations of the elements in the mission hierarchy in terms of the 
human error failure consequence probability and severity criterion 
The evaluations of the failure consequence probability and severity of human errors 
that could possibly occur in the missions are conducted based on Figures 5.5 and 5.6 
using the same pattern adopted in subsection 5.4.8.1. Tables 5.22 and 5.23 indicate 
the results in terms of the failure consequence probability and severity criteria 
between the missions using fuzzy AHP modelling based on the fuzzy expression 
shown in Appendix 5. It is noted that since the objective of this test case in the study 
is to demonstrate the methodology proposed, the data is based on the assumption that 
all pairwise comparisons have achieved the acceptable consistency and such data is 
set to have the perfect consistency. Thus, the complete pairwise comparisons between 
each mission and the values of CR associated in the comparisons in terms of the 
criteria of the failure consequence probability and severity are not given in the 
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Appendix. In real-world case studies where some degree of inconsistency is 
encountered, however, the pairwise comparisons between each element and the CR 
values associated should be conducted using the pattern similar to Tables 5.10-5.21 as 
well as Equations 5.7,5.8,5.9 and Table 5.1, respectively. 
Table 5.22. The weighting vectors and normalised weighting vectors of each 
mission in terms of the failure conseauence Drobabilitv criterion 
Missions Weighting vector 
Normalised weighting 
vector 
1. Approach and berthing 0.0314 0.0174 
2. Connection 0.0994 0.0552 
3. Start up 0.2981 0.1655 
4. Steady rate 0.2981 0.1655 
5. Finishing 0.1863 0.1034 
6. Disconnection 0.0552 0.0306 
7. Departure 0.0314 0.0174 
Table 5.23. The weighting vectors and normalised weighting vectors of each 
mission in term% of the severitv criterion 
Missions Weighting vector 
Normalised weighting 
vector 
1. Approach and berthing 0.1126 0.0399 
2. Connection 0.0709 0.0251 
3. Start up 0.1126 0.0399 
4. Steady rate 0.3829 0.1357 
5. Finishing 0.2127 0.0754 
6. Disconnection 0.0638 0.0226 
7. Departure 0.0445 0.0158 
5.4.9 Evaluation of the elements in the step hierarchy in terms of the human 
error likelihood criterion 
The elements in the step hierarchy can be evaluated by repeating the procedure of the 
pairwise-relationship fuzzification, defuzzification, and weighting vector calculation 
using the membership functions developed in Figure 5.5. Table 5.24 contains the 
ftizzy pairwise relationship between the steps in the approach and berthing mission. 
Table 5.25 shows the single crisp values of the fuzzy expression after the 
deftizzification process. It is noted, again, that the data is based on the assumption 
that all pairwise comparisons have achieved the acceptable consistency and such data 
is set to have the perfect consistency. Thus the complete pairwise comparisons 
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between each step in the mission and the value of CR associated in the comparisons in 
terms of the human error likelihood criterion are not given. 
Table 5.24. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the approach and berthing 
mission 
Berth 
Approach 
Ship Berth Line Final 
with escort 
selection positioning approach handling positioning tugs 
0.4 
0.6 
0.5 0.6 
0.3 Fairly, 
Berth Strongly, Moderately, Slightly, 
1.0 Fairly, 
0.7 
approach 0.6 0.4 Fairly 
0.5 Equally 0.4 
Strongly 
Absolutely Moderately Strongly 
Table 5.25. The single crisp values of the pairwise comparisons of the steps in the 
aDDroach and berthing missinn 
Approach 
Berth with Ship Berth Line Final 
selection escort positioning approach handling positioning 
tugs 
Berth 
9.6 5.8 4.0 1.0 7.8 8.4 
approach 
Therefore, the pairwise comparison matrix indicating the quantified relationship 
between the steps in the approach & berthing mission is constructed as shown in Am, * 
Accordingly, the weighting vector W., and normalised weighting vector W"mj 
matrices can be obtained and shown below: 
1.0 0.60 0.42 0.10 0.81 0.88 
1.66 1.0 0.69 0.17 1.34 1.45 
2.40 1.45 1.0 0.25 1.95 2.10 
A., 
9.60 5.80 4.00 1.00 7.80 8.40 
1.23 0.74 0.51 0.13 1.0 1.08 
_1.14 
0.69 0.48 0.12 0.93 1.00 
0.0587 0.0022 
0.0972 0.0036 
0.1409 0.0052 
W11 = , W., = 0.5638 0.0209 
0.0723 0.0027 
_0.0671_ _0.0025_ 
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The quantified pairwise relationship and the associated weighting vectors between the 
steps in the other six missions can be obtained using the same pattern described 
above. The fuzzy relationship between the steps of each mission is listed in Appendix 
6 based on the assumption that all pairwise comparisons have achieved the acceptable 
consistency and such data is set to have the perfect consistency. The weighting 
vectors and normalised weighting vectors of the steps in each mission are calculated 
and shown in Table 5.26. 
Table 5.26. The weighting vectors and normalised weighting vectors of each step 
in each mission for the nrobabilitv of occurrence criterion 
Mission Step No. Weighting vector 
Normalised 
weighting vector 
1.1 0.0587 0.0022 
1.2 0.0972 0.0036 
1. Approach and 1.3 0.1409 0.0052 
berthing 1.4 0.5638 0.0209 
1.5 0.0723 0.0027 
1.6 0.0671 0.0025 
2.1 0.0433 0.0003 
2.2 0.0656 0.0005 
2. Connection 2.3 0.1036 0.0007 
2.4 0.3937 0.0027 
2.5 0.3937 0.0027 
3.1 0.1033 0.0019 
3.2 0.1033 0.0019 
3 Start up 
3.3 0.0527 0.0010 
. 3.4 0.4956 0.0090 
3.5 0.1652 0.0030 
3.6 0.0799 0.0015 
4. Steady rate 
4.1 0.1111 0.0005 
4.2 0.8889 0.0043 
5.1 0.64 0.0058 
Finishing 5 
5.2 0.16 0.0015 
. 5.3 0.1 0.0009 
5.4 0.1 0.0009 
6.1 0.1772 0.0018 
6.2 0.1107 0.0011 
6. Disconnection 6.3 0.1107 0.0011 
6.4 0.5315 0.0055 
6.5 0.0699 0.0007 
7. Departure 
7.1 0.1389 0.0006 
1 7.2 1 0.8611 0.0036 
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5.4.9.1 Evaluations of the elements in the step hierarch in terms of the human 
error failure consequence probability and severity criteria 
The risks of each step needed to complete the missions in terms of failure 
consequence probability and severity criteria are obtained based on Figures 5.5 and 
5.6 and the fuzzy outputs in Appendices 7 and 8 after the defuzzification process. 
They are shown in Tables 5.27 and 5.28. It is noted, again, that the data is based on 
the assumption that all pairwise comparisons have achieved the acceptable 
consistency and such data is set to have the perfect consistency. Thus the complete 
pairwise comparisons between each step in the mission and the values of CR 
associated in the comparisons in terms of the criteria of the failure consequence 
probability and severity are not given in the Appendices. 
Table 5.27. The weighting vectors and normalised weighting vectors of each step 
in each mission for the failure conseauence nrohahilitv criterion 
Mission Step No. Weighting vector 
Normalised 
weighting vector 
1.1 0.0560 0.0010 
1.2 0.4812 0.0084 
1. Approach and 1.3 0.1504 0.0026 
berthing 1.4 0.1504 0.0026 
1.5 0.0891 0.0016 
1.6 0.0729 0.0013 
2.1 0.0625 0.0034 
2.2 0.1343 0.0074 
2. Connection 2.3 0.5374 0.0297 
2.4 0.0867 0.0048 
2.5 0.1791 0.0099 
3.1 0.1563 0.0259 
3.2 0.0782 0.0129 
3 Start u 
3.3 0.0568 0.0094 
. p 3.4 0.5002 0.0828 
3.5 0.1251 0.0207 
3.6 0.0834 0.0138 
4 Stead rate 
4.1 0.1667 0.0276 
. y 4.2 0.8333 0.1379 
5.1 0.5538 0.0573 
Finishing 5 
5.2 0.1385 0.0143 
. 5.3 0.1538 0.0159 
5.4 0.1538 0.0159 
6. Disconnection 6.1 0.6017 0.0184 
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6.2 0.1037 0.0032 
6.3 0.1037 0.0032 
6.4 0.1254 0.0038 
6.5 0.0654 0.0020 
arture De 7 
7.1 0.1389 0.0024 
p . 7.2 0.8611 0.0150 
Table 5.28. The weighting vectors and normalised weighting vectors of each step 
in each mission for the severitv criterion 
Mission Step No. Weighting vector 
Normalised 
weighting vector 
1.1 0.0565 0.0023 
1.2 0.5429 0.0217 
1. Approach and 1.3 0.0734 0.0029 
berthing 1.4 0.1086 0.0043 
1.5 0.1597 0.0064 
1.6 0.0590 0.0024 
2.1 0.1714 0.0043 
2.2 0.1428 0.0036 
2. Connection 2.3 0.0829 0.0021 
2.4 0.5142 0.0129 
2.5 0.0887 0.0022 
3.1 0.1509 0.0060 
3.2 0.0755 0.0030 
3 Start u 
3.3 0.0549 0.0022 
. p 3.4 0.1150 0.0046 
3.5 0.1207 0.0048 
3.6 0.4830 0.0193 
rate Stead 4 
4.1 0.1667 0.0226 
y . 4.2 0.8333 0.1131 
5.1 0.5598 0.0422 
Finishin 5 
5.2 0.2799 0.0211 
g . 5.3 0.0903 0.0068 
5.4 0.0700 0.0053 
6.1 0.5890 0.0133 
6.2 0.1227 0.0028 
6. Disconnection 6.3 0.1227 0.0028 
6.4 0.1016 0.0023 
6.5 0.0640 0.0014 
arture De 
7- 7.1 0.1389 0.0022 
p 
F 
. 7.2 1 0.8611 0.0136 
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5.4.10 Synthesis of the risk of each step in terms of the three criteria and 
establishment of an overall risk priority for all oil cargo handling steps 
In this step, the risks evaluated in terms of the aforementioned three criteria are 
synthesised to obtain the overall risk for the steps required to perform the oil cargo 
handling. The overall results are acquired by the summation of the normalised 
weighting vector of each step in terms of the three criteria as shown in Tables 5.26, 
5.27 and 5.28. Accordingly, the risk priority is established based on the combined 
risks obtained as shown in Table 5.29. 
Table 5.29. The synthesised risk of each step in terms of three criteria and the 
overall risk nrioritv of each sten 
Mission 
Step 
No. 
Probability 
of 
occurrence 
criterion 
Failure 
consequence 
probability 
criterion 
Severity 
criterion 
Overall 
risk 
Overall 
risk 
priority 
1.1 0.0022 0.0010 0.0023 0.0055 27 
1.2 0.0036 0.0084 0.0217 0.0337 8 
1. Approach 1.3 0.0052 0.0026 0.0029 0.0107 23 
and berthing 1.4 0.0209 0.0026 0.0043 0.0278 13 
1.5 0.0027 0.0016 0.0064 0.0107 22 
1.6 0.0025 0.0013 0.0024 0.0062 26 
2.1 0.0003 0.0034 0.0043 0.008 24 
2.2 0.0005 0.0074 0.0036 0.0115 21 
2. Connection 2.3 0.0007 0.9297 0.0021 0.0325 10 
2.4 0.0027 0.0048 0.0129 0.0204 16 
2.5 0.0027 0.0099 0.0022 0.0148 18 
3.1 0.0019 0.0259 0.0060 0.0338 7 
3.2 0.0019 _ 0.0129 _ 0.0030 0.0178 17 
3 Start up 
3.3 0.0010 0.0094 0.0022 0.0126 19 
. 3.4 0.0090 0.0828 0.0046 0.0964 3 
3.5 0.0030 0.0207 0.0048 0.0285 12 
3.6 0.0015 0.0138 0.0193 0.0346 6 
Steady rate 4 
4.1 0.0005 0.0276 0.0226 0.0507 4 
. 4.2 0.0043 0.1379 0.1131 0.2553 1 
5.1 0.0058 0.0573 0.0422 0.1053 2 
Finishing 5 
5.2 0.0015 0.0143 0.0211 0.0369 5 
. 5.3 0.0009 0.0159 0.0068 0.0236 14 
5.4 0.0009 0.0159 0.0053 0.0221 15 
nnection 1 6.1 0.0018 0.0184 0.0 0.0335 9 
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6.2 0.0011 0.0032 0.0028 0.0071 25 
6.3 0.0011 0.0032 0.0028 0.0071 25 
6.4 0.0055 0.0038 0.0023 0.0116 20 
6.5 0.0007 0.0020 0.0014 0.0041 29 
arture D 7 
7.1 0.0006 0.0024 0.0022 0.0052 28 
ep . 
1 
7.2 0.0036 0.0150 0.0136 0.0322 11 
It can be seen from the Table that steps 4.2 (continuous calculation and periodical 
verification of the volume of transfer), 5.1 (prior warning), 3.4 (all connections 
checked for leaks), 4.1 (gradual increase of flow to steady rate) and 5.2 (closing 
valves slowly by the initiating party) are the processes with higher risks in the oil 
cargo handling operation. This is because the overall risks of these steps in terms of 
the criteria are relatively higher than the others. Thus, these steps need to be 
considered appropriately so that the risks resulting from human error in such steps can 
be reduced to an acceptable level. In addition, the risk priority established enables 
decision makers to propose Risk Control Options (RCOs) to the areas needing more 
attentions in a reasonable order from the risk point of view. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The technique presented in this chapter illustrates an alternative perspective for 
evaluating human error assessment. In assessing the human error risk, the steps in 
each mission are compared to each other in terms of the likelihood, failure 
consequence probability and severity criteria to acquire the relative importance and 
overall risk priority. This resolves the difficulty imposed on the traditional human 
error methods where the human error data is transformed from the source that may not 
be relevant to the project in question or where human error related risks are purely 
estimated based on expert judgement due to the scarcity of such data. In addition, the 
filzzy AHP method gives the practitioners a flexible and rational fashion upon which 
to model the relationships between the elements in the pairwise comparison process 
although such a method may require cumbersome computations if there are many 
criteria to be considered. However, it should be noted that the experience of the 
experts consulted is crucial since the core of this research is the professional 
judgement from such personnel. Furthermore, appropriate quantitative data facilitates 
the research quality in determining the level of the linguistic terms used to express the 
relationships between the elements. Thus, although the scarcity of the data causes 
difficulties in human error research, the acquisition of quantitative data from daily 
port operations is still recommended. 
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Chapter 6. Multi-Attribute Decision-Making 
using Evidential Reasoning 
When evaluating Risk Control Options (RCOs), difficulties may be 
encountered due to the attribute nature of the defined criteria In this 
chapter a decision-making model using the Evidential Reasoning (ER) 
approach is proposed provided that RCOs have been identified It is the 
technique aimed at solving the Multiple Attribute Decision Analysis 
(AMDA) problems. This is because of its capability of consistently 
modelling precise data and subjective judgement with uncertainty under a 
unifiedftamework However, a problem occurs in circumstances where a 
decision-making project is evaluated by multiple experts and various 
utility appreciation arisingfrom each expert exists when assessing each 
evaluation grade. This could result in an RCO or general attribute 
ranking order conflict between the experts. Such a conflict would become 
obvious if the evaluation grades and belief degrees obtained for each 
alternative or general attribute were close. The framework proposed in 
this chapter is capable of solving such a difficulty. This is accomplished 
by constructing a utility category-evaluation grade matrixfor each expert 
using the beliefdegree method and synthesising the utility levels contained 
in the matrices estimated by all experts using the ER approach. The 
ftamework is demonstrated by a test case which considers the effects of 
the security, safety and human error reduction measures in ports. The 
analysis will be performed in terms offive criteria, namely, effectiveness, 
cost, time ofdeployment, resource availability and co-operation level. 
6.1 Introduction 
Many real world decision analysis problems involve multiple attributes with both a 
quantitative and qualitative nature. When evaluating RCOs for enhancing security 
and safety in a port, for instance, there are many parameters that need to be considered 
other than risk reduction and the ratio of costs and benefits such as time of 
deployment, existing resources available, etc. Difficulties may be encountered due to 
the attribute nature of the parameters under consideration. A decision-making process 
may not be regarded as appropriate if it does not take into account all the attributes in 
question [Stewart, 1992] [Belton and Stewart, 2002]. Several approaches have been 
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proposed to deal with such MADA problems. The ER approach is one of the 
techniques that were developed to solve the MADA problems. By using this 
technique, subjective judgement with uncertainty and precise data can be consistently 
modelled under a unified framework based on an evaluation analysis model and the 
Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence [Lopez de Mantaras, 19901. However, a 
problem occurs in circumstances where a decision-making project is evaluated by 
multiple experts due to the fact that the utility appreciation of each evaluation grade 
by the experts could be different. This could result in an attribute or RCO ranking 
order conflict between the experts. The phenomenon would become obvious if the 
evaluation grades and belief degrees obtained for each alternative or general attribute 
were close. 
The framework proposed in this study is capable of solving such a difficulty since it 
contains a systematic mechanism capable of acquiring a combined utility level of 
linguistic terms. Such consensus assessments with regard to linguistic terms provide 
the consistence throughout safety management process. It is demonstrated by a test 
case considering the effects of the security, safety and human error reduction 
measures in port in terms of five mutually exclusive criteria due to the natures of the 
attributes, namely, effectiveness, cost, time of deployment, resource availability and 
co-operation level. Effectiveness is defined as the effectiveness of the RCOs on risk 
reductions in terms of the security, safety and human error aspects. Cost is the capital 
that will be consumed once the RCOs are implemented, including initial costs, 
operational costs, maintaining costs and decommissioning costs. Time of deployment 
is the time spent in deploying the measures, including the time taken for personnel 
training and for facility or equipment installations. Resource availability is, regardless 
of monetary capitals, defined as the existing resource available for the measures such 
as existing facilities, equipment or skilled personnel capable of accomplishing the 
missions established. Co-operation level is the level of the diversity in which 
different departments both within and outside the port need to participate in the 
activities proposed by the measures, depending upon the functions and complexity of 
the RCOs- In other words, a specific measure would be preferred if the number of 
different department participating in the proposed activity was low (e. g. one or two) in 
terms of the co-operation level criterion. 
The previously mentioned problem is solved by first constructing a utility category- 
evaluation grade matrix for each expert to estimate the utilities of each evaluation 
grade. This is followed by a synthesis process using the ER algorithm. The 
synthesised utility level for each evaluation is subsequently applied to the aggregating 
results obtained also by ER. An RCO priority can then be obtained followed by the 
conduction of a sensitivity analysis to identify the best RCOs. 
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6.2 Background 
6.2.1 The ER approach 
The ER approach was developed in the 1990s to solve the MADA problems 
characterised by both qualitative and quantitative attributes with various types of 
uncertainties [Yang and Singh, 1994] [Yang and Sen, 1994] [Yang, 2001] [Yang and 
Xu, 2002a]. The core of the approach is the development of an ER algorithm based 
on an evaluation analysis model and the D-S theory of evidence [Lopez de Mantaras, 
1990]. This is capable of aggregating the attributes in a multilevel structure. On the 
basis of the ER framework, attributes are evaluated by a distributed assessment using 
the belief degree method along with the evaluation grade associated. Therefore, both 
subjective judgement with uncertainty and precise data can be consistently modelled 
under a unified framework. 
Extensive research aimed at enhancing the ER approach in solving the MADA 
problems has been conducted in recent years. First, a generalised and extended 
decision-making matrix was constructed. Then rule and utility based techniques were 
developed to enhance the ER approach for dealing with the MADA problems of a 
quantitative and qualitative nature under uncertainties [Yang, 20011. The framework 
proposed is capable of transforming various types of information within the matrix for 
aggregating attributes via the ER procedure. Secondly, the research revealing the 
nonlinear features of the ER aggregation process by investigating the decision 
analysis process of the ER approach was conducted, providing a guidance on 
conducting sensitivity analysis [Yang and Xu, 2002b]. Thirdly, a rigorous and 
pragmatic ER algorithm was developed to enhance the process of aggregating 
attributes under uncertainty [Yang and Xu, 2002a]. This revised ER approach is 
different from the original version, and treats the unassigned belief degree in two parts; 
one caused by the incompleteness, and the other by the fact that each attribute plays 
only one part in the whole assessment process according to its relative weight. Utility 
intervals were proposed to characterise the degrees of incompleteness present in the 
original approach and describe the impact of ignorance on decision analysis. Using 
the new version of the ER approach, four synthesis axioms were explored and these 
provide the theoretical basis for the approach [Yang and Xu, 2002a]. 
Suppose a two-level evaluation structure contains a general attribute at the top level, 
with a number of basic attributes at the bottom level. Each basic attribute is assessed 
with reference to a set of evaluation grades and each can be assessed to a specific or a 
subset of the evaluation grades with different belief degrees. Then 
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If no basic attribute is assessed to a specific evaluation grade at all, the general 
attribute should not be assessed to that grade either (Basic synthesis theorem). 
If all basic attributes are precisely assessed to a specific grade, the general 
attribute should also be precisely assessed to the saine grade (Consensus 
synthesis theorem). 
If all basic attributes are completely assessed to a subset of grades, the general 
attribute should also be completely assessed to the same subset (Complete 
synthesis theorem). 
If any basic assessment is incomplete either due to the lack of data or the 
inability of the assessors to provide precise judgement, a general assessment 
obtained by aggregating the incomplete and complete basic assessments 
should also be incomplete with a degree of incompleteness (Incomplete 
synthesis theorem). 
Finally, a window-based and graphically designed Intelligent Decision System (IDS) 
has been developed to employ the ER approach [Yang and Xu, 2002a]. This user- 
friendly software enables the practitioners an easy and flexible way to model and 
analyse the MADA problems. 
The ER technique has been applied in the engineering and management fields. First, 
it can be combined with the fuzzy set theory and the fuzzy rule base method to 
conduct safety analysis and synthesis [Wang et al., 1995,1996] [Liu et al., 2004, 
2005]. Secondly, it has been employed for motorcycle assessment [Yang and Sen, 
1994] [Yang, 2001], general cargo ship design [Sen and Yang, 1995], retro-fit ferry 
design [Yang and Sen, 1997], organisational self-assessment [Yang et al., 2001] 
[Siow et al., 2001] and contractor selection [Sonmez et al., 2001,2002]. Finally, a 
new ftizzy ER algorithm capable of dealing with the MADA problems with 
probabilistic and fuzzy uncertainties has also been developed [Yang et al., 2006a]. A 
generic Rule-base Inference Methodology using ER (RIMER) has also been proposed 
to capture vagueness, incompleteness and nonlinear causal relationships [Yang et al., 
2006b]. 
6.2.2 The problem of the ER approach when applied by multiple experts 
When assessing the utilities of the evaluation grades using the ER technique, the 
probability assignment approach is utilised [Winston, 1994]. This method is 
appropriate when applied by one expert. However, it may not be practicable in 
circumstances where a decision-making project is evaluated by multiple experts due 
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to the fact that the utility appreciation of each evaluation grade by the experts could be 
different. Therefore, the ranking order of the alternatives or the attributes may vary 
between experts. The phenomenon would become obvious if the evaluation grades 
and belief degrees obtained for each alternative or general attribute were close. 
Therefore, it is necessary to develop a framework considering individual expert 
judgement with regard to the utilities of the evaluation grades when applying the ER 
approach for multi-attribute aggregation. 
6.2.3 The framework proposed 
In this study, a framework capable of solving the aforementioned problem is proposed. 
It will be demonstrated by a test case considering the effects of security, safety and 
human error reduction measures in port in terms of five criteria provided that such 
measures have been identified [Ung et al., 2006c]. First, the utilities for the 
evaluation grades are estimated by each expert using the belief degree method. 
Subsequently the estimated utilities from each expert are synthesised using the ER 
algorithm. Finally, the priority of the alternatives can be established. The result 
obtained will be more reliable since it allows for the attribute assessment and 
synthesis of the utility levels of the evaluation grades based on the judgement by each 
expert. Finally, a sensitivity analysis will be conducted to assist decision makers in 
selecting the best alternatives, thus providing another way of thinking in terms of the 
different importance in the risk and cost aspects. The methodology of the proposed 
model is presented in section 6.3. 
6.3 Methodology 
The framework in this study commences with the identification of the criteria that will 
be used to assess the RCOs. The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique is 
subsequently employed to determine the relative weight of the criteria identified. The 
effects of each RCO in terms of the criteria identified will then be evaluated by each 
expert. This result is then synthesised using the ER approach to acquire the overall 
aggregating result. This, in turn, is followed by the development of a utility category- 
evaluation grade matrix for each expert to estimate the utility level of each evaluation 
grade using the belief degree method. The utility preference of each evaluation grade 
estimated by each expert is then combined using the ER algorithm and will be 
normalised. The synthesised utility level of each evaluation grade based on all 
experts is subsequently employed to the aggregating result of the effects of each RCO. 
An RCO priority will then be acquired based on the results calculated. Finally, a 
sensitivity analysis will be conducted to identify the best measures and so provide 
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another way of considering the importance of the various risk and cost aspects. 
Figure 6.1 shows the framework of the research methodology in this study. 
6.3.1 Identification of the criteria to assess the RCOs 
The first step in the methodology is to identify the attributes (criteria) that play 
important roles in evaluating the measures proposed. The mission can be 
accomplished by brainstorming based on the experience and knowledge of the experts. 
1. Identification of the criteria to assess the RCOs 
Effectivcness cost Time of Resource Co-operation 
__1 II deployment availability 
II 
level 
2. Detennination of the relative weight of each criterion I 
using AHP 
I 
3. Combination of each RCO assessment based on the 
individual criterion evaluated by each expert and synthesis of 
I 
such an assessment from all experts using ER 
I 
4. Development of a utility category-evaluation grade matrix 
for each expert using the belief degree method 
I 
5. Combination of the utility preference of each evaluation I 
grade expressed by each expert using ER 
I 
1 6. Nortnalisation process I 
7. Application of the nonnalised utility preference to the 
aggregating result of each RCO 
8. Sensitivity analysis 
9. Identification of the best RCOs based on the sensitivity 
analysis conducted 
Figure 6.1. The framework of the research methodology 
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The crucial factors identified in this test case include effectiveness, cost, time of 
deployment, resource availability and co-operation level, respectively. 
6.3.2 Determination of the relative weight of each criterion using AHP 
After identifying the criteria to be used to assess the RCOs, the relative weight of each 
criterion will subsequently be determined. The AHP method will be employed to 
achieve this aim. Suppose an nxn comparison matrix A represents the relative 
importance on pairs of criteria C, and Cj, then; 
a12 *** a,, 
A= aj = 
a2, ... 
a2n 
_an, 
an2 
(Equation 6.1) 
where each a, is the relative importance of criteria C, against Cj, and in this test 
case, n is set to be 5. 
The weighting vector indicating the priority of each element in the pairwise 
comparison matrix in terms of its contribution to the overall decision making can be 
obtained by a synthesis procedure [Anderson, et. al., 2003]. This consists of the 
following three steps: 
Calculating the summation of the values in each column of the pairwise 
comparison matrix. 
2 Dividing each element in the pairwise comparison matrix by its column 
summation. The resulting matrix is referred to as the normalised pairwise 
comparison matrix. 
3 Computing the average value of the elements in each row of the normalised 
pairwise comparison matrix. In this section the average values of each element 
indicate the priority for criteria. 
The mathematical expression of the synthesis is shown in Equation 6.2. 
1-a,, 
wk =-E n n j., a, 
a12 
1 
(Equation 6.2) 
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where wk is the weighting vector of a specific element k in the pairwise comparison 
matrix, and k=1,2 n. 
The aspect of the consistency of pairwise judgements provided by decision makers is 
important. When numerous pairwise comparisons are evaluated, perfect consistency 
is often difficult to achieve, and some degree of inconsistency could be expected to 
exist in almost any set of pairwise comparisons. The AHP method provides a 
measure of the consistency for pairwise comparisons by introducing a consistency 
ratio. The ratio is designed in such a way that a value greater than 0.1 indicates an 
inconsistency in the pairwise judgements in question, meaning that the comparisons 
will have to be revaluated. The comparisons will be considered reasonable only if the 
consistency ratio is equal to or less than 0.1 [Yang el aL, 2001]. The exact 
mathematical computation of the ratio is beyond this study. However, an 
approximation of the ratio can be obtained using the algorithm listed in Equation 6.3: 
CR = 
C, 
RI 
(Equation 6.3) 
where CR is the consistency ratio, RI is the random index for the matrix size, n- 
The value of RI depends on the number of items being compared and is given in 
Table 6.1 [Satty, 19801 and CI is the consistency index that can be obtained from 
Equation 6.4. 
CI = 
A. 
ax-n (Equation 6.4) 
n-I 
where A.. is the maximum eigenvalue of an nxn comparison matrix A that is 
calculated using Equation 6.5. 
n 
1: 
Wkakj 
k=l, j=l 
k=l Wk 
n 
Table 6.1. Average random index values 
(Equation 6.5) 
n 11 21 31 41 5 -1 61 71 81 91 10 
RI 
-0 
01 0.58 1 -0. -9q 1.12 1 1.24 ] 1.3 1 1.41 1 1.45 11.49 
1 
Note: n is the size or the pairwise comparison matrix. 
Source: [Satty, 1980] 
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6.3.3 Combination of each RCO assessment based on the individual criterion 
evaluated by each expert and synthesis of such an assessment from all 
experts using ER 
After determining the relative importance of each criterion, the RCO assessment 
based on the individual criterion will be conducted by each expert. When evaluating 
the RCO in terms of the criteria identified, the effect of each RCO will be described 
by one or more specific evaluation grades associated with the corresponding belief 
degrees. The ER method applied in this study is the revised version proposed in 2002 
[Yang and Xu, 2002]. Suppose there are L basic attributes (criteria) e, (i = 1,2 .... L) , 
each of whose relative importance is denoted by w, (i=1,2 ... L ), M alternatives 
(RCOs) a, (I = 1,2.. M) and N distinctive and mutually exclusive evaluation grades 
H,, (n=1,2 ... N) to be employed in assessing the RCOs in terms of the criteria 
identified. Then a multi-attribute decision problem is modelled as follows: 
S(e, (a, )) = (ajý n=1,2 ... NJ, i=1,2 .... L, I=1,2.. M (Equation 6.6) 
where 9,,, (al) is a degree of belief. 0 and 1: flnjaj:! ý 
N 
n=1 
Let y be a general attribute expressing an RCO assessment by an expert and m, 
', 
be a 
basic probability mass estimated by that expert representing the degree to which the 
i th basic attribute, e, , supports the hypothesis that y is assessed to the n th 
evaluation grade, H, Also let m., be a remaining probability mass unassigned to 
any individual evaluation grade after all N grades have been taken into account for 
assessing y as far as e, is concerned. m,,,, and m,,, can be acquired using Equations 
6.7 and 6.8. 
m,,,, = WIAj (Equation 6.7) 
L 
where jw, 
i=l 
NN 
MHJ =l-WiLfl. j (Equation 6.8) 
n=l n=l 
-153- 
Chapter 6. Multi-attribute Decision Making using ER 
The remaining probability mass is subsequently considered separately in terms of the 
relative weights of attributes and the incompleteness in the assessment. Therefore, 
MHý ý 
is decomposed into two parts: 
MHJ ": 
ffHj + MHj (Equation 6.9) 
1-wi (Equation 6.10) 
Ar 
fl,, 
J (Equation 6.11) 'n'Hj =W, 1-1] 
n=l 
ff., is the remaining probability mass that is not yet assigned to individual evaluation 
grades since e, only plays one part in the assessment depending upon its relative 
weight, wi. It represents the degree to which other attributes can play a role in the 
assessment. 'nHj is the other remaining probability mass unassigned to individual 
evaluation grades that is caused by an incomplete assessment. The value of 
in-Hj will 
be zero if S(e, (a, )) is complete, otherwise it will be positive. 
Suppose and 'n'H, I(i) are the probability masses obtained from S(e, (a, )) 
using Equations 6.7,6.10 and 6.11. The aggregation of the attribute i and the 
attribute i+l can be acquired using Equations 6.12,6.13,6.14,6.15 and 6.16, 
respectively. 
m,,, (, +i) = 
Kl(i,, )(mn,, (i)mnj+, + MHJ(i)Mnj+l + Mn, ](i)MH, i+l) (Equation 6.12) 
'nH, I(i) = 
NHI(i) + kj(i) (Equation 6.13) 
NH, 
I(i+l) (Equation 6.14) 
+ (Equation 6.15) 'nHj(i+l) KI(i+l) Hj(i) Hj+l + NHI(i) Hj+l HI(i)FHj+l) 
NN 
K, (, +, )= (Equation 6.16) t=l j-1 j*t 
10 
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where m, j(i+, ) denotes the probability mass representing the 
degree to which the 
basic attributes e, and e, +, support the 
hypothesis that y is assessed to the 
nth evaluation grade H,, , 
MHJ(i+l) is the combined remaining probability mass unassigned to any 
individual evaluation grade after all N grades have been taken into account 
for assessing y as far as e, and ej+, are concerned, 
represents the combined remaining probability mass that is not yet 
assigned to individual grades due to the fact that e, and e,.,, only play some 
parts in the assessment, 
is the combined remaining probability mass unassigned to individual nH, I(i-, -I) 
evaluation grades that is caused by an incomplete assessment, and 
N 
is a normalising factor so that I Mpil(i+l) + MHJ(1+1) and 
n=l 
i=1,2,... L -1. 
Once all attributes have been aggregated, the combined belief degrees are generated 
by using Equations 6.17 and 6.18. 
Mn, I(L) (Equation 6.17) 
- 
FHJ(L) 
MHJ(L) 
PH (Equation 6.18) 
where 6,, denotes a belief degree to which H,, is assessed, and 
, 8,, 
is the unassigned belief degree representing the extent of the 
incompleteness in the overall assessment. 
The assessment for the general attribute, y, can be represented using the following 
equation. 
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S(y) =n=1,2 .... NJ (Equation 6.19) 
Equation 6.19 establishes that y is assessed to the evaluation gade H,, with the 
belief degee of 6,,. 
After obtaining S(y) of each RCO by each expert, all assessments of S(Y) of each 
RCO evaluated by all experts will subsequently be synthesised using Equations 6.7- 
6.19. The aggregating result will be listed. A table similar to Table 6.2 will be 
established. 
Table 6.2. An example of a list of the aggregating result of each RCO 
H, H2 ... H,, 
RCO, A, RCOJ P2, RCOJ ... 
fln, 
RCOI 
RC02 A, RC02 fl2, RC02 ... fin, RC02 
RC03 A, RC03 ARCOý ... 
fln, 
RC03 
RCO. A, RCOm 182, R-COm n, RCOm 
6.3.4 Development of a utility category-evaluation grade matrix for each expert 
using the belief degree method 
The objective of this step is to determine the utility of each evaluation grade 
expressed by each expert. A utility category-evaluation grade matrix will be 
developed. It contains II utility categories from zero to 10, each of which is used to 
express the utility level to which a specific evaluation grade is assessed by each expert 
using the belief degree method. It is noted that the summation of the belief degrees 
from categories zero to 10 are smaller than or equal to 1. Suppose there are N 
evaluation grades, then a utility category-evaluation grade matrix will be established 
and completed by an expert as shown in Table 6.3: 
Table 6.3. The utility levels of N evaluation grades expressed by an expert using 
the belief degree method 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
H, flo'l A,, 82,1 P3,1 P4,1 P5,1 P6,1 P7.1 A, A, Ao,, 
H2 A, 2 
A. 
2 
P2,2 P3,2 fl4,2 A. 
2 
P6,2 A. 
2 
A, 
2 
A, 
2 
AO, 
2 
H,, flo, I A, A, A, n P4. n An fl6, n P7. An -- AA TA,. Ao, 
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It should be noted that the utility category 10 denotes the maximum utility whereas 
utility category 0 represents the minimurn in assessing a specific evaluation grade II,,. 
6.3.5 Combination of the utility preference of each evaluation grade expressed 
by each expert using ER 
The mission of this stage is to combine the utility preference of each evaluation grade 
expressed by each expert. This is accomplished by repeating Equations 6.7 to 6.19. 
After considering the utility preference of each evaluation grade of all experts, the 
result will be expressed using Equation 6.20. 
j(Ci, ßi), 1=0,1,2..., 101 (Equation 6.20) 
where U,, (H,, ) expresses the original utility preference of the evaluation n, 
C, is the i th utility category in question, and 
, 
8, denotes the belief degree to which C, is assessed. 
By assigning the values of 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, and 10 to the categories 0,1,2,3, 
4, ' 5,6,7,8,9, and 10, respectively, the quantitative utility preference of eacb 
evaluation grade can be obtained using Equation 6.2 1. 
10 
uK)=EV, A,, 
1=0 
(Equation 6.2 1) 
where U(H,, ) denotes the quantitative utility preference of the evaluation grade n, 
V, is the value of the category i assigned, and C 
A,,, is the belief degree to which the evaluation grade n is assessed to the 
category i- 
6.3.6 Normalisation process 
A normalisation process will take place to convert U(H,, ) obtained from section 6.3.5 
to the normalised numerical values using Equation 6.22. 
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U(HI)nm = 
U(H,, ) - min U(H,, ) (Equation 6.22) 
max U(H,, ) - min U(H,, ) 
where U(H,, ),,. is the normalised utility of the evaluation grade H, 
represents the quantitative utility preference of the evaluation grade n, 
max U(H,, ) denotes the maximum original value of U(H,, ), and 
min U(H,, ) is the minimum original value of U(H,, ). 
6.3.7 Application of the normalised utility preference developed to the 
aggregating result of each RCO 
Let U(H,, ),,. be the normalised utility of the evaluation grade H', as stated in section 
6.3.6 and U(H,,, ),,. > U(H, ) if H,,,, is preferred to H,,. When all assessments are 
complete, the value of & is zero. Therefore, the expected utility of the general 
attribute y can be obtained using Equation 6.23. 
N 
U(v) =IP,, U(Hn)nm 
n=l 
(Equation 6.23) 
If U(y(a, )) > Uý(aj, then the alternative i is preferred to the alternative 
When any of the basic attribute assessments is incomplete, 8Hwill be positive. The 
revised ER algorithm is capable of providing the upper and lower bounds of the belief 
degrees using the results from Equations 6.17 and 6.18. In other words, '8', represents 
the lower bound of the belief degree, and (fl, +, 8, )denotes the upper bound of the 
belief degree based on the concepts of the belief measure and also the plausibility 
measure in the D-S theory of evidence. Therefore, [fl, (, 6,, +, BH)] provides the range 
of the belief degree to which y is assessed to H, that is, the value of U(y) could be 
anything in the belief interval [9,,, (, 8,, +, 6H)]. Three measures have been defined to 
characterise U(y), namely, the minimum, maximum and average expected utilities 
shown in the following equations. Let H, be the least preferred evaluation grade 
representing the lowest utility and H. be the highest preferred grade denoting the 
highest utility. Then 
-158- 
Chapter 6. Multi-attribute Decision Making using ER 
U.. (Y) + ON + PH)U(HN)nm 
n=l 
Al 
U. 1j. 
(y) = (fl, + PH)U(HI),,. + 1:, 8nU(Hn)nm 
n=2 
U. 
"g 
(Y) 
= 
U. 
", 
(Y) U. 
i. 
(Y) 
2 
(Equation 6.24) 
(Equation 6.25) 
(Equation 6.26) 
In summary, the priority of the RCOs will be obtained based on the result of U(y) of 
each RCO if all assessments are complete or the values of Um. (y), U. j., 
(y) and 
u 
avg 
(y) when any of incomplete assessment exists. 
6.3.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis of the RCOs will be conducted by modifying the weights of the 
effectiveness and cost criteria since these two elements play crucial roles in this study. 
It is noted that when conducting the sensitivity analysis, the importance of the other 
three criteria will remain unchanged. The outcome of the analysis will be scrutinised 
in the fol owing section. 
6.3.9 Identification of the best RCOs based on the sensitivity analysis 
conducted 
In this step, the best measures are identified by investigating the priority orders of 
each RCO when changing the weights in the criteria. On the other hand, the 
sensitivity analysis conducted will be capable of providing another way of thinking in 
terms of different importance in the risk and cost aspects. This will enable the 
management to have a more flexible decision-making in the RCO selection from 
different aspects. 
6.4 Test Case 
6.4.1 Identification of the criteria to assess the RCOs 
Since the test case selected in this study is the decision making of the security, safety 
and human error reduction measures within a port, the factors playing important roles 
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identified are, namely, effectiveness, cost, time of deployment, resource availability 
and co-operation level. 
6.4.2 Determination of the relative weight of each criterion using AHP 
First, a comparison scale for the importance of the criteria is developed based on 
expert judgement as shown in Table 6.4. A5x5 comparison matrix representing the 
relative importance of the criteria based on the comparison scale developed is 
subsequently established in Table 6.5. The matrix has drawn on industry expert 
judgement. This is because of the difficulty of acquiring real industrial data as 
discussed in section 1.4. It is noted thatCES, CC, CT9 CR and CcL denote the criteria 
of effectiveness, cost, time of deployment, resource availability and co-operation level, 
respectively. 
Table 6.4. Comparison scale for the importance of criteria 
Verbal judgement Numerical rating 
Extremely more important 
9 
8 
Very strongly more important 
7 
6 
Strongly more important 
5 
4 
Moderately more important 
3 
2 
Equally important 
Table 6.5. The pairwise comparisons of the relative weight between each 
criterion 
CE CC CT CR CCL 
CE 1.00 1.00 6.00 4.00 8.00 
cc 1.00 1.00 6.00 4.00 8.00 
CT 0.17 0.17 1.00 0.67 1.33 
CR 0.25 0.25 1.50 1.00 2.00 
CTE 
1 0.13 0.13 0.75 0.50 1.00 
The synthesisation procedure is then applied to obtain the weighting vector of each 
criterion using Equation 6.2. Table 6.6 shows the results calculated. 
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Table 6.6. The relative weighting vector of each criterion 
CE CC CT CR CCL 
Wk 0.39 0.39 0.07 0.10 0.05 
In order to examine whether the pairwise comparisons of the relative importance of 
each criterion achieve the constancy, 
CRCriteria is obtained as 0.0186 using Equations 
6.3,6.4 and 6.5 and Table 6.1. Since CRcrlteria< 0.1, the pairwise comparisons have 
achieved the consistency. 
6.4.3 Combination of each RCO assessment based on the individual criterion 
evaluated by each expert and synthesis of such an assessment from all 
experts using ER 
A set of evaluation grades consisting of five linguistic terms has been developed and 
applied to describe the criteria in this test case. The definitions of each evaluation 
grade for each criterion when investigating each RCO are listed in Table 6.7. It is 
noted that the identification of a threshold for each evaluation grade in terms of 
different criteria may facilitate the RCO assessment process although it is not the case 
in this study. If using the evaluation of a specific RCO in terms of the cost criterion 
as an example, the thresholds identified for the evaluation grades of 'Excellent', 
'Good', 'Moderate', 'Poor' and 'Worst' could be 0-10,000,10,001-25,000,25,001- 
40,000,40,001-55,000 and over 55,000 GBP, respectively. It is noted that the unit of 
the thresholds for the evaluation grades in terms of the criteria may be different, e. g., 
the threshold unit for the effectiveness criterion could be a risk index and the unit for 
the cost criterion could be monetary values. 
Table 6.7. The definitions of each evaluation grade for each criterion 
Evaluation Derinition for each criterion 
grade 
Worst 
Worst effectiveness, highest cost, longest time of deployment, worst 
resource availability and very extensive co-operation level 
Poor 
Poor effectiveness, higher cost, longer time of deployment, poor 
resource availability and extensive co-operation level 
Moderate effectiveness, moderate cost, moderate time of deployment, Moderate 
moderate resource availability and moderate co-operation level 
Good 
Good effectiveness, lower cost, lower time of deployment, higher 
resource availability and limited co-operation level 
Excellent 
Excellent effectiveness, lowest cost, lowest time of deployment, highest 
resource availability and very limited co-operation level 
-161- 
Chapter 6 Multi-attribute Decision Making using ER 
In this test case, 15 alternatives (RCOs) are set to be evaluated by 4 experts and are 
shown in Table 6.8 provided that such RCOs are mutually exclusive. The combined 
assessment of each RCO based on the individual criterion from each expert can be 
acquired using ER. The following calculations demonstrate the combining process 
provided that such data have been given by Expert 1 with regard to RCO I assessment 
as shown in Table 6-9. 
Table 6.8. The RCOs for the test case 
RCO I Procurement of high-tech detecting facilities (security) 
Development of an onshore safety management system reducing the human RCO 2 
errors in the oil cargo handling performance (human error) 
RCO 3 Deployment of an additional pilot on board vessels (port marine safety) 
Reinforcement of the communications between pilots and traffic control units RCO 4 (port marine safety) 
Deployment of an additional team auditing the cargo handling performance RCO 5 
periodically (human error) 
Reinforcement of the maintenance regarding to sealanes and navigation aids & RCO 6 facilities (port marine safety) 
RCO 7 Deployment of additional crew for oil cargo handling (human error) 
RCO 8 Training of pilots (port marine safety) 
RCO 9 Deployment of additional personnel in traffic control units (port marine safety) 
RCO 10 the existing onshore personnel (human error) 
Reinforcement of the communications between port and public security agencies RCO 11 (security) 
RCO 12 Training of security related personnel (security) 
Procurement of new facilities reducing the workload of the personnel involved RCO 13 in the cargo handling procedure (human error) 
RCO 14 Installation of alarm systems (security) 
RCO 15 Employment of additional security crew (security) 
Table 6.9. The evaluation of RCO I based on each criterion by Expert 1 
FS-(e 
I 
(aRcol)) = (H3,0.2, H4,0.7, 
H5,0.1) I 
S(e2 (aRCOI (HI, 0.2, H2,0.7, H3,0.1) 
S(e3 (aRCOI (H2 
10'19H3 ý 0.6, H4,0.3) 
S(e4 (aRCOI =(H2,0.2, H3,0.8, ) 
S(e5 (aRcol)) = (H3,0.2, H4,0.3, H5,0.5) 
It is noted that throughout this study, the symbols of the attributes, el, e2 , e3, e4 and e5 denote 
the criteria of effectiveness, cost, time of deployment, resource availability and co-operation level 
and the evaluation grades H,, H2, H3, H4 and HS denote the linguistic terms of 'Worst', 
'Poor', 'Moderate', 'Good' and 'Excellent', respectively. 
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Therefore, the probability masses of m,,,, N,,, and in-H, j are obtained using Equations 
6.7,6.10 and 6.11 and the results of w, shown in Table 6.6 and the belief degrees in 
Table 6.9. 
In, j = M2,1 -= 
0, m3,1 = 0.078, M4,1 = 0.273, M5,1 = 0.039, iWH, l = 0.6 1, 'nH, l =0 
=M0.078,0.273,0.039, =M 0.6 1, 'n'H. 2 =0 1,2 M2,2 M3,2 M4,2 5,2 =0H, 2 
0, m 3,3 = 0.021, m=0.93, 
_H, 
3 =0 MI, 3 = 2,3= 0.007, m=0.042, M4,3 5,3 =09 HiH, 3 in- 
= 0.02, = 0.08, =MN MI, 4 
01 M2,4 M3,4 M4,4 5,4 =0ýH, 4 = 
0*9 
9 
'nH. 
4 =0 
M2,5 =01 M3,5 = 0-0 1, M4,5 = 0.0 15,0.025, iWU, s = 0.95, 
'nH, 
5 =0 
'I 
and 'nH, j be m,,,, (1), NHj (1) and 'nHI (1) 9 
LetMn, 
l the attribute 1 and the attribute 
2 can be aggregated using Equations 6.12,6.13,6.14,6.15 and 6.16 respectively. 
KI(2) 
M3, IMI, 2 + M3, IM2,2 + M4, IM1,2 + M4, IM2,2 + M4, IM3,2 + 
1.1752 
M5, IMI, 2 + M5, IM2,2 + M5, IM3,2 
MI, 1(2) =KI(2)(MIJ(I)MI, 2 + MHI(I)MI, 2 + MII(I)MH, 2) = 
0-0559 
M2J(2) """: 
KI(2)(M2j(l)M2,2 + MHJ(I)M2,2 + M2, I(I)MH, 2)= 0.1957 
tn3, (2) =KI(2)(M3j(l)M3,2 + MH, IM3,2 + M3j(l)MH, 2) = 0.0874 
MV(2) -'--KI(2)(M4, I(I)M4,2 + MHI(I)M4,2 + M4, IMH, 2) =0.1957 
ln5j(2) ": --KI(2)(M5j(l)M5,2 + MH, I(I)M5,2 + M5, I(I)MH, 2) = 0.0280 
KI(2)(NHI(I)NH, 
2 0.4373 
m, (, ) = 
Kj(2)(in-Hj(1)ýnH, 
2 + 
'WH, 
Iin-H, 2 + 
in-HI(1)'WH, 
2 
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By repeating Equations 6.12-6.16, the combined probability masses are obtained as 
follows: 
ml,, (, ) = 0.05029 
M5.1(5) = 0.33874 
M2, I(5) 0.193 10 
NH, 
I(5) 0.36805 
M3j(5)= 0.14919 
in_H, 
1(5) =0- 
M4,1(5) = 0.19771 
The combined belief degrees of each evaluation grade in terms of the criteria 
considered can be obtained based on Equations 6.17,6.18 and 6.19 and is shown 
below: 
S(Y), I, ertl ý 
(Worst, 7.96%XPoor, 30.56%XModerate, 23.61%XGood, 31.29%)l 
(Excellent, 5.36%) 
The evaluation of 15 RCOs based on each criterion by Expert I is listed in Table A9.1 
of Appendix 9. The aforementioned windows-based programme, IDS [Yang and Xu, 
2002a], is employed to perform such calculations to obtain the combined belief 
degrees of each evaluation grade in terms of the criteria for each RCO. Table A9.2 
contains the results calculated from the software. Furthermore, Appendix 10 shows 
the evaluation of the RCOs by the rest of three experts. Tables A10.1, A10.3 and 
A10.5 contain the evaluations of each RCO based on each criterion by Experts 2,3 
and 4 and Tables A10.2, A10.4 and AIO. 6 list the combined belief degrees of all 
criteria of each RCO by the Experts. Table 6.10 shows the synthesised evaluation of 
15 RCOs by the experts. 
Table 6.10. The synthesised evaluation of the RCOs by the experts (%) 
Hj_ H2 H3 H4 Hs 
RCO 1 10.88 29.42 24.16 31.60 3.94 
RCO 2 1.12 16.52 70.44 8.23 3.69 
RCO 3 7.07 84.14 7.50 1.29 0 
RCO 4 0 1.51 54.98 15.63 27.88 
RCO 5 13.08 69.77 16.98 0.17 0 
RCO 6 0 7.21 84.58 8.20 0 
RCO 7 42.05 6.20 10.48 5.11 36.17 
RCO 8 0 33.31 18.96 46.93 0.80 
RCO 9 86.05 11.39 2.56 0 0 
RCO 10 0 0 2.56 17.18 80.27 
RCO I 1- 0 5.10 89.59 5.30 0 
RCO 12 0 0 9.17 82.98 7.85 
RCO 13 2.32 81.74 15.95 0 0 
RCO 14 0 0 6.0 3-3.81 60.19 
RCO 15 0 36.70 9.25 37.02 17.03 
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6.4.4 Development of an utility category-evaluation grade matrix for each 
expert using the belief degree method 
A utility category-evaluation grade matrix is developed. Each expert is required to 
determine the utility levels (from 0 to 10) of each evaluation grade based on the belief 
degree method. Table 6.11 contains the utility levels of the evaluation grades 
expressed by Expert 1. Appendix II lists the utility levels of the evaluation grades 
determined by the remaining three experts. 
Table 6.11. The utility levels of the evaluation grades expressed by Expert I 
using the belief degree method 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
H, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H2 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H3 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 
-H41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 0 0 
H5 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 
6.4.5 Combination of the utility preference of each evaluation grade expressed 
by each expert using ER 
In this step, the combined utility preference of each evaluation grade determined by 
the experts is obtained using Equations 6.7 to 6.19. Table 6.12 shows the results 
calculated. 
Table 6.12. The combined utility preference of each evaluation grade of all 
experts using the belief degree method (%) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2.0 10.62 67.78 17.60 2.0 0 0 0 0 0 
H3 0 0 0 1.88 16.64 77.65 3.83 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.88 7.98 78.23 7.91 0 
0 0 0 0 
I 
0 
I- 
0 0 0 0 0 1 Oýj 
Ij 
The utility preference of each evaluation grade is obtained based on the values 
assigned to each category using Equation 6.21. Table 6.13 lists the results calculated. 
The utility level of, 'Moderate', for instance is acquired as follows: 
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U(H3)= 0.0188x3 +0.1664x 4+ 0.7765x 5+0.0383x 6=4.8343 
Table 6.13. The utility preference of each evaluation grade based on the value 
assigned to each category 
H, H2 H3 H4 HS 
utility 
0 3.0698 4.8343 7.8817 10 
Preference 
6.4.6 Normalisation process 
The utility preference degrees calculated are subsequently normalised using Equation 
6.22 and are presented in Table 6.14. 
Table 6.14. The normalised utility preference of each evaluation grade based on 
the value assigned to each category 
H, H2 H3 H4 Hs 
utility 
Preference 
0 0.30698 0.48343 0.78817 1 
6.4.7 Application of the normalised utility preference to the aggregating result 
of each RCO 
The utility of each RCO can be obtained based on the normalised utility preference 
shown in Table 6.14 and the aggregating result calculated in Table 6.10 using 
Equation 6.23. Table 6.15 lists the results with each RCO being ranked according to 
its utility level. It is noted that all assessments in this test case are set to be complete. 
In situations where any of incomplete assessments exists, Equations 6.24,6.25 and 
6.26 should be applied. 
It can be seen from Table 6.15 that the first 5 RCOs are RCOs 10,14,12,4 and 15. 
This is due to the fact that the belief degrees of the positive evaluation grades (Good 
and Excellent) of these RCOs are relatively higher than the others. On the other hand, 
the RCOs ranked in the last 5 are ROCs 7,13,3,5, and 9, and this is because their 
belief degrees assigned to negative grades are relatively higher compared to the rest of 
the alternatives. 
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Table 6.15. The utility and rank of each RCO 
H, H2 H3 H4 H5 
utility 
Level 
RCO 10 I 0.0000 0.0000 0.0256 0.1718 0.8027 0.9505 
RCO 14 I 
] 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0600 0.3381 0.6019 0.8974 
RCO 12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0917 0.8298 0.0785 0.7769 
RCO 4 0.0000 0.0151 0.5498 0.1563 0.2788 0.6724 
RCO 15 0.0000 0.3670 0.0925 0.3702 0.1703 0.6195 
RCO 8 0.0000 0.3331 0.1896 0.4693 0.0080 0.5718 
RCO 6 0.0000 0.0721 0.8458 0.0820 0.0000 0.4956 
RCO 1 0.1088 0.2942 0.2416 0.3160 0.0394 0.4956 
RCO 2 0.0112 0.1652 0.7044 0.0823 0.0369 0.4930 
RCO 11 0.0000 0.0510 0.8959 0.0530 0.0000 0.4905 
RCO 7 0.4205 0.0620 0.1048 0.0511 0.3617 0.4717 
RCO 13 0.0232 0.8174 0.1595 0.0000 0.0000 0.3280 
RCO 3 0.0707 0.8414 0.0750 0.0129 0.0000 0.3047 
RCO 5 0.1308 0.6977 0.1698 0.0017 0.0000 0.2976 
RCO 9 0.8605 0.1139 0.0256 0.0000 0.0000 0.0473 
6.4.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity analysis of RCOs is conducted by investigating the ranking difference 
due to the weight changes in the effectiveness and cost criteria while others remain 
the same. Table 6.16 shows the RCO priority when effectiveness is twice as 
important as cost whereas Table 6.17 lists the rank when cost is twice as important as 
effectiveness. 
Table 6.16. Sensitivity analysis I (Effectiveness is twice as important as Cost) 
H, H2 H3 H4 H5 
utility 
Level 
RCO 10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160 0.2011 0.7829 0.9491 
RCO 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0660 0.4029 0.5311 0.8806 
RCO 12 0.0000 0.0000 0.1035 0.8337 0.0628 0.7699 
RCO 4 0.0000 0.0107 0.3752 0.1523 0.4617 0.7665 
RCO 15 0.0000 0.1857 0.0518 . 2E621 
RCO 7 0.1975 0.0431 !g 0.5936 
RCO 1 0.0528 0.1428 0.2722 0.4861 0.0461 0.6046 
RCO 6 0.0000 0.0817 0.8300 0.0883 0.0000 0.4959 
RCO 11 0.0000 0.0508 0.9012 0.0480 0.0000 0.4891 
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RCO 8 0.0000 0.4976 0.2094 0.2890 0.0040 0.4858 
RCO 2 0.0103 0.2417 0.6608 0.0681 0.0190 0.4664 
RCO 13 0.0257 0.8642 0.1101 0.0000 0.0000 0.3185 
RCO 3 0.0655 0.8402 0.0784 0.0160 0.0000 0.3084 
RCO 5 0.1854 0.6640 0.1490 0.0016 0.0000 0.2771 
RCO 9 0.8285 0.1377 0.0338 0.0000 0.0000 0.0586 
Table 6.17. Sensitivity analysis 2 (Cost is twice as important as Effectiveness) 
H, H2 H3 H4 Hs 
utility 
Level 
RCO 10 
1 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0355 0.1485 0.8160 0.9502 
RCO 14 0.0000 0.0000 0.0557 0.2800 0.6644 0.9119 
RCO 12 0.0000 0.0000 0.0826 0.8185 0.0989 0.7839 
RCO 8 0.0000 0.1797 0.1612 0.6473 0.0119 0.6551 
RCO 4 0.0000 0.0177 0.7013 0.1484 0.1326 0.5940 
RCO 2 0.0102 0.0959 0.7377 0.0994 0.0568 0.5213 
RCO 15 0.0000 0.5573 0.1289 0.2307 0.0831 0.4983 
RCO 6 0.0000 0.0665 0.8539 0.0796 0.0000 0.4959 
RQO 11 0.0000 0.0520 0.8869 0.0611 0.0000 0.4929 
RCO 1 0.1672 0.4601 0.1897 0.1553 0.0277 0.3830 
RCO 13 0.0210 0.7604 0.2187 0.0000 0.0000 0.3391 
RCO 5 0.0878 0.7212 0.1895 0.0015 0.0000 0.3142 
RCO 3 0.0797 0.8399 0.0710 0.0094 0.0000 0.2995 
RCO 7 0.6503 0.0703 0.0932 0.0291 0.1571 0.2466 
RCO 9 0.8867 0.0938 0.0195 0.0000 0.0000 0.0382 
6.4.9 Identification of the best RCOs based on the sensitivity analysis 
conducted 
it can be seen from Table 6.16 that the first 5 RCOs remain unchanged as compared 
with Table 6.15 whereas the ranking order of the others has been rearranged. The 
positions of RCOs 7,1 and II have been promoted, ranking at 6,7 and 9, since the 
belief degrees of the RCOs assigned by the experts in the effectiveness criterion are 
relatively higher than in the cost criterion. Likewise, the first 3 RCOs in Table 6.17 
remain the same in comparison to Table 6.15. However, RCOs 8,2,11,13 and 5 
have become more important since the belief degrees of the RCOs assigned by the 
experts in the cost criterion are relatively higher than in the effectiveness criterion. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the best RCOs in this study are RCOs 10,14 12 and 4, 
respectively. It should be noted that there is no rule to judge which priority order in 
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Tables 6.15,6.16 and 6.17 has the most appropriate rank. The priority is dependent 
upon whether the management is a risk and cost equalitarian, or either a risk or cost 
adverse advocator. 
6.5 Conclusion 
When evaluating RCOs, difficulties may be encountered due to the attribute nature of 
the defined criteria. In this chapter a decision-making model using the ER algorithm 
is proposed provided that RCOs have been identified. The approach has been applied 
in the engineering and management fields since the 1990s due to its capability of 
consistently modelling precise data and subjective judgement with uncertainty under a 
unified framework. However, a problem occurs in circumstances where a decision- 
making project is evaluated by multiple experts and where various utility realisations 
from each expert exist when assessing each evaluation grade. This could result in an 
RCO or general attribute ranking order conflict between the experts. Such a conflict 
would become obvious if the evaluation grades and belief degrees obtained for each 
alternative or general attribute were close. Using the framework proposed and the test 
case demonstrated, such a difficulty can be resolved. This is accomplished by first, 
constructing a utility category-evaluation grade matrix for each expert using the belief 
degree method. Secondly, the utility levels contained in the matrices estimated by all 
experts are synthesised using the ER approach. Finally, after the normalisation 
process, the synthesised utility level is employed to acquire the aggregating result for 
each RCO. Therefore, the priority of the RCOs can be established based on the 
aggregating result calculated. A sensitivity analysis is employed to identify the best 
measures and also to provide another way of thinking in terms of the various 
importance in the risk and cost aspects. Consequently, the management is able to 
have the measures implemented based on the sensitivity analysis conducted. On the 
other hand, the assignment of the evaluation grades and the associated belief degrees 
to RCOs is crucial for this decision-making framework. The more realistic the RCO 
assessment is, the more reliable the decision-making result. Therefore, the 
identification of a threshold for each evaluation grade in terms of different criteria is 
also recommended since it is capable of facilitating the RCO assessment process. 
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Chapter 7. Quality Assurance of the Efficiency 
of Port Security and Safety Measures 
Nowadays, more and more security and safety regulations and policies 
have been adopted and implemented in the port industry. The objective of 
this is to ensure that the international trade could be safely expedited 
without undue safety practices nor threatfrom intentional crime activities. 
Nevertheless, more regulations and measures sometimes paradoxically 
imply an increasedprobability of inefficiency affectingport operations. In 
this chapter, following the introduction of the Six Sigma method, a 
methodology for improving the quality of port security and safely 
measures is proposed A test case is then used to demonstrate the 
proposed methodology. It is concluded that to achieve this, it is crucial to 
distinguish each step of a security or safety process clearly from the 
outset. Furthermore, gathering quantitative data at each stage is the first 
priorityfor ports attempting to enhance the measures implemented 
7.1 Introduction 
In this PhD study, novel techniques of risk assessment and safety management have 
been employed to evaluate the security and safety of port operations. After the 
decision-making process discussed in Chapter 6, the best measures have been 
identified and a Risk Control Option (RCO) priority can be established depending 
upon the opinions from the management with regard to the relative importance 
between the safety and cost criteria. Accordingly, a port implements the RCOs based 
on the results acquired from the decision-making process. Thus, additional measures 
are put into action to enhance safety and security. This may sometimes cause delay or 
other unwanted events to port users. In addition, more and more security and safety 
regulations and policies have been adopted and implemented in the port industry. The 
objective of this is certainly to ensure that the international trade can be safely 
expedited without undue safety practices or threats from intentional crime activities. 
This, however, may also undermine the efficiency of port operations. It is therefore 
necessary to incorporate the various opinions with regard to the implementation of 
security and safety measures from port customers, such as vessel owners and traders 
having businesses within port areas. The purpose of this is to achieve customer 
satisfaction based on the opinions gathered to improve the quality of security and 
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safety measures adopted so as to ensure that the efficiency of port operations is either 
improved or maintained. Thus, the objective of this quality assurance study is to 
establish a methodology capable of improving and maintaining the quality of port 
measures. This will be achieved using a quality assurance approach, namely, Six 
Sigma and demonstrated by a test case of a port security process [Ung et al., 2006d]. 
The proposed framework may enable ports to stand in a competitive position in the 
shipping industry. 
7.2 Background of Six Sigma 
7.2.1 Fundamental Theory 
Six Sigma was originated at Motorola in 1987 and was widely adopted by General 
Electric (GE) in 1995, as a quality improvement tool. It is becoming accepted by 
many companies suffering from the costs of rework and other aspects of poor quality. 
It contains four components, namely, Total Quality Management (TQM), Statistical 
Process Control (SPC), customer satisfaction and customer needs analysis, and a new 
paradigm of total customer satisfaction [Tennant, 2001]. The key elements in the 
technique are customer needs analysis and employee performance without which the 
quality improvement will be meaningless. 
Six Sigma can be defined as a methodology, based on the statistical analysis of total 
customer satisfaction, by which the quality of a process can be improved. It is 
capable of identifying root causes using measurable methods and rigorous statistical 
techniques to improve and sustain the quality of processes. Since statistics is 
concerned with the collection, analysis, interpretation and presentation of data [Goh, 
1999], Six Sigma projects are regarded as data-driven whereas TQM ones are often 
based on unproven assumptions or questionable data [Revere and Black, 2003]. 
Therefore, this approach eliminates the thoughts of "I think" and "I feel" when 
attempting to improve the quality of a process [Murphy, 19981. 
Any process is affected by natural and non-natural variations. Natural variations 
occur when a number of inherent factors are random and independent of each other. 
Such variations can only be measured, controlled and reduced but they can never be 
eliminated completely. Non-natural variations happen while a small number of non- 
random factors influence the process, which can be totally eliminated once the causes 
are identified. Most performances of business processes are attributable to natural 
variations and have the same characteristics and shape if plotted. The bell curve 
shown in Figure 7.1 is a typical shape for the performance of any process being 
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affected by natural variations. In the statistics field, there is a powerl'ul tool dealing 
Figure 7.1. A typical bell curve of normal distribution ItIng et al., 2006dj 
As Six Sigma is based on the normal distribution, the mean (p) (sometimes expressed 
as X) and standard deviation ((T) are employed. The value ofmean is defined as a 
quotient that is obtained from the value of the summation aggregated by a certain 
number of numerals and then divided by the number of the numerals in question. The 
average sum of the square number of the difference between each value 01' tile 
numeral and mean is regarded as a variance (072). The square root ofthe variance is 
the standard deviation. The mathematical expressions ofmean, variance and standard 
deviation are indicated below. 
Mean: 
-(XI+x ............ + X) =-1 x' (Equation 7.1 ) 
Variance: 
X)2 (XI 
(T 2=11n (V, quation 7.2) 
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most of the examples in a set of data are close to the "average" although relatively 
few examples tend to be at one extreme or tile other. 
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Standard deviation: 
Z (xi 
_X) 
(Equation 7.3) 
where c'is the variance, a is the standard deviation, X, is the value of each 
numeral and n is the number of the numerals. 
One of the most significant aspects of the Six Sigma approach is the element of 
Criticality to Quality (CTQ). It- is a firm and measurable satisfaction indicating the 
upper and lower limits of the quality translated from often fuzzy and intangible 
expectations made by customers. It can be seen in Figure 7.2 that the range within 
CTQs forms the idea of customer satisfaction where the quality of products or service 
provided achieves the customer needs. These two CTQs sometimes are referred to as 
Upper Specification Limit (USL) and Lower Specification Limit (LSL). The process 
measurement and improvement will begin in earnest only if a set of CTQs is well 
defined. The objective of Six Sigma is therefore to minimise the value of the standard 
deviation in each process by identifying the root causes so that the process sigma 
metric (the unit of the distance between CTQ limits and g if plotted in a normal 
distribution figure as shown in Figure 7.3) is able to achieve the level of six a. If a 
process attains a six sigma level, the number of defects (the unacceptable quality of 
performances realised by customers) that occur per million opportunities (DPMO) 
will be no more than 3.4. 
7.2.2 Belt system 
The personnel involved in a belt system implementing Six Sigma projects include 
Champions, Master Black Belt, Black Belt and Green Belt. The Champions of a Six 
Sigma project team should be the delegated persons coming from the senior 
management. They are the personnel who well understand the Six Sigma 
methodology associated with the authority and ability to drive the vision of customer 
quality. Below these champions are the experts who have extensive knowledge and 
skills required to perform the projects. They are often called Master Black Belts, 
whose roles are to act as internal consultants, trained experts, teachers, leaders and 
coaches. Full time practitioners of Six Sigma are called Black Belts who support 
several quality projects simultaneously. A Black Belt in the team ensures that the 
communications between staff performing the same project are organised and the 
project is running efficiently and effectively. The person also provides the necessary 
technical skill for each project he supports. Part-time practitioners are generally 
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called Green Belts who might only be responsible i'()r one pro. ject and complete the 
mission delegated by Black Belts. A generic deployment of' personnel in port to 
implement Six Sigma is shown in Table 7.1 altcr being trained properlý. Although 
the belt system participants have the overriding responsibility I'Or the Six Signia 
pr(Iects, it is recommended that the personnel not involved in the belt system sliall 
have a basic understanding of' Six Sigma and the idea of' quality becausc of' the 
interactive Function imposed on each staff member. The more people appreciate it, 
the better the quality improvement that will be achieved. 
Figure 7.2. CTQ and customer satisfaction ILIng et al., 2006dj 
re 7.3. Process sigma metric I Ung et al., 2006d 
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Tahle 7.1. A imneric denlovment Of Dersonnel in nort to imDlement Six Sima 
Name of Personnel Definition of Personnel Types 
Most Likely Port 
Types Personnel 
Senior management with 
authority to drive the vision of Directors of operations, 
customer quality or the finance, personnel and 
Champions personnel responsible for policy marketing. 
issues, positioning of business, 
capital expenditure and cost 
control 
Acting as internal consultants; Senior managers of safety, trained experts; teachers; 
security, terminals and Master Black Belts leaders; coaches and experts in 
manne groups within 
specific fields, involved in 
special projects. 
operations. 
Full time practitioners 
supporting several quality 
projects simultaneously, 
ensuring that the communication The managers of the 
Black Belts 
betweens between staff container, bulk, oil and 
performing on the same project Ro/Ro terminals plus say 
are organised and the project is pilot manager. 
running properly and providing 
the necessary technical skill for 
each project. 
Shift managers of 
Those responsible for one container, bulk, oil or 
Green Belts project and completing tasks set Ro/Ro terminals or 
by Black belts. contractors working on 
these terminals. 
7.2.3 Success of Six Sigma 
There are some factors which are essential to the success of Six Sigma. When 
applying Six Sigma to port security, those elements identified and realised from the 
companies implementing the approach should be considered and are discussed below. 
Upper management support, involvement and commitment. This is the 
most important factor addressed by those who have applied the approach to 
their businesses [Henderson and Evans, 2000]. This is in line with a survey 
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conducted in the UK industry in 2002 [Antony and Coronodo, 2002] since 
any successful initiative requires top management commitment and provision 
of appropriate resources and training. In Six Sigma success stories like 
Motorola, GE and Allied Signal, the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
support, participate and are actively involved and dedicated themselves to 
this initiative [Coronado and Antony, 20021. In addition, implementing 
quality improvement initiatives is a part of the job for every single person 
involved in the project, including top management and senior managers. 
Without such support, involvement and commitment, the success of Six 
Sigma will be difficult to foresee. 
2. Training. In order to make the belt system effective, the role and 
responsibility of each participant must be identified and appreciated using 
training programmes. This work should be associated with providing Six 
Sigma knowledge, tools and techniques needed for these belts depending 
upon the group that they are located to. 
3. Linking Six Sigma to business strategy. Six Sigma needs to be integrated 
into port operations rather than just the usage of a few tools and techniques 
for quality improvement [Dale, 2000]. Since the objective of such an 
application objective is to improve the quality of performance and 
consequently gain the profits, the link between' every single project and the 
business strategy should be established. 
4. Linking Six Sigma to customers. Customer satisfaction is the key element 
of Six Sigma. By equipping with CTQs, the approach is capable of reducing 
the gap of expectations between the port authority applying Six Sigma and its 
customers provided that the key customers crucial to the port operations have 
been identified. 
Culture change. A successful application and implementation of Six Sigma 
requires a change to the culture of the company and a reform to the attitude 
of its employees. Employees have to be responsible for the quality of their 
own work. This, however, sometimes leads to fears of change and of not 
achieving the new standards. The organisations that have successfully 
overcome the culture change have stated that the best solution is through 
increased and sustained communications, motivations and education [Antony 
and Coronodo, 2002]. 
6. Organisation infrastructure. The formation of the personnel participating 
and implementing Six Sigma in a company is divided into five groups, 
including Champions, Master Black Belts, Black Belts, Green Belts and 
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individuals supporting specific projects in their areas [Harry and Schroeder, 
2000]. Therefore, if a port authority intends to apply Six Sigma fully to its 
business, the issue of adjusting its infrastructure should be taken into account. 
7.2.4 App ications 
By using Six Sigma Motorola has acquired $16 billion in savings over the past 12 
years while Ford reports more than $1 billion saved since 2000 [Heuring, 20041. 
Additionally due to its flexibility, it can be applied to various characteristics of 
companies, where substantial cost savings have been reported. Apart from Table 
2.13, these include the Service Master Company in Chicago U. S. using the approach 
to improve credit card processing [AFP Exchange, 2004], the Scranton Parts 
Manufacturing Center of Flowserve Corp. converting the facility into a sizable and 
efficient plant for the production of new parts [Modem Applications News, 2004], 
Carlson Companies in Minnesota applying it to cut the supply chain costs [Porter, 
2004], as well as Virtua Health in New Jersey adopting the tool to improve the patient 
satisfaction, operation throughput, nurse retention and reduce medication errors 
[Ettinger, 2001]. Therefore, it seems sensible to utilise Six Sigma for the 
improvement and maintenance of the quality of port operations. 
7.3 Methodology 
When implementing a Six Sigma project to improve the quality of a process, there are 
five steps which should be taken, namely, Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and 
Control. In the definition step, the unit of the measurement that will be used to judge 
the performance of the quality of a process should first be decided. Secondly, the goal 
of the quality and the value of the CTQ must be identified. Thirdly, the term "defect" 
needs to be defined. The mission of the measurement step will be to evaluate the 
current performance of the efficiency of a port process. At the analysis stage, the root 
causes of poor quality that may occur due to excessive variation contributing to the 
defects unacceptable for customers are identified and analysed. A sensitivity analysis 
will also be conducted to identify appropriate solutions. In the improvement step, the 
solutions aimed at reducing the root causes identified in the analysis step can be 
generated. Accordingly, the quality of port security and safety measures can be 
improved. After the implementation of the solutions, the actual improvement of the 
quality of the process will be realised and acquired in the final step. Figure 7.4 
illustrates the research methodology of this study. 
-177- 
Chapter 7. Quality Assurance ofthe Efficiency ofPort Security and Safety Measures 
7.3.1 Definition of the measuring unit, CTQ and defect of the quality with 
regard to port security and safety measures 
At the first stage, the unit of measurement that will be used to judge the performance 
of the quality of a process should first be decided. Secondly, the goal of the quality 
and the value of the CTQ must be identified. Thirdly, the term "defect" needs to be 
defined. In the manufacturing industries, "defect" is easy to understand and has been 
applied widely. However, if adopted in the port industry, it should be converted to an 
"unacceptable performance". Therefore, the third mission on this stage is the 
definition of the unacceptable performances. It is noted that since the objective of this 
study is to demonstrate the applicability of Six Sigma when introducing it to ports, the 
value of CTQ will be given by expert judgements. In the real world, CTQs may be 
obtained from customer requirements through a comprehensive survey and analysis 
and then converted to a measurable unit for the process. The goal for the project is set 
on the basis of the definition of defects (or unacceptable performances in the port 
industry) and customer CTQs for the purpose of achieving total customer satisfaction. 
1. Definition of the measuring unitý 
CTQ and defect of the quality of 
port security and safety measures 
2. Measurement of the current 
process performance and quality 
level in terms of the process sigma 
metric 
3. Analysis of the root causes and 
conduction of a sensitivity analysis 
to identify appropriate solutions 
4. Improvement of the quality of the 
process by employing the optimum 
solutions 
S. Calculation of the actual quality 
improvement and control and 
maintenance of the quality by 
reviewing each step periodically 
Figure 7.4. Research methodology 
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7.3.2 Measurement of the current process performance and the quality level in 
terms of the process sigma metric 
The objective of this step is to add facts to the project, enabling the initial or current 
short term process sigma metric to be calculated and therefore provide valuable 
information for the next step. The following calculations are needed in this stage: 
Calculate the values of Mean (g) and Standard Deviation (a) from the data 
gathered using Equations 7.1,7.2 and 7.3. 
2. Convert each customer limit i. e. USL and LSL to a standardized normal 
variate referred to as a value of Z [Oakland, 1999] when the normal 
distribution is standardized as shown in Equations 7.4 and 7.5. 
ZUSL = 
(USL - 
Tcurrent) 
(Equation 7.4) 
ZISL =. 
(LSL - Xcurrent) 
(Equation 7.5) 
17.. t 
where ZusL is the converted Z value derived from USL, 
USL is the Upper Specification Limit expressed by the customers, 
Z, 
j , sL 
is the converted Z value derived from LSL, 
LSL is the Lower Specification Limit requested by the customers, 
Xcurrent is the Mean of the current perfonnance of the process, and 
acurrent is the Standard Deviation of the current performance of the 
process. 
3. Calculate the successful probability that the process in question is able to 
achieve the customer needs referred to as P (Z,, ',,, f,, d). 
It is the difference 
between P(ZusL) and P(ZLsL). These two values can be obtained from the 
Standard Normal Probability Distribution Table as shown in Appendix 12 
[Yin, 2001]. 
P (Zsatisfied) -`ý P(ZUSL) - P(ZLSL) (Equation 7.6) 
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where P(Z.,,,, i,, f,, d) is the probability that the performance of the process 
satisfies the customers, 
P(ZusL) is the probability that the process performance is within the 
upper specification limit, and 
P(ZLsL) is the probability that the process performance is outside the 
lower specification limit. 
4. Obtain the probability that the process performance fails to satisfy the 
customers, which is regarded as the defect rate, P(Zdf,, ,). 
P(Zdefect) 
-'ý 
1- P(Zsatisfied) (Equation 7.7) 
5. Calculate the DPMO using Equation 7.8. Having acquired the value of the 
DPMO the current short term process sigma metric can be obtained from the 
DPMO-To-Process Sigma Conversion Table. If a DPMO of a process 
performance was 192,200, it would mean that the number of defects that the 
process would commit per million opportunities is 192,200. The current 
short term process sigma metric then can be obtained, being 2.37 based on 
the value of the DPMO using the DPMO-To-Process Sigma Conversion 
Table as shown in Appendix 13 [Tennant, 2001]. 
DPMO-, = 1000 000 x P(Z current 99 defect (Equation 7.8) 
It is important to note that the early work with the process performing at the three- 
sigma level in the manufacturing industries showed that over a period of time, the 
output from a process would change. Either the mean of the distribution would shift 
to sideways a little or the standard deviation would become greater [Tennant, 2001]. 
It has become an accepted practice to devalue the three sigma ideally by 1.5 sigma (so 
called 1.5 sigma shift) [Stanard, 2001]. Thus, throughout the study such a process 
sigma metric mentioned is referred to as a short-term process sigma metric. 
For ports, the mission of this step would be the collection of the data from daily 
operations where the process in question is tasked. By identifying the value of the 
process sigma metric, the extent of improvement to achieve will be realised if 
necessary. 
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73.3 Analysis of the root causes and conduction of a sensitivity analysis to 
identify preferable solutions 
It is at this stage that the root causes of poor quality that may occur due to excessive 
variations contributing to the defects unacceptable for customers are analysed. The 
mission in this step can be accomplished by employing rigorous statistical techniques. 
Inferential statistical analysis such as confidence intervals, hypothesis tests and 
regression and correlation analysis along with the practical analysis of a process 
mapping are the typical tools used to identify the root causes of a defective process 
[Tennant, 2001]. In this study, once the root causes are identified, the conduction of a 
sensitivity analysis is recommended. By changing the parameters of Mean and 
Standard Deviation individually or both at the same time, the result of the distribution 
will be understood and used to compare with the process performance without any 
solution placed. The appropriate solutions will be identified based on the comparison 
between the performances of the improved and original processes by calculating the 
quality improvement using the Equations presented below. 
Calculate the values of Mean (g) and Standard Deviation (cr) of the data 
gathered from the improved process using Equations 7.1 and 7.3. 
2. Convert each customer limit i. e. USL and LSL to a standardized normal 
variate (i. e. Z) [Oakland, 1999] when the normal distribution is standardized 
as shown in Equations 7.9 and 7.10. 
(USL-Xi. 
p,,,,,, d) ZiUSL =. 
ai. 
proved 
Zaa = 
(LSL 
- 
aimproved 
(Equation 7.9) 
(Equation 7.10) 
where ZjusL is the improved converted Z value derived from USL, 
USL is the Upper Specification Limit expressed by the customers, 
ZgsL is the improved converted Z value derived from LSL, 
LSL is the Lower Specification Limit requested by the customers, 
Xi. 
p.. d is the Mean of the improved performance of the process, and 
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aimproved is the Standard Deviation of the improved performance of the 
process. 
3. Calculate the improved probability that the process in question is able to 
achieve the customer needs referred to asp ( Zisalisfied ) *It is the difference 
between P(Z, usL) and P(ZjLsj and can be obtained using Equation 7.11. 
P Visalisfied ) -: - P(ZiUSL) - P(ZdSL) (Equation 7.11) 
where P (Z,.,,,, if,, d) is the improved probability that the process performance 
satisfies the customers, 
P(ZjusL) is the improved probability that the process performance is 
within the upper specification limit, and 
P(ZgsL) is the improved probability that the process performance is 
outside the lower specification limit. 
4. Obtain the improved probability that the process performance fails to satisfy 
the customers, which is regarded as the defect rate, P(Zidefect) - 
P Videfed ) :-1-P Visatisfied ) (Equation 7.12) 
5. Calculate the improved DPMO. Having acquired the value of the improved 
DPMO the improved short term process sigma metric can be obtained from 
the DPMO-to-Process Sigma Conversion Table listed in Appendix 13. The 
quality improvement will then be obtained using Equation 14. 
DPMO, 
mproved ý-- 
19000,1000 X P(Zldefec 0 (Equation 7.13) 
PSMi PSMimproved - Psmoriginal (Equation 7.14) 
where PSM, is the quality improvement of the process after having the 
solutions implemented, 
PSMi. 
proved is the improved process sigma metric, and 
PSM,,,. i, i,,,, is the original process sigma metric without any solution in 
place 
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7.3.4 Improvement of the quality of the process by employing the optimum 
solutions 
As aforementioned, once the root causes have been identified, the solutions aimed at 
reducing them can be generated. Accordingly, the quality of port security and safety 
measures can be improved. 
7.3.5 Calculation of the actual quality improvement and control and 
maintenance of the quality by reviewing each step periodically 
After the implementation of the solutions, the actual improvement of the quality of the 
process will be acquired. Any improvements in performance will only be sustained if 
the process operations are periodically monitored and controlled. The actual 
improved sigma metric of the process performance can be obtained and the quality 
improvement will therefore be identified by employing the equations shown in the 
Analysis Stage. Furthermore, the only way of maintaining the quality level of the 
process is to continuously review the performance in each step and adopt any measure 
available to improve the quality if necessary. 
7.4 Test case 
The objective of this study is to demonstrate how the quality of port security and 
safety measures can be measured and improved by applying Six Sigma. The test case 
in this research selected is the transport process of ship stores (foodstuff) in a port as 
recommended by American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Consulting when developing a 
port Facility Security Plan [Casada et aL, 20031. Since the berthing time is important 
for vessels calling at ports and stores suppliers providing goods needed for vessels, 
the time taken during the process is used as a measuring index when investigating the 
quality of the security measures. It should be noted that the values of average time 
and standard deviation in each step are detennined based on expert judgement. 
7.4.1 Definition of the measuring unit, CTQ and defect of the quality with 
regard to the port security measures 
7.4.1.1 The security process of ship stores transport 
According to the Guide for Port Security proposed by ABS Consulting [Casada et aL, 
2003], the security process should be conducted in the following way provided that 
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the registration of such transport has been organised in advance. The process can be 
separated into five steps as illustrated in Figure 7.5. 
On arrival, Gate Security will verify the vehicle carrying stores and driver 
details and then notify the Ship Security Officer (SSO), who will 
subsequently arrange crewmernbers to meet the vehicle at the staging area. 
2. The store vehicle will then be escorted to the designated vehicle staging area 
which is separated from the restricted area by appropriate physical barriers. 
3. When the vehicle is permitted for delivery, it will subsequently be escorted to 
the shipside for unloading. 
4. Unloading the goods. 
5. After discharging the goods the vehicle will again be escorted to the gate and 
finally leave the port. It should be noted that without appropriate escorts, the 
vehicle is not allowed to move within the port area. 
Step 1: Verification and notification by 
gate security 
Step 2: Escort of the vehicle to the 
staging area 
Step 3: Escort of the vehicle to shipside 
Step 4: Unloading 
Step 5: Escort of the vehicle to 
the gate 
Figure 7.5. The security process of ship stores transport [Casada et ah, 20031 
7.4.1.2 Definition of time 
In the test case, the time spent in the process is used as a measuring index so as to 
calculate the process sigma metric. The time definitions of each step are presented 
below. 
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e Step 1: the time of verifying the vehicle and driver details and the notification 
of the SSO. 
9 Step 2: the time spent when escorting the vehicle to the designated staging 
area and waiting for the permit for delivery. 
9 Step 3: the period of escorting the vehicle to shipside. 
e Step 4: the unloading time. 
* Step 5: the time required to escort of the vehicle to the gate. 
7.4.1.3 Identification of CTQ 
Prior to assessing the quality of the process, it is important to identify the CTQ for the 
process. It is assumed that the CTQ is 50 minutes, meaning that the time limit 
requested by the traders organising the foodstuff supply takes no longer than 50 
minutes. If the time of completing the whole security process is greater than CTQ, it 
will be an unacceptable performance i. e. a defect. Accordingly, the traders may lose 
business elsewhere since the berthing time is critical for vessels and thus it leads to 
dissatisfied customers (traders). Thus, in this test case it is defined that the 
unacceptable performance occurs if the time spent in the security process exceeds 50 
minutes. Allowing for the statistical significance, the sample number is assumed to be 
100, that is, the frequency of measuring the mission time of the security process is 
100. This is because if the sample was set too low, for instance, 30, the characteristic 
of the population, i. e. the quality performance, would not be appropriately observed 
and identified. Such a difficulty can only be resolved by increasing the sample. 
Therefore, by rising the sample from 30 to 100, the statistical significance can be 
improved substantially. 
7.4.2 Measurement of the current process performance and the quality level in 
terms of the process sigma metric 
In the real world case studies, the mission at this stage is to gather the data needed. 
However, since the objective of this test case is to demonstrate the methodology 
proposed, the values of the time spent in each step in the test case were generated 
randomly based on normal distribution by using Microsoft Excel. Table 7.2 shows 
the Mean (ýt) and Standard Deviation (a) in each step acquired based on expert 
judgement and the g and a values for the whole process. Figure 7.6 illustrates the 
value (time) distribution of each security process after 100 simulations, indicating the 
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quality ot'the current security measure Cor the transport of' Iloodstul'l'. 
I It can be seen 
from the Figure that the most Frequent numbers i. e. the time spent In tile process in 
100 simulations are 34,44 and 45 respectively, each 1rcqucncy ol'which Is 7. 
Tahle 7.2. The Mean and Standard Deviation in each steD and the whole Drocess 
Mean (ýI) Standard Deviation ((T) 
Step 1 8 3.0 
Step 2 14 6.5 
Step 3 5 2.0 
Step 4 10 2.0 
Step5 5 1.5 
The whole process 42.39 9.56 
I Jilit: minutcs 
8 
7 
6 
Figure 7.6. The time distribution of the current security process of the test case 
Using Equation 7.4, the process sigma metric fior short terin is calculated as 1'()IioAs: 
(USL -X current (50 - 42.39) ZUM, 
8.56 = 
0.89 
Since there is no LSL in this test case, the calculation of Z,,,,,,, is omitted. The value of 
p( z is obtained from the Standard Normal Probability Distribution Table in I 
Appendix 12 and is calculated below using F, quations 7.6,7.7 and 7.9: 
The value (time) of the security process is the summation of the time estimated from Step I to Step 5 
and the value generated in each step is the approximate random integer based on normal distribution. 
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P( Zsatisfied )« USL) -P(ZLSL) = 0.8133 -0 = 0.8133 «= 
Az 
. -. P(Zdf) =1 -P(Z. f, ýd) = 
1-0.8133 = 0.1867 
DPMO. 
rrent = 
1900%000 X P(Zdefect) = 186,700 
DPMO. rrent --: 
186,700 means that if the same process was repeated one million 
opportunities, it is likely that the number of the frequency of failing to satisfy the 
customer needs would be 187,700. According to the DPMO-To-Process Sigma 
Conversion Table shown in Appendix 13, the process sigma metric for short term in 
this test case approximates to 2.4. 
7.4.3 Analysis of the root causes and conduction of a sensitivity analysis to 
identify preferable solutions 
At this stage it is possible to identify the root causes of the unacceptable variations 
using the inferential statistical tools as aforementioned for real-world case studies. 
However, in this test case, the Analysis step is omitted. This is because it is a 
procedure of applying statistical techniques to identify root causes and the research 
contribution of such an application may not be significant. In the real world, if the 
quality of a security process was so unacceptable, the core problem would probably 
have originated from Steps I and 2 described in Section 7.4.1.1 since the number of 
the security related personnel participating in these two steps is maximum and the 
liaison between different departments from both ashore and onboard is likely to cause 
delay if sufficient effort is not made by the personnel on duty. Therefore, in this test 
case, the characteristics of Steps I and 2 are taken into account. In addition, because 
the unloading of ship stores in Step 4 is straightforward, it is assumed that the 
Standard Deviation of this step remains constant. Accordingly, based on the 
sensitivity analysis by altering the values of Means in Steps I and 2 and Standard 
Deviations in Steps 1,2,3 and 5 individually or both simultaneously, the decision 
maker will realise how the distribution would be and compare such cases with the 
original one. The appropriate solutions will then be decided based on the quality 
improvement and resources available. 
7.4.3.1 Sensitivity Analysis 1- the alteration of the values of Mean (the average 
time spent in Steps I and 2) 
Table 7.3. Sensitivity analysis 1 
Mean (ýt) Standard Deviation (a) 
Step 163.0 
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Step 2 1 6.5 
Step 3 5 2.0 
Step 4 10 2.0 
Step5 5 1.5 
The whole process 38.23 7.16 
I J111t: 111111LItCS 
Altering the values of the Mean in Steps I and 2 from 9 and 14 to 6 and 12, i. e. 
changing the average time spent in Steps I and 2, while other parameters remain the 
same, it can be seen in Table 7.3 that the Mean ofthc whole process has been changed 
from 42.39 to 38.23 and that the Standard Deviation has been reduced from 9.56 to 
7.16. The graph in Figure 7.7 is therefore thinner than in Figure 7.6. Thc extreme 
values have been changed from 63 and 23 to 53 and 2 1. 
12 
10 
;,, 
Cr 
ý, 
2 
0 
Figure 7.7. The time distribution of the improved security process of the 
test case by changing Mean 
The quality improvement is subsequently calculated as follows: 
ZlINL --:: 
(UkýL - X1,11prov, j) (50 -38.23) 1.64 
aimproved 7.16 
Since there is no LSL in this case study, the calculation of Z, I,,, l is ornitted. The value 
of P(Z,,,,,,, ) is obtained from the Standard Normal Probability Distribution Table and 
is calculated as follows: 
P (Z, 
wnsfied = 
P(Z,,., j) - P(Z, I,,, I, ) = 0.9495 -0=0.9495 
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Onaliti, . Issm-ance ofilic ol Porl Sccurill, 
P(Zidlect) I-0.9495 = 0.0505 
DPWniproved ý 1,000,000 x= 50,500 
According to the D 13M O-To- Process Sigma Conversion Table, the estimated process 
sigma metric for short term approximates to 3.14. The quality improvement would 
then be: 
PSA4, = PSM,. provcd - 
PSMorigmal = 3.14 - 2.4 = 0.74 
7.4.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 2- the alternation of the values of Standard Deviation 
Table 7.4. Sensitivitv anaivsis 2 
Mean (ýi) Standard Deviation (a) 
Step 1 8 1.5 
Step 2 14 3.0 
Step 3 5 1.5 
Step 4 10 2.0 
Step5 5 1.0 
The whole process 42.86 4.28 
Unit: minutcs 
14 i 
12 
I () 
; 0-ý 
8 
ýlw 
2 
0 
Figure 7.8. The time distribution of the improved security process of 
this test case by changing Standard Deviation 
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By decreasing the values of the Standard Deviation in Steps 1,2,3 and 5 from 3.0, 
6.5,2.0 and 1.5 to 1.5,3.0,1.5 and 1.0 respectively, and keeping the others 
unchanged, it shows that the Standard Deviation of the whole process is minimised by 
half, down to 4.28 and the value of the Mean almost remains the same as can be seen 
from Table 7.4. Figure 7.8 shows that the graph is more centred to the Mean than 
Figure 7.6 and the maximum and minimum values have been changed from 63 and 23 
to 54 and 33. 
The quality improvement is then calculated as follows: 
Z, USL = 
(USL 
- 
Xi. 
p., ýd) (50-42.86) 
~ 1.69 
aimproved 4.28 
Since there is no LSL in this case study, the calculation of ZIsL is omitted. The value 
of P(Z, usL) is obtained from the Standard Normal Probability Distribution Table and 
P(Z,,,,, i., f,, d) is then calculated as follows: 
P (zisatisfied ) == P(ZIusj - P(ZLsL) = 0.9545 -0=0.9545 
P(Zidfe, ) =I- P(ziý"Wif - 0.9545 = 0.0455 
J 
DPMO,,, 
proved -= 1,000,000 x P(Zidf,,,, ) = 45,500 
According to the DPMO-To-Process Sigma Conversion Table, the process sigma 
metric for short term approximates to 3.19. The quality improvement would then be: 
PSMi -'ý PSMImproved - PSMoriginal = 3.19 - 2.4 = 0.79 
7.4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 3- the alternation of the values of Mean (the average 
time spent in Steps I and 2) and Standard Deviation 
Table 7.5. Sensitivitv analvsis 3 
Mean ([t) Standard Deviation (cr) 
Step 1 6 1.5 
Step 2 12 3.0 
Step 3 5 1.5 
Step 4 10 2.0 
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Step5 51 
.0 
Fhe Whole Process 38.07 4.31 
I jilit: 111111111cs 
Altering the values of the Mean in Step I and 2 as well as the Standard Deviation ill 
Steps 1,2,3 and 5, while others remain constant, the Mean and Standard Deviation 
for the process performance decrease to 39.07 and 4.31 as shown in Table 7.5. Figure 
7.9 is much more thinner and centred to the Mean than in Figure 7.6. Thc cxtrcinc 
values in Figure 7.9 therefore become smaller, shifting from 63 and 23 to 48 and 28. 
16 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
28 29 30 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 48 
Time (minutes) 
Figure 7.9. The time distribution of the improved security process of 
the test case by changing Mean and Standard Deviation 
The quality improvement is therefore calculated as follows: 
(USL 
- 
Ximproved) (50-38.07) 
-2.77 07improved 4.31 
Since there is no LSL in this case study, the calculation of Z, I, sl. is ornitted. The value 
of P(Zll; sl, ) 
is obtained from the Standard Normal Probability Distribution Table and 
P(Z,,, aqW) 
is then calculated as follows: 
P= P(Z,,,,,,, ) - P(Z, j_, j) = 0.9972 -0=0.9972 
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I 
. -. P(Zidf,, 
) =I- P(Zj,,,,,, f, ýd) =I-0.9972 = 
0.0028 
DPMO, 
mproved= 11,000,000 x P(Z, &fe,,, ) = 2,800 
According to the DPMO-To-Process Sigma Conversion Table, the assumed process 
sigma metric for short term approximates to 4.27. The quality improvement would 
then be: 
PSMj = PSMi prowd - 
PSM,,,, 
g,. l = 4.27 - 2.4 = 1.87 
The values of the quality improvement derived from sensitivity analyses 1,2 and 3 are 
0.74,0.79 and 1.87 respectively. There is no doubt that sensitivity analysis 3 (i. e. 
changing the Mean and Standard Deviation) is much preferred to the others. 
However, sensitivity analysis 3 could mean that the management would have to put 
additional resources in place. The solutions may include the increase of the number 
of the personnel performing the task in Steps 1 and 2 or the procurement of new 
facilities useful for the verification in Step I and most importantly, the establishment 
of a well-organised training scheme with regard to Six Sigma. On the other hand, 
sensitivity analysis 1 could mean allocating the resource available to employ, recruit 
or move staff from other departments without training, whereas sensitivity analysis 2 
would suggest providing the training scheme without placing any additional 
personnel. Each option originated from the sensitivity analyses has disadvantages and 
strengths. Therefore, the selection of appropriate solutions depends upon the ports 
willing to improve the quality of their security and safety measures. 
7.4.4 Improvement of the quality of the process by employing the optimum 
solutions 
The purposes of this step are to have the solution implemented in the security process 
and reduce the variation in order to provide customer satisfaction. In this test case, it 
is omitted. However, in the real world, having identified the root causes, it is possible 
to have more than one solution in hand simultaneously. The application of Cost- 
Benefit Assessment (CBA), Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) or some other 
appropriate decision-making techniques would be useful depending upon the 
circumstance encountered. 
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7.4.5 Calculation of the actual quality improvement and control and 
maintenance of the quality by reviewing each step periodically 
The actual quality improvement in the process can be obtained by providing solutions 
such as procuring security checking sensors into the process or organising a periodical 
quality training scheme. This step is again omitted in this test case. However, it is 
important to note that none of the organisations or companies adopting the Six Sigma 
methodology was able to reach the perfect level i. e. the six sigma level in the first 
time. The way to achieve it is moving forward gradually and this will need the 
commitment from the management, the belts handling the quality control of security 
and safety measures and the employees. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Nowadays a number of conventions aimed at, saving life and protecting the 
environment have been introduced to the port and shipping industries. The efficiency 
of port and vessel operations resulting from the introduction of port safety and 
security measures becomes an important issue for port customers. In this chapter an 
issue of introducing the quality concept to port was raised. A framework capable of 
improving the quality of port security and safety measures by applying Six Sigma 
using time as a measuring index is also proposed. Although the demonstration is 
through a test case based on expert judgement, the objective can be seen very 
explicitly that by introducing this approach, the customer satisfaction (i. e. the time 
saving in the test case) will be achieved thus improving the efficiency of port 
operations. In order to attain this positive result, it is crucial that in the outset each 
step of a security process should be identified clearly irrespective of the measuring 
index. A sensitivity analysis in the Analysis stage is also highly recommended since 
such a technique enables the management to identify the appropriate solutions for 
quality improvement based on the resources available. In addition, since Six Sigma is 
based on statistical analysis, the incorporation of this quality assurance tool into port 
security and safety studies may not be as easy as it is with the manufacturing 
industries where there is already a tradition of recording data on each stage of every 
single process. Therefore, if any port authority intends to apply Six Sigma to evaluate 
the quality of its operations, collecting the information and data from each stage 
carefully and quantitatively is required. 
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Chapter 8. Discussion 
In this chapter, the integration of the research is discussed based on the 
safety principles arising ftom safety regulations, addressing how the 
findings of the previous chapters can be linked each other. Thisisfollowed 
by the verification of the research, explaining how the framework proposed 
can be tested and verified Finally, the limitations of the research are 
addressed due to the nature of the design or the assumption made in the 
reasoning process. 
8.1 Integration and verification of research 
In the past, safety regulations were introduced following an accident or a series of 
accidents. Over years, however, after a number of defining incidents and accidents 
and the introduction of new safety regulations, the way in which safety is reviewed 
has been altered. The characteristics of maritime safety have evolved in a reactive 
manner towards a proactive attitude where a risk-based regime is required. The-main 
objective of these safety regulations is to ensure that risks have been reduced to As 
Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and that Risk Control Options (RCOs) 
proposed are cost-effective. In general, the safety principles arising from these 
regulations with regard to the establishment of an effective risk assessment and safety 
management framework as discussed in sections 2.2-2.5 consist of five steps, namely, 
hazard identification, risk estimation, preparation of RCOs, cost-benefit assessment 
and decision making. 
In this research, the areas in a port with higher potential to cause harm and damage to 
human beings and the environment were identified as discussed in Chapter 2. This is 
consistent with the first step of the aforementioned safety principles. In the chapter, 
the difficulties encountered when evaluating risks due to the nature of maritime 
operations were also revealed. These include the inadequacy or lack of data for new 
designs, processes and regulations for port and vessels, the difficulty of quantifying 
the information of safety-related parameters, the absence of effective techniques 
capable of handling human factors, the necessity of taking into account a variety of 
criteria other than safety for decision making and the absence of scientific-based 
quality assurance models for the port industry. 
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Chapters 3,4 and 5 present three different risk assessment techniques that are 
independent of each other. In Chapter 3, a model incorporating fuzzy set theory and 
the rule base method was proposed. Such a model is particularly useful in 
circumstances where the lack of data exists or the level of uncertainty in data for use 
is high. It evaluates four parameters and is capable of taking into account different 
importance between such elements. In the model, the information with regard to the 
parameters for each scenario is fazzified. Such fuzzified data are subsequently 
combined to obtain the fuzzy conclusions using the rule base method and min-max 
approach. The defuzzification process is then conducted to obtain the risk crisp-value 
for the scenario. Finally, a security risk ranking for all scenarios is established based 
on the crisp-values acquired. In the test case, it can be seen from Tables 3.8 and 3.13 
that the scenarios with the parameters described by more negative linguistic terms 
have higher risks than those depicted by more positive terms. For instance, in Table 
3.8 the parameters of criticality (C), probability of occurrence (P), severity (S) and 
vulnerability (V) of the Scenario 3 are Very High 0.4 and High 0.4; High 0.4 and 
Moderate 0.18; Moderate 0.5 and Very High 0.52 and High 0.29, respectively, 
whereas the C, P, S and V for Scenario 7 are Low 0.5 and Remote 0.14; Low 0.31 and 
Remote 0.31; Moderate 0.44 and Low 0.08 and Remote 1.0. In the common sense 
point of view, scenario 3 should have a higher risk than scenario 7. Such an issue can 
be verified by the risk ranking acquired based on the proposed framework using fuzzy 
set theory and the rule base method, i. e. the risk level of scenario 3 is the highest 
whereas scenario 7 ranks at the SP position among all scenarios. Furthermore, the 
difference of the risk levels between these scenarios can be appreciated. That is, the 
difference of the risk levels between scenarios 3 and 7 in terms of the defuzzified 
value is 5.53 (6.53 for scenario 3 and 1.0 for scenario 7). 
A risk prediction model based on fuzzy set theory and an Artificial Neural Network 
(ANN) was proposed in Chapter 4. The model was developed to resolve the difficulty 
encountered when applying ftizzy set theory and the rule base technique in 
circumstances where there are multiple parameters to be considered which are 
described by multiple linguistic terms. In the model, the parameters are first fuzzified 
using the membership functions developed. Fuzzy set theory enables safety analysts 
to evaluate risks under circumstances where the lack of data exists whereas an ANN 
has the strength of predicting reliable results based on the quantitative training data 
prepared. Therefore, for the purpose of incorporating the advantages of these two 
techniques and allowing for the fact that the data entered into an ANN must be 
quantitative, an interface between the fuzzy set theory and ANN must be provided. 
Accordingly, an algorithm capable of converting the risk-related parameters and the 
overall risk level ftorn the fuzzy property to the crisp-valued attribute is developed. 
This is followed by the preparation of training and testing data. The training data 
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prepared contains the potential circumstances that are likely encountered by the port 
industry hypothetically established by the author based on the experience from the 
supervisors and the experts specialising in ports. A neural network consisting of 
inputs and outputs is then established. The purpose of the testing data is to investigate 
whether the network achieves the acceptable criteria. The network is tested and 
modified by inputting the testing data until it meets the appropriate accuracy criteria. 
Consequently, the method based on fuzzy set theory and ANN can be utilised as a risk 
prediction tool to facilitate the process of decision making. In the test case, the 
scenarios in which the parameters described by more negative linguistic terms have 
higher risks than those depicted by more positive terms as can be seen from Table 4.7. 
The information with regard to the parameters of vessel traffic control (VTC) 
performance, navigational aids and facilities, pilotage performance and sealane 
maintenance from data no. I to 4, for instance, are identical. These are Very Poor 0.75 
and Poor 0.25. The fuzzy data of the weather condition parameter from data no. I to 
4 is Very Poor 0.75 and Poor 0.25; Poor 0.75 and Moderate 0.25; Moderate 0.75 and 
Good 0.25; and Good 0.75 and Excellent 0.25, respectively. The overall risks of data 
no. I to 4 acquired are 4.625,4.425,4.225 and 4.025. In other words, data no. I has 
the highest risk, followed by data no. 2 and 3 whereas data no. 4 relatively has the 
lowest risk. Furthermore, the difference of the overall risks between the data can also 
be identified based on the results obtained. In addition, Table 4.10 shows the detail of 
the testing data as well as the results predicted by the network in comparison to the 
target values conducted using the fuzzy combination algorithm developed. It can be 
seen that the lowest prediction rate is 92.88% in the set of data numbered 29, which is 
the only data below 95%. Inspiringly, the average prediction rate of the neural 
network is over 98% and therefore has achieved the acceptable criteria established by 
the author based on the experience gained from the ANN literature. Accordingly, it 
can be concluded that the neural network has been trained appropriately and is 
capable of predicting risks as long as the training data takes into account any potential 
circumstance that may be met by the port. 
A human error assessment framework using fuzzy set theory and Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) was developed in Chapter 5 that is capable of conducting human error 
assessment with confidence and avoiding the difficulties encountered when 
employing traditional Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) methods. In the method 
proposed, an AHP structure is established based on the information available. In this 
structure, four hierarchies are required, namely, the operation hierarchy, risk factor 
(criteria), mission and step hierarchies. Since the study incorporates the fuzzy set 
theory into the AHP method to evaluate human error related risks, a set of linguistic 
priority terms along with the membership functions describing the relationship 
between the elements in each hierarchy of the AHP structure are adopted and 
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developed. Therefore, the pairwise comparisons between the elements in each 
hierarchy using fuzzy set theory can be established. The fuzzy expressions are 
subsequently converted to the single crisp values using the defuzzification method. 
This is followed by a weighting vector calculation so as to obtain the relative 
importance of the elements. By repeating the steps aforementioned, the risk of the 
elements in the step hierarchy in terms of each criteria defined can be acquired based 
on the normalised weighting vectors calculated. The results obtained from these three 
criteria are then synthesised and an overall risk priority will finally be established 
based on the combined risks. In the test case, it can be seen from the Table 5.29 that 
steps 4.2 (continuous calculation and periodical verification of the volume of transfer), 
5.1 (prior warning), 3.4 (all connections checked for leaks), 4.1 (gradual increase of 
flow to steady rate) and 5.2 (closing valves slowly by the initiating party) are the 
processes with higher risks in the oil cargo handling operation. This is because the 
relative importances of these steps are higher than the rest in terms of the human error 
likelihood, failure consequence probability and severity criteria as can be seen in 
Appendices 6,7 and 8 and Tables 5.26,5.27 and 5.28. In the appendices, such steps 
are either the most or second important elements of each mission in terms of the 
criteria. For instance, step 3.4 is the most important step of the start up mission in 
terms of the likelihood and failure consequence probability criteria. Because it is 0.9 
moderately and 0.1 slightly, 0.9 moderately and 0.1 slightly, 0.6 strongly and 0.4 
absolutely, 1.0 slightly and 0.4 moderately and 0.6 fairly important than steps 3.1,3.2, 
3.3,3.5 and 3.6 in terms of the likelihood criterion as shown in Table A6.3. Also it is 
0.9 moderately and 0.1 slightly, 0.3 moderately and 0.7 fairly, 0.1 fairly and 0.9 
strongly, 0.5 slightly and 0.5 moderately and 0.5 moderately and 0.5 fairly important 
than steps 3.1,3.2,3.3,3.5 and 3.6 in terms of the failure consequence probability 
criterion as indicated in Table A7.3. For the severity criterion, however, it is the 
second important element of the mission. The most important step in terms of the 
severity criterion is step 3.6, being 0.9 slightly and 0.1 moderately, 0.3 moderately 
and 0.7 fairly, 0.1 fairly and 0.9 strongly, 0.4 slightly and 0.6 moderately and 0.5 
slightly and 0.5 moderately important than steps 3.1,3.2,3.3,3.4 and 3.5 as shown in 
Table A8.3. Accordingly, step 3.4 is the third important element in the oil cargo 
handling test case in Table 5.29 since its values of the normalised weighting vector in 
terms the likelihood, failure consequence probability and severity criteria are 0.009, 
0.0828 and 0.0046 as shown in Tables 5.26,5.27 and 5.28 based on its fuzzy 
information obtained. In addition, since the proposed fuzzy AHP does not consider 
the Human Error Probability (HEP) database, it avoids the difficulties encountered 
when applying traditional HRA approaches as discussed in section 5.2.3. 
The risk studies conducted in Chapters 3,4 and 5 are in line with the risk estimation 
step in the safety principles and can be selectively applied depending upon 
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circumstances encountered. In circumstances where there is no or extremely scarce 
data or information available, the risk studies in Chapters 3 and 4 may prove to be 
u seful based on the test cases applied. When the data collected is sufficient to a 
certain level, the model proposed in Chapter 5 is recommended. This is because the 
risk assessment techniques in Chapters 3,4 and 5 are based on a bottom-up approach. 
When the lack of data exists, the number of the levels of the bottom-up approach 
structure is often no more than two. The application of the rule base technique in 
Chapter 3 is capable of genuinely generating results with confidence. However, when 
the information is sufficient to a certain level, implying that such infannation can be 
presented in terms of a multiple-hierarchy structure such as the one in Chapter 5, the 
application of the rule base method will be inappropriate. This is due to the fact that 
the rule base method is applied to process the fuzzy information at the same level and 
the use of such a method cannot avoid the loss of useful information in a hierarchical 
synthesis process. 
The safety management methods proposed in Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with 
decision making and quality assurance. The parameters considered in the decision- 
making model in Chapter 6 are effectiveness, cost, time of deployment, resource 
availability and co-operation level, respectively. The AHP technique is subsequently 
employed to determine the relative weight of the criteria identified. The effects of 
each RCO in terms of the criteria identified are then evaluated by each expert. This 
result is then synthesised using the Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach to acquire the 
overall aggregating result. This, in turn, is followed by the development of a utility 
category-evaluation grade matrix for each expert to estimate the utility level of each 
evaluation grade using the belief degree method as discussed in section 6.4.4 and 
shown in Tables 6.11, All. 1, All. 2 and All. 3. The utility preference of each 
evaluation grade estimated by each expert is then combined using the ER algorithm 
and normalised. The synthesised utility level of each evaluation grade based on all 
experts is subsequently employed to the aggregating result of the effects of each RCO. 
An RCO priority is then established based on the results calculated. Finally, a 
sensitivity analysis is conducted to identify the best measures and so provide another 
way of considering the importance of the various risk and cost aspects. It can be seen 
from Table 6.15 of the test case that the first 5 RCOs are RCOs 10,14,12,4 and 15. 
This is due to the fact that the belief degrees of the positive evaluation grades (Good 
and Excellent) of these RCOs are relatively higher than the others. For instance, the 
belief degrees of RCO 10 for the evaluation grades of Worst, Poor, Moderate, Good 
and Excellent are 0,0,0.0256,0.1718, and 0.8027. Its belief degrees assigned for the 
negative evaluation grades of Worst and Poor are none whereas the degrees for the 
positive evaluation grades of Good and Excellent are very high. On the other hand, 
the RCOs ranked in the last 5 are ROCs 7,13,3,5, and 9, and this is because their 
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belief degrees assigned to negative grades are relatively higher compared to the rest of 
the alternatives. The belief degrees of RCO 9 for the evaluation grades of Worst, 
Poor, Moderate, Good and Excellent, for instance, are 0.8605,0.1139,0.0256,0 and 0. 
its belief degrees assigned for the negative evaluation grades of Worst and Poor are 
very high whereas none of the belief degrees for the positive evaluation grades of 
Good and Excellent is given. In addition, based on the sensitivity analysis conducted, 
it can be seen from Table 6.16 that the first 5 RCOs remain unchanged whereas the 
ranking order of the others has been rearranged as compared with Table 6.15. The 
positions of RCOs 7,1 and II have been promoted, ranking at 6,7 and 9, since the 
belief degrees of the RCOs assigned by the experts in the effectiveness criterion are 
relatively higher than in the cost criterion. Likewise, the first 3 RCOs in Table 6.17 
remain the same in comparison to Table 6.15. However, RCOs 8,2,11,13 and 5 
have become more important since the belief degrees of the RCOs assigned in the cost 
criterion are relatively higher than in the effectiveness criterion. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the best RCOs in this study are RCOs 10,14,12 and 4, respectively 
based on Tables 6.15,6.16 and 6.17. Through the above descriptions, it is reasonable 
to judge that the decision-making model is in line with the safety principles 
addressing cost-benefit assessment and decision making. It is also demonstrated from 
the above descriptions that the developed decision-making model is capable of 
evaluating multiple attributes with both a qualitative and quantitative nature such as 
cost and effectiveness in the test case and also selecting the best RCOs. 
The introduction of more and more safety and security RCOs based on risk 
assessment and safety management implies an increased probability of inefficiency 
influencing port operations. The quality assurance model developed using Six Sigma 
in Chapter 7 introduces the quality concept to the port industry and is capable of 
evaluating, maintaining and improving the quality of the port new-designed 
regulations. When implementing a Six Sigma project to improve the quality of a port 
security process using time as the measuring unit in the test case, there are five steps 
which should be taken, namely, Define, Measure, Analyse, Improve and Control as 
discussed in sections 7.3 and 7.4. In the definition step, the unit of the measurement 
that is used to judge the performance of the quality of a process should first be 
decided. Secondly, the goal of the quality and the value of the Criticality to Quality 
(CTQ) must be identified. Thirdly, the term "defecf' needs to be defined. The 
mission of the measurement step is to evaluate the current performance of the 
efficiency of a port process. At the analysis stage, the root causes of poor quality that 
may occur due to excessive variation contributing to the defects unacceptable for 
customers are identified and analysed. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted to 
identify appropriate solutions. In the improvement step, the solutions aimed at 
reducing the root causes identified in the analysis step can be generated. Accordingly, 
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the quality of port security and safety measures can be improved. After the 
implementation of the solutions, the actual improvement of the quality of the process 
is realised and acquired in the final step. In the test case, the CTQ is 50 minutes. The 
short term signia metric of the current performance of the port security process can be 
obtained by applying Equation 7.4, Standard Normal Probability Distribution Table 
and DPMO-to Process Sigma Conversion Table, being 2.4 as shown in section 7.4.2. 
The potential improvements can also be acquired based on sensitivity analyses I (the 
alteration of Mean), 2 (the alteration of Standard Deviation) and 3 (the alteration of 
Mean and Standard Deviation) using similar patterns aforementioned. The values of 
the quality improvement derived from sensitivity analyses 1,2 and 3 are 0.74,0.79 
and 1.87 respectively. There is no doubt that sensitivity analysis 3 is much preferred 
to the others. However, sensitivity analysis 3 could mean that the management would 
have to put additional resources in place. The solutions may include the increase of 
the number of the personnel performing the task in Steps I and 2 or the procurement 
of new facilities useful for the verification in Step I and most importantly, the 
establishment of a well-organised training scheme with regard to Six Sigma. On the 
other hand, sensitivity analysis I could mean allocating the resource available to 
employ, recruit or move staff from other departments without training, whereas 
sensitivity analysis 2 would suggest providing the training scheme without placing 
any additional personnel. Each option originated from the sensitivity analyses has 
disadvantages and strengths. Therefore, the selection of appropriate solutions 
depends upon the ports willing to improve the quality of their security and safety 
measures. 
The risk assessment and safety management techniques developed in this thesis 
ensure that risk results can be acquired with confidence and RCOs proposed are cost- 
effective meanwhile without jeopardising the quality of port operations. This meets 
the objective of the safety regulations discussed in sections 2.2-2.5 since such 
methods are consistent with the safety principles identified in such sections based on 
which each method can be linked each other and integrated together. 
8.2 Limitation of research 
When validating research, the benchmark based on previous research which are often 
used to compare to developed frameworks is essential. However, since the methods 
proposed in Chapters 3 to 7 are original, no such benchmarks are available for 
conducting a full validation. Lack of the industrial data has also made a full 
validation of the proposed methods challenging. Although there is a large potential of 
the proposed framework to be applied for risk modelling and decision making, the 
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framework may be best utilised in circumstances where the lack of data exists or the 
level of uncertainty in data is unacceptably high since it effectively quantifies expert 
judgement which initially is expressed qualitatively. 
As aforementioned that the risk assessment and safety management framework 
proposed is capable of effectively incorporating expert judgement to conduct safety 
analysis based on the verifications conducted in section 8.1. Therefore, the opinions 
from safety and port professional personnel are crucial once the developed framework 
is applied in the industry although it is not the case in this research due to the 
difficulty of acquiring real industry data. In other words, when the framework is 
applied in real-world case studies, if the experts consulted do not have sufficient 
knowledge with regard to the subject matter under consideration, the value of the 
framework in this research will not be foreseen. In addition, there are limitations with 
regard to the methods developed in the framework, which are described in the 
following paragraphs. 
When the fuzzy set theory and the fuzzy rule base techniques are applied, a 
shortcoming occurs in circumstances where there are multiple parameters to be 
considered which are described by multiple linguistic terms. For instance, if there 
were five parameters described by five different linguistic terms, the number of fuzzy 
rules needed to be developed would be 3,125 as discussed in section 3.5. Accordingly, 
such an application would become impractical. Although the shortcoming can be 
resolved by the model incorporating fuzzy set theory and ANN, it is nevertheless a 
limitation of the design. 
The reason for adopting ANN with fuzzy set theory to resolve the shortcoming 
aforementioned is that ANN has the strength of pattern recognition. However, such a 
technique can only recognise the inputs and generate the outputs that are similar to the 
ones it has met during the training process. Therefore, the limitation of the model 
developed in Chapter 4 is that if such a trained ANN encounters the inputs that it has 
never been trained to recognise, the outputs to be generated will be unreliable. This 
implies the importance of the training data preparation. The more potential situations 
that are likely to be encountered by the training data the less the limitation of the 
trained ANN. 
The decision-making method proposed in Chapter 6 was developed based on the 
assumption that RCOs are mutually exclusive. In other words, the decision making 
was based only on the implementation of a single RCO. There would be a limitation 
occurring in circumstances where two or more RCOs were introduced simultaneously. 
The calculation of the overall effects predicted would not be simple since the RCOs 
-201- 
Chapter 8. Discussion 
may interact with each other. This implies the need to develop new techniques 
capable of addressing the issue of conditional probability between elements. 
in summary, the literature review conducted in Chapter 2 and the risk assessment and 
safety management methods proposed from Chapters 3 to 7 were integrated based on 
the safety principles of hazard identification, risk estimation, cost-benefit assessment 
and decision making. The risk assessment and safety management framework 
consisting of such methods is capable of effectively incorporating expert judgement to 
conduct safety analysis in circumstances where the lack or incompleteness of data 
exists based on the verifications conducted in section 8.1. Therefore, expert 
judgement plays an important role in this research. In addition, there are some 
limitations with regard to the methods proposed. These imply the need to 
continuously develop novel risk assessment and safety management techniques. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion and Implications 
Following the peroration, the conclusions of the research questions and 
the research problem are drawn. The conclusions and recommendations 
for the port industry as well as the implications for further research are 
also given. In summary, it is concluded that these developed models can 
be integrated to formulate a plaffiorm to facilitate risk assessment and 
safety management ofport operations withoutjeopardising the efficiency 
ofport operations in a variety ofsituations where traditional techniques 
cannot be applied with confidence. 
9.1 Peroration 
Maritime safety has evolved in a reactive manner towards a risk-based and goal 
setting regime since the 1990s due to the public concern following several 
catastrophic disasters. Traditional risk assessment techniques are capable of handling 
risks with confidence on the premise that historical data is available. However, such 
techniques may not genuinely reflect risk results in circumstances where the lack of 
data exists or the information available consists of a high level of uncertainty. 
Accordingly, it is necessary for a study of safety and security in port to enable the 
areas with higher risks for which the data available is scarce to be addressed. 
Following the research needs, this PhD study has developed five analytical models 
capable of performing risk assessment and safety management with confidence under 
the aforementioned circumstances. Such frameworks have been demonstrated by five 
corresponding test cases with regard to the safety and security of port operations. 
First, a risk assessment framework is proposed to evaluate port security using fuzzy 
set theory and the rule base technique. ' 
This is because of the lack of data resulting 
from the confidentiality of the intelligence with regard to terrorism and the difficulty 
of the information accession. Secondly, a shortcoming occurs when the fuzzy rule 
base technique is applied to circumstances where there are multiple parameters to be 
evaluated, which are described by multiple linguistic terms. Such a problem can be 
overcome by a proposed risk prediction model incorporating fuzzy set theory with an 
Artificial Neural Network (ANN). The framework is demonstrated by a test case 
focusing on port safety. Thirdly, human error accounts for significant contribution to 
port accidents. In this study, a new method of human error assessment using fuzzy 
set theory and Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is proposed. It is demonstrated 
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using a test case of an oil cargo handling process in port, and is capable of avoiding 
the criticism raised when traditional Human Error Assessment (HRA) techniques are 
applied. Fourthly, many real world decision analysis problems involve multiple 
attributes with both a quantitative and qualitative nature. A decision-making model 
using the Evidential Reasoning (ER) algorithm is proposed to demonstrate the 
selection of the best security, safety and human error reduction measures under such 
circumstances. Finally, more safety regulations and security measures may often 
paradoxically imply an increased probability of inefficiency influencing port 
operations. Thus, the quality of the port processes regulated by such measures is 
essential. A quality control model is proposed based on the Six Sigma technique and 
is demonstrated by a test case of a port security process. 
On the basis of the verifications of the test cases as discussed in section 8.1, the 
scenarios or RCOs with the parameters described by more negative linguistic terms 
have higher risks or are less preferred than or to those depicted by more positive 
tenns. Therefore, the frameworks do possess significant potential for use in 
improving safety and security of port operations. Thus, these developed models can 
be integrated to formulate a platform, based on the safety principles arising from 
safety regulations as discussed in section 8.1, to facilitate risk assessment and safety 
management of port operations without jeopardising the efficiency of port operations 
in a variety of situations where traditional techniques cannot be applied with 
confidence. 
9.2 Conclusion about research questions 
The research questions of this PhD study have been answered by the frameworks 
proposed and the test cases demonstrated from Chapters 3 to Chapter 7. These are 
surnmarised in the following subsections. 
9.2.1 Research Question 1: How port security is modelled taking into account 
of the lack of data resulting from the confidentiality of the intelligence 
with regard to terrorism and the difficulty of the information accession. 
Port security is evaluated based on the concept of risk assessment using fuzzy set 
theory along with the rule base technique. When developing a security model, the 
parameters of the criticality of each asset, the probability of occurrence of each threat 
against a specific asset or target, the severity of each adverse attack against that 
specific asset and the vulnerability of each asset or facility are considered. A scenario 
consisting of the aforementioned parameters is also established. Within the Failure 
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Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) framework, the risk level of each 
scenario can be appreciated. Based on the risk results after the defuzification process, 
the scenarios with higher risks can be identified. The higher defuzzified values that 
the scenarios have, the more the attention should be paid to same. Thus, security 
measures aimed at reducing security risks can be identified based on the ranking 
acquired. 
9.2.2 Research Question 2: How risks are modelled using the fuzzy rule base 
technique in circumstances where there are multiple parameters to be 
evaluated, which are described by multiple linguistic terms. 
Although the fuzzy rule base technique applied in this study is capable of modelling 
and synthesising the fuzzy parameters under consideration in a consistent manner, it 
has drawbacks. A shortcoming occurs as the technique is applied to circumstances 
where there are multiple parameters to be evaluated which are described by multiple 
linguistic terms. If there were five parameters described by five different linguistic 
variables, for instance, the number of fuzzy rules needed to be developed would be 
3,125. Accordingly, the applications of fuzzy set theory with the adoption of a fuzzy 
rule base would become impractical. The risk prediction approach incorporating 
fuzzy set theory and an ANN in this PhD study is capable of avoiding the awkward 
situations so encountered. The test case used to demonstrate the framework is the risk 
assessment of port marine safety. The crucial factors considered are Vessel Traffic 
Control (VTC) performance, navigation aids and facilities, pilotage performance, 
sealane maintenance and the weather conditions, respectively. It is noted that the 
successful application of this method depends upon the accuracy of the prediction rate. 
This implies the importance of the preparation of the training data. A thorough 
understanding of the parameters to be evaluated in the risk modelling is crucial since 
ANNs only recognise the patterns similar to the ones they previously met during the 
training process. Accordingly, if an ANN is trained using the data that covers more 
potential circumstances the port may usually confront, the predicting result generated 
is more reliable. 
9.2.3 Research Question 3: How human error assessment is conducted without 
the difficulties imposed by traditional human error methods. 
The human error assessment proposed in this PhD study is based on the fuzzy AHP 
method. It illustrates an alternative perspective for evaluating human error 
assessment. When assessing human error risks in the test case of an oil cargo 
handling process in this study, the steps in each mission are compared to each other in 
terms of the likelihood, failure consequence probability and severity criteria. The 
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model proposed is capable of providing results with confidence. It also avoids the 
criticism raised from traditional HRA techniques where the human error data is 
transformed from the source that may not be relevant to the project in question or 
where human error related risks are purely estimated based on expert judgement due 
to the scarcity of such data. In addition, the fuzzy AHP method gives the 
practitioners a flexible and rational fashion upon which to model the relationships 
between the elements in the pairwise comparison process although such a method 
may require cumbersome computations if there are many criteria to be considered. 
9.2.4 Research Question 4: How the best RCOs are selected by multi-experts in 
circumstances where the defined criteria are of a multi-attribute nature. 
When evaluating RCOs, difficulties may be encountered due to the attribute nature of 
the defined criteria. In this study a decision-making model using the ER algorithm 
capable of resolving such difficulties is proposed provided that RCOs have been 
identified. Furthermore, the assignment of the evaluation grades and the associated 
belief degrees to RCOs is crucial for this decision-making framework. The more 
realistic is the RCO assessment, the more reliable is the decision-making result. 
Therefore, the identification of a threshold for each evaluation grade in terms of 
different criteria is recommended since it is capable of facilitating the RCO 
assessment process. 
In addition, the ER approach has been applied in the engineering and management 
fields since the 1990s due to its capability of consistently modelling precise data and 
subjective judgement with uncertainty under a unified framework. However, a 
problem occurs in circumstances where a decision-making project is evaluated by 
multiple experts, and where various utility realisations, arising from each expert exist 
when assessing each evaluation grade. This could result in an RCO or general 
attribute ranking order conflict between the experts. Such a conflict would become 
obvious if the evaluation grades and belief degrees obtained from each alternative or 
general attribute were close. Using the framework proposed and the test case 
demonstrated, such a difficulty can be resolved. This is accomplished by first, 
constructing a utility category-evaluation grade matrix for each expert using the belief 
degree method. Secondly, the utility levels contained in the matrices estimated by all 
experts are synthesised using the ER approach. Finally, after the normalisation 
process, the synthesised utility level is employed to acquire the aggregating result for 
each RCO. Therefore, the priority of the RCOs can be established based on the 
aggregating result calculated. The conduct of a sensitivity analysis is also 
recommended. In this study, such an analysis is applied to identify the best measures, 
providing another way of thinking in terms of the various importance in the risk and 
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cost aspects. Consequently, the management is able to have the measures 
implemented based on the sensitivity analysis conducted. 
9.2.5 Research Question 5: How the quality assurance concept is introduced to 
a port. 
Nowadays a number of conventions aimed at saving life and protecting the 
environment have been introduced to the port and shipping industries. The efficiency 
of port operations resulting from the introduction for port security and safety 
measures is thus an important issue for port customers. A framework capable of 
improving and maintaining the quality of port security and safety measures by 
applying the Six Sigma technique using time as a measuring index is proposed. 
Although the demonstration is through a test case based on expert judgement, the 
objective can be seen very explicitly that by introducing this approach, the customer 
satisfaction (i. e. the time saving for the test case) will be achieved thus enhancing the 
efficiency of port operations. In order to attain this positive result, it is crucial that in 
the outset each step of any operation should be identified clearly irrespective of the 
unit of the measuring index. The conduct of a sensitivity analysis in the analysis 
stage is also highly recommended since it enables the management to identify the 
appropriate solutions for quality improvement based on the resources available. 
9.3 Conclusion emanating from research problem 
In risk assessment and safety management, the issue of, "How to manage uncertainty", 
is a main concern. However, the causes of uncertainty are diverse. Thus, regardless 
of what approach to be applied, it is always dependent upon human judgement to 
manage such negative effects. In other words, the deficiencies of risk modelling 
resulting from the lack of information or a high level of uncertainty must be made up 
by means of the general evaluation capacity of humans, who are able to grasp the 
essence of an object, even if it is vague and unclear. Thus, the experience of experts 
consulted is crucial, since the cornerstone of such uncertainty treatments is the 
professional judgement from such personnel. 
The risk assessment and safety management frameworks proposed based on fuzzy set 
theory and the ER approach in this study are capable of handling imprecise, 
ambiguous and qualitative information from experts in a consistent manner. These 
can be regarded as decent reasoning processes with the capability of quantifying the 
judgement from experts who express their opinions qualitatively. In addition, the 
linguistic terms employed in the risk studies are developed in a consensus manner. 
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Such risk assessment frameworks can be facilitated by incorporating quantitative data 
available for the subject matter under consideration into the linguistic terms developed 
although it is not the case in this study. Furthermore, the utility levels of the linguistic 
terms used in safety management also play an important part. In this PhD study, a 
systematic method of acquiring a combined utility level of such terms is also 
presented. Such consensus assessments with regard to linguistic terms provide the 
consistence throughout the risk assessment and safety management process. 
Moreover, the identification of a quantitative threshold for each linguistic term 
applied to describe safety parameters may also facilitate the systematic process 
aforementioned if the data collected is sufficient to a certain level. 
on the other hand, the risk assessment frameworks proposed are based on the bottom- 
up safety assessment approach. This is because such an approach can divide a system 
into subsystems that can be further broken down to system components in order to 
identify all possible hazards. Possible failure events at both the component and 
subsystem levels can then be combined. Consequently, the possible serious failure 
events can be identified with less or no omissions. Accordingly the frameworks are 
capable of providing risk results with a high level of confidence. Thus, when 
conducting risk assessment under circumstances where the lack of data or a high level 
of uncertainty exists, the bottom-up safety assessment process is recommended. 
9.4 Conclusion and recommendations for the port industry 
Security assessment is a difficult analysis to be conducted due to the lack of data 
stemming from the confidentiality of the intelligence with regard to terrorism and the 
difficulty of the information accession. Conventionally, such an analysis is performed 
using the risk index technique. When the security risk is evaluated, the parameters of 
the threat of an attack associated with the vulnerability of the object and the 
consequences caused by such attack are considered. Such an application results in 
some difficulties discussed in section 2.6.1. Such difficulties can be avoided by the 
generic methodology using fuzzy modelling proposed in this study. It illustrates an 
alternative way of evaluating security risks, taking into account an additional and 
crucial parameter, criticality of each port facility. This enables security analysts to 
have a holistic view when evaluating security risks and to provide risk results with 
confidence under the circumstances aforementioned. 
The generic methodologies with regard to risk assessment for port marine safety and 
human error analysis in the oil cargo handling in this study have the potential for the 
port industry to improve the safety of its operations. It is noted that such frameworks 
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are based on the bottom-up safety assessment approach as aforementioned, thus for 
the port industry dividing a specific operation into detailed components is a crucial 
task. In addition, more appropriate quantitative data can facilitate the risk assessment 
process in determining the level of the linguistic terms used to express the 
relationships between parameters. Accordingly, collecting data both qualitatively and 
quantitatively from each component based on daily operations is recommended. This 
can be accomplished by the adoption of the operations such as the daily records with 
regard to vessel traffic density, pilotage performance and weather conditions for port 
marine safety and near miss reports for human error assessment. 
When evaluating RCOs for enhancing security and safety in ports, there are many 
parameters that need to be considered other than risk reduction and the ratio of cost 
and benefit such as time of deployment, current resources available, etc.. On the basis 
of the test case considering the elements of effectiveness, cost, time of deployment, 
resource availability and co-operation level and the verifications conducted, it is 
reasonable to judge that the decision-making model developed is capable of handling 
such multi-criteria decision problems. The framework proposed is particularly useful 
in obtaining the combined results in circumstances where multiple experts are 
involved in a decision-making process. 
The introduction of the concept of quality assurance to security and safety measures 
can facilitate the efficiency of port operations. Its adoption will enable a port to be 
more competitive and attract more business. In addition, since Six Sigma is based on 
statistical analysis, the incorporation of this quality assurance tool into port security 
and safety studies may not be as easy as it is with the manufacturing industries where 
there is already a tradition of recording data on each stage of every single process. 
Therefore, if any port authority intends to apply Six Sigma to evaluate the quality of 
its operations, collecting the information and data from each stage carefully and 
quantitatively is required. 
Since the test cases in this study provide reasonable results, the analytical models 
developed have the potential to improve the safety and security of port operations. 
Thus, such models can be applied individually by a port particularly in circumstances 
where the lack of data exists or such information is associated with a high level of 
uncertainty. More importantly, these frameworks can be integrated to formulate a 
platform to facilitate risk assessment and safety management of port operations 
without j eopardising the efficiency of port operations in a variety of situations where 
traditional techniques may not be applied with confidence. 
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9.5 Implications for further research 
In maritime safety studies under circumstances where the lack of data or a high level 
of uncertainty exists, a large number of assumptions, judgements and opinions need to 
be involved subjectively in the reasoning process. Other than the approximate 
reasoning methods, new approaches capable of addressing uncertainty and combining 
expert judgement and empirical data should be further developed. Bayesian network, 
for instance, is a method that has the capability of incorporating expert judgement 
with historical data to evaluate risks. It provides intuitive visual representation with a 
sound mathematical basis in Bayesian probability that translates genuine cause and 
effect relationship. Moreover, the technique facilitates a meaningful communication 
of uncertainty, allowing decision to be made based on expected values. Such a 
technique is also capable of dealing with conditional probability problems. 
Accordingly, it may have the potential to resolve the limitation of the decision-making 
model developed as discussed in section 8.3. 
Furthermore, when evaluating risks under circumstances of the scarcity of data due to 
a high level of costs of conducting a full-scale experimentation or some other reasons, 
the use of computer simulation may be potentially useful. It is worthwhile noting that 
some computer software facilitates the compilation process. Matlab, for instance, 
provides the Toolbox function, enabling safety analysts to perform the function 
needed by directly typing the command established. 
It is also should be noted that safety management methods developed in the aviation 
and nuclear industries are more advanced than those in the maritime industry. Thus, 
the application of such techniques to the maritime field is required for the 
reinforcement of safety. 
Within the security context, the establishment of security levels is required by the 
international Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Such security levels are 
defined qualitatively by the linguistic terms. In this study, however, the security risks 
of the scenarios are presented in terms of a ranking based on the defuzzified values 
acquired. Accordingly, it is implied that such security levels should be equipped with 
the quantitative meaning so that the risk level of a specific scenario acquired using the 
framework proposed can be assigned to the appropriate level. Thus, appropriate 
safeguards or measures according to the security level could be deployed without any 
hesitation. 
The maritime industry is moving towards a goal-setting risk-based regime. This gives 
safety analysts more flexibility to employ novel and the latest risk modelling and 
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decision-making techniques. Subjective modelling and approximate reasoning 
methods may be one of these useful approaches. It may be beneficial if these novel 
techniques developed in this research could be further applied to facilitate risk 
modelling and decision making. Thus, the practical application of such novel 
techniques to the port industry is emphasised. Furthermore, since the methodologies 
proposed in this study are generic, such frameworks can be further verified for the 
safety topics outside the port industry. This will provide an added value to the 
promotion of their use in different industries. 
In addition, the introduction of a quality assurance concept is capable of facilitating 
the efficiency of port operations. Ports are encouraged to propose quality assurance 
projects using appropriate measuring units to improve and maintain the quality of the 
operations provided. 
Finally, this PhD study formulates a platform for ports to improve the risk assessment 
and safety management of port operations. A main implication of this is that ports 
will have to collect data for each component with regard to safety and quality 
qualitatively and quantitatively based on daily operations for the objective of 
continuous improvement of safety and efficiency. 
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Appendix 1. The Composition of the Fuzzy Rule Base 
No. Criticality Probability of Severity Vulnerability Priority Level 
Occurrence 
I Remote Remote Remote Remote Minor (1) 
2 Remote Remote Remote Low Low (0.3) 
3 Remote Remote Remote Moderate Low (0.6) 
4 Remote Remote Remote High Low (0.9) 
5 Remote Remote Remote Very High Moderate (0.2) 
6 Remote Remote Low Remote Low (0.2) 
7 Remote Remote Low Low Low (0.5) 
8 Remote Remote Low Moderate Low (0.8) 
Remote Remote Low High Moderate (0.1) 
10 Remote Remote Low Very High Moderate (0.4) 
11 Remote Remote Moderate Remote Low (0.4) 
12 Remote Remote Moderate Low Low (0.7) 
13 Remote Remote Moderate Moderate Low (1) 
14 Remote Remote Moderate High Moderate (0.3) 
15 Remote Remote Moderate Very High Moderate (0.6) 
16 Remote Remote High Remote Low (0.6) 
17 Remote Remote High Low Low (0.9) 
18 Remote Remote High Moderate Moderate (0.2) 
19 Remote Remote High High Moderate (0.5) 
20 Remote Remote High Very High Moderate (0.8) 
21 Remote Remote Very High Remote Low (0.8) 
22 Remote Remote Very High Low Moderate (0.1) 
23 Remote Remote Very High Moderate Moderate (0.4) 
24 Remote Remote Very High High Moderate (0.7) 
25 Remote Remote Very High Very High Moderate (1) 
26 Remote Low Remote Remote Low (0.2) 
27 Remote Low Remote Low Low (0.5) 
28 Remote Low Remote Moderate Low (0.8) 
29 Remote Low Remote High Moderate (0.1) 
30 Remote Low Remote Very High Moderate (0.4) 
31 Remote Low Low Remote Low (0.4) 
32 Remote Low Low Low Low (0.7) 
33 Remote Low Low Moderate Low (1) 
34 Remote Low Low High Moderate (0.3) 
35 Remote Low Low Very High Moderate (0.6) 
36 Remote Low Moderate Remote Low (0.6) 
37 Remote Low Moderate Low Low (0.9) 
38 Remote Low Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.2) 
39 Remote Low Moderate High Moderate (0.5) 
40 Remote Low Moderate Very High Moderate (0.8) 
, 
41 Remote Low High Remote Low (0.8) 
42 Remote Low High Low Moderate (0.1) 
. 
43 Remote Low High Moderate Moderate (0.4) 
44 Remote Low High High Moderate (0.7) 
, 45 Remote Low High Very High Moderate (1) 
46 Remote Low Very High Remote Low (1) 
47 Remote Low Very High Low Moderate (0.3) 
48 Remote Low Very High Moderate Moderate (0.6) 
49 Remote Low Very High High Moderate (0.9) 
50 Remote Low Very High Very High Significant (0.2) 
51 Remote Moderate Remote Remote Low (0.4) 
52 Remote Moderate Remote Low Low (0.7) 
53 Remote Moderate Remote Moderate Low (1) 
-54 
Remote Moderate Remote High Moderate (0.3) 
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55 Remote Moderate Remote Very High Moderate (0.6) 
56 Remote Moderate Low Remote Low (0.6) 
57 Remote Moderate Low Low Low (0.9) 
58 Remote Moderate Low Moderate Moderate (0.2) 
59 Remote Moderate Low High Moderate (0.5) 
60 Remote Moderate Low Very High Moderate (0.8) 
61 Remote Moderate Moderate Remote Low (0.8) 
62 Remote Moderate Moderate Low Moderate (0.1) 
63 Remote Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.4) 
64 Remote Moderate Moderate High Moderate (0.7) 
65 Remote Moderate Moderate Very High Moderate (1) 
66 Remote Moderate High Remote Low (1) 
67 Remote Moderate High Low Moderate (0.3) 
68 Remote Moderate High Moderate Moderate (0.6) 
69 Remote Moderate High High Moderate (0.9) 
10 Remote Moderate High Very High S ignif icant (0.2) 
71 Remote Moderate Very High Remote Moderate (0.2) 
72 Remote Moderate Very High Low Moderate (0.5) 
, 73 
Remote Moderate Very High Moderate Moderate (0.8) 
74 Remote Moderate Very High High Significant (0.1) 
75 Remote Moderate Very High Very High Significant (0.4) 
. 76 Remote 
High Remote Remote Low (0.6) 
77 Remote High Remote Low Low (0.9) 
78 Remote High Remote Moderate Moderate (0.2) 
79 Remote High Remote High Moderate (0.5) 
80 Remote High Remote Very High Moderate (0.8) 
81 Remote High Low Remote Low (0.8) 
82 Remote High Low Low Moderate (0.1) 
83 Remote High Low Moderate Moderate (0.4) 
84 Remote High Low High Moderate (0.7) 
85 Remote High Low Very High Moderate (1) 
86 Remote High Moderate Remote Low (1) 
87 Remote High Moderate Low Moderate (0.3) 
88 Remote High Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.6) 
89 Remote High Moderate High Moderate (0.9) 
90 Remote High Moderate Very High Significant (0.2) 
91 Remote High High Remote Moderate (0.2) 
92 Remote High High Low Moderate (0.5) 
93 Remote High High Moderate Moderate (0.8) 
94 Remote High High High Significant (0.1) 
95 Remote High High Very High Significant (0.4) 
96 Remote High Very High Remote Moderate (0.4) 
97 Remote High Very High Low Moderate (0.7) 
98 Remote High Very High Moderate Moderate (1) 
99 Remote High Very High High Significant (0.3) 
100 Remote High Very High Very High Significant (0.6) 
101 Remote Very High Remote Remote Low (0.8) 
102 Remote Very High Remote Low Moderate (0.1) 
103 Remote Very High Remote Moderate Moderate (0.4) 
104 Remote Very High Remote High Moderate (0.7) 
, 
105 Remote Very High Remote Very High Moderate (1) 
106 Remote Very High Low Remote Low (1) 
107 Remote Very High Low Low Moderate (0.3) 
' 108 Remote Very High Low Moderate Moderate (0.6) 
' 109 Remote Very High Low High Moderate (0.9) 
110 Remote Very High Low Very High Significant (0.2) 
III Remote Very High Moderate Remote Moderate (0.2) 
112 Remote Very High Moderate Low Moderate (0.5) 
113 Remote Very High Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.8) 
114 Remote Very High Moderate High Significant (0.1) 
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115 Remote Very High Moderate Very High Significant (0.4) 
116 Remote Very High High Remote Moderate (0.4) 
117 Remote Very High High Low Moderate (0.7) 
118 Remote Very High High Moderate Moderate (1) 
119 Remote Very High High High Significant (0.3) 
120 Remote Very High High Very High Significant (0.6) 
121 Remote Very High Very High Remote Moderate (0.6) 
122 Remote Very High Very High Low Moderate (0.9) 
123 Remote Very High Very High Moderate Significant (0.2) 
124 Remote Very High Very High High Significant (0.5) 
125 Remote Very High Very High Very High Significant (0.8) 
126 Low Remote Remote Remote Low (0.3) 
127 Low Remote Remote Low Low (0.6) 
128 Low Remote Remote Moderate Low (0.9) 
129 Low Remote Remote High Moderate (0.2) 
130 Low Remote Remote Very High Moderate (0.5) 
131 Low Remote Low Remote Low (0.5) 
132 Low Remote Low Low Low (0.8) 
133 Low Remote Low Moderate Moderate (0.1) 
134 Low Remote Low High Moderate (0.4) 
135 Low Remote Low Very High Moderate (0.7) 
136 Low Remote Moderate Remote Low (0.7) 
137 Low Remote Moderate Low Low (1) 
138 Low Remote Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.3) 
139 Low Remote Moderate High Moderate (0.6) 
140 Low Remote Moderate Very High Moderate (0.9) 
141 Low Remote High Remote Low (0.9) 
142 Low Remote High Low Moderate (0.2) 
143 Low Remote High Moderate Moderate (0.5) 
144 Low Remote High High Moderate (0.8) 
145 Low Remote High Very High Significant (0.1-) 
146 Low Remote Very High Remote Moderate (0.1) 
147 Low Remote Very High Low Moderate (0.4) 
148 Low Remote Very High Moderate Moderate (0.7) 
149 Low Remote Very High High Moderate (1) 
150 Low Remote Very High Very High Significant (0.3) 
151 Low Low Remote Remote Low (0.5) 
152 Low Low Remote Low Low (0.8) 
153 Low Low Remote Moderate Moderate (0.1) 
154 Low Low Remote High Moderate (0.4) 
155 Low Low Remote Very High Moderate (0.7) 
156 Low Low Low Remote Low (0.7) 
157 Low Low Low Low Low (1) 
158 Low Low Low Moderate Moderate (0.3) 
159 Low Low Low High Moderate (0.6) 
160 Low Low Low Very High Moderate (0.9) 
161 Low Low Moderate Remote Low (0.9) 
162 Low Low Moderate Low Moderate (0.2) 
163 Low Low Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.5) 
164 Low Low Moderate High Moderate (0.8) 
165 Low Low Moderate Very High Significant (0.1) 
166 Low Low High Remote Moderate (0.1) 
167 Low Low High Low Moderate (0.4) 
168 Low Low High Moderate Moderate (0.7) 
169 Low Low High High Moderate (1) 
170 Low Low High Very High Significant (0.3) 
171 Low Low Very High Remote Moderate (0.3) 
172 Low Low Very High Low Moderate (0.6) 
173 Low Low Very High Moderate Moderate (0.9) 
174 Low Low Very High High Significant (0.2) 
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175 Low Low Very High Very High Significant (0.5) 
176 Low Moderate Remote Remote Low (0.7) 
177 Low Moderate Remote Low Low (1) 
178 Low Moderate Remote Moderate Moderate (0.3) 
179 Low Moderate Remote High Moderate (0.6) 
180 Low Moderate Remote Very High Moderate (0.9) 
181 Low Moderate Low Remote Low (0.9) 
182 Low Moderate Low Low Moderate (0.2) 
183 Low Moderate Low Moderate Moderate (0.5) 
184 Low Moderate Low High Moderate (0.8) 
185 Low Moderate Low Very High Significant (0.1) 
186 Low Moderate Moderate Remote Moderate (0.1) 
187 Low Moderate Moderate Low Moderate (0.4) 
188 Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.7) 
189 Low Moderate Moderate High Moderate (1) 
190 Low Moderate Moderate Very High Significant (0.3) 
191 Low Moderate High Remote Moderate (0.3) 
192 Low Moderate High Low Moderate (0.6) 
193 Low Moderate High Moderate Moderate (0.9) 
194 Low Moderate High High Significant (0.2) 
195 Low Moderate High Very High Significant (0.5) 
196 Low Moderate Very High Remote Moderate (0.5) 
197 Low Moderate Very High Low Moderate (0.8) 
198 Low Moderate Very High Moderate Significant (0.1) 
199 Low Moderate Very High High Significant (0.4) 
200 Low Moderate Very High Very High Significant (0.7) 
201 Low High Remote Remote Low (0.9) 
202 Low High Remote Low Moderate (0.2) 
203 Low High Remote Moderate Moderate (0.5) 
204 Low High Remote High Moderate (0.8) 
205 Low High Remote Very High Significant (0.1) 
206 Low High Low Remote Moderate (0.1) 
207 Low High Low Low Moderate (0.4) 
208 Low High Low Moderate Moderate (0.7) 
209 Low High Low High Moderate (1) 
210 Low High Low Very High Significant (0.3) 
211 Low High Moderate Remote Moderate (0.3) 
212 Low High Moderate Low Moderate (0.6) 
213 Low High Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.9) 
214 Low High Moderate High Significant (0.2) 
215 Low High Moderate Very High Significant (0.5) 
216 Low High High Remote Moderate (0.5) 
217 Low High High Low Moderate (0.8) 
218 Low High High Moderate Significant (0.1) 
219 Low High High High Significant (0.4) 
220 Low High High Very High Significant (0.7) 
221 Low High Very High Remote Moderate (0.7) 
222 Low High Very High Low Moderate (1) 
223 Low High Very High Moderate Significant (0.3) 
224 Low High Very High High Significant (0.6) 
225 Low High Very High Very High Significant (0.9) 
226 Low Very High Remote Remote Moderate (0.1) 
227 Low Very High Remote Low Moderate (0.4) 
228 Low Very High Remote Moderate Moderate (0.7) 
229 Low Very High Remote High Moderate (1) 
, 230 Low Very High Remote Very High Significant (0.3) 
231 Low Very High Low Remote Moderate (0.3) 
232 Low Very High Low Low Moderate (0.6) 
233 Low Very High Low Moderate Moderate (0.9) 
234 Low Very High Low High Significant (0.2) 
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235 Low Very High Low Very High Significant (0.5) 
236 Low Very High Moderate Remote Moderate (0.5) 
237 Low Very High Moderate Low Moderate (0.8) 
238 Low Very High Moderate Moderate Signif icant (0.1) 
239 Low Very High Moderate High Significant (0.4) 
240 Low Very High Moderate Very High Significant (0.7) 
241 Low Very High High Remote Moderate (0.7) 
242 Low Very High High Low Moderate (1) 
243 Low Very High High Moderate Significant (0.3) 
244 Low Very High High High Signiflcant (0.6) 
245 Low Very High High Very High Significant (0.9) 
246 Low Very High Very High Remote Moderate (0.9) 
247 Low Very High Very High Low Significant (0.2) 
248 Low Very High Very High Moderate Significant (0.5) 
249 Low Very High Very High High Significant (0.8) 
250 Low Very High Very High Very High High (0.1) 
251 Moderate Remote Remote Remote Low (0.6) 
252 Moderate Remote Remote Low Low (0.9) 
253 Moderate Remote Remote Moderate Moderate (0.2) 
254 Moderate Remote Remote High Moderate (0.5) 
255 Moderate Remote Remote Very High Moderate (0.8) 
256 Moderate Remote Low Remote Low (0.8) 
257 Moderate Remote Low Low Moderate (0.1) 
258 Moderate Remote Low Moderate Moderate (0.4) 
259 Moderate Remote Low High Moderate (0.7) 
260 Moderate Remote Low Very High Moderate (1) 
261 Moderate Remote Moderate Remote Low (1) 
262 Moderate Remote Moderate Low Moderate (0.3) 
263 Moderate Remote Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.6) 
264 Moderate Remote Moderate High Moderate (0.9) 
265 Moderate Remote Moderate Very High Significant (0.2) 
266 Moderate Remote High Remote Moderate (0.2) 
267 Moderate Remote High Low Moderate (0.5) 
268 Moderate Remote High Moderate Moderate (0.8) 
269 Moderate Remote High High Signi f icant (0.1) 
270 Moderate Remote High Very High Significant (0.4) 
271 Moderate Remote Very High Remote Moderate (0.4) 
272 Moderate Remote Very High Low Moderate (0.7) 
273 Moderate Remote Very High Moderate Moderate (1) 
274 Moderate Remote Very High High Signiflcant (0.3) 
275 Moderate Remote Very High Very High Significant (0.6) 
276 Moderate Low Remote Remote Low (0.8) 
277 Moderate Low Remote Low Moderate (0.1) 
278 Moderate Low Remote Moderate Moderate (0.4) 
279 Moderate Low Remote High Moderate (0.7) 
280 Moderate Low Remote Very High Moderate (1) 
281 Moderate Low Low Remote Low (1) 
282 Moderate Low Low Low Moderate (0.3) 
283 Moderate Low Low Moderate Moderate (0.6) 
284 Moderate Low Low High Moderate (0.9) 
285 Moderate Low Low Very High Significant (0.2) 
286 Moderate Low Moderate Remote Moderate (0.2) 
287 Moderate Low Moderate Low Moderate (0.5) 
288 Moderate Low Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.8) 
289 Moderate Low Moderate High Significant (0.1) 
290 Moderate Low Moderate Very High Significant (0.4) 
291 Moderate Low High Remote Moderate (0.4) 
292 Moderate Low High Low Moderate (0.7) 
293 Moderate Low High Moderate Moderate (1) 
294 Moderate Low High High Significant (0.3) 
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295 Moderate Low High Very High Signiricant (0.6) 
, 296 Moderate Low Very High Remote Moderate (0.6) 
297 Moderate Low Very High Low Moderate (0.9) 
298 Moderate Low Very High Moderate Significant (0.2) 
299 Moderate Low Very High High Significant (0.5) 
300 Moderate Low Very High Very High Significant (0.8) 
301 Moderate Moderate Remote Remote Low (1) 
302 Moderate Moderate Remote Low Moderate (0.3) 
303 Moderate Moderate Remote Moderate Moderate (0.6) 
304 Moderate Moderate Remote High Moderate (0.9) 
305 Moderate Moderate Remote Very High Significant (0.2) 
306 Moderate Moderate Low Remote Moderate (0.2) 
307 Moderate Moderate Low Low Moderate (0.5) 
308 Moderate Moderate Low Moderate Moderate (0.8) 
309 Moderate Moderate Low High Significant (0.1) 
310 Moderate Moderate Low Very High Significant (0.4) 
311 Moderate Moderate Moderate Remote Moderate (0.4) 
312 Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Moderate (0.7) 
313 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate (1) 
314 Moderate Moderate Moderate High S ignif icant (0.3) 
315 Moderate Moderate Moderate Very High Significant (0.6) 
316 Moderate Moderate High Remote Moderate (0.6) 
317 Moderate Moderate High Low Moderate (0.9) 
318 Moderate Moderate High Moderate Significant (0.2) 
319 Moderate Moderate High High Significant (0.5) 
320 Moderate Moderate High Very High Significant (0.8) 
321 Moderate Moderate Very High Remote Moderate (0.8) 
322 Moderate Moderate Very High Low Significant (0.1) 
323 Moderate Moderate Very High Moderate Significant (0.4) 
324 Moderate Moderate Very High High Significant (0.7) 
325 Moderate Moderate Very High Very High Significant (1) 
326 Moderate High Remote Remote Moderate (0.2) 
327 Moderate High Remote Low Moderate (0.5) 
328 Moderate High Remote Moderate Moderate (0.8) 
329 Moderate High Remote High Significant (0.1) 
330 Moderate High Remote Very High Significant (0.4) 
331 Moderate High Low Remote Moderate (0.4) 
332 Moderate High Low Low Moderate (0.7) 
333 Moderate High Low Moderate Moderate (1) 
334 Moderate High Low High Significant (0.3) 
335 Moderate High Low Very High Significant (0.6) 
336 Moderate High Moderate Remote Moderate (0.6) 
337 Moderate High Moderate Low Moderate (0.9) 
338 Moderate High Moderate Moderate Significant (0.2) 
339 Moderate High Moderate High Significant (0.5) 
340 Moderate High Moderate Very High Significant (0.8) 
341 Moderate High High Remote Moderate (0.8) 
342 Moderate High High Low Significant (0.1) 
343 Moderate High High Moderate Significant (0.4) 
344 Moderate High High High Significant (0.7) 
345 Moderate High High Very High Significant (1) 
346 Moderate High Very High Remote Moderate (1) 
347 Moderate High Very High Low Significant (0.3) 
348 Moderate High Very High Moderate Significant (0.6) 
349 Moderate High Very High High Significant (0.9) 
350 Moderate High Very High Very High Very Significant 
(0.2) 
351 Moderate Very High Remote Remote Moderate (0.4) 
352 Moderate Very High Remote Low Moderate (0.7) 
353 Moderate Very High Remote Moderate Moderate (1) 
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354 Moderate Very High Remote High Significant (0.3) 
355 Moderate Very High Remote Very High Significant (0.6) 
356 Moderate Very High Low Remote Moderate (0.6) 
357 Moderate Very High Low Low Moderate (0.9) 
358 Moderate Very High Low Moderate Significant (0.2) 
359 Moderate Very High Low High Significant (0.5) 
360 Moderate Very High Low Very High Significant (0.8) 
361 Moderate Very High Moderate Remote Moderate (0.8) 
362 Moderate Very High Moderate Low Significant (0.1) 
363 Moderate Very High Moderate Moderate Significant (0.4) 
364 Moderate Very High Moderate High Significant (0.7) 
365 Moderate Very High Moderate Very High Significant (1) 
366 Moderate Very High High Remote Moderate (1) 
367 Moderate Very High High Low Significant (0.3) 
368 Moderate Very High High Moderate Significant (0.6) 
369 Moderate Very High High High Significant (0.9) 
370 Moderate Very High High Very High Very Significant 
(0.2) 
371 Moderate Very High Very High Remote Significant (0.2) 
372 Moderate Very High Very High Low Significant (0.5) 
373 Moderate Very High Very High Moderate Significant (0.8) 
374 Moderate Very High Very High High Very Significant 
(0.1) 
375 Moderate Very High Very High Very High Very Significant 
(0.4) 
376 High Remote Remote Remote Low (0.9) 
377 High Remote Remote Low Moderate (0.2) 
378 High Remote Remote Moderate Moderate (0.5) 
379 High Remote Remote High Moderate (0.8) 
380 High Remote Remote Very High Significant (0.1) 
381 High Remote Low Remote Moderate (0.1) 
382 High Remote Low Low Moderate (0.4) 
383 High Remote Low Moderate Moderate (0.7) 
384 High Remote Low High Moderate (1) 
385 High Remote Low Very High Significant (0.3) 
386 High Remote Moderate Remote Moderate (0.3) 
387 High Remote Moderate Low Moderate (0.6) 
388 High Remote Moderate Moderate Moderate (0.9) 
389 High Remote Moderate High Significant (0.2) 
390 High Remote Moderate Very High Significant (0.5) 
391 High Remote High Remote Moderate (0.5) 
392 High Remote High Low Moderate (0.8) 
393 High Remote High Moderate Significant (0.1) 
394 High Remote High High Significant (0.4) 
395 High Remote High Very High Significant (0.7) 
396 High Remote Very High Remote Moderate (0.7) 
397 High Remote Very High Low Moderate (1) 
398 High Remote Very High Moderate Significant (0.3) 
399 High Remote Very High High Significant (0.6) 
400 High Remote Very High Very High Significant (0.9) 
401 High Low Remote Remote Moderate (0.1) 
402 High Low Remote Low Moderate (0.4) 
403 High Low Remote Moderate Moderate (0.7) 
404 High Low Remote High Moderate (1) 
405 High Low Remote Very High Significant (0.3) 
406 High Low Low Remote Moderate (0.3) 
407 High Low Low Low Moderate (0.6) 
408 High Low Low Moderate Moderate (0.9) 
409 High Low Low High Significant (0.2) 
_410. ý 
High Low Low Ve! y HiLh Significant (0.5) 
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411 High Low Moderate Remote Moderate (0.5) 
412 High Low Moderate Low Moderate (0.8) 
413 High Low Moderate Moderate Significant (0.1) 
, 414 High 
Low Moderate High Significant (0.4) 
415 High Low Moderate Very High Significant (0.7) 
416 High Low High Remote Moderate (0.7) 
417 High Low High Low Moderate (1) 
418 High Low High Moderate Significant (0.3) 
419 High Low High High Significant (0.6) 
420 High Low High Very High Significant (0.9) 
421 High Low Very High Remote Moderate (0.9) 
422 High Low Very High Low Significant (0.2) 
423 High Low Very High Moderate Significant (0.5) 
424 High Low Very High High Significant (0.8) 
425 High Low Very High Very High Very Significant 
(0.1) 
426 High Moderate Remote Remote Moderate (0.3) 
427 High Moderate Remote Low Moderate (0.6) 
428 High Moderate Remote Moderate Moderate (0.9) 
429 High Moderate Remote High Significant (0.2) 
430 High Moderate Remote Very High Significant (0.5) 
431 High Moderate Low Remote Moderate (0.5) 
432 High Moderate Low Low Moderate (0.8) 
433 High Moderate Low Moderate Significant (0.1) 
434 High Moderate Low High Significant (0.4) 
435 High Moderate Low Very High Significant (0.7) 
436 High Moderate Moderate Remote Moderate (0.7) 
437 High Moderate Moderate Low Moderate (1) 
438 High Moderate Moderate Moderate Significant (0.3) 
439 High Moderate Moderate High Significant (0.6) 
440 High Moderate Moderate Very High Significant (0.9) 
441 High Moderate High Remote Moderate (0.9) 
442 High Moderate High Low Significant (0.2) 
443 High Moderate High Moderate Significant (0.5) 
444 High Moderate High High Significant (0.8) 
445 High Moderate High Very High Very Significant 
(0.1) 
446 High Moderate Very High Remote Significant (0.1) 
447 High Moderate Very High Low Significant (0.4) 
448 High Moderate Very High Moderate Significant (0.7) 
449 High Moderate Very High High Significant (1) 
450 High Moderate Very High Very High Very Significant 
(0.3) 
451 High High Remote Remote Moderate (0.5) 
452 High High Remote Low Moderate (0.8) 
453 High High Remote Moderate Significant (0.1) 
454 High High Remote High Significant (0.4) 
455 High High Remote Very High Significant (0.7) 
456 High High Low Remote Moderate (0.7) 
457 High High Low Low Moderate (1) 
458 High High Low Moderate Significant (0.3) 
459 High High Low High Significant (0.6) 
460 High High Low Very High Significant (0.9) 
461 High High Moderate Remote Moderate (0.9) 
462 High High Moderate Low Significant (0.2) 
463 High High Moderate Moderate Significant (0.5) 
464 High High Moderate High Significant (0.8) 
465 High High Moderate Very High Very Significant 
4 66 High High ! Ligh Remote Significant (0.1) 
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467 High High High Low Significant (0.4) 
468 High High High Moderate Significant (0.7) 
469 High High High High Significant (1) 
470 High High High Very High Very Significant 
(0.3) 
471 High High Very High Remote Significant (0.3) 
472 High High Very High Low Significant (0.6) 
473 High High Very High Moderate Significant (0.9) 
474 High High Very High High Very Significant 
(0.2) 
475 High High Very High Very High Very Signiricant 
(0.5) 
476 High Very High Remote Remote Moderate (0.7) 
477 High Very High Remote Low Moderate (1) 
478 High Very High Remote Moderate Significant (0.3) 
479 High Very High Remote High Sign i ficant (0.6) 
480 High Very High Remote Very High Significant (0.9) 
481 High Very High Low Remote Moderate (0.9) 
482 High Very High Low Low Significant (0.2) 
483 High Very High Low Moderate Significant (0.5) 
484 High Very High Low High Significant (0.8) 
485 High Very High Low Very High Very Significant 
(0.1) 
486 High Very High Moderate Remote Significant (0.1) 
487 High Very High Moderate Low Significant (0.4) 
488 High Very High Moderate Moderate Significant (0.7) 
489 High Very High Moderate High Significant (1) 
490 High Very High Moderate Very High Very Significant 
(0.3) - 491 High Very High High Remote Significant (0.3) 
492 High Very High High Low Significant (0.6) 
493 High Very High High Moderate Significant (0.9) 
494 High Very High High High Very Significant 
(0.2) 
495 High Very High High Very High Very Significant 
(0.5) 
496 High Very High Very High Remote Significant (0.5) 
497 High Very High Very High Low Significant (0.8) 
498 High Very High Very High Moderate Very Significant 
(0.1) 
499 High Very High Very High High Very Significant 
(0.4) 
500 High Very High Very High Very High Very Significant 
(0.7) 
501 Very High Remote Remote Remote Moderate (0.2) 
502 Very High Remote Remote Low Moderate (0.5) 
503 Very High Remote Remote Moderate Moderate (0.8) 
504 Very High Remote Remote High Significant (0.1) 
505 Very High Remote Remote Very High Significant (0.4) 
506 Very High Remote Low Remote Moderate (0.4) 
507 Very High Remote Low Low Moderate (0.7) 
508 Very High Remote Low Moderate Moderate (1) 
509 Very High Remote Low High Significant (0.3) 
510 Very High Remote Low Very High Significant (0.6) 
511 Very High Remote Moderate Remote Moderate (0.6) 
512 Very High Remote Moderate Low Moderate (0.9) 
513 Very High Remote Moderate Moderate Significant (0.2) 
514 Very High Remote Moderate High Significant (0.5) 
515 Very High Remote Moderate Very High Significant (0.8) 
516 Very High Remote High Remote Moderate (0.8) 
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517 Very High Remote High Low Significant (0.1) 
518 Very High Remote High Moderate Significant (0.4) 
519 Very High Remote High High Significant (0.7) 
520 Very High Remote High Very II igh Significant (1) 
521 Very High Remote Very High Remote Moderate (1) 
522 Very High Remote Very High Low Significant (0.3) 
523 Very High Remote Very High Moderate Significant (0.6) 
524 Very High Remote Very High High Significant (0.9) 
525 Very High Remote Very High Very High Very Significant 
(0.2) 
526 Very High Low Remote Remote Moderate (0.4) 
527 Very High Low Remote Low Moderate (0.7) 
528 Very High Low Remote Moderate Moderate (1) 
529 Very High Low Remote High Significant (0.3) 
530 Very High Low Remote Very High Significant (0.6) 
531 Very High Low Low Remote Moderate (0.6) 
532 Very High Low Low Low Moderate (0.9) 
533 Very High Low Low Moderate Significant (0.2) 
534 Very High Low Low High Significant (0.5) 
535 Very High Low Low Very H igh Significant (0.8) 
536 Very High Low Moderate Remote Moderate (0.8) 
537 Very High Low Moderate Low Significant (0.1) 
538 Very High Low Moderate Moderate Significant (0.4) 
539 Very High Low Moderate High Significant (0.7) 
540 Very High Low Moderate Very High Significant(l) 
541 Very High Low High Remote Moderate (1) 
542 Very High Low High Low Significant (0.3) 
543 Very High Low High Moderate Signi f icant (0.6) 
544 Very High Low High High Significant (0.9) 
545 Very High Low High Very High Very Signiricant 
(0.2) 
546 Very High Low Very High Remote Significant (0.2) 
547 Very High Low Very High Low Significant (0.5) 
548 Very High Low Very High Moderate Significant (0.8) 
549 Very High Low Very High High Very Significant 
(0.1) 
550 Very High Low Very High Very High Very Significant 
(0.4) 
551 Very High Moderate Remote Remote Moderate (0.6) 
552 Very High Moderate Remote Low Moderate (0.9) 
553 Very High Moderate Remote Moderate Significant (0.2) 
554 Very High Moderate Remote High Significant (0.5) 
555 Very High Moderate Remote Very High Significant (0.8) 
556 Very High Moderate Low Remote Moderate (0.8) 
557 Very High Moderate Low Low Significant (0.1) 
558 Very High Moderate Low Moderate Significant (0.4) 
559 Very High Moderate Low High Significant (0.7) 
560 Very High Moderate Low Very High Significant (1) 
561 Very High Moderate Moderate Remote Moderate (1) 
562 Very High Moderate Moderate Low Significant (0.3) 
563 Very High Moderate Moderate Moderate Significant (0.6) 
564 Very High Moderate Moderate High Significant (0.9) 
565 Very High Moderate Moderate Very High Very Significant 
(0.2) 
566 Very High Moderate High Remote Significant (0.2) 
567 Very High Moderate High Low Significant (0.5) 
568 Very High Moderate High Moderate Significant (0.8) 
569 Very High Moderate High High Very Significant 
(0.1) 
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570 Very High Moderate High Very II igh Very Significant 
(0.4) 
571 Very High Moderate Very High Remote Significant (0.4) 
572 Very High Moderate Very High Low Significant (0.7) 
573 Very High Moderate Very High Moderate Significant (1) 
574 Very High Moderate Very High High Very Significant 
(0.3) 
575 Very High Moderate Very High Very High Very Significant 
1 (0.6) 
576 Very High High Remote Remote Moderate (0.8) 
577 Very High High Remote Low Significant (0.1) 
578 Very High High Remote Moderate Significant (0.4) 
579 Very High High Remote High Significant (0.7) 
580 Very High High Remote Very High Significant(l) 
581 Very High High Low Remote Moderate (1) 
582 Very High High Low Low Significant (0.3) 
583 Very High High Low Moderate Significant (0.6) 
584 Very High High Low High Significant (0.9) 
585 Very High High Low Very High Very Significant 
(0.2) 
586 Very High High Moderate Remote Significant (0.2) 
587 Very High High Moderate Low Significant (0.5) 
588 Very High High Moderate Moderate Significant (0.8) 
589 Very High High Moderate High Very Significant 
(0.1) 
590 Very High High Moderate Very H igh Very Significant 
(0.4) 
591 Very High High High Remote Significant (0.4) 
592 Very High High High Low S ignif icant (0.7) 
593 Very High High High Moderate Significant (1) 
594 Very High High High High Very Significant 
(0.3) 
595 Very High High High Very High Very Significant 
(0.6) 
596 Very High High Very High Remote Significant (0.6) 
597 Very High High Very High Low Significant (0.9) 
598 Very High High Very High Moderate Very Significant 
(0.2) 
599 Very High High Very High High Very Significant 
(0.5) 
600 Very High High Very High Very High Very Significant 
(0.8) 
601 Very High Very High Remote Remote Moderate (1) 
602 Very High Very High Remote Low Significant (0.3) 
603 Very High Very High Remote Moderate Significant (0.6) 
604 Very High Very High Remote High Significant (0.9) 
605 Very High Very High Remote Very High Very Significant 
(0.2) 
606 Very High Very High Low Remote Significant (0.2) 
607 Very High Very High Low Low Significant (0.5) 
608 Very High Very High Low Moderate Significant (0.8) 
609 Very High Very High Low High Very Significant 
(0.1) 
610 Very High Very High Low Very High Very Signiricant 
(0.4) 
611 Very High Very High Moderate Remote Significant (0.4) 
612 Very High Very High Moderate Low Significant (0.7) 
613 Very High Very High Moderate Moderate Significant (1) 
614 Very High Very High Moderate High Very Significant 
(0.3) 
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615 Very High Very High Moderate Very II igh Very Significant 
(0.6) 
616 Very High Very High High Remote Significant (0.6) 
617 Very High Very High High Low Significant (0.9) 
618 Very High Very High High Moderate Very Significant 
(0.2) 
619 Very High Very High High High Very Significant 
(0.5) 
620 Very High Very High High Very High Very Significant 
(0.8) 
621 Very High Very High Very High Remote Significant (0.8) 
622 Very High Very High Very High Low Very Significant 
(0.1) 
623 Very High Very High Very High Moderate Very Significant 
(0.4) 
624 Very High Very High Very High High Very Significant 
(0.7) 
625 Very High Very High Very High Very High Very Significant 
(1) 
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Appendix 2. The Training Data for the Neural Network 
No. VTC Performance Navigation Aids Pilot Performance Sealane Weather Overall 
& Facilities Maintenance Condition Risk 
I V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. 1"oor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.625 
2 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 1 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.425 
3 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 4.225 
4 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Good 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 Excellent 0.25 4.025 
5 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 3.825 
6 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.625_ 
7 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.425 
8 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.225 
9 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 3.025 
10 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.825 
11 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.625 
12 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.425 
13 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 0.25 2.225 
14 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Good 0.75, GoTd 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.025 
15 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 1.825 
16 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 1.625 
17 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.425 
18 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.225 
19 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 4.025 
20 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Good 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.825 
21 1 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor V-Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.425 
22 
F37 
Y4- 
T5 
T6 
77- 
78 
29 
v. poor u. -i:,, iroor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
iroor u. -/. ), 
Moderate 0.25 
Poor 0.75, 
Moderate 0.25 
Poor 0.75, 
Moderate 0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
v. roor u., /. ), Foor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
Poor 0.75, Moderate 
0.25 
Poor 0.75, Moderate 
0.25 
Poor 0.75, Moderate 
0.25 
Poor 0.75, Moderate 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V-Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
Poor 0.75, 
Moderate 0.25 
Poor 0.75, 
Modcrate 0.25 
Modcratc 0.75, 
Good 0.25 
Good 0.75, 
Exccllent 0.25 
V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 
Poor 0.75, 
Moderatc 0.25 
Moderatc 0.75, 
Good 0.25 
Good 0.75, 
Exccllent 0.25 
V. Poor 0.75,13oor 
0.25 
4.225 
4.025 
3.825 
4.425 
4.225 
4.025 
3.825 
4.425 
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30 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.225 
31 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 4.025 
-32 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.825 
33 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.225 
34 Poor 0.75i Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.025 
35 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 3.825 
36 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.625 
37 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor _ 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.225 
38 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.025 
39 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 3.825 
40 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Good 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.625 
41 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor _ 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 4.225 
42 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.025 
43 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.825 
44 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.625 
45 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.225 
46 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, - 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.025 
47 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 3.825 
48 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.625 
4-9 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 4.225 
50 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, _ 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.025 
51 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.825 
52 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.625 
53 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 4.225 
54 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 4.025 
55 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.825 
56 V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.625 
57 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 4.025 
58 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.825 
59 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 3.625 
60 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, poor Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.425 
PI Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, 1 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor I 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 
1 
4.025 
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62 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75. 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3,825 
63 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.625 
- 64 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 7 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.425 1 
65 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 4.025 
66 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.825 
67 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.625 
68 Poor 0.75, Moderate V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.425 
69 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 4.025 
-70 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.825 
71 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.625 
72 V. Poor 0.75, Poor Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.425 
73 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 3.625 
74 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25_ Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.425 
75 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.225 
76 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.025_ 
77 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. 11loor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 3.625 
78 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.425 
79 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.225 
80 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.025 
81 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 3.625 
82 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.425_ 
83 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.225 
84 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.025 
85 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Goo( 0.25 3.625 
86 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.425 
87 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 3.225 
88 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 3.025 
89 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 3.425 
90 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.225 
91 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.025 
92 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.825 
93 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, 1 Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 1 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 3.425 
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94 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.225 
95 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.025 
96- Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 1 2.8251 
97 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 3.425 
98 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.225 
99 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderatc Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 3.025 
100 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.825 
101 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 3.425 
102 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.225 
103 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 3.025 
104 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.825 
105 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 3.425 
106 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.225 
107 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 3.025 
108 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, _ 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.825 
109 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 3.425 
110 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, _ 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.225 
III Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 3.025 
112 Poor 0.75, Moderate Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.825 
113 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor _ 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 0.25 3.225 
114 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.025 
115 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 2.825 
116 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.625 
117 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 3.225 
118 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.025 
jig Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.825 
120 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.625 
121 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 3.225 
122 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.025 
123 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.825 
124 Moderate 0.75, Good Poor 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Moderate 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.625 
125 Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 3.225 
A-16 
The Development ofSafety and Security Assessment Techniques and their Application to Port Operatio 
126 Poor 0.75, Moderate o o r O Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 3.025 
-- 127 
F 
Poor 0.75, Moderate Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.23 2.825 
128 O-75, Moderate P o o r Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 1 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 1 2.625 
129 Good 0.75, Excellent o crate o crate o cr c . oor ., 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 2.825 
130 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.625 
131 ý Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 
0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.425 
132 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.225 
133 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 2.825 
134 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.625 
135 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.425 
136 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.225 
137 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 2.825 
138 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.625 
139 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.425 
140 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.225 
141 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 0.25 2.825 
142 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.625 
143 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 2.425 
144 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.225 
145 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 2.625_ 
146 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.425 
147 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.225 
148 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.025 
149 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 2.625 
150 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.425_ 
151 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.225 
152 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.025 
153 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 0.25 2.625 
154 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.425 
155 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 2.225 
156 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.025 
157 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.7 0 ý 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 
1 
0.25 25 
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158 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75. 1 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.425 
159 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.225 
Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 1 Excel lent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.025 
161 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 0.25 2.625 
162 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.425 
163 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 2.225 
164 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.025 
165 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 0.25 2.625 
166 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.425 
167 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 2.225 
168 Moderate 0.75, Good Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 2.025 
169 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 0.25 2.425 
170 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.225 
171 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Good 0.25 2.025 
172 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 1.825 
173 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 0.25 2.425 
174 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.225 
175 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 2.025 
176 Good 0.75, Excellent Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 1.825 
177 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 0.25 2.425 
178 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.225 
179 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 2.025 
180 Good 0.75, Excellent Moderate 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Good 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 1.825 
181 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, V. Poor 0.75, Poor 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 0.25 2.425 
182 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Poor 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Moderate 0.25 2.225 
183 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Moderate 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Good 0.25 2.025 
184 Moderate 0.75, Good Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, Good 0.75, 
0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 Excellent 0.25 1.825 
185 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 4.375 
186 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V-Poor 0.25, Poor V-Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 4.175 
187 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V-Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V-Poor 0.25, Poor Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 3.975 
188 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V-Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V-Poor 0.25, Poor Good 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.775 
189 Poor 0.25, Moderate C = Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 I Moderate 0.75 1 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.575 
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190 90 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.375 
191 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 3.175 
192 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.975 
119 93 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.775 
119 94 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.575 
9 195 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.375 
196 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.175 
97 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 0.75 1.975 
198 198 198 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Moderate 0.75 1.775 
199 199 199 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 1.575 
200 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.375_ 
201 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 4.175 
202 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.975 
203 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 3.775 
204 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Good 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.575 
205 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 4.175 
-TO-6 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.975 
207 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 3.775 
208 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.575 
209 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 4.175_ 
210 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.975 
211 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 3.775 
212 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Good 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.575 
213 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V-Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 4.175 
214 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.975 
215 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V-Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 3.775 
216 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.575 
217 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 3.975 
218 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.775 
219 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 3.575 
220 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.375 
221 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
Lmý 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 3.975 
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222 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, 1 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.775 
223 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 3.575 
224 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Good 0.25. 
0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.375 
225 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.975 
226 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.775 
227 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 3.575 
228 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.375 
229 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. 11loor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 3.975 
230 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.775 
231 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 3.575 
232 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.375 
233 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.975 
234 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.775 
235 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 3.575 
236 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.375 
237 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
1 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.975 
238 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.775 
239 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 3.575 
240 V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.375 
241 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 3.775 
242 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.575 
243 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Moderate 0.25, 
'0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 3.375 
244 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.175 
245 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.775 
246 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.575 
247 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 3.375 
248 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excclicnt 0.75 3.175 
249 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.775 
250 poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.575 
251 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 3.375 
252 Poor 0.25, Moderate V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
1 0.75 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.175 
253 1 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. 11loor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 1 3.775 
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254 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25. Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.575 
255 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 3.375 
256 V. Poor 0.25, Poor Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 1 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 3.175 1 
257 Moderate 0.25, Good 1 Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.375 
258 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.175 
259 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 2.9751 
260 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.775 
261 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.375 
262 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 1 Moderate 0.75 3.175 
263 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 2.975 
264 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.775_ 
265 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.375 
266 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.175_ 
267 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 2.975 
268 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.775 
269 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 1 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 3.375 
270 Poor 0.25, Moderate 1 Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 3.175 
271 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.975_ 
272 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.775 
273 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.175 
274 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.975 
275 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 2.775 
276 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.575 
277 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.175 
278 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25 , 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.975 
279 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 2.775 
280 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.575 
281 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 3.175 
282 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.975 
283 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.775 
284 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 
__ 
Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.575 
285 1 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 3.175 
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286 86 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.975 
287 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 2.775 
288 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1 2.575 
289 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 3.175 
290 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, -- 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.975 
291 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.775 
--- 292 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 1 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.575 
293 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 3.175 
294 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.975 
295 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.23, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.775_ 
296 Poor 0.25, Moderate Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.575 
297 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 0.75 2.975 
298 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.775_ 
299 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 2.575 
300 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.375 
301 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.975_ 
302 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.775 
303 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.575_ 
304 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.375 
305 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.975 
306 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.775 
307 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.575 
308 Moderate 0.25, Good Poor 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Moderate 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.375 
309 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.975 
310 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.775 
311 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.575 
312 Poor 0.25, Moderate Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 2.375 
313 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.575 
314 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.375 
315 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.175 
316 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 6.75 1.975 
317 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.575 
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318 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.375 
19 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.175 
320 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excclicrit 0.75 1.975 
321 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.575 
322 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.375 
323 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 2.175 
324 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.975 
325 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 0.75 2.575 
326 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.375 
327 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 2.175 
328 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.975 
329 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.375 
330 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.175 
331 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, _ 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 1.975 
332 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.775 
333 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.375 
334 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.175 
335 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 1.975 
336 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.775 
337 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 0.75 2.375 
338 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.175 
339 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 1.975 
340 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.775 
341 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2.375 
342 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.175 
343 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 1.975 
344 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.775 
345 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, od 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 0.75 2.375 
346 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.175 
347 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 1.975 
348 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.775 
349 Moderate 0.25, Good 1 Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 1 
0.75 1 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 0.75 2-375 
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350 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Moderate 0.75 2.175 
351 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 1.975 
352 Moderate 0.25, Good Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.775 
353 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 0.75 2,175 
354 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Moderate 0.75 1.975 
355 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Good 0.75 1.775 
356 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.575 
Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, V. Ploor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excel lent 0.75 0.75 2.175 
358 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Moderate 0.75 1.975 
359 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 1.775 
360 Good 0.25, Excellent Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.575 
361 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 0.75 2.175 
362 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Moderate 0.75 1.975 
363 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 1.775 
364 Good 0.25, Excellent Moderate 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Good 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.575 
365 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, V. Poor 0.25, Poor 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 0.75 2.175 
366 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Poor 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Moderate 0.75 1.975 
367 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Moderate 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Good 0.75 1.775 
368 Moderate 0.25, Good Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, Good 0.25, 
0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 Excellent 0.75 1.575 
369 V. Poor 0.5, Poor V-Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.5 
370 V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 4.3 
371 V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor ' Moderate 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 4.1 
372 V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor Good 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.9 
373 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.7 
374 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.5 
375 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.3 
376 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
- 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.1 
77 7 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 2.9 
378 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.7 
379 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.5 
380 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 
- 
0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.3 
- 38 ij Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
- 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 2.1 
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382 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 r,, xccllcnt 0.5 Moderate 0.5 1.9 
383 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Good 0.5 1.7 
384 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 1 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Excellent 0.5 1.5 
385 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.3 
386 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 4.1 
387 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.9 
388 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor Good 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.7 
389 Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5. Poor 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.3 
390 Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 4.1 
391 Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor Moderate 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.9 
392 Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor Good 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.7_ 
393 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.3_ 
394 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 4.1 
395 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Moderate 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.9 
396 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Good 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.7 
- 397 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. 1"oor 0.5, Poor 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 V-Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.3 
398 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 4.1 
39 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.9 
400 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.7 
401 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.1 
402 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, i V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, 0.5 Moderate 0.5 V-Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.9_ 
- 403 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5 Poor 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.7 
404 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor Good 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.5_ 
405 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.1 
406 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.9 
407 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.7 
Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Good 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.5 
Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 0.5 V-Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.1 
410 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.9 
411 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.7 
12 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, F 
0.5 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.5 
41 3 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V-Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.1 
A-25 
The Development ofSafety and Security Assessment Techniques and their Application to Port Operaflo 
414 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.9 
415 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Moderate 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.7 
416 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Good 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 1 3.5 
417 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.1 
-418 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.9 
419 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.7 
420 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5. 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.5 
421 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 4.1 
422 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.9 
423 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.7 
424 V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.5- 
425 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 
' 
Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.9 
-: F2-6 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.7 
427 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.5 
428 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Good 0.5, 
0.5 .5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.3 
429 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Moderat 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.9 
-ý30 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.7 
431 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.5 
432 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.3 
433 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.9 
434 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 
' 
0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.7 
73-5 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.5 
436 Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.3 
437 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.9 
438 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 
__0.5 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.7 
439 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.5 
440 Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 3.3 
441 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.5 
442 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
. 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.3 
- 443 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.1 
444 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.9 
445 poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 5.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
_0.5 
1 Good 0.5 0.5 
. 
0.5 o. 5 3.5 
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446 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.3 
447 
1 
Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.1 
448 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.9 
449 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.5 
450 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.3 
451 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 3.1 
452 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.9 
453 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 3.5 
454 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.3 
455 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 3.1 
456 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.9 
457 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.3 
458 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.1 
459 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 2.9 
460 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.7 
461 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.3 
462 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.1 
463 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 2.9 
464 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.7 
465 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 3.3 
466 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.1 
467 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, _ 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.9 
468 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.7 
469 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.3 
470 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.1 
471 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 2.9 
472 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5. 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.7 
473 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 
- 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 3.3 
474 Poor 0.5, M7d erate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.1 
475 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.9 
476 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.7 
477 Poor 0,5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
1 0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 3.3 
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478 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 3.1 
479 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.9 
480 Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.7 
4,81 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 3.1 
2 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.9 
483 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 2.7 
484 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.5 
485 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 3.1 
-44-8--6 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.9 
487 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.7 
488 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.5 
489 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 3.1 
490 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.9 
491 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.7 
492 Moderate 0.5, Good Poor 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Moderate 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.5_ 
493 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 3.1 
494 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.9 
495 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.7 
496 Poor 0.5, Moderate Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.5 
497 1 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 2.7 
498 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.5 
499 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.3 
500 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.1 
501 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 2.7 
502 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.5 
503 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.3 
504 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.1 
505 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 2.7 
506 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Modcraic 0.5 2.5 
507 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.3 
508 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.1 
509 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 2.7 
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510 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.5 
511 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Good 0.5 2.3 
512 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Excellent 0.5 2.1 
513 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 2.5 
514 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.3 
515 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.1 
516 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 1.9 
517 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 2.5 
518 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.3 
519 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.1 
520 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 1.9 
521 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 2.5 
522 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.3 
523 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Good 0.5 2.1 
524 Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Excellent 0.5 1.9 
525 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 2.5 
526 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.3 
527 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 2.1 
528 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 1.9 
529 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 2.5 
530 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.3 
531 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Good 0.5 2.1 
532 Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, Good Good 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Excellent 0.5 1.9 
533 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 2.5 
534 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.3 
535 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Good 0.5 2.1 
536 Moderate 0.5, Good Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 Excellent 0.5 1.9 
537 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 0.5 2.3 
538 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Poor 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Moderate 0.5 2.1 
539 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Moderate 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Good 0.5 1.9 
540 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Good 0.5, Excellent Moderate 0.5, Good 0.5, 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Good 0.5 Excellent 0.5 1.7 
541 Good 0.5, Excellent Good 0.5, Moderate 6.5, Good Good 0.5, V. Poor 0.5, Poor 1 
0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 Excellent 0.5 0.5 
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542 Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Moderate 0.5, Good 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Poor 0.5, 
Moderate 0.5 2.1 
543 Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Moderate 0.5, Good 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Moderate 0.5, 
Good 0.5 1.9 
544 Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Moderate 0.5, Good 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 1.7 
545 Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Moderate 0.5, 
Good 0.5 
Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 2.3 
546 Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Moderate 0.5, 
Good 0.5 
Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Poor 0.5, 
Moderate 0.5 2.1 
547 Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Moderate 0.5, 
Good 0.5 
Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Moderate 0.5, 
Good 0.5 1.9 
548 Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Moderate 0.5, 
Good 0.5 
Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 1.7 
549 Moderate 0.5, Good 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
V. Poor 0.5, Poor 
0.5 2.3 
550 Moderate 0.5, Good 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Poor 0.5, 
Moderate 0.5 2.1 
551 
1 
Moderate 0.5, Good 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Moderate 0.5, 
Good 0.5 1.9 
552 Moderate 0.5, Good 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Good 0.5, Excellent 
0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 
Good 0.5, 
Excellent 0.5 1.7 
553 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 5 
554 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.8 
555 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.6 
556 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4.4 
557 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 4.2 
558 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.2 
559 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4 
560 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.8 
561 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.6 
562 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.4 
563 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.4 
564 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.2 
565 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate IT 3 
566 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 2.8 
567 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.6 
568 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.6 
569 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.4 
570 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.2 
571 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 2 
572 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.8 
573 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 1.8 
574 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Poor 1.0 1.6 
575 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.4 
576 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 1.2 
577 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1 
578 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.8 
579 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.6 
580 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.4 
581 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4.2 
582 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 4 
583 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.8 
584 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.6 
585 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.4 
586 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4.2 
587 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 4 
588 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.8 
589 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.6 
590 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.4 
591 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4.2 
592 1 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 j Excellent 1.0 4 593 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 1 V. Poor 1.0 4.8 
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594 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.6 
595 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.4 
596 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4.2 
597 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 4 
598 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4. 
599 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.4 
600 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.2 
601 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4 
602 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.8 
603 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.6 
604 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.4 
605 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.2 
606 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4 
607 1 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.8 
608 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.6 
609 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.4 
610 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.2 
611 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4 
612 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.8 
613 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.6 
614 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.4 
615 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.2 
616 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4 
617 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.8 
618 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.6 
619 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.4 
620 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.2 
621 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4 
622 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.8 
623 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.6 
624 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.4 
625 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4.2 
626 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 4 
627 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.8 
628 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.4 
629 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.2 
630 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4 
631 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.8 
632 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.6 
633 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.4 
634 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.2 
635 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4 
636 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.8 
637 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.6- 
638 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.4- 
639 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.2 
640 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4 
641 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.8- 
642 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.6 
643 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4.4 
644 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 4.2 
645 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 4 
646 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.8 
647 V. Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.6- 
648 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4 
649 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.8 
650 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.6 
651 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.4 
652 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.2 
653 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4 
654 Poor 1.0 
1 
Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.8 
655 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.6 
A-31 
The Development ofSafety and Security Assessment Techniques and their Application to Port Operations 
656 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.4 
657 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.2 
658 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4 
659 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.8 
660 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.6 
61 6 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.4 
662 6 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.2 
63 6 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 4 
[ 
6 66 64 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.8 
66 665 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.6 
66 666 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 3.4 
66 667 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3.2 
66 668 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.8 
669 Moderate 1 .0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 
3.6 
670 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.4 
671 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.2 
672 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3 
673 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.8 
674 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.6 
675 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.4 
676 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.2 
677 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3 
678 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.8 
679 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.6 
680 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.4 
681 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 3.2 
682 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3 
683 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.8 
684 1 Poor LO Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.6 
685 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.4_ 
686 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3.2 
687 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3 
688 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.8 
689 Poor 1 .0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 
3.6 
690 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.4 
691 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 3.2 
692 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3 
693 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.8 
694 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.6 
695 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.4 
696 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 3.2 
697 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 3 
698 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.6 
699 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.4 
700 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.2 
701 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Good 1.0 3 
702 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.8 
703 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.6 
704 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.4 
705 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.2 
706 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 3 
707 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.8 
708 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.6 
709 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.4 
710 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.2 
711 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 3 
712 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.8 
713 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.6 
714 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3.4 
715 Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 3.2 
716 Poor 1.0 
i 
Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 3 [tt 
Poor 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.8 
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718 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.2 
719 Good I. 0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3 
720 Good I. 0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.8 
721 Good I. 0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 2.6 
722 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.4 
723 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.2 
724 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3 
725 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.8 
726 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 2.6 
727 1 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.4 
728 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.2 
729 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 3 
730 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.8 
731 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 2.6 
732 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.4 
733 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3.2 
734 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 3 
735 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.8 
736 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 2.6 
737 Moderate 1 .0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.4 
738 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3 
739 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.8 
740 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.6 
741 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 2.4 
742 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.2 
743 
1 
Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3 
744 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.8 
745 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.6 
746 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 2.4 
747 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.2 
748 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3 
749 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.8 
750 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.6 
751 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 2.4 
752 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.2 
753 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3 
754 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.8 
755 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.6 
756 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 2.4 
757 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.2 
758 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3 
759 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.8 
760 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 _ 2.6 
761 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 2.4 
762 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.2 
763 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 3 
764 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.8 
765 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.6 
766 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 2.4 
767 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2.2 
768 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.8 
769 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.6 
770 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.4 
771 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 2.2 
772 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2 
773 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.8 
774 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.6 
775 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.4 
776 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 2.2 
777 Good 1.0 
1 
Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2 
778 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0_ Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.8 
1 779 1 Good 1.0 1 Moderate 1.0 1 Good 1.0 1 Good 1.0 1 Poor 1.0 1 2.6 1 
A-33 
The Development ofSafety and Security Assessment Techniques and their Application to Port Operations 
780 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.4 
781 Good I. 0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 2.2 
782 Good I. 0 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2 
783 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.8 
784 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.6 
785 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2.4 
786 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 2.2 
787 Moderate 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 2 
788 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.4 
789 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.2 
790 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2 
- 791 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 1.8 
792 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.6 - 
793 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.4 
794 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.2 
795 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2- 
796 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 1.8- 
797 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.6- 
798 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.4 
799 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.2 
800 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2- 
801 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 1.8- 
802 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.6 
803 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.4 
804 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Poor 1.0 2.2 
805 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Moderate 1.0 2 
806 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 1.8- 
807 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.6 
808 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.2 
809 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2 
810 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.8- 
- 811 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 1.6 
812 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.4 
813 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.2 
814 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2 
815 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.8 
816 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 1.6 
817 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.4 
818 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.2 
819 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Poor 1.0 2 
820 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.8 
821 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 1.6 
822 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.4 - 
823 Good 1 .0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.2 
824 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 2- 
825 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.8 
826 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 1.6 
827 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.4 - 
828 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2.2 
829 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Poor 1.0 2 
830 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.8 
831 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 1.6- 
832 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.4 
833 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 _ 2.2 
834 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Poor 1.0 2- 
835 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.8 
836 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 1.6 
837 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.4- 
838 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2 
839 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Poor 1.0 1.8 
840 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.6 
841 
- 
Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Good 1.0 1.4 
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842 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.2 
843 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2 
844 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Poor 1.0 1.8 
845 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.6 
846 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 1.4 
847 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.2 
848 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2 
849 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Poor 1.0 1.8 
850 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.6 
851 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 1.4 
852 Excellent 1.0 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.2 
853 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 V. Poor 1.0 2 
854 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Poor 1.0 1.8 
855 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Moderate 1.0 1.6 
856 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 ýExcellent 1.0 Good 1.0 1.4 
857 Good 1.0 Excellent 1.0 Excellent IT I Excellent 1.0 Excellent 1.0 1.2 
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Appendix 3. The Crisp-Value Training Data for the Neural 
Network 
No. VTC Performance Navigation 
Aids & 
Facilities 
Pilot 
Performance 
Sealane 
Maintenance 
Weather 
Condition 
Overall 
Risk 
1 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.625 
2 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.425 
3 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 2.75 4.225 
4 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 1.75 4.025 
5 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.825 
6 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.625 
7 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.425 
8 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 1.75 3.225 
9 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 4.75 3.025 
10 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.825 
11 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.625 
12 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.425 
13 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 4.75 2.225 
14 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 3.75 2.025 
15 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 1.825 
16 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.625 
17 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.425 
18 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.225 
19 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 2.75 4.025 
20 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 1.75 3.825 
21 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.425 
22 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.225 
23 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 2.75 4.025 
24 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 1.75 3.825 
25 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.425 
26 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 4.225 
27 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 2.75 4.025 
28 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 1.75 3.825 
29 4.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.425 
30 4.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.225 
31 4.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 2.75 4.025 
32 4.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 1.75 3.825 
33 3.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.225 
34 3.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.025 
35 3.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 2.75 3.825 
36 3.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 1.75 3.625 
37 3.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.225 
38 3.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 4.025 
39 3.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 2.75 3.825 
40 3.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 1.75 3.625 
41 3.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.225 
42 3.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.025 
43 3.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 2.75 3.825 
44 3.75 4.75 4.75 3.75 1.75 3.625 
45 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.225 
46 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 4.025 
47 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 2.75 3.825 
48 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 1.75 3.625 
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49 4.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.225 
50 4.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.025 
51 4.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 2.75 3.825 
52 4.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 1.75 3.625 
53 1 4.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 4.225 
54 4.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.025 
55 4.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.825- 
56 4.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 1.75 3.625- 
57 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 4.75 4.025 
58 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 3.825 
59 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 2.75 3.625- 
60 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 1.75 3.425 
61 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 4.75 4.025 
62 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.825 
63 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 2.75 3.625 
64 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.75 1.75 3.425- 
65 3.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 4.025 
66 3.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.825 
67 3.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.625 
68 3.75 4.75 3.75 3.75 1.75 3.425 
69 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 4.025 
70 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.825 
71 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.625 
72 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 1.75 3.425 
73 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.625 
74 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.425 
75 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.225 
76 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 1.75 3.025- 
77 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 3.625 
78 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.425 
79 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.225 
80 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 1.75 3.025- 
81 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 4.75 3.625 
82 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.425 
83 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 3.225 
84 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 1.75 3.025- 
85 3.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 4.75 3.625 
86 3.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.425 
87 3.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 3.225 
88 3.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 1.75 3.025 
89 2.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 4.75 _ 3.425 
90 2.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.225 
91 2.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.025 
92 2.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 1.75 2.825 
93 2.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 4.75 3.425 
94 2.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.225 
95 2.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 3.025 
96 2.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 1.75 2.825 
97 2.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 4.75 3.425 
98 2.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.225 
99 2.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 3.025 
100 2.75 3.75 3.75 2.75 1.75 2.825 
101 3.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 4.75 3.425 
102 
103 ii i- 
3.75 
3.75 
2.75 
2.75 
2.75 
2.75 
3.75 
3.75 
3.75 
2.75 
3.225 
3.025 h 
o l 3.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 1.75 2.825 
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105 3.75 
- 
2.75 3.75 2.75 4.75 3.425 - 
106 3.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.225 - 
107 3.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 3.025 
108 3.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 1.75 2.825- 
109 1 3.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 4.75 3.425 
110 3.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 3.225 
111 3.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.025 
112 3.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.825 
113 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 4.75 3.225 
114 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 3.75 3.025 
115 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 2.825- 
116 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 1.75 2.625 
117 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 4.75 3.225 
118 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 3.75 3.025 
119 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 2.825- 
120 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.75 1.75 2.625 
121 2.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 4.75 3.225 
122 2.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 3.025 
123 2.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.825 
124 2.75 3.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.625 
125 3.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 4.75 3.225 
126 3.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 3.025 
127 3.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.825 
128 3.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.625 
129 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 4.75 2.825 
130 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.625 
131 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.425 
132 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.225- 
133 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 4.75 2.825 
134 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.625 
135 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.425 
136 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.225 
137 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 4.75 2.825 
138 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 3.75 2.625 
139 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.425 
140 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 2.225 
141 2.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 4.75 2.825 
142 2.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 3.75 2.625 
143 2.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.425 
144 2.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 2.225 
145 1.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 4.75 2.625 
146 1.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 3.75 2.425 
147 1.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.225 
148 1.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.025 
149 1.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 4.75 2.625 
150 1.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 3.75 2.425 
151 1.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.225 
152 1.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 2.025 
153 1.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 4.75 2.625 
154 1.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 3.75 2.425 
155 1.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.225 
156 1.75 2.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 2.025 
157 2.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 4.75 2.625 
158 2.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 3.75 2.425 
159 2.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.225 
2.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 2.025__j 
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161 2.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 4.75 2.625 
162 2.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 3.75 2.425 
163 2.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.225 
164 2.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 2.025- 
165 1 2.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 4.75 2.625 
166 2.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 3.75 2.425 
167 2.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 2.225- 
168 2.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.025- 
169 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 4.75 2.425 
170 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 3.75 2.225 
171 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 2.75 2.025 
172 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 1.825 
173 1.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 4.75 2.425 
174 1.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 3.75 2.225 
175 1.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 2.75 2.025 
176 1.75 1.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 1.825- 
177 1.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 4.75 2.425 
178 1.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 3.75 2.225 
179 1.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 2.025 - 
180 1.75 2.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.825- 
181 2.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 4.75 2.425 
182 2.75 1.75 1.7 1.75 3.75 2.225 
183 2.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.75 2.025- 
184 2.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.825- 
185 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.375 
186 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 4.175 
187 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 2.25 3.975- 
188 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 1.25 3.775- 
189 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.575 
190 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.375 
191 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.175 
192 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 1.25 2.975 
193 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 4.25 2.775 
194 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.575 
195 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.375 
196 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 1.25- 2.175- 
197 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 4.25 1.975 
198 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 3.25 1.775 
199 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.575 
200 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.375 
201 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.175 
202 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 3.975 
203 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 2.25 3.775 
204 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 1.25 3.575- 
205 4.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.175 
206 4.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 3.975 
207 4.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 2.25 3.775 
208 4.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 1.25 3.575 
209 4.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.175 
210 4.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.975 
211 4.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 2.25 3.775- 
212 4.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 1.25 3.575 
213 4.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 4.25- _ 4.175 
214 4.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.975 
215 . 25 4.25 4.25 3.25 2.25 3.775 
_216 
4.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 1.25 3.575- 
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217 3.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 3.975 
218 3.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 3.775 
219 3.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 2.25 3.575- 
220 3.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 1.25 3.375- 
221 1 3.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 3.975 
222 3.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.775 
223 3.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 2.25 3.575- 
224 3.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 1.25 3.375- 
225 3.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 3.975 
226 3.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.775 
227 3.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 2.25 3.575 
228 3.25 4.25 4.25 3.25 1.25 3.375 
229 4.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 3.975 
230 4.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.775 
231 4.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.25 3.575- 
232 4.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 1.25 3.375- 
233 4.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 3.975 
234 4.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.775 
235 4.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 2.25 3.575 
236 4.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 1.25 3.375 
237 4.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.975 
238 4.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.775 
239 4.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.575 
240 4.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 1.25 3.375 
241 3.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 4.25 3.775 
242 3.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.575 
243 3.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 2.25 3.375 
244 3.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 1.25 3.175 
245 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 4.25 3.775 
246 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.575 
247 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 2.25 3.375 
248 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.25 1.25 3.175 
249 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.775 
250 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.575 
251 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.375 
252 3.25 4.25 3.25 3.25 1.25 3.175 
253 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.775 
254 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.575 
255 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.375 
256 4.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 1.25 3.175 
257 2.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.375 
258 2.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.175 
259 2.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 2.975 
260 2.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 1.25 2.775 
261 3.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.375 
262 3.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.175 
263 3.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 2.975 
264 3.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 1.25 2.775 
265 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 4.25 3.375 
266 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 3.175 
267 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.975 
268 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 1.25 2.775 
269 3.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 4.25 3.375 
270 3.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 3.175 
3.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.975 
3.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 1.25 2.775 
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273 2.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 4.25 3.175 
274 2.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 2.975 
275 2.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 2.775 
276 2.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 1.25 2.575 
277 2.25 3.2 2.25 3.25 4.25 3.175 
278 2.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 2.975 
279 2.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.775 
280 2.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 1.25 2.575 
281 2.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 4.25 3.175 
282 2.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 2.975 
283 2.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.775 
284 2.25 3.25 3.25 2.25 1.25 2.575 
285 3.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 4.25 3.175 
286 3.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 2.975 
287 3.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.775 
288 3.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 1.25 2.575 
289 3.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 4.25 3.175 
290 3.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 2.975 
291 3.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.775 
292 3.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 1.25 2.575 
293 3.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 4.25 3.175 
294 3.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.975 
295 3.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.775 
296 3.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 2.575 
297 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 4.25 2.975 
298 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 3.25 2.775 
299 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.575 
300 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 1.25 2.375 
301 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 4.25 2.975 
302 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 3.25 2.775 
303 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.575 
304 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.25 1.25 2.375 
305 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 4.25 2.975 
306 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.775 
307 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.575 
308 2.25 3.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 2.375 
309 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 4.25 2.97) : ý- 
310 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.77 5 
j 
311 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.575 
312 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 _ 2.375 
313 1.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 4.25 2.575 
314 1.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.375 
315 1.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.175 
316 1.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 1.975 
317 2.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 4.25 2.575 
318 2.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.375 
319 2.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 2.175 
320 2.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 1.975 
321 2.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 4.25 2.575 
322 2.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 3.25 2.375 
323 2.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 2.175 
324 2.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 1.975 
325 2.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 4.25 2.575 
326 2.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 3.25 2.375 
327 L- : 
2.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 2.175 
3i8 ' 2.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.975 
A-41 
The Development ofSafely and Security Assessment Techniques and their Application to Port Operations 
329 1.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 4.25 2.375 
330 1.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 3.25 2.175 
331 1.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 1.975 
332 1.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 1.775 
333 1.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 4.25 2.375 
334 1.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 3.25 2.175 
335 1.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 1.975 
336 1.25 2.25 1.25_ 2.25 1.25 1.775 
337 1.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 4.25 2.375 
338 1.2 2.25 2.25 1.25 3.25 2.175 
339 1.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 1.975 
340 1.25 2.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.775 
341 2.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 4.25 2.375 
342 2.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 3.25 2.175 
343 2.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 1.975 
344 2.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 1.775 
345 2.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 4.25 2.375 
346 2.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 3.25 2.175 
347 2.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 1.975 
348 2.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.775 
349 2.25 2.25 1.2 1.25 4.25 2.375 
350 2.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 3.25 2.175 
351 2.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.975 
352 2.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.775 
353 1.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 4.25 2.175 
354 1.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 3.25 1.975 
355 1.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 2.25 1.775 
356 1.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 1.575 
357 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 4.25 2.175 
358 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 3.25 1.975 
359 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 2.25 1.775 
360 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.575 
361 1.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 4.25 2.175 
362 1.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 3.25 1.975 
363 1.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.775 
364 1.25 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.575 
365 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 4.25 2.175 
366 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 3.25 1.975 
2.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 2.25 1.775 
368 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.575 
369 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
370 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.3 
371 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 2.5 4.1 
372 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 1.5 3.9 
373 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.7 
374 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
375 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.3 
376 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 3.1 
377 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 2.9 
378 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.7 
379 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
380 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.3 
381 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 2.1 
382 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.5 1.9 
383 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.7 
384 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
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385 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 
386 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.1 
387 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 2.5 3.9 - 
388 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 1.5 3.7 - 
389 1 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 
390 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.1 - 
391 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 2.5 3.9 - 
392 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 1.5 3.7 - 
393 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.3 
394 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.1 
395 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 2.5 3.9 - 
396 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 1.5 3.7 - 
397 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.3 
398 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 4.1 
399 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 3.9 - 
400 4.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 1.5 3.7 
401 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.1 
402 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.9 
403 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 2.5 3.7 - 
404 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 1.5 3.5 - 
405 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.1 
406 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.9 
407 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 2.5 3.7 - 
408 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 1.5 3.5 
409 3.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.1 
410 3.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.9 
411 3.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 3.7 - 
412 3.5 4.5 4.5 3.5 1.5 3.5 - 
413 4.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.1 
414 4.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.9 
415 4.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 2.5 3.7 - 
416 4.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 1.5 3.5 
417 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 4.1 
418 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.9 
419 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 3.7 
420 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 1.5 3.5 
421 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.1 
422 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.9 
423 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.7 
424 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 3.5 
425 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 3.9 
426 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.7 
427 3. 3.5 3.5 4.5 2.5 3.5 
428 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 1.5 3.3 
429 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.9 
430 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 
431 3. 3.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 
432 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 1.5 3.3 
433 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.9 
434 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 
435 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 
436 3.5 4.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 3.3 
437 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.9 
438 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.7 
439 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 
440 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 3.3 
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441 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 
442 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.3 
443 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.1 
444 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 2.9 
445 1 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 
446 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.3 
447 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.1 
448 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 2.9 
449 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 3.5 
450 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.3 
451 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.1 
452 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 1.5 2.9 
453 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 4.5 3.5 
454 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.3 
455 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.1 
456 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 2.9 - 
457 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 3.3 - 
458 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.1 
459 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.9 - 
460 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 1.5 2.7 - 
461 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 3.3 
462 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.1 
463 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.9 - 
464 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 1.5 2.7 
465 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 4.5 3.3 
466 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.1 
467 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.9 
468 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 2.7 
469 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 3.3 
470 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.1 
471 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.9 
472 3.5 2.5 2.5_ 3.5 1.5 2.7 
473 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 4.5 3.3 
474 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 3.1 
475 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.9 
476 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 2.7 
477 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 3.3 
478 3. 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.1 
479 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.9 
480 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.7- 
481 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 4.5 3.1 
482 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 3.5 2.9 
483 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.7 - 
484 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 1.5 2.5 - 
485 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 4.5 3.1 
486 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 3.5 2.9 
487 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 - 
488 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 
489 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 3.1 
490 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.9 
491 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7- 
492 2.5 3.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 - 
493 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 3.1 
494 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.9 
495 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.7 
496 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 
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497 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 2.7 
498 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 
499 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 
500 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.1 
501 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 2.7 
502 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 
503 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 
504 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.1 
505 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 4.5 2.7 
506 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 2.5 
507 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.3 
508 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.1 
509 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 4.5 2.7 
510 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 3.5 2.5 
511 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.3 
512 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.1 
513 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 2.5 
514 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 3.5 2.3 
515 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 
516 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.9 
517 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 4.5 2.5 
518 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 2.3 
519 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 
520 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.9 
521 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 4.5 2.5 
522 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 3.5 2.3 
523 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.1 
524 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 
525 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 4.5 2.5 
526 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 2.3 
527 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.1 
528 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.9 
529 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 4.5 2.5 
530 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 3.5 2.3 
531 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 2.1 
532 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 
533 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 2.5 
534 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 3.5 2.3 
535 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.1 
536 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 
537 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 4.5 2.3 
538 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 3.5 2.1 
539 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.9 
540 1.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.7 
541 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 4.5 2.3 
542 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 3.5 2.1 
543 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.5 1.9 
544 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 
545 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 2.3 
546 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 3.5 2.1 
547 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.9 
548 1.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 
549 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 4.5 2.3 
550 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.5 2.1 
551 2.5 1.5 1 1.5 1.5 2.5 1.9 
1 552 2.5 1.5 1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.7 
j 
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553 5 5 5 5 5 5 
554 5 5 5 5 4 4.8 
555 5 5 5 5 3 4.6 
556 5 5 5 5 2 4.4 
557 5 5 5 5 1 4.2 
558 4 4 4 4 5 4.2 
559 4 4 4 4 4 4 
560 4 4 4 4 3 3.8 
561 4 4 4 4 2 3.6 
562 4 4 4 4 1 3.4 
563 3 3 3 3 5 3.4 
564 3 3 3 3 4 3.2 
565 3 3 3 3 3 3 
566 3 3 3 3 2 2.8 
567 3 3 3 3 1 2.6 
568 2 2 2 2 5 2.6 
569 2 2 2 2 4 2.4 
570 2 2 2 2 3 2.2 
571 2 2 2 2 2 2 
572 2 2 2 2 1 1.8 - 
573 1 1 1 1 5 1.8 
574 1 1 1 1 4 1.6 
575 1 1 1 1 3 1.4 - 
576 1 1 1 1 2 1.2 - 
577 1 1 1 1 1 1 
578 4 5 5 5 5 4.8 
579 4 5 5 5 4 4.6 - 
580 4 5 5 5 3 4.4 - 
581 4 5 5 5 2 4.2 
582 4 5 5 5 1 4 
583 5 4 5 5 5 4.8 - 
584 5 4 5 5 4 4.6 - 
585 5 4 5 5 3 4.4 - 
586 5 4 5 5 2 4.2 
587 5 4 5 5 1 4 
588 5 5 4 5 5 4.8 
589 5 5 4 5 4 4.6 
590 5 5 4 5 3 4.4 
591 5 5 4 5 2 4.2 
592 5 5 4 5 1 4 
593 5 5 5 4 5 4.8 
594 5 5 5 4 4 4.6 
595 5 5 5 4 3 4.4 - 
596 5 5 5 4 2 4.2 - 
597 5 5 5 4 1 4 
598 4 4 5 5 5 4.6 
599 4 4 5 5 4 4.4 - 
600 4 4 5 5 3 4.2 - 
601 4 4 5 5 2 4 
602 4 4 5 5 1 3.8 
603 4 5 4 5 5 4.6 - 
604 4 5 4 5 4 4.4 - 
605 4 5 4 5 3 4.2 
606 4 5 4 5 2 4 
607 4 5 4 5 1 3.8 - 
4 5 5 4 5 4.6 
A-46 
The Development ofSafety and Security Assessment Techniques and their Application to Port Operations 
609 4 5 5 4 4 4.4 
610 4 5 5 4 3 4.2 
611 4 5 5 4 2 4 
612 4 5 5 4 1 3.8 
613 1 5 4 4 5 5 4.6 
614 5 4 4 5 4 4.4 
615 5 4 4 5 3 4.2 
616 5 4 4 5 2 4 
617 5 4 4 5 1 3.8 
618 5 4 5 4 5 4.6 
619 5 4 5 4 4 4.4 
620 5 4 5 4 3 4.2 
621 5 4 5 4 2 4 
622 5 4 5 4 1 3.8 
623 5 5 4 4 5 4.6 
624 5 5 4 4 4 4.4 
625 5 5 4 4 3 4.2 
626 5 5 4 4 2 4 
627 5 5 4 4 1 3.8 - 
628 4 4 4 5 5 4.4 - 
629 4 4 4 5 4 4.2 
630 4 4 4 5 3 4 
631 4 4 4 5 2 3.8 - 
632 4 4 4 5 1 3.6 - 
633 4 4 5 4 5 4.4 
634 4 4 5 4 4 4.2 
635 4 4 5 4 3 4 
636 4 4 5 4 2 3.8 
637 4 4 5 4 1 3.6 
638 4 5 4 4 5 4.4 
639 4 5 4 4 4 4.2 
640 4 5 4 4 3 4 
641 4 5 4 4 2 3.8 
642 4 5 _ 4 4 1 3.6 
643 5 4 4 4 5 4.4 - 
644 5 4 4 4 4 4.2 - 
645 5 4 4 4 3 4 
646 5 4 4 4 2 3.8 
647 5 4 4 4 1 3.6 - 
648 3 4 4 4 5 4- 
649 3 4 4 4 4 3.8 
650 3 4 4 4 3 3.6 
651 3 4 4 4 2 3.4 - 
652 3 4 4 4 1 3.2 - 
653 4 3 4 4 5 4 
654 4 3 4 4 4 3.8 
655 4 3 4 4 3 3.6 - 
656 4 3 4 4 2 3.4 - 
657 4 3 4 4 1 3.2 
658 4 4 3 4 5 4 
659 4 4 3 4 4 3.8 - 
660 4 4 3 4 3 3.6 - 
661 4 4 3 4 2 3.4 
662 4 4 3 4 1 3.2 
663 4 4 4 3 5 4- 
664 4 4 4 3 4 3.8 - 
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665 4 4 4 3 3 3.6 
666 4 4 4 3 2 3.4 
667 4 4 4 3 1 3.2 
668 3 3 4 4 5 3.8 
669 1 3 3 4 4 4 3.6 
670 3 3 4 4 3 3.4 
671 3 3 4 4 2 3.2 
672 3 3 4 4 1 3 
673 3 4 3 4 5 3.8 
674 3 4 3 4 4 3.6 
675 3 4 3 4 3 3.4 
676 3 4 3 4 2 3.2 
677 3 4 3 4 1 3 
678 3 4 4 3 5 3.8 
679 3 4 4 3 4 3.6 
680 3 4 4 3 3 3.4 
681 3 4 4 3 2 3.2 
682 3 4 4 3 1 3 
683 4 3 3 4 5 3.8 
684 4 3 3 4 4 3.6 
685 4 3 3 4 3 3.4 
686 4 3 3 4 2 3.2 
687 4 3 3 4 1 3 
688 4 3 4 3 5 3.8 
689 4 3 4 3 4 3.6 
690 4 3 4 3 3 3.4 
691 4 3 4 3 2 3.2 
692 4 3 4 3 1 3 
693 4 4 3 3 5 3.8 
694 4 4 3 3 4 3.6 
695 4 4 3 3 3 3.4 - 
696 4 4 3 3 2 3.2 - 
697 4 4 3 3 1 3 
698 3 3 3 4 5 3.6 
699 3 3 3 4 4 3.4 - 
700 3 3 3 4 3 3.2 - 
701 3 3 3 4 2 3 
702 3 3 3 4 1 2.8 
703 3 3 4 3 5 3.6 
704 3 3 4 3 4 3.4 
705 3 3 4 3 3 3.2 
706 3 3 4 3 2 3 
707 3 3 4 3 1 2.8 
708 3 4 3 3 5 3.6 - 
709 3 4 3 3 4 3.4 
710 3 4 3 3 3 3.2 
711 3 4 3 3 2 3- 
712 3 4 3 3 1 2.8 - 
713 4 3 3 3 5 3.6 
714 4 3 3 3 4 3.4 
715 4 3 3 3 3 3.2 - 
716 4 3 3 3 2 3- 
717 4 3 3 3 1 2.8 
718 2 3 3 3 5 3.2 
719 2 3 3 3 4 3- 
720 12 3 3 3 3 2.8 - 
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721 2 3 3 3 2 2.6 
722 2 3 3 3 1 2.4 
723 3 2 3 3 5 3.2 
724 3 2 3 3 4 3 
725 3 2 3 3 3 2.8 
726 3 2 3 3 2 2.6 
727 3 2 3 3 1 2.4 
728 3 3 2 3 5 3.2 
729 3 3 2 3 4 3 
730 3 3 2 3 3 2.8 
731 3 3 2 3 2 2.6 
732 3 3 2 3 1 2.4 
733 3 3 3 2 5 3.2 
734 3 3 3 2 4 3 
735 3 3 3 2 3 2.8 - 
736 3 3 3 2 2 2.6 - 
737 3 3 3 2 1 2.4 
738 2 2 3 3 5 3 
739 2 2 3 3 4 2.8 
740 2 2 3 3 3 2.6 
741 2 2 3 3 2 2.4 
742 2 2 3 3 1 2.2 
743 3 2 3 5 3 
744 2 3 2 3 4 2.8 
745 2 3 2 3 3 2.6 
746 2 3 2 3 2 2.4 
747 2 3 2 3 1 2.2 
748 2 3 3 2 5 3 
749 2 3 3 2 4 2.8 
750 2 3 3 2 3 2.6 
751 2 3 3 2 2 2.4 - 
752 2 3 3 2 1 2.2 - 
753 3 2 2 3 5 3 
754 3 2 2 3 4 2.8 
755 3 2 2 3 3 2.6 
756 3 2 2 3 2 2.4 
757 3 2 2 3 1 2.2 
758 3 2 3 2 5 3 
759 3 2 3 2 4 2.8 
760 3 2 3 2 3 2.6 
761 3 2 3 2 2 2.4 
762 3 2 _ 3 2 1 2.2 
763 3 3 2 2 5 3 
764 3 3 2 2 4 2.8 
765 3 3 2 2 3 2.6- 
766 3 3 2 2 2 2.4 
767 3 3 2 2 1 2.2 
768 2 2 2 3 5 2.8 
769 2 2 2 3 4 2.6 
770 2 2 2 3 3 2.4 
771 2 2 2 3 2 2.2 
772 2 2 2 3 1 2 
773 2 2 3 2 5 2.8 
774 2 2 3 2 4 2. 
775 2 2 3 2 3 2.4 
776__ 2 2 3 2 2 12 
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777 2 2 3 2 1 2 
778 2 3 2 2 5 2.8 
779 2 3 2 2 4 2.6 
780 2 3 2 2 3 2.4 
781 2 3 2 2 2 2.2 
782 2 3 2 2 1 2 
783 3 2 2 2 5 2.8 
784 3 2 2 2 4 2.6 
785 3 2 2 2 3 2.4 
786 3 2 2 2 2 2.2 
787 3 2 2 2 1 2 
788 1 2 2 2 5 2.4 
789 1 2 2 2 4 2.2 
790 1 2 2 2 3 2 
791 1 2 2 2 2 1.8 
792 1 2 2 2 1 1.6 
793 2 1 2 2 5 2.4 
794 2 1 2 2 4 2.2 
795 2 1 2 2 3 2 
796 2 1 2 2 2 1.8 
797 2 1 2 2 1 1.6 
798 2 2 1 2 5 2.4 
799 2 2 1 2 4 2.2 
800 2 2 1 2 3 2 
801 2 2 1 2 2 1.8 
802 2 2 1 2 1 1.6 
803 2 2 2 1 5 2.4 
804 2 2 2 1 4 2.2 
805 2 2 2 1 3 2 
806 2 2 2 1 2 1.8 
807 12 2 2 1 1 1.6 
808 1 1 2 2 5 2.2 
809 1 1 2 2 4 2 
810 1 1 2 2 3 1.8 
811 1 1 2 2 2 1.6 
812 1 1 2 2 1 1.4 
813 1 2 1 2 5 2.2 
814 1 2 1 2 4 2 
815 1 2 1 2 3 1.8 
816 1 2 1 2 2 1.6 
817 1 2 1 2 1 1.4 
818 1 2 2 1 5 2.2 
819 1 2 2 1 4 2 
820 1 2 2 1 3 1.8 
821 1 2 2 1 2 1.6 
822 1 2 2 1 1 1.4 
823 2 1 1 2 5 2.2 
824 2 1 1 2 4 2 
825 2 1 1 2 3 1.8 
826 2 1 1 2 2 1.6 
827 2 1 1 2 1 1.4 
828 2 1 2 1 5 2.2 
829 2 1 2 1 4 2 
830 2 1 2 1 3 1.8 
831 L- 
- 
2 1 2 1 2 1.6 
2 3 
4 
12 1 2 1 1 1.4 
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833 2 2 1 1 5 2.2 
834 2 2 1 1 4 2 
835 2 2 1 1 3 1.8 
836 2 2 1 1 2 1.6 
837 2 2 1 1 1 1.4 
838 1 1 1 2 5 2 
839 1 1 1 2 4 1.8 
840 1 1 1 2 3 1.6 
841 1 1 1 2 2 1.4 
842 1 1 1 2 1 1.2 
843 1 1 2 1 5 2 
844 1 1 2 1 4 1.8 
845 1 1 2 1 3 1.6 
846 1 1 2 1 2 1.4 
847 1 1 2 1 1 1.2 
848 1 2 1 1 5 2 
849 1 2 1 1 4 1.8 
850 1 2 1 1 3 1.6 
851 1 2 1 1 2 1.4 
852 1 2 1 1 1 1.2 
853 2 1 1 1 5 2 
854 2 1 1 1 4 1.8 
855 2 1 1 1 3 1.6 
856 2 1 1 1 2 1.4 
857 2 11 11 1 1 1.2 
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Appendix 4. The Normalised Training Data for the Neural 
Network 
No. VTC Performance Navigation 
Aids & 
Facilities 
Pilot 
Performance 
Sealane 
Maintenance 
Weather 
Condition 
Overall 
Risk 
1 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.90625 
21 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.85625 
3 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.4375 0.80625 
4 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.1875 0.75625 
5 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.70625 
6 0.6875 0.6875 0.687 0.6875 0.6875 0.65625 
7 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.60625 
8 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.1875 0.55625 
9 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.9375 0.50625_ 
10 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.45625 
11 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.40625 
12 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.35625 
13 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.9375 0.30625 
14 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.6875 0.25625 
15 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.20625 
16 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.15625 
17 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.85625 
18 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.80625 
19 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.4375 0.75625 
20 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.1875 0.70625 
21 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.85625 
22 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.80625 
23 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.4375 0.75625 
24 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.1875 0.70625 
25 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.85625 
26 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.80625 
27 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.4375 0.75625_ 
28 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.1875 0.70625 
29 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.85625 
30 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.80625 
31 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.4375 0.75625 
32 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.1875 _ 0.70625 
33 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.9375 0.80625 
34 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.75625 
35 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.4375 0.70625_ 
36 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.1875 0.65625 
37 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.80625 
38 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.75625 
39 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 OA375 0.70625 
40 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.1875 0.65625 
41 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.80625 
42 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.75625 
43 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.4375 0.70625 
44 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.1875 0.65625 
ý--45 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.80625 
46 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.75625 
47 1 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.437 0.70625 
48 1 0.9375 0.6875 1 0.6875 0.9375 0.1875 1 0.65625 
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49 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.80625 
50 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.75625 
51 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.4375 0.70625 
52 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.1875 0.65625 
53 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.80625 
54 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.75625 
55 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.70625 
56 0.9375 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.1875 0.65625 
57 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.9375 0.75625 
58 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.70625 
59 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.4375 0.65625 
60 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.1875 0.60625_ 
61 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.9375 0.75625 
62 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.70625 
63 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.4375 0.65625 
64 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.1875 0.60625 
65 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.75625 
66 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.70625 
67 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.65625 
68 0.6875 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.1875 0.60625 
69 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.75625 
70 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.70625 
71 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.65625 
72 0.9375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.1875 0.60625 
73 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.65625 
74 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.60625 
75 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375- 0.55625 
76 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.1875 0.50625 
77 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.65625 
78 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.60625 
79 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.55625 
80 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.1875 0.50625 
81 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.9375 0.65625 
82 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.60625 
83 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.55625 
84 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.1875 0.50625 
85 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.9375 0.65625_ 
86 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.60625 
87 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.55625- 
88 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.1875 0.50625 
89 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.9375 0.60625 
90 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.6875 _ 0.55625 
91 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.50625 
92 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.1875 0.45625 
93 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.9375 0.60625 
94 0.4375 0.6875 1 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.55625 
95 0.4375 0.6875 1 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.50625- 
96 U. 4375 U. 6875 U. 4375 0.6875 0.1875 0.45625 
97 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.9375 0.60625 
98 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.55625 
99 OA375 0.6875 0.6875 OA375 0.4375 0.50625 
100 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.1875 0.45625 
101 0.6875 OA375 OA375 0.6875 0.9375 0.60625 
102 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.6875 0.55625 
103 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.50625 
104 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.1875 0.45625 
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105 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.9375 
1 0.60625 
- 106 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.55625 
107 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.50625 
108 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.1875 0.45625 
109 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.9375 0.60625 
- 110 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.55623 
111 0.6875 0.6875 OA375 0.4375 0.4375 0.50625 
112 0.6875 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.45625 
113 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.9375 0.55625 
114 OA375 OA375 OA375 0.6875 0.6875 0.50625 
115 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.45625 
116 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.1875 0.40625_ 
117 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.9375 0.55625 
118 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.6875 0.50625 
119 OA375 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 OA5625 
120 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.1875 0.40625 
121 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.9375 0.55625 
122 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.50625 
123 0.4375 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.45625 
124 
- 
OA375 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.40625 J 
125 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.9375 0.55625 
126 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.50625 
127 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.45625 
128 0.6875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.40625 
129 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.9375 OA5625 
130 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.40625 
131 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.35625 
132 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.30625 
133 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.9375 0.45625 
134 OA375 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.40625 
135 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.35625 
136 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.30625 
137 OA375 0.4375 0.1875 OA375 0.9375 OA5625 
138 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.6875 0.40625 
139 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.35625 
140 OA375 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.30625 
141 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.9375 0.45625 
142 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.6875 0.40625 
143 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.35625 
144 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.30625 
145 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.9375 0.40625 
146 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.6875 0.35625 
147 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.4375 0.30625 
148 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.25625 
149 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.9375 0.40625 
150 0.1875 OA375 0.1875 0.4375 0.6875 0.35625 
151 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.30625 
152 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.25625 
153 0.1875 OA375 0.4375 0.1875 0.9375 0.40625 
154 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.6875 0.35625 
155 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.30625 
156 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.25625 
157 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.9375 0.40625 
158 U. 4375 0.1875 0.1875 OA375 0.6875 0.35625 
159 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.30625 
160 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.25625 
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161 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.9375 0.40625 
162 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.6875 0.35625 
163 OA375 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.30625 
- 164 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.25625 
165 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.9375 0.40625 
166 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.6875 0.35625 
- 167 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.30625 
168 0.4375 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.2562 
169 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.9375 0.35625 
170 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.6875 0.30625 
171 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.4375 0.25625 
172 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.20625 
173 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.9375 0.35625 
174 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.6875 0.30625 
175 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.4375 0.25625 
176 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.20625 
177 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.9375 0.35625 
178 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.6875 0.30625 
179 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.25625 
180 0.1875 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.20625 
181 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.9375 0.35625 
182 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.6875 0.30625 
183 0.4375 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.4375 0.25625 
184 OA375 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.1875 0.20625 
185 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.84375_ 
186 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.79375 
187 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.3125 0.74375 
188 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.0625 0.69375 
189 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.64375_ 
190 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.59375 
191 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.54375 
192 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.0625 0.49375 
193 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.8125 0.44375 
194 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.39375 
195 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.34375 
196 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.29375 
197 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.8125 0.24375 
198 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.5625 0.19375 
199 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.14375 
200 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.09375 
201 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.79375 
202 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.74375 
203 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.3125 0.69375 
204' 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.0625 0.64375 
205 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.79375 
206 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.74375 
207 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.3125 0.69375 
208 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.0625 0.64375 
209 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.79375 
210 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.74375 
211 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.3125 0.69375 
212 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.0625 0.64375 
213 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.79375 
214 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.74375 
215 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.3125 0.69375 
0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.0625 0.64375_j 
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217 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.8125 0.74375 
218 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.69375 
219 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.3125 0.64375 
220 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.0625 0.59375 
221 1 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.74375 
222 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.69375 
223 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.3125 0.64375 
224 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.0625 0.59375 
225 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.74375 
226 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.69375 
227 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.3125 0.64375 
228 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.0625 0.59375 
229 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.74375 
230 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.69375 
231 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.3125 0.64375 
232 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.0625 0.59375 
233 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.74375 
234 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.69375 
235 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.3125 0.64375 
236 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.0625 0.59375 
237 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.74375 
238 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.69375 
239 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.64375 
240 0.8125 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.0625 0.59375 
241 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.8125 0.69375 
242 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.64375 
243 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.3125 0.59375 
244 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.0625 0.54375 
245 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.8125 0.69375 
246 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.64375 
247 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.3125 0.59375 
248 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.0625 0.54375 
249 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.69375 
250 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.64375 
251 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.59375 
252 0.5625 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.0625 0.54375 
253 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.69375 
254 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.64375 
255 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.59375 
256 0.8125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.0625 0.54375 
257 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.59375 
258 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.54375 
259 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.49375 
260 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.0625 0.44375 
261 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.59375 
262 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.54375 
263 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.49375 
264 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.0625 0.44375 
265 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.8125 0.59375 
266 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.54375 
267 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.49375 
268 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.0625 0.44375 
269 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.8125 0.59375 
270 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.54375 
0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.49375- 
0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.0625 0.44375 
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273 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.8125 0.54375 
274 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.5625 0.49375 
275 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.44375 
276 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.0625 0.39375- 
277 1 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.8125 0.54375 
278 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.49375 
279 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.44375- 
280 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.0625 0.39375 
281 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.8125 0.54375 
282 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.49375 
283 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.44375- 
284 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.0625 0.39375 
285 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.8125 0.54375 
286 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.49375 
287 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.44375 
288 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.0625 0.39375- 
289 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.8125 0.54375 
290 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.49375 
291 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.44375 
292 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.0625 0.39375- 
293 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.8125 0.54375 
294 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.49375 
295 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.44375 
296 0.5625 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.39375 
297 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.8125 0.49375 
298 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.5625 0.44375 
299 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.39375 
300 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.0625 0.34375 
301 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.8125 0.49375 
302 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.5625 0.44375 
303 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 _ 0.39375 
304 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.0625 0.34375 
305 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.8125 0.49375 
306 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.44375 
307 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.39375 
308 0.3125 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.34375 
309 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.8125 0.49375 
310 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.44375 
311 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.39375 
312 0.5625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.34375 
313 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.8125 0.39375 
314 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.34375 
315 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.29375 
316 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.24375 
317 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.8125 0.39375 
318 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.5625 0.34375 
319 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.29375 
320 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.24375 
321 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.8125 0.39375 
322 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.5625 0.34375 
323 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.29375 
324 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.24375 
325 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.8125 0.39375 
326 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.5625 0.34375 
327 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.29375 
328 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.24375 
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329 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.8125 0.34375 
330 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125- 0.5625 0.29375 
331 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.3125 0.24375 
332 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.19375 
333 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.8125 0.34375 
334 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.5625 0.29375 
335 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.24375 
336 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.1937 
337 0.0625 0.3125 0.312 0.0625 0.8125 0.34375 
338 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.5625 0.29375 
339 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.06'? 1 0.3125 0.24375 
340 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.19375 
341 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.8125 0.34375 
342 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.5625 0.29375 
343 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.24375 
344 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.19375 
345 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.8125 0.34375 
346 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.5625 0.29375 
347 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.24375 
348 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.1937 
349 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.8125 0.34375 
350 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.5625 0.29375 
351 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.24375 
352 0.3125 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.19375 
353 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.8125 0.29375 
354 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.5625 0.24375 
355 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.3125 0.19375 
356 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.14375 
357 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.8125 0.29375 
358 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.5625 0.24375 
359 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.3125 0.19375 
360 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.14375 
361 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.8125 0.29375 
362 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.5625 0.24375 
363 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.19375 
364 0.0625 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.14375 
365 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.8125 0.29375 
366 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.5625 0.24375 
367 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.3125 0.19375 
368 0.3125 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.0625 0.14375 
369 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 
370 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.825 
371 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.375 0.775- 
372 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.125 0.725 
373 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.675 
374 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 
375 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.575 
376 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.125 0.525 
377 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.875 0A75 
378 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.425 
379 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 
380 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.325 
381 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.875 0.275 
382 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.625 0.225 
383 0125 * 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.175 
384 125 
10 
0.125 0.125 1 0.125 0.125 1 0.125 
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385 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.825 
386 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.775 
387 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.375 0.725 
388 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.125 0.675 
389 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.825 
390 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.775 
391 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.375 0.725 
392 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.125 0.67T- 
393 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.825 
394 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.775 
395 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.375 0.725 
396 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.125 0.675 
397 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.825 
398 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.775 
399 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.375 0.725 
400 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.125 0.675 
401 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.775 
402 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.725 
403 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.375 0.675 
404 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.125 0.625 
405 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.775 
406 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.725 
407 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.375 0.675 
408 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.125 0.625 
409 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.775 
410 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.625 _ 0.725 
411 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.375 0.675 
412 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.125 0.625- 
413 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.775 
414 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.72 
415 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.375 0.675 
416 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.125- 0.625 
417 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.775 
418 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.725 
419 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.375 0.675 
420 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.125 0.625- 
421 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.775 
422 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.725 
423 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.675 
424 0.875 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.125 0.625 
425 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.875 0.725 
426 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.675 
427 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.375 0.625 
428 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.125 0.575 
429 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.875 0.725 
430 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.675 
431 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.375 0.625 
432 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.125 0.575 
433 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.725 
434 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.675 
435 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.625 
436 0.625 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.125 0.575 
437 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.725 
438 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.675 
439 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.6 2-. ' L 
440 0.875 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.125 0.575 
I 
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441 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.625 
442 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.575 
443 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.525 
444 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.125 0.475 
445 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.625 
446 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.575 
447 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.525 
448 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.125 0.475 
449 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.875 0.625 
450 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.575 
451 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.525 
452 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.125 0.475 
453 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.875 0.625 
454 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.575 
455 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.525 
456 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.125 0.475 
457 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.875 0.575 
458 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.525 
459 0.37 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.475 
460 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.125 0.425 
461 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.875 0.575 
462 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.525 
463 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.475 
464 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.125 0.425 
465 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.875 0.575 
466 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.525 
467 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.475 
468 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.125 0.425 
469 0.625 0.375 0.37 0.625 0.875 0.575 
470 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.525 
471 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.475 
472 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.125 0.425 
473 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.875 0.575 
474 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.525 
475 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.475 
476 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.125 0.425 
477 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.875 0.575 
478 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.525 
479 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.475 
480 0.625 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.425- 
481 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.875 0.525 
482 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.625 0.475 
483 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.425 
484 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.125 0.375- 
485 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.875 0.525 
486 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.625 0.475 
487 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.425 
488 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.125 0.375 
489 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.875 0.525 
490 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.475 
491 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.425 
492 0.375 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.375- 
493 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.875 0.525 
494 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.475 
495 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.425 
496 0.625 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.375 
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497 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.875 0.425 
498 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.375 
499 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.325 
500 0.125 0.375 _ 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.275 
501 1 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.875 0.425 
502 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.375 
503 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.325 
504 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.275 
505 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.875 0.425 
506 0.37 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.625 0.375 
507 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.325 
508 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.275 
509 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.875 0.425 
510 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.625 0.375 
511 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.325 
512 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.275 
513 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.875 0.375 
514 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.625 0.325 
515 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.275 
516 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.225 
517 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.875 0.375 
518 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.625 0.325 
519 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.275 
520 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.225 
521 0.125 0.375 0.37 0.125 0.875 0.375 
522 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.625 0.325 
523 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.275 
524 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.225 
525 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.875 0.375 
526 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.625 0.325 
527 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.275 
528 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.225 
529 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.875 0.375 
530 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.625 0.325 
531 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.275 
532 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.225 
533 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.875 0.375 
534 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.625 0.325 
535 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.275 
536 0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.225 
537 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.875 0.325 
538 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.625 0.275 
539 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.375 0.225 
540 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.175 
541 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.875 0.325 
542 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.625 0.275 
543 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.375 0.225 
544 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.175 
545 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.875 0.325 
546 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.625 0.275 
547 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.225 
548 0.125 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.175 
549 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.875 0.325 
550 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.625 0.275 
551 0.375 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.375 0.225 
0.375 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.175 
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553 1 1 1 1 1 1 
554 1 1 1 1 0.75 0.95 
555 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.9 
556 1 1 1 1 0.25 0.85 
557 1 1 1 1 0 0.8 
558 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 0.8 
559 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
560 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.7 
561 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.65 
562 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0.6 
563 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.6 
564 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.55 
565 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
566 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.45 
567 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.4 
568 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1 0.4 
569 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.35 
570 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.3 
571 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
572 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.2 
573 0 0 0 0 1 0.2 
574 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.15 
575 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.1 
576 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.05 
577 0 0 0 0 0 0 
578 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.95 
579 0.75 1 1 1 0.75 0.9 
580 0.75 1 1 1 0.5 0.85 
581 0.75 1 1 1 0.25 0.8 
582 0.75 1 1 1 0 0.75 
583 1 0.75 1 1 1 0.95 
584 1 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.9 
585 1 0.75 1 1 0.5 0.85 
586 1 0.75 1 1 0.25 0.8 
587 1 0.75 1 1 0 0.75 
588 1 1 0.75 1 1 0.95 
589 1 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.9 
590 1 1 0.75 1 0.5 0.85 
591 1 1 0.75 1 0.25 0.8 
592 1 1 0.75 1 0 0.75 
593 1 1 1 0.75 1 0.95 
594 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.9 
595 1 1 1 0.75 0.5 0.85 
596 1 1 1 0.75 0.25 0.8 
597 1 1 1 0.75 0 0.75 
598 0.75 0.75 1 1 1 0.9 
599 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.85 
600 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.5 0.8 
601 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.25 0.75 
602 0.75 0.75 1 1 0 0.7 
603 0.75 1 0.75 1 1 0.9 
604 0.75 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.85 
605 0.75 1 0.75 1 0.5 0.8 
606 0.5 1 0.75 1 0.25 0.75 
607 0.75 1 0.75 1 0 0.7 
608 0.75 1 1 0.75 1 0.9 
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609 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.85 
610 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.5 0.8 
611 0.75 1 1 0.75 0.25 0.75 
612 0.75 1 1 0.75 0 0.7 
613 1 1 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.9 
614 1 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 0.85 
615 1 0.75 0.75 1 0.5 0.8 
616 1 0.75 0.75 1 0.25 0.75 
617 1 0.75 0.75 1 0 0.7 
618 1 0.75 1 0.75 1 0.9 
619 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.85 
620 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.5 0.8 
621 1 0.75 1 0.75 0.25 0.75 
622 1 0.75 1 0.75 0 0.7 
623 1 1 0.75 0.75 1 0.9 
624 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.85 
625 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.8 
626 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 
627 1 1 0.75 0.75 0 0.7 
628 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 1 0.85 
629 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 0.8 
630 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 0.5 0.75 
631 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 0.25 0.7 
632 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 0 0.65 
633 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 1 0.85 
634 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.8 
635 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 0.5 0.75 
636 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 0.25 0.7 
637 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 0 0.65 
638 0.75 1 0.73 0.75 1 0.85 
639 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.8 
640 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 
641 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.7 
642 0.75 1 0.75 0.75 0 0.65 
643 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 0.85 
644 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.8 
645 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 
646 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.7 
647 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0.65 
648 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 
649 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.7 
650 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.65 
651 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.6 
652 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0 0.55 
653 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 1 0.75 
654 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.7 
655 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.65 
656 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.6 - 
657 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0 0.55 - 
658 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 1 0.75 
659 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.7 - 
660 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.65 - 
661 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.6 
662 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 0 0.55 
663 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 1 0.75 
664 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.7 
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665 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.65 
666 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.6 
667 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0 0.55 
668 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 1 0.7 
669 1 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.65 
670 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.6 
671 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.55 
672 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0 0.5 
673 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 1 0.7 
674 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.65 
675 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.6 
676 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.55 
677 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 0 0.5 
678 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 1 0.7 
679 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.65 
680 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.6 
681 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.55 
682 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0 0.5 
683 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.75 1 0.7 
684 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.65 
685 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.6 
686 0.75 0.5 0.5- 0.75 0.25 0.55 
687 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.75 0 0.5 
688 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.5 1 0.7 
689 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.65 
690 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.6 
691 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.55 
692 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.5 0 0.5 
693 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 1 0.7 
694 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.65 
695 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 
696 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.55 
697 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 
698 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 1 0.65 
699 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.6 
700 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.55 - 
701 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 
702 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0 0.45 
703 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 1 0.65 
704 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.6 - 
705 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.55 
706 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.5 
707 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0 0.45 
708 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 1 0.65 - 
709 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.6 - 
710 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.55 
711 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 
712 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.5 0 0.45 
713 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.65- 
714 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.6 
715 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.55 
716 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 - 
717 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.45 
718 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.55 
719 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 ý0.5 
720 1 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.45 
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721 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.4 
722 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.35 
723 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5 1 0.55 
724 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 
725 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.45 
726 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.4 
727 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5 0 0.35 
728 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 1 0.55 
729 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 1 0.75 0.5 
730 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.45 
731 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.4 
732 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 0 0.35 
733 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 1 0.55 
734 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.5 
735 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.45 
736 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.4 
737 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.25 0 0.35 
738 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 
739 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.45 
740 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 
741 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.35 
742 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0 0.3 
743 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5 1 0.5 
744 0.25 0.5 _ 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.45 
745 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.4 
746 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.35 
747 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5 0 0.3 
748 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 1 0.5- 
749 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.45 
750 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.4 
751 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.35 
752 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 0 0.3 
753 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 1 0.5 
754 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.45 
755 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.4 
756 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.35 
757 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.3 
758 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 1 0.5 
759 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.45 
760 0.5 0.25 Os5 0.25 0.5 0.4 
761 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.35 
762 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.3 
763 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 1 0.5 
764 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.45 
765 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.4 
766 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.35 
767 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.3 
768 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 1 0.45 
769 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.4 
770 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.35 
771 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.3 
772 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0 0.25 
773 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 1 0.45 
774 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.4 
775 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5 0.35 
776 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.3 
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777 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.25 
778 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 1 0.45 
779 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.4 
780 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.35 
781 1 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.3 
782 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 
783 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 1 0.45 
784 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.4 
785 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.35 
786 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.2ý 0.25 0.3 
787 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 
788 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 1 0.35 
789 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.3 
790 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 
791 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.2 
792 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.15 
793 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 1 0.35 
794 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.3 
795 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 
796 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.2 
797 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.15 
798 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 1 0.35 
799 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.75 0.3 
800 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 
801 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.2 
802 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.15 
803 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 1 0.35 
804 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.75 0.3 
805 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 0.25 
806 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.2 
807 0.25 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.15 
808 0 0 0.25 0.25 1 0.3 
809 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 
810 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.2 
811 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.15 
812 0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.1 
813 0 0.25 0 0.25 1 0.3 
814 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.75 0.25 
815 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.2 
816 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 0.15 
817 0 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.1 
818 0 0.25 0.25 0 1 0.3 
819 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.75 0.25- 
820 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.5 0.2 
821 0 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.15 
822 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.1 
823 0.25 0 0 0.25 1 0.3 - 
824 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.75 0.25 
825 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.2 - 
826 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.25 0.15 - 
827 0.25 0 0 0.25 0 0.1 
828 0.25 0 0.25 0 1 0.3 
829 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.75 0.25- 
830 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.5 0.2 
831 0.25 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.15 
832 0.25 0 0.25 0 0 0.1- 
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833 0.25 0.25 0 0 1 o. 3 
834 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.75 0.25 
835 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.5 0.2 
836 0.25 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.15 
837 0.25 0.25 0 0 0 0.11 L 
838 0 0 0 0.25 1 0.25 
839 0 0 0 0.25 0.75 0.2 
1 
840 0 0 0 0.25 0.5 0.15 0.1 5 
841 0 0 0 0.25 0.25 1 0.1 
842 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.05 
843 0 0 0.25 0 1 0.25 
844 0 0 0.25 0 0.75 0.2 
845 0 0 0.25 0 0.5 0.15 
846 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 0.1 
847 0 0 0.25 0 0 0.05 
848 0 0.25 0 0 1 0.25 
849 0 0.25 0 0 0.75 0.2 
850 0 0.25 0 0 0.5 0.15 
851 0 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.1 
852 0 0.25 0 0 0 0.05 
853 0.25 0 0 0 1 0.25 
854 0.25 0 0 0 0.75 0.2 
855 0.25 0 0 0 0.5 0.15 
856 0.25 0 0 0 0.25 0.1 
857 1 0.25 10 0 10 0 0.05 
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Appendix 5. The Pairwise Comparisons of the Missions in 
terms of the Human Error Failure Consequence Probability 
and Severity Criteria using Fuzzy Set Theory 
Table A5.1. The pairwise comparisons of the missions in oil cargo handling in terms of human 
error failure consequence probability criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Approach Connection Start Steady Stripping Disconnection Departure 
& berthing UP rate 
Steady rate 0.5 1.0 slightly 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.8 moderately, 0.5 
strongly, equally equally equally, 0.2 fairly strongly, 
0.5 0.4 0.5 
absolutely slightly absolutely 
Table A5.2. The pairwise comparisons of the missions in oil cargo handling in terms of human 
error severity criteria usine fuzzy set theorv 
Approach Connection Start up Steady Stripping Disconnection Departure 
& berthing rate 
Steady rate 0.2 fairly, 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.5 moderately, 0.2 fairly, 
0.8 moderately, slightly, equally equally, 0.5 fairly 0.8 
strongly 0.2 fairly 0.2 0.3 strongly 
1 , moderately slightly 
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Appendix 6. The Pairwise Comparisons of the Steps in Each 
Mission in terms of Human Error Probability of Occurrence 
Criteria using Fuzzy Set Theory 
Table A6.1. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the approach and berthing mission In terms 
of human error probability of occurrence criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Berth Approach Ship Berth Line Final 
selection with escort positioning approach handling positioning 
tugs 
Berth 0.4 0.6 0.5 slightly, 1.0 equally 0.6 fairly, 0.3 fairly, 
approach strongly, moderately, 0.5 0.4 strongly 0.7 strongly 
0.6 0.4 fairly moderately 
absolutely 
Table A6.2. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the connection mission In terms of human 
error probability of occurrence criteria usine fuzzy set theory 
Pre-transfer Removal of Examination of Loading arms Alignment 
conference face plates o-rings connection check 
Loading arms 0.9 strongly, 0.5 0.6 slightly, 0.4 1.0 equally 1.0 equally 
connection 0.1 absolutely moderately, moderately 
0.5 fairly 
Table A6.3. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the start up mission in terms of human 
error probabilitV of occurrence criteria usine fuzzv set theorv 
Valve Valve Commencement All Observation Gradual 
operations operations of pumping by connections of loading increase of 
by the by the the initiating checked for arms now 
receiving initiating party leaks 
parity party 
All 0.9 0.9 0.6 strongly, 0.4 1.0 equally 1.0 slightly 0.4 
connections moderately, moderately, absolutely moderately, 
checked for 0.1 slightly 0.1 slightly 0.6 fairly 
leaks 
I I I I 11 
Table A6.4. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the steady rate mission in terms of human 
error probability of occurrence criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Gradual Continuous calculation and periodical verification 
increase of flow of the volume of transfer 
to steady rate 
Continuous calculation and 0.5 fairly, 0.5 1.0 equally 
periodical verification of the strongly 
volume of transfer I II 
Table A6.5. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the stripping mission in terms of human 
error probabilitv of occurrence criteria usinLy fuzzv set theorv 
Prior warning Closing valves Shutting down Closing valves 
slowly by the pump completely by the 
initiating party initiating party 
Prior warning 1.0 equally 0.5 slightly, 0.5 0.3 0.3 moderately, 0.7 
moderately moderately, fairly 
1 0.7 fairly 
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Table A6.6. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the disconnection mission In terms of 
human error probability of occurrence criteria using fuzzy set theorV 
Drain of Disconnection Disconnection Examination of Use of a 
lines of flanges of loading arms o-rings and plastic bag 
from the ship securing of face covering 
plates loading 
arms 
Examination 1.0 slightly 0.1 slightly, 0.9 0.1 slightly, 0.9 1.0 equally 0.7 fairly, 
of o-rings and moderately moderately 0.7 
securing of strongly 
face plates 
Table A6.7. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the departure mission in terms of human 
error probability of occurrence criteria usine fuzzv set theorv 
Ship lines let go Vessel pulled away from the wharf by assisting tugs 
Vessel pulled away from 0.4 moderately, 1.0 equally 
the wharf by assisting 0.6 fairly 
L- 
tugs 
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Appendix 7. The Pairwise Comparisons of the Steps in Each 
Mission in terms of the Human Error Failure Consequence 
Probability Criteria using Fuzzy Set Theory 
Table A7.1. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the approach and berthing mission In terms 
of human error failure consequence probability criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Berth Approach Ship Berth Line Final 
selection with escort positioning approach handling positioning 
tugs 
Approach 0.2 fairly, 1.0 equally 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.2 
with escort 0.8 strongly moderately, moderately, moderately, moderately, 
tugs 1 1 
0.9 slightly , 
0.9 slightly , 0.2 fairly , 0.8 
fairly 
Table A7.2. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the connection mission in terms of human 
error failure consequence Probabilitv criteria usin2 fuzzv set theorv 
Pre-transfer Removal of Examination of Loading arms Alignment 
conference face plates o-rings connection check 
Examination 0.2 fairly, 0.8 0.5 slightly, 1.0 equally 0.4 moderately, 1.0 slightly 
of o-rings strongly 0.5 0.6 fairly 
mo erately . 1 1 
Table A7.3. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the start up mission in terms of human 
error failure consequence iDrobabilitv criteria usina fuzzv set theorv 
Valve Valve Commencement All Observation Gradual 
operations operations of pumping by connections of loading increase of 
by the by the the initiating checked for arms flow 
receiving initiating party leaks 
parity party 
All 0.9 0.3 0.1 fairly, 0.9 1.0 equally 0.5 slightly, 0.5 
connections slightly, moderately, strongly 0.5 moderately, 
checked for 0.1 0.7 fairly moderately 0.5 fairly 
leaks moderately , I 1- 1 11 
Table A7.4. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the steady rate mission in terms or human 
error failure consequence probability criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Gradual Continuous calculation and periodical verification 
increase of flow of the volume of transfer 
to steady rate 
Continuous calculation and 1.0 moderately 1.0 equally 
periodical verification of the 
volume of transfer 
Table A7.5. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the stripping mission in terms of human 
error failure consequence probabilitv criteria usinLy fuzzv set theorv 
Prior warning Closing valves Shutting down Closing valves 
slowly by the pump completely by the 
initiating party initiating party 
Prior warning 1.0 equally 0.5 slightly, 0.5 0.7 slightly, 0.7 slightly, 0.3 
moderately 0.3 moderately moderately 
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Table A7.6. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the disconnection mission In terms of 
human error failure consequence probability criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Drain of Disconnection Disconnection Examination of Use of a 
lines of flanges of loading arms o-rings and plastic bag 
from the ship securing of face covering 
plates loading 
arms 
Drain of lines 1.0 equally 0.6 moderately, 0.6 moderately, 0.1 slightly, 0.9 0.8 
0.4 fairly 0.4 fairly moderately strongly, 
0.2 
absolutely 
Table A7.7. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the departure mission in terms of human 
error failure consequence probability criteria usina fuzzy set theory 
Ship lines let go Vessel pulled away from the wharf by assisting tugs 
Vessel pulled away from 0.4 moderately, 1.0 equally 
the wharf by assisting 0.6 fairly 
tugs I II 
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Appendix 8. The Pairwise Comparisons of the Steps in Each 
Mission in terms of the Human Error Severity Criteria using 
Fuzzy Set Theory 
Table A8.1. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the approach and berthing mission in terms 
of human error severity criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Berth Approach Ship Berth Line Final 
selection with escort positioning approach handling positioning 
tugs 
Approach 0.4 1.0 equally 0.8 fairly, 1.0 0.8 slightly, 0.8 
with escort strongly, 0.2 strongly moderately 0.2 strongly, 
tugs 0.6 moderately 0.2 
absolutely absolutely 
Table A8.2. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the connection mission in terms of human 
error severity criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Pre-transfer Removal of Examination of Loading arms Alignment 
conference face plates o-rings connection check 
Loading arms 1.0 slightly 0.7 slightly, 0.4 moderately, 1.0 equally 0.6 
connection 0.3 0.6 fairly moderately, 
moderately I 1 1 0.4 fairly 
Table A8.3. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the start up mission in terms of human 
error severity criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Valve Valve Commencement All Observation Gradual 
operations operations of pumping by connections of loading increase 
by the by the the initiating checked for arms of now 
receiving initiating party leaks 
parity party 
Gradual 0.9 slightly, 0.3 0.1 fairly, 0.9 0.4 slightly, 0.5 slightly, 1.0 
increase of 0.1 moderately, strongly 0.6 0.5 equally 
flow moderately 0.7 fairly moderately moderately 
Table A8.4. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the steady rate mission in terms of human 
error severity criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Gradual Continuous calculation and periodical verification 
increase of flow of the volume of transfer 
to steady rate 
Continuous calculation and 1.0 moderately 1.0 equally 
periodical verification of the 
volume of transfer 
Table A8.5. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the stripping mission in terms of human 
error severity criteria usina fuzzy set theory 
Prior warning Closing valves Shutting down Closing valves 
slowly by the pump completely by the 
initiating party initiating party 
Prior warning 1.0 equally 0.3 equally, 0.3 0.4 0.5 fairly, 0.5 
slightly moderately, strongly 
0.6 fairly 
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Table A8.6. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the disconnection mission In terms of 
human error severitv criteria usina fuzzv set theorv 
Drain of Disconnection Disconnection Examination of Use of a 
lines of flanges of loading arms o-rings and plastic bag 
from the ship securing of face covering 
plates loading 
arms 
Drain of lines 1.0 equally 0.1 slightly, 0.9 0.1 slightly, 0.9 0.6 moderately, 0.8 
moderately moderately 0.4 fairly strongly, 
0.2 
absolutely 
Table A8.7. The pairwise comparisons of the steps in the departure mission in terms of human 
error severity criteria using fuzzy set theory 
Ship lines let go Vessel pulled away from the wharf by assisting tugs 
Vessel pulled away from 0.4 moderately, 1.0 equally 
the wharf by assisting 0.6 fairly 
tugs I I 
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Appendix 9. The Evaluation of Each RCO based on Each 
Criterion and the Combined Belief Degrees of All Criteria 
by Expert I 
Table A9. 1. The evaluation of each RCO based on each cr iterion by Expe rt I 
I H, H2 H3 H4 HS 
RCO I el 0 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 
e2 0.2 0.7 0.1 0 0 
e3 0 0.1 0.6 0.3 0 
e4 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 
e5 0 0 0.2 0.3 0.5 
RCO 2 el 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
e2 - 0 0 0.6 0.2 0.2 
e3 0.1 0.1 0.8 0 0 
e4 0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0 
e5 1 0.4 0.3 0.3 0 0 
RCO 3 el 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 
e2 0.2 0.7 0.1 0 0 
e3 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 
e4 0 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 
e5 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 
RCO 4 el 0 0 0.3 0.1 0.6 
e2 0 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 
e3 0 0.1 0.7 0.2 0 
e4 0 0 0.3 0.7 0 
e5 0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 
RCO 5 el 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 
e2 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 
e3 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 
e4 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 
e5 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
RCO 6 el 10 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e2 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0 
e3 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e4 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0 
e5 0 0.1 0.9 0 0 
RCO 7 el 1 0 0 0 0 1.0 
e2 1.0 0 0 0 0 
e3 0 0 1.0 0 0 
e4 0 1.0 0 0 0 
e5 0 0 1.0 0 0 
RCO 8 el 1 0 0.9 0.1 0 0 
e2 0 0 0.1 0.9 0 
e3 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
e4 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 
e. 5 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 
RCO 9 el 1 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 
e2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0 
e3 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 0 
e4 0.8 0.2 0 0 0 
e5 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0 
RCO 10 el 0 0 0 I 0.1 0.9 
e2 0 10 1 0.1 0.1 0.8 
e3 0 10 1 0.1 0.2 0.7 
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e4 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
e5 0 0 0 0.1 0.9 
RCO 11 ei 0 0.1 0.9 0' 0 
eg 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
e3 0 0.1 0.9 0 0 
e4 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
e5 0 0 0.9 0.1 0 
RCO 12 ei 0 0 0.1 0.9 0 
e2 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.2 
e3 0 0 0.3 0.7 0 
e4 0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 
e5 0 0 0 1.0 0 
RCO 13 ei 1 0.1 0.9 0 0 0 
e 0.1 0.7 0.2 0 0 
e3 0.3 0.7 0 0 0 
ef 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 
e5 0 1.0 0 0 0 
RCO 14 ei 10 0 0 0.5 0.5 
e2 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.5 
e3 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.4 
e4 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 
e5 0 0 0 0.6 0.4 
RCO 15 ei 10 0 0 0.8 0.2 
e2 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
e3 0 0 0 1 0.7 0.3 
e4 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 
e. 5 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.2 
Table A9.2. The combined belief degrees of all criteria of each RCO 
bv ExDert 1 (%) 
H, H2 H3 H4 H5 
RCO 1 7.96 30.56 23.61 31.29 5.36 
RCO 2 1.62 24.90 58.31 7.93 7.23 
RCO 3 11.94 76.45 10.64 0.97 0 
RCO 4 0 0.43 50.89 21.13 27.55 
RCO 5 21.42 70.72 7.86 0 0 
RCO 6 0 12.03 80.36 7.60 0 
RCO 7 42.02 7.30 8.67 0 42.02 
RCO 8 0 44.61 11.77 43.62 0 
RCO 9 87.72 8.60 3.69 0 0 
RCO 10 0 0 4.0 8.0_ 88.07 
RCO 11 0 3.38 89.16 7.46 0 
RCO 12 0 0 8.26 84.93 6.81 
RCO 13 8.26 84.93 6.81 0 0 
RCO 14 0 0 4.48 44.53 50.99 
RCO 15 0 38.79 1 9.81 1 41.20 10.20 
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Appendix 10. The Evaluation of Each RCO based on Each 
Criterion and the Combined Belief Degrees of All Criteria 
by Experts 2-4 
Table AIO. I. The evaluation of each RCO based on each criterion by Expert 2 
H, H2 H3 H4 H5 
RCO 1 ei 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 
e2 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 
e3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
e4 0 0.4 0.6 0 0 
es 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
RCO 2 ei 0 0.4 0.5 0.1 0 
e2 0 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 
e3 0.2 0.2 0.6 0 0 
e4 0 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 
e5 0.4 0.4 0.2 0 0 
RCO 3 ei 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 
e2 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 
e3 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 
e4 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
e5 1 0.3 0.5 0.2 0 0 
RCO 4 ei 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
eg 0 0 0.9 0.1 0 
e3 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0 
e4 0 0 0.4 0.6 0 
e5 1 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.2 
RCO 5 ei 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 
e2 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
e3 0.1 0.6 0.3 0 0 
e4 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 
e5 10 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 
RCO 6 ei 10 0.1 0.7 0.2 0 
e2 0 0.2 0.6 0.2 0 
e3 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
e4 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e5 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 
RCO 7 ei 0 0 0 0.2 0.8 
e2 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 
e3 0 0 1.0 0 0 
e4 0 0.9 0.1 0 0 
e5 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
RCO 8 ei ,0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 
e2 0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 
e3 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 
e4 0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0 
e5 0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0 
RCO 9 ei , 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0 
e2 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 
e3 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 
e4 0.7 0.3 0 0 0 
e5 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 0 
RCO 10 ei 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 
e2 0 10 0.1 0.2 0.7 
e3 0 10 0.1 0.2 0.7 
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e4 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.7 
es 0 0 0 0.2 0.8 
RCO 11 ei 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
eg 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e3 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 
e4 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
es 0 0 0.9 0.1 0 
RCO 12 ei 0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 
e2 0 0 0.2 0.6 0.2 
e3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
e4 0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 
es 0 0 0.1 0.9 0 
RCO 13 ei 1 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 
e2 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 
e3 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 
e4 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 
es 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
RCO 14 ei 10 0 0.1 0.4 0.5 
e2 0 0 0 0.4 0.6 
e3 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 
e4 0 0 0.1 0.4 0.5 
es 0 0 0 0.8 0.2 
RCO 15 ei 0 0 0 0.7 0.3 
e2 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 
e3 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.2 
e4 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 
es 0 0 0.3 0.6 0.1 
Table A10.2. The combined belief degrees of all criteria of each RCO 
bv Exnert 2 M) 
H, H2 H3 H4 H5 
RCO 1 8.09 36.62 16.13 36.49 2.66 
RCO 2 2.0 20.55 65.99 7.95 3.51 
RCO 3 14.62 81.26 3.74 0.38 0 
RCO 4 0 0.91 51.47 15.78 31.84 
RCO 5 - 18.07 65.46 16.18 0.29 0 
RCO 6 0 11.65 72.61 15.74 0 
RCO 7 37.61 11.13 8.69 9.13 33.43 
RCO 8 0 39.45 11.55 45.18 3.82 
RCO 9 85.61 11.01 3.38 0 0 
RCO 10 0 0 4.33 25.04 70.63 
RCO 11 0 7.80 84.95 7.26 0 
RCO 12 0 0 13.59 75.49 10.92 
RCO 13 3.19 79.15 17.66 0 0 
RCO 14 0 0 4.47 40.28 55.25 
RCO 15 0 34.91 10.13 41.87 13.09 
Table A10.3. The evaluation of each RCO based on each criterion bv Exnert 3 
H, H2 H3 H4 H5 
RCO 1 ei 0 0.5 0.5 0 
e2 0.4 0.6 0 0 0 
3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
ef 0 0.5 0.5 0 
L- e5 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.7 
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RCO 2 ei 0 0.3 0.5 0.2 i 0 
e2 0 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 
e3 0 0.4 0.6 0 0 
e4 0 0.4 0.5 0.1 0 
es 0.4 0.4 0.2 0 0 
RCO 3 ei 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 
e2 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 
e3 0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0 
e4 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 
es 0.1 0.7 0.2 0 0 
RCO 4 ei 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
e2 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e3 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0 
e4 0 0.1 o. 8 0.1 0 
es 0 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 
RCO 5 ei 0.3 0.6 0.1 0 0 
e2 0.1 0.6 0.3 0 0 
e3 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 
e4 0.1 0.6 0.3 0 0 
es 0 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 
RCO 6 ei 1 0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0 
e2 0 0 1.0 0 0 
e3 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
e4 0 0 1.0 0 0 
es 0 0.4 0.6 0 0 
RCO 7 ei 10 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
e2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0 
e3 0 0 0.6 0.4 0 
e4 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0 
es 0 0 0.6 0.4 0 
RCO 8 ei 10 0.6 0.3 0.1 0 
eg 0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0 
e3 0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0 
e4 0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0 
es 0 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 
RCO 9 ei 1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0 0 
eg 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 
e3 0.4 0.6 0 0 0 
e4 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 
es 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 0 
RCO 10 ei 10 0 0 0.5 0.5 
e 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.7 
e3 0 0 1 0.1 0.4 0.5 
e4 0 1 
_O 
1 0.1 0.2 0.7 
e. 5 1 0 0 0 0 1.0 
RCO 11 ei 1 0 0 0.9 0.1 0 
e2 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e3 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
e4 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e5 0 0.3 0.6 0.1 0 
RCO 12 ei 10 0 0.3 0.6 0.1 
e2 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.2 
e3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
e4 0 0 0 0.8 0.2 
e5 0 0 0 1.0 0 
KCO 13 RCO 13 1 ei 10 1.0 0 0 0 
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e2 
e3 
e4 
e5 
0 
0 
0 
0.2 
0.5 
0.7 
0.5 
0.7 
0.5 
0.3 
0.5 
0.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
RCO 14 el 1 0 0 0.2 0.5 1 o. 3 
e2 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
e3 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 
e4 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
e5 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 
RCO 15 el 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 
e2 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 
e3 0 0 0 1.0 
0 
e4 0 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 
e5 0 0 0.3 0.6 0. E: 
J 
Table A10.4. The combined belief degrees of all criteria of each RCO 
bv Exnert 3 (%) 
H, H2 H3 H4 H5 
RCO 1 16.09 28.96 28.49 24.14 2.32 
RCO 2 1.16 17.08 62.41 15.81 3.53 
RCO 3 6.87 81.72 11.04 0.37 0 
RCO 4 0 1 5.51 51.67 11.72 31.11 
RCO 5 15.20 64.14 20.38 0.28 --0 RCO 6 0 10.90 81.83 7.28 --0 RCO 7 40.72 4.78 14.75 7.51 32.25 
RCO 8 0 34.84 25.38 39.78 0 
RCO 9 78.65 17.84 3.5 0 0 
RCO 10 0 0 4.41 29.86 65.73 
RCO 11 0 6.50 86.19 7.31 0 
RCO 12 0 0 16.41 71.82 11.78 
RCO 13 0.54 77.13 22.32 0 0 
RCO 14 0 0 12.25 26.97 60.78 
RCO 15 0 39.38 5.66 35.05 1 
Tahla AI (I At Tha- Pwabiatinn nf i-%phRrn hnwd nn estch criterion bv Exnert 4 
H, H2 H3 H4 H5 
RCO 1 ei 0 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 
e., 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0 
e3 , 
0 0 0.7 0. 0 
e4 1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0 0 
e5 1 0 0 0 0.2 0.8 
RCO 2 ei 0 0.3 0.7 0 0 
e2 0 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 
e3 0 0.4 0.6 0 0 
e4 0 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 
e5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0 0 
RCO 3 ei 10 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 
eg 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 
e3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
e4 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 0 
e5 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
RCO 4 ei 0 0 1 0.1 1 0.2 0.7 
e2 0 0 1 0.8 ý ýO. 2 0 
e3 0 0.1 1 0.7 1 0.2 0 
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e4 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
es 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
RCO 5 ei 0.1 0.6 0.3 0 0 
e2 0.1 0.5 0.4 0 0 
e3 0 0.6 0.4 0 0 
e4 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
es 0 0.7 0.2 0.1 0 
RCO 6 ei 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e2 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
e3 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
e4 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 
es 0 0.2 
5.6 0.2 0 
RCO 7 ei 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
e2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 0 
e3 0 0 0.5 0.3 0.2 
ef 0.8 0.1 0.1 0 
0 
es 0 0 0.6 0.3 0.1 
RCO 8 ei 0 0.3 0.5 0.2 0 
e2 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 
e3 0 0.4 0.4 0.2 0 
e4 0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0 
es 0 0.6 0.2 1 0.2 0 
RCO 9 ei 1 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 
eg 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 
e3 0.5 0.5 0 0 0 
ef 0.9 0.1 0 0 0 
es 0.5 0.4 0.1 0 0 
RCO 10 1 ei 1 0 0 0 0.3 1 0.7 
e2 0 0 0 0.2 
_O. 
8 
e3 0 0 0.1 0.4- 2.5 
e4 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.7 
es 0 0 0 0.2 0.8 
RCO 11 ei 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e2 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
e3 0 0.7 0.3 0 0 
e4 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
es 10 0.2 0.7 0.1 0 
RCO 12 ei 0 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 
eg 0 0 0 0.8 0.2 
e3 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 
ef 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.2 
es 0 0 0 1.0 0 
RCO 13 ei 0 0.8 0.2 0 0 
e2 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
e3 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
e4 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
es 1 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 
RCO 14 ei 0 0 0.1 0.6 0.3 
e2 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
e3 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 
e4 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.8 
es 1 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 
RCO 15 ei 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 
e2 0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0 
e3 0 0 0 1.0 10 
e4 0 0.6 0.3 0.1 10 
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II e5 101010.2 1 0.5 1 0.3 1 
Table A10.6. The combined belief degrees of all criteria of each RCO 
bv EXDert 4 M) 
H, H2 H3 H4 115 
RCO 1 14.38 19.35 28.71 30.80 6.75 
RCO 2 0.84 13.76 73.30 8.09 4.01 
RCO 3 3.92 76.64 14.07 5.37 0 
RCO 4 0 0.44 52.41 20.84 26.30 
RCO 5 7.06 58.21 34.46 0.28 0 
RCO 6 0 3.66 83.77 12.57 0 
RCO 7 40.51 4.75 14.12 6.60 34.02 
RCO 8 0 16.04 33.38 50.58 0 
RCO 9 74.14 22.27 3.59 0 0 
RCO 10 0 0 0.94 21.53 77.53 
RCO 11 0 10.85 81.65 7.51 0 
RCO 12 0 0 9.23 79.35 11.41 
RCO 13 0.55 66.58 32.87 0 0 
RCO 14 0 0 7.92 30.79 61.30 
RCO 15 0 29.64 15.23 25.84 29.30 
A-82 
The Development ofSafety and Security Assessment Techniques and their Application to Port Operations 
Appendix 11. The Utility Levels of the Evaluation Grades 
Expressed by Experts 2-4 
Table A11.1. The utility levels of the evaluation grades expressed by Expert 2 using the belief 
de2ree method 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
H, 1-0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H2 0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H3 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 0 0 0 0 
H4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.6 
_0.2 
0 
-H5 o o o o o o o o o o 1.0 
Table A11.2. The utility levels of the evaluation grades expressed by Expert 3 using the belief 
degree method 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
H, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H2 0 0 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 
H3 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 
H4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0 
Hs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1. 
Table A11.3. The utility levels of the evaluation grades expressed by Expert 4 using the belief 
deuee method 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
H, 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H2 0 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
H3 0 0 0 0 0.2 0.7 0.1 0 0 0 0 
H4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.8 0.1 0 
H5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 01 1.0 
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Appendix 12. Standard Normal Probability Distribution 
Table for Positive Z Values 
z 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0.0 0.5000 0.5040 0.5080 0.5120 0.5160 0.5199 0.5239 0.5279 0.5319 0.5359 
0.1 0.5398 0.5438 0.5478 0.5517 0.5557 0.5596 0.5636 0.5675 0.5714 0.5753 
0.21 0.5793 0.5832 1 0.5871 0.5910 0.5948 0.5987 1 0.6026 0.6064 0.6103 1 0.6141 
0.3 1 0.6179 0.6217 0.6255 0.6293 0.6331 0.6368 0.6406 0.6443 0.6480 0.6517 
0.4 0.6554 0.6591 0.6628 0.6664 0.6700 0.6736 0.6772 0.6808 0.6844 0.6879 
0.5 0.6915 0.6950 0.6985 0.7019 0.7054 0.7088 0.7123 0.7157 0.7190 0.7224 
0.6 0.7257 0.7291 0.7324 0.7357 0.7389 0.7422 0.7454 0.7486 0.7517 0.7549 
0.71 0.7580 0.7611 0.7642 0.7673 0.7704 0.7734 0.7764 0.7794 0.7823 0.7852 
0.8 0.7881 0.7910 0.7939 0.7967 0.7995 0.8023 0.8051 0.8078 0.8106 0.8133 
0.9 0.8159 0.8186 0.8212 0.8238 0.8264 0.8289 0.8315 0.8340 0.8365 0.8389 
1.0 0.8413 0.8438 0.8461 0.8485 0.8508 0.8531 0.8554 0.8577 0.8599 0.8621 
1.1 1 0.8643 0.8665 0.8686 0.8708 0.8729 0.8749 0.8770 0.8790 0.8810 0.8830 
1.2 0.8849 0.8869 0.8888 0.8907 0.8925 0.8944 0.8962 0.8980 0.8997 0.9015 
1.3 0.9032 0.9049 0.9066 0.9082 0.9099 0.9115 0.9131 0.9147 0.9162 0.9177 
1.4 0.9192 0.9207 0.9222 0.9236 0.9251 0.9265 0.9279 0.9292 0.9306 0.9319 
1.5 1 0.9332 0.9345 0.9357 0.9370 0.9382 0.9394 0.9406 0.9418 0.9429 0.9441 
1.61 0.9452 0.9463 0.9474 0.9484 0.9495 0.9505 0.9515 0.9525 0.9535 0.9545 
1.7 0.9554 0.9564 0.9573 0.9582 0.9591 1 0.9599 0.9608 0.9616 0.9625 0.9633 
1.8 0.9641 0.9649 0.9656 0.9664 0.9671 0.9678 0.9686 0.9693 0.9699 0.9706 
1.9 0.9713 0.9719 0.9726 0.9732 0.9738 0.9744 0.9750 0.9756 0.9761 0.9767 
2.01 0.9772 0.9778 0.9783 0.9788 0.9793 0.9798 0.9803 0.9808 0.9812 0.9817 
2.1 0.9821 0.9826 0.9830 0.9834 0.9838 0.9842 0.9846 0.9850 0.9854 0.9857 
2.2 0.9861 0.9864 0.9868 0.9871 0.9875 0.9878 0.9881 0.9884 0.9887 0.9890 
2.3 0.9893 0.9896 0.9898 0.9901 0.9904 0.9906 0.9909 0.9911 0.9913 0.9916 
2.4 1 0.9918 0.9920 0.9922 0.9925 0.9927 0.9929 0.9931 0.9932 0.9934 0.9936 
2.5 0.9938 0.9940 0.9941 0.9943 0.9945 0.9946 0.9948 0.9949 0.9951 0.9952 
2.6 0.9953 0.9955 0.9956 0.9957 0.9959 0.9960 0.9961 0.9962 0.9963 0.9964 
2.7 0.9965 0.9966 0.9967 0.9968 0.9969 0.9970 0.9971 0.9972 0.9973 0.9974 
2.8 1 0.9974 0.9975 0.9976 0.9977 0.9977 0.9978 0.9979 1 0.9979 0.9980 0.9981 
2.9 0.9981 0.9982 0.9982 0.9983 0.9984 0.9984 0.9985 0.9985 0.9986 0.9986 
3. 
1 
0.9987 0.9990 0.9993 0.9995 0.9997 0.9998 0.9998 0.9999 0.9999 1 1.0000 
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Appendix 13. DPMO-To-Process Sigma Conversion Table 
Process Defects Per Million Opportunities 
Sigma 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 
0.0 933,200 931,900 930,600 929,200 927,900 926,500 925,100 923,600 922,200 920,700 
0.1 919,200 917,700 916,200 914,700 913,100 911,500 909,900 908,200 906,600 904,900 
0.2 903,200 901,500 899,700 898,000 896,200 894,400 892,500 890,700 888,800 886,900 
0.3 884,900 883,000 881,000 879,000 877,000 874,900 872,900 870,800 868,600 866,500 
0.4 864,300 862,100 859,900 857,700 855,400 853,100 850,800 848,500 846J00 843,800 
0.5 841,300 838,900 836,500 834,000 831,500 828,900 826,400 823,800 821,200 818,600 
0.6 815,900 813,300 810,600 807,800 805,100 802,300 799,500 796,700 793,900 791,000 
0.7 788,100 785,200 782,300 779,400 776,400 773,400 770,400 767,300 764,200 761,100 
0.8 758,000 754,900 751,700 748,600 745,400 742,200 738,900 735,700 732,400 729,100 
0.9 725,700 722,400 719,000 715,700 712,300 708,800 705,400 701,900 698,500 695,000 
1.0 691,500 687,900 684,400 680,800 677,200 673,600 6709000 666,400 662,800 659,100 
1.1 655,400 651,700 648,000 644,300 640,600 636,800 1 633,100 629,300 625,500 621,700 
1.2 617,900 614,100 610,300 606,400 602,600 598,700 594,800 591,000 587,100 583,200 
1.3 579,300 575,300 571,400 567,500 563,600 559,600 555,700 551,700 547,800 543,800 
1.4 539,800 535,900 531,900 527,900 523,900 519,900 516,000 512,000 508,000 504,000 
1.5 500,000 496,000 492,000 488,000 484,000 480,100 476,100 472,100 468,100 464,100 
1.6 460,200 456,200 452,200 448,300 444,300 440,400 436,400 432,500 428,600 424,700 
1.7 420,700 416,800 412,900 409,000 405,200 401,300 397,400 393,600 389,700 385,900 
1.8 382,100 378,300 374,500 370,700 366,900 363,200 359,400 355,700 352,000 348,300 
1.9 344,600 340,900 337,200 333,600 330,000 326,400 322,800 319,200 315,600 312,100 
2.0 308,500 305,000 301,500 298,100 2949600 291,200 287,700 284,300 281,000 2779600 
2.1 274,300 270,900 267,600 264,300 261,100 257,800 254,600 251,400 248,300 245,100 
2.2 242,000 238,900 235,800 232,700 229,600 226,600 223,600 220,600 217,700 214,800 
2.3 211,900 209,000 206,100 203,300 200,500 197,700 194,900 192,200 189,400 186,700 
2.4 184,100 181,400 178,800 176,200 173,600 171,100 168,500 166,000 163,500 161,100 
2.5 158,700 156,200 153,900 151,500 149,200 146,900 144,600 142,300 140,100 137,900 
2.6 135,700 133,500 131,400 129,200 127,100 125,100 123,000 121,000 119,000 117,000 
2.7 115,100 113,100 111,200 109,300 107,500 105,600 103,800 102,000 100,300 98,530 
1 
2.8 969800 95,100 93,420 91,760 90,120 88,510 86,920 85,340 83,790 82,260 
2.9 80,760 79,270 77,800 76,360 74,930 739530 72,150 70,780 69,440 68,110 
3.0 66,810 65,520 64,260 63,010 61,780 60,570 59,380 58,210 57,050 55,920 
3.1 54,800 53,700 52,620 51,550 50,500 49,470 48,460 47,460 46,480 45,510 
3.2 44,570 43,630 42,720 41,820 40,930 40,060 399200 38,360 37,540 36,730 
3.3 35,930 35,150 34,380 33,620 32,880 32,160 31,440 30,740 30,050 29,380 
3.4 28,720 28,070 27,430 26,800 26,190 259590 25,000 249420 23,850 23,300 
3.5 22,750 22,220 21,690 21,180 20,680 20,180 199700 19,230 18,760 18,310 
3.6 17,860 17,430 179000 16,590 16,180 15,780 15,390 15,000 14,630 14,260 
3.7 13,900 13,550 13,210 12,870 129550 12,220 11,910 11,600 11,300 11,010 
3.8 10,720 109440 10,170 9,903 9,642 9,387 9,137 8,894 89656 8,424 
3.9 8,198 7,976 7,760 7,549 7,344 7,143 6,947 6,756 6,569 6,387 
4.0 6,210 6,037 5,868 5,703 5,543 5,386 5,234 5.085 49940 4,799 
4.1 4,661 4,527 4,397 4,269 4,145 4,025 3,907 3,793 3,681 39573 
4.2 3,467 3,364 3,264 3,167 3,072 2,980 2,890 2,803 2,718 2,635 
4.3 2,555 2,477 2,401 2,327 2,256 2,186 2,118 2,052 1,988 1,926 
1,866 1,807 1,750 1,695 1,641 1,589 1,538 1,489 1,44T 19395 
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4.5 1,350 1,306 1,264 1,223 1,183 1,144 1,107 1,070 1,035 1,001 
4.6 968 936 904 874 845 816 789 762 736 711 
4.7 687 664 641 619 598 577 557 538 519 501 
4.8 483 467 450 434 419 404 390 376 362 350 
4.9 337 325 302 291 280 270 242 
5.0 233 224 216 208 200 193 185 179 172 165 
5.1 159 153 147 142 136 131 126 121 117 112 
5.2 108 104 100 96 92 88 85 82 78 75 
5.3 72 70 67 64 62 59 57 54 52 50 
5.4 48 46 44 42 41 39 37 36 34 33 
5.5 32 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 
5.6 21 20 19 18 17 17 16 15 15 14 
5.7 13 13 12 12 11 11 10 10 9 9 
5.8 9 8 8 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 
5.9 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 
6.0 -774 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2 2 
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